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Se refiere a:

**08ABR82 – (13ABR 0929Z) USELondres a State Department.** (Secretary's Meeting with Prime Minister Thatcher April 8:  
Falkland Islands crisis)  
*corrected memcon; redacted*  
(Margaret Thatcher Foundation/US State Department) (desclasificado 2001)

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FM USDEL SECRETARY IN LONDON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6691  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

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FOR S/S-BREMER ONLY


E.O. 12065: RDS-1 4/12/12 (HAIG, ALEXANDER M. JR.)  
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER  
          THATCHER APRIL 8: FALKLAND ISLANDS CRISIS

REF: LONDON 7892

FOLLOWING IS CLEARED MEMCON OF SECRETARY'S APRIL 8  
MEETING WHICH REPLACES DRAFT CONTAINED IN LONDON 7892.

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THE SECRETARY BEGAN BY MEETING AT 6:00 P.M. APRIL 8  
AT NO. 10 DOWNING STREET WITH PRIME MINISTER THATCHER TO  
DISCUSS THE FALKLAND ISLANDS CRISIS. ALSO PRESENT  
WERE FOREIGN SECRETARY FRANCIS PYM, PRIVATE SECRETARY JOHN  
COLES AND U.S. CHARGE EDWARD STREATOR.

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
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8. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE WAS CERTAIN THE PRIME MINISTER KNEW WHERE THE PRESIDENT STOOD. WE ARE NOT IMPARTIAL. CERTAINLY WE WERE NOT IMPARTIAL ON THE UNRESOLUTION AND THE PRESIDENT WAS NOT IMPARTIAL IN HIS TELEPHONE CALL TO GALTIERI. HE SAID HE DID NOT NEED TO ELABORATE PRESIDENT REAGAN'S FEELINGS TOWARDS THE PRIME MINISTER. THE SPECIAL FRIENDSHIP OF THE PRIME MINISTER OVER FIFTEEN MONTHS WAS DEEPLY APPRECIATED; THERE IS NO ISSUE ON WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER HAD NOT BACKED THE U.S.

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9. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT WE FACE A CRITICAL COMMON PROBLEM: "WE MUST DO ALL WE CAN TO STRENGTHEN YOU AND YOUR GOVERNMENT."

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[REDACTED]

THE SECRETARY ALSO SAID THAT DELAYS HAD BEEN MANIPULATED IN BUENOS AIRES. FOR EXAMPLE, THE ARGENTINES HAD STONEWALLED ON THE ISSUE OF SOVEREIGNTY. MOREOVER, THE PRESIDENT HAD BEEN KEPT WAITING WHEN HE TELEPHONED TO SPEAK TO GALTIERI. WHEN THE PRESIDENT WAS ABLE TO GET IN TOUCH WITH THE PRESIDENT OF ARGENTINA, GALTIERI USED THE SAME TALKING POINTS EARLIER USED BY THE GOA WITH OUR AMBASSADOR TO ARGENTINA. IN THE SECRETARY'S VIEW THE GOA OPERATION HAD BEEN PLANNED FOR MONTHS.

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11. THE SECRETARY SAID WE WERE WATCHING THE ARGENTINE SITUATION CLOSELY. THE ARGENTINES HAD BEEN ARROGANTLY CONFIDENT THAT THE U.K. WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO CHALLENGE THE INVASION AND THUS THEY WERE NOT DETERRED. THE SECRETARY

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ALSO OBSERVED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE BEGINNING TO POSITION THEMSELVES FOR MISCHIEF. AT THE SAME TIME, HE SAID THAT THE INCUMBENT PRESIDENT OF ARGENTINA IS IN SOME JEOPARDY AND WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY SOMEONE MORE INTRANSIGENT IF A CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT OCCURRED IN ARGENTINA AS A RESULT OF THIS CRISIS. THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER HAD TOLD THE SECRETARY THAT EVERYTHING WAS NEGOTIABLE. THE SECRETARY HAD RESPONDED THAT HE WOULD NOT GO TO BUENOS AIRES IF HE WERE GOING TO BE TOLD THE SAME THINGS AS PREVIOUSLY. THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER HAD MADE IT CLEAR HE WANTED THE SECRETARY TO COME. THE SECRETARY SAID WE WOULD NOT ACCEPT A CHANGE IN STATUS QUO BY FORCE. THE SECRETARY CONTINUED, WE HAVE A WINDOW NOW, WE BELIEVE. WHEN THE BRITISH FLEET REACHES THE 50TH PARALLEL IT WILL BECOME AN EMOTIONAL ISSUE IN BOTH U.K. AND ARGENTINA AND PROGRESS THEREAFTER WILL BE DIFFICULT. SIMILARLY, THE OAS, WITH ITS THIRD WORLD PROBLEMS, WILL NOT BE OBJECTIVE WHEN IT MEETS AND ULTIMATELY WILL FORM AN ANTI-COLONIALIST CONSENSUS. THE SECRETARY RECALLED THAT THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER HAD SAID HE HAD TWO OPTIONS: THE OAS AND THE SOVIET UNION, AND WOULD USE THEM. WHILE HE DIDN'T WANT TO OVERDRAMATIZE, THE ARGENTINES WOULD BE STRENGTHENED IN THEIR MACHO BY THE OAS. EVEN IN THE U.K. HE SAID, THE SITUATION WILL BECOME MORE DIFFICULT WITH HEAVY EXPENDITURES OF RESOURCES.

