

# **Doing Windows**

## **Non-Traditional Military Responses to Complex Emergencies**

**Bradd C. Hayes  
Jeffrey I. Sands**





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# Contents

Preface .....	v
Executive Summary .....	vi
List of Figures .....	xx
List of Tables .....	xxii
1 Introduction .....	1
2 Promoting Relief <i>with</i> Development .....	17
3 Operational Sectors: Issues and Strategies .....	35
4 Understanding and Using SIAM .....	165
5 The Generic, Baseline SIAM Influence Net Models .....	185
6 Conclusions .....	199
Appendix A: Workshops .....	259
Appendix B: Peace Operations Task List .....	277
Appendix C: SIAM Influence Nets .....	303
Bibliography .....	359
Glossary .....	375

# Preface

This volume was first published by U.S. Naval War College's Center for Naval Warfare Studies as the final report of a project undertaken for the Joint Warfare Analysis Center. It examines how military complex contingency operations can be executed in a way that supports long-term political objectives—the establishment of civil stability and a durable peace. The report also examines the utility of the Situational Influence Assessment Module (SIAM) in training and planning for inter-agency responses to complex emergencies.

Complex emergencies will remain a permanent feature of the world's security environment, and the military will continue to be involved in them. Getting that involvement "right" is a matter of national security that goes beyond relieving the immediate suffering of victimized populations. This volume provides an overview of the issues, offers recommendations concerning where and when the military should get involved, and discusses what the military should do when national leaders direct it to respond to complex emergencies.

# Executive Summary

There are a lot of things that have to happen to make sure this peace works, and most of them have to be done by the Bosnians themselves. . . . If there isn't progress on rebuilding the country and making the peace real, you could have foreign forces there forever and it wouldn't make a difference.

—White House National Security Adviser  
Sandy Berger<sup>1</sup>

## Project Objectives and Design

This book provides the final results of a project sponsored by the Joint Warfare Analysis Center. Our primary objective in this project was to examine how military operations can support the long-term objective of achieving civil stability and durable peace in states embroiled in complex emergencies. A complex emergency is one which draws every sector of society into its tentacles. Without coordinated external assistance, few if any states are capable of extracting themselves from such crises without abandoning the goal of attaining sustainable security. Our secondary objective was to determine the utility of the Situational Influence As-

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<sup>1</sup> Quoted in "Durable peace is NATO goal in Bosnia," USA Today, 14 July 1997, p. 10.

essment Module (SIAM), an automated decision support application, in preparing the military to respond to these crises.

Since the end of the Cold War, many in the defense community have decried the military's increasing role in such contingencies, claiming that such participation diverts the military's focus from warfighting and leads to decreased unit readiness. We have learned, however, that when one lives in a glass house, one eventually ends up "doing windows" (i.e., the dirty, labor-intensive jobs that must be done but no one wants to perform). Thus, the US military found itself responding, in one way or another, to crises in places as widely dispersed as Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, Cambodia, Liberia, and the former Zaire. Like waves on the ocean, complex emergencies continue to appear on the horizon, threatening to slam against the cliffs of international stability. Since the military is likely to continue its involvement in such operations, we designed this project to answer a basic yet complicated question: *How can the US military, during its involvement in a complex contingency operation, support (or at least do no harm to) the longer-term, non-military efforts to create a stable, civil society?*

The project involved three distinct phases. First, we conducted an extensive literature review to frame the issues used in a workshop in which experts in the fields associated with complex emergencies explored these issues and identified strategies to promote relief-with-development and create the conditions necessary for

civil stability and a durable peace. Second, in collaboration with our project colleagues, we conducted two more workshops to develop, refine, and test SIAM to see if it could help planners deal with complex emergencies. The final workshop included a simulated inter-agency response to a potential real-world complex contingency operation. Finally, in preparation for this report, we analyzed the research and workshops and developed recommendations for the military (and others) to pursue. In Chapter 1, we provide a more detailed description of the project.

## **Framing the Issues**

Military involvement in any operation that includes providing humanitarian assistance remains controversial. For years the military has been anathema to non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which have condemned violence and the horrific suffering caused by war. Recently, however, these organizations have themselves been the targets of violence and have needed protection in order to accomplish their work. This has created an uneasy truce between international aid-givers and the military, who continue to work out which group should do what, when, and how. The most challenging areas are the transition phases between relief, rehabilitation, and development, which we discuss in Chapter 2.



