

ACLARACION DE www.radarmalvinas.com.ar

El siguiente documento se encuentra en el sitio

<http://www.archives.gov>

en donde usted puede leerlo directamente en su formato original y acceder al resto del sitio.

Copyright © 2001 United States National Archives

Se refiere a:

30ABR82 0527Z – USEBue a Sec Estado. Postura de Galtieri ante el fin de la mediación.

(US National Archives) (desclasificado 2001)

A efectos de preservarlo como documento histórico para el caso en que el archivo original o el sitio que lo contiene no figurasen más en internet, a continuación se ha realizado una copia.



**NATIONAL
ARCHIVES**

UNCLASSIFIED

E213
Page: 1

PAGE 01 BUENOS 02640 300558Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 (AS-01 NSCE-00)/000 W
-----107572 300646Z /12

Z 300527Z APR 82 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 3485

BUENOS AIRES 2640
DECAPTIONED

RELEASED IN FULL

E.O. 12065: RDS-2 4/30/02 (SHLAUDEMAN, HARRY W.) OR-M
TAGS: PBOR, MILI, UK, FA, AR
SUBJ: FALKLANDS CRISIS: PRESPECTIVE US MEASURES

REF: GILLESPIE/KING SECURE TELEPHONE CALL

1. ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING RECEIPT OF SUBJECT PHONE CALL, I ASKED TO SEE
PRESIDENT GALTIERI AND WAS RECEIVED AT MIDNIGHT. ARMA
ACCOMPANIED ME AS HE HAS THROUGHOUT THESE CRITICAL MEETINGS.

2. I TOLD GALTIERI THAT WE CAME WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS
AND WITH THE ONLY PRUPOSE OF SEEING WHAT WE COULD DO TO
HEAD OFF A FATAL CONFRONTATION. I POINTED OUT TO THE
PRESIDENT THAT WE HAD NOT RECEIVED AN ADEQUATE RESPONSE
TO OUR PROPOSAL AND THAT WE WOULD ANNOUNCE TOMORROW
SEVERAL MEASURES AGAINST ARGENTINA. DURING MORE THAN
AN HOUR'S CONVERSATION, HE DEMONSTRATED NO GIVE WHATSOEVER
ON THE PROPOSAL.

3. I REPEATEDLY ASKED HIM WHAT HE SAW AS A WAY OUT OF
THIS IMPASSE. HIS RESPONSE WAS, AS MIGHT BE EXPECTED,
THAT THERE SHOULD BE A STAND DOWN TO GIVE AN OPPORTUNITY
FOR NEGOTIATIONS. I JUST AS REPEATEDLY POINTED OUT

PAGE 02 BUENOS 02640 300558Z

TO HIM THAT SUCH A BACK OFF WOULD GIVE ARGENTINA THE
VICTORY IT SOUGHT.

4. AT THE END OF OUR CONVERSATION, AND ON MY OWN
INITIATIVE, I SUGGESTED TO GALTIERI THAT THE GOA
MIGHT ANNOUNCE UNILATERALLY A WITHDRAWAL OF ITS TROOPS

Page: 1

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Page: 2

[REDACTED]

FROM THE MALVINAS AS A FIRST STEP TOWARD A PEACEFUL SOLUTION AND AS A GESTURE OF GOOD FAITH. HE SEEMED TO TAKE THIS SUGGESTION SERIOUSLY, WROTE IT DOWN, BUT SAID AGAIN, AS HE HAD SEVERAL TIMES BEFORE, THAT HE WAS ONLY ONE OF THREE WHO MADE THESE DECISIONS.

5. I RECOMMEND MOST STRONGLY THAT WE NOT AT NOT ANNOUNCE THE MEASURES CONTEMPLATED UNTIL I HAVE HAD A CHANCE TO FOLLOW UP WITH GALTIERI TOMORROW MORNING. I THINK THERE IS STILL A CHANCE, ALTHOUGH A SLIGHT ONE, THAT WE CAN HOLD THESE PEOPLE OFF.

6. BOTH ARMA AND I (AND GALTIERI PARTICULARLY LISTENED TO THE FORMER) BORE DOWN VERY HEAVILY ON THE ABSOLUTE NECESSITY FOR ARGENTINA NOT REPEAT NOT TO TAKE THE FIRST OFFENSIVE ACTION. GALTIERI SAID THAT HE HAD ALREADY STOPPED SUCH ACTIONS THREE TIMES IN THE LAST FEW DAYS, BUT INDICATED THAT HE COULD NOT DO SO FOR MUCH LONGER. HE MADE A POINT, AS WE ALL KNOW, THAT THE NAVY IS HUNGRY FOR ACTION. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE ARGENTINES PLAN TO RE-SUPPLY THE ISLANDS TOMORROW (APRIL 30) BY AIR ESCORTED BY MILITARY AIR CRAFT.

7. GALTIERI SEEMED TO ME AND TO ARMA ANXIOUS TO FIND A WAY OUT WITHIN THE VERY TIGHT CONSTRAINTS IN WHICH HE OPERATES. HE SAID AGAIN THAT ARGENTINA

[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 BUENOS 02640 300558Z

WOULD NOT BE THE FIRST ONE TO FIRE AND EMPHASIZED TO US THAT HE HAS SPENT CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL CAPITAL IN PREVENTING THE ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES FROM GOING ON THE OFFENSIVE. HE CLOSED THE CONVERSATION BY PROMISING TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH ME, PARTICULARLY ON THE IDEA OF A UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL FROM THE MALVINAS. I THINK THAT WE MAY HAVE GOTTEN THROUGH TO HIM AND IF WE ARE ABLE TO OFFER HIM A LITTLE TIME THAT WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO MOVE FORWARD.

SHLAUDEMAN

[REDACTED]

NN
<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Page: 2

UNCLASSIFIED