12. THE SECRETARY SAID HE VIEWED THE NEXT 72 HOURS AS VERY IMPORTANT IN ARGENTINA. WHILE WE NEED TO DEMAND WITHDRAWAL AND ACHIEVE IT, WE NEED TO DO IT BY MONDAY (4/12/82). LONDON WAS CHOSEN TO VISIT FIRST BECAUSE THE BRITISH ARE OUR CLOSEST FRIENDS AND ALLIES AND WE WISHED TO START DISCUSSIONS WITH THEM; IT WAS POINTLESS TO GO TO BUENOS AIRES FIRST AND LISTEN TO MACHO RHETORIC

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WITHOUT A FUNDAMENTAL FEEL FOR BRITAIN'S LIMITS. AND THE SECRETARY SAID HE WANTED TO BE ABLE TO SAY HOW STRONG U.S. VIEWS ARE. HE HOPED TO BE ABLE TO FORCE A WITHDRAWAL.

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
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HE ADDED, "WE AGREE WITH WHAT YOU ARE DOING, ALTHOUGH WE WANT TO AVOID A WAR."



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14. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE DID NOT FEAR A MAJOR U.S. INVOLVEMENT, BUT IF THE BRITISH CARRIED OUT A MILITARY ACTION HE COULD ENVISAGE SOVIET MILITARY INVOLVEMENT. HE FORESAW THAT THE BRITISH COULD SUCCEED IN MILITARY TERMS IN A LIMITED WAY. HOWEVER, THE ARGENTINES WOULD GO INTO PORT AND LAND-BASED AIR WOULD BECOME A PROBLEM.



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
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15. THE SECRETARY ASKED WHAT PRESSURES BRITAIN COULD BRING TO BEAR, NOTING THAT EUROPE KNOWS THAT THE REPUTATION OF THE WEST IS AT STAKE. THE U.S. HAD STOPPED MILITARY EXPORTS. THE PRIME MINISTER RESPONDED THAT THE ARGENTINES CAN FEED THEMSELVES; HOWEVER, THEY HAVE NO CREDIT WORTHINESS LEFT. IT WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO BORROW MORE ON THE EURO DOLLAR MARKET. THEY MIS-CALCULATED IN HER VIEW AND SHE SAID SHE WANTED TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM BY DEMOCRATIC MEANS. TO DATE BRITAIN WAS GETTING A LOT OF HELP BECAUSE MOST REALIZED THAT THE WEST IS ON TRIAL.

16. IN RESPONSE TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S QUESTIONS ABOUT GALTIERI, THE SECRETARY SAID HE IS REPUTED TO BE A RELIGIOUS MAN AND SOMETHING OF A DRINKER. SHE HAD A REPUTATION AS WELL FOR BEING A "TOUGH GUY" AND A POKER

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PLAYER. THAT IS WHY THERE MAY BE A WINDOW NOW. HE WILL UP THE ANTE IF FORCED AND HE WILL CONTINUE THE STRUGGLE EVEN IF HE WNT SURVIVE. HIS FLEET CAN BE DAMAGED SEVERELY AND THE ISLANDS PUT IN A COCOON. BUT LANDING ON THE BIG ISLAND WOULD BE VERY COSTLY AND IT WILL PUT THE POPULATION IN JEOPARDY. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS ONCE ENGAGEMENT STARTS IT WILL BECOME AN INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT BURDEN TO PROTECT PRINCIPLE. PEOPLE WILL BEGIN TO ASK QUESTIONS LIKE WHY THEY ARE MAKING SUCH A SACRIFICE FOR A THOUSAND SHEEP HERDERS. U.S. OPINION NOW SUPPORTS THE PRINCIPLED POSITION BRITAIN HAS TAKEN BUT WE CANNOT BE SURE IT WILL LAST TOO LONG IF THE ISSUE IS NOT SETTLED.

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18. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WANTED TO FIND SOME APPROACH THAT PROTECTED PRINCIPLE AND ACHIEVED A SUCCESS BEFORE THERE IS A BACKLASH. THE THATCHER GOVERNMENT HAD TO BE STRENGTHENED AND IF SO, WE WILL ALL COME OUT BETTER.

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[REDACTED] THE SECRETARY SAID THE HOPE WAS TO WORK FOR WITHDRAWAL IN SUCH A WAY THAT GALTIERI IS NOT TOPPLED AND REPLACED BY SOMEONE MORE RIGID. HE EMPHASIZED WITHDRAWAL OF MILITARY AND SECURITY RELATED FORCES; TO GET THAT STEP HE THOUGHT THE ARGENTINES NEED TO BE CONVINCED THAT THEY ARE NOT LOSING FACE IN THE PROCESS. AT THE SAME TIME, THERE MUST BE A VICTORY FOR PRINCIPLE.

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19. THE SECRETARY OUTLINED A THREE-STEP APPROACH INVOLVING WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES, RESTORATION OF ADMINISTRATION AND NEGOTIATIONS ON NEXT STEPS. THE TOPIC OF SOVEREIGNTY WOULD ARISE.

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[REDACTED] THE SECRETARY SAW THE NEED TO AVOID A PRIORI JUDGEMENTS; IT WAS NECESSARY TO GO BACK TO NEGOTIATIONS.

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20. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT IF IN THE FUTURE FREEDOM OF CHOICE CAN BE ASSURED AND IF THE FORCES ARE WITHDRAWN AS A FIRST STEP AND IF CHANGE IN LOCAL AUTHORITY IS BROUGHT ABOUT IMMEDIATELY SOME PROGRESS MIGHT BE POSSIBLE.

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
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
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22. THE MEETING ADJOURNED FOR DINNER.HAIG

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