The challenges of coordinating across the spectrum of assistance and during the various phases of a complex emergency are problems not just between the military and relief organizations. Some of the same problems exist between the Department of Defense and other US agencies. To overcome these interagency problems, the US Government has adopted in Presidential Decision Directive 56 an approach to interagency planning. It focuses on the development of a Political-Military Plan, dealing with eight operational sectors:

- Diplomacy
- Military Activities
- Humanitarian Assistance
- Internal Politics
- Civil Law and Order/Public Security
- Public Information and Education
- Infrastructure and Economic Restoration
- Human Rights and Social Development

In Chapter 3, we examine each of the operational sectors in detail. These discussions make it clear that there are no neat dividing lines between the activities of various groups. Hence, these groups are going to continue to rub against one another; the hope is that they will learn to rub with the grain. We also explore specific strategies in Chapter 3 that can be used in each of the operational sectors to promote success. In Table ES-1 we summarize these strategies.

**Table ES-1. Operational Sector Recommendations**

Operational Sector	Recommended Strategy <i>(specific military strategies in italics)</i>
<b>Diplomacy</b>	Prevention is better than cure—identify early warning mechanisms
	Address both causes and symptoms of conflict
	Intervene early
	Respond promptly to resolve or contain crises
	Give diplomats the authority and assets to make crisis diplomacy work
	Reconciliation may not always be the answer
	<i>The military should be in a supporting role, if involved at all</i>
<b>Military Activities</b>	<i>Be prepared to help professionalize and restructure military forces</i>
	<i>Incorporate evenhanded weapons control programs as part of rehabilitation efforts</i>
	<i>Give special attention to demining activities</i>
	<i>Open a dialogue with everyone</i>
	<i>Protect the force, but be prepared to act</i>
<b>Humanitarian Assistance</b>	Foster self-sufficiency
	Be aware of the political impact of relief efforts
	Pursue ‘food security’ in its broadest sense
	Involve indigenous communities
	Target the public health sector
	Provide sustainable health care programs
	Support refugee reintegration
	<i>The military should perform (or support) humanitarian assistance tasks</i>

x

**Table ES-1. (cont'd.)**

<b>Operational Sector</b>	<b>Recommended Strategy</b> <i>(specific military strategies in italics)</i>
<b>Internal Politics</b>	Support the establishment of fair and effective institutions of governance
	Cultivate indigenous leadership
	<i>The military can help, both directly and indirectly</i>
<b>Civil Law and Order/Public Security</b>	Separate military and police public security functions
	Try to limit the number of contributors to coalition police operations
	<i>The military may have to perform constabulary and other public security functions, requiring a broad array of expertise</i>
	Deal directly with the challenges associated with rules of engagement
	Support civil weapons control programs
<b>Public Information and Education</b>	Security requires fair judicial and humane penal systems
	Collectively develop a message early and get it out
	Work to counter competing messages (e.g., hate-propaganda sources)
	<i>View education as a security function</i>
	Tailor education to local needs
<i>Military support must include education and training</i>	
<i>Provide training and education for intervention forces</i>	

**Table ES-1. (cont'd.)**

<b>Operational Sector</b>	<b>Recommended Strategy</b> <i>(specific military strategies in italics)</i>
<b>Infrastructure and Economic Restoration</b>	With military involvement, assess infrastructure needs early
	Get local input during assessments
	<i>Focus military efforts on restoring basic public services and lines of communication</i>
	Be mindful that efforts can prove counter-productive
	Pursue economic development on a local level
	Job creation is a security as well as an economic concern
<b>Human Rights/Social Development</b>	<i>Protecting human rights is part and parcel of any military mission</i>
	<i>But “peace comes before justice”</i>
	<i>Civic action programs are not “mission creep”</i>
<b>Cultural Awareness</b>	Interpreters—of language and culture—are critical to mission success
	Language skills are a must

As we point out throughout this report, strategies are situationally dependent; no single strategy is a template, and no single strategy ever survives unchanged. At the conclusion of Chapter 3, we assess the degree to which the military, on a generic basis, should be willing to perform tasks directly, be prepared to support others in performing tasks, or seek to avoid any involvement. We conclude that the military should:

- Be prepared to *perform* military and humanitarian assistance tasks
- Be prepared to *support* the performance of
  - public information and education tasks
  - human rights and social development tasks
  - public security and law and order tasks
  - infrastructure and economic restoration tasks
- Generally, *avoid* internal political and diplomatic tasks, since they fall outside its purview.

## **Exploring SIAM's Utility**

In Chapters 4 and 5 we discuss SIAM and examine its utility for helping the military and others respond to complex emergencies. In Chapter 5, we focus on the generic baseline influence net models developed and

examined during our workshops. The Basic Sources of Influence net model is supported by three sub-net models, focusing on governance, civil unrest, and human requirements. Based on our analysis of these sub-net models, we conclude the following:

- *“Civil Unrest” sub-net model:* Internal political factors, especially the resolution of differences by competing groups (either through negotiation or armed victory), are the most critical factors explaining the presence or absence of civil strife and the perception of a safe and secure environment. Demobilizing and disarming irregular forces are also important factors in achieving lasting peace.
- *“Governance” sub-net model:* People are most satisfied with political leadership when they believe their interests are being honestly represented. The effectiveness and fairness of the executive and judicial branches of government also play important roles.
- *“Human Requirements” sub-net model:* Meeting people’s immediate needs and ensuring that human rights are protected can dramatically increase the chances for stability and peace, but only if people believe that genuine efforts are being made toward improving the long-term outlook as well. The economic health of the state is the surest indicator that both short- and long-term challenges are being addressed.

Our analysis of the Basic Sectors of Influence net model yields these general insights:

- Dealing with the physical well-being (that is, the security and health) of the population can help reduce instability. This conclusion may appear intuitively obvious, but some workshop participants questioned it, believing it reflected a traditional theory of revolution that has not proven historically accurate.
- Stopping fighting and resolving conflicts (that is, human security) are the most critical issues. These challenges, by their nature, are extremely time-sensitive and are best met by early intervention.
- The basic needs of the people—water, food, and shelter—follow in importance. These, too, are short-fused problems requiring immediate attention.
- Following these are issues of governance. While important, these issues are less urgent than those involving physical security or other humanitarian requirements.

Hence, even at a generic level, we found that the SIAM modeling approach helps to order and prioritize issue areas. To learn more requires a closer examination of each of the major sub-nets in the context of specific operations.

## Reaching Conclusions

In Chapter 6 we provide our final impressions, conclusions, and recommendations. We first identify principles for responding to complex emergencies that remain consistent even during idiosyncratic operations. These are to:

- Achieve better coordination and cooperation
- Involve all parties in pre-planning, including the military
- Move beyond coping strategies to pursue sustainable security, characterized by the capacity of a formerly collapsed state to solve its own problems peacefully without a foreign administrative or military presence
- Pursue sustainable security through prevention, mitigation, and preparedness
- Integrate existing capacities of all elements of society (especially elements from the most vulnerable groups)
- Meet the challenges of displaced populations
- Foster local institutions and programs
- Properly select and use measures of effectiveness
- Rebuild key infrastructure elements

Throughout the course of this study, two competing views emerged. First, many believe that the military's complex contingency operation assistance tasks should continue to be narrowly construed, with the focus on



maintaining a safe and secure environment. Proponents of this view believe that when the military gets involved in a broad range of activities, a “mission creep” warning bell should go off. An alternative view is that the military can do much in the context of its short-term security mission to have a broader impact on the long-term security of a failed state. But in order to do so, the military must look beyond traditional roles to see how it can assist rehabilitation and development. This will involve the military in “doing windows” during complex emergencies.

One of the most significant issues raised in Chapter 3 is that many of the military activities currently shunned as “mission creep” are extremely important for the achievement of long-term objectives. In Chapter 6, we recommend that politicians and military leaders reexamine their misgivings about having the military conduct such tasks. Even within the military, there is a growing belief that US forces will continue to get involved in complex emergencies and should therefore be better prepared to deal with them. When the military does get involved, it should do its best to be a part of a long-term solution. By taking the long view, the military will be able to understand how a broader range of activities can have an enormous impact well beyond their immediate military benefit. Although we conclude in this study that the military should provide a wide range of support, two facts must be accepted: first, the military is not going to focus on humanitarian missions; and second,

it will disengage from a crisis as quickly as it can. For those reasons, the military will and should remain a supporting agency.

With regard to SIAM's utility, we conclude that it can be an excellent tool for collaborative training and long-term planning. Our workshops demonstrated that SIAM offers one method of helping disparate groups discuss and work through their differences. It is not a panacea for current planning ills, nor will it replace sound judgment. There may even be better collaborative methods available. It allows one to structure a problem, explore complex cause-and-effect relationships, identify critical leverage areas and factors, assess the impact of alternative courses of action, and check for unintended consequences of those actions. SIAM analysis, however, is probabilistic, not deterministic (i.e., not predictive); using its results requires the exercise of good judgment.

## **Quo Desiderat Pacem, Praeparet Pacem**

Complex emergencies are ugly creatures, and in no danger of extinction. At times, however, it has appeared that responses to them might be. When states do intervene, they want to make sure that national treasure is well spent. The best way to ensure this is to try to get those involved to move in consonance with one another. In complex emergencies, the need to act quickly and use scarce resources wisely means that interagency

and international actors can no longer afford to ignore each other or pursue competing agendas. This is as true for the military as any other group. Hence, focusing on short-term military goals is truly shortsighted.

When a military operation fails to understand the connection between its activities, humanitarian assistance actions, and future requirements, it ultimately fails to achieve its objectives. By focusing on long-term objectives, the military has a better chance of “getting it right” when it must intervene. If the military wants to help win the peace, it must prepare for peace.

# List of Figures

Figure 2-1. Inferred relative priority of continuum stages .....	27
Figure 2-2. Relative priority of assistance type across continuum stages .....	29
Figure 2-3. Relative priority of assistance type across continuum stage, percent of overall total .....	31
Figure 3-1. Relative importance of operational sectors (percent of total) .....	153
Figure 3-2. Role of military across sectors .....	156
Figure 3-3. Where should the military focus its efforts? .....	158
Figure 4-1. Immediate Causal Nodes net model .....	168
Figure 4-2. Node Dialog, root node: Civil stability and durable peace exist .....	169
Figure 4-3. Link Dialog: “Immediate needs of the people are satisfied” and “Civil stability and durable peace exist” .....	173
Figure 4-4. Link Dialog: “Civil (internal) unrest is present” and “Civil stability and durable peace exist” .....	175
Figure 4-5. Driving Parent Analysis for “Civil stability and durable peace exist” .....	177
Figure 4-6. Pressure Parent Analysis for “Civil stability and durable peace exist” .....	179
Figure 5-1. Basic Sources of Influence net model .....	189
Figure 5-2. Correlation between the Generic, Baseline Influence net model and the Generic Pol-Mil Plan’s operational sectors .....	192

Figure C-1. Civil Unrest Sub-net .....	310
Figure C-2. Governance Sub-net .....	320
Figure C-3. Human Requirements Sub-net .....	332

# List of Tables

Table ES-1. Operational Sector Recommendations .....	x
Table 2-1. Comparison of operational sectors .....	33
Table 3-1. Sector vote prioritizations (percent) .....	154
Table 5-1. Driving Parent Analysis for “Civil stability and durable peace exist” .....	193
Table 5-2. Pressure Parent Analysis for “Civil stability and durable peace exist” .....	194
Table 6-1. Illustrative Components of a Political-Military Plan .	210
Table 6-2. Operational Sector Recommendations .....	215
Table 6-3. Beneficial attitudes and behavior: tips from professionals .....	221
Table A-1. List of workshop participants .....	264
Table B-1. Peace Operations Task List .....	279
Table C-1. List of link types in generic baseline influence nets .....	307
Table C-2. Driving Parent Analysis for Civil Unrest Sub-net: “Safe and secure environment is perceived” .....	311
Table C-3. Pressure Parent Analysis for Civil Unrest Sub-net: “Safe and secure environment is perceived” .....	313
Table C-4. Pressure Point Analysis for Civil Unrest Sub-net: “Safe and secure environment is perceived” .....	314
Table C-5. Driving Parent Analysis for Civil Unrest Sub-net: “Civil (internal) unrest is present” .....	315

Table C-6. Pressure Parent Analysis for Civil Unrest Sub-net: “Civil (internal) unrest is present” .....	317
Table C-7. Pressure Point Analysis for Civil Unrest Sub-net: “Civil (internal) unrest is present” .....	318
Table C-8. Driving Parent Analysis for Governance Sub-net: “Government has domestic legitimacy” .....	322
Table C-9. Pressure Parent Analysis for Governance Sub-net: “Government has domestic legitimacy” .....	323
Table C-10. Pressure Point Analysis for Governance Sub-net: “Government has domestic legitimacy” .....	325
Table C-11. Driving Parent Analysis for Governance Sub-net: “Institutions of governance are effective and fair” .....	326
Table C-12. Pressure Parent Analysis for Governance sub-net: “Institutions of governance are effective and fair” .....	326
Table C-13. Pressure Point Analysis for Governance Sub-net: “Institutions of governance are effective and fair” .....	327
Table C-14. Driving Parent Analysis for Governance Sub-net: “Administration of justice is effective and fair” .....	329
Table C-15. Pressure Parent Analysis for Governance Sub-net: “Administration of justice is effective and fair” .....	330
Table C-16. Driving Parent Analysis for Human Requirements Sub-net: “People are tolerant of the status quo” .....	333
Table C-17. Driving Parent Analysis for Human Requirements Sub-net: “Immediate needs of the people are satisfied” .....	335
Table C-18. Pressure Parent Analysis for Human Requirements Sub-net: “Immediate needs of the people are satisfied” .....	336
Table C-19. Driving Parent Analysis for Human Requirements Sub-net: “Food is sufficient” .....	337

Table C-20. Pressure Parent Analysis for Human Requirements Sub-net: "Food is sufficient" .....	338
Table C-21. Driving Parent Analysis for Human Requirements Sub- net: "Economy is sound" .....	340
Table C-22. Pressure Parent Analysis for Human Requirements Sub-net: "Economy is sound" .....	341
Table C-23. Pressure Point Analysis for Human Requirements Sub- net: "Economy is sound" .....	342
Table C-24. Driving Parent Analysis for Human Requirements Sub- net: "Acceptable jobs are available" .....	343
Table C-25. Pressure Parent Analysis for Human Requirements Sub-net: "Acceptable jobs are available" .....	344
Table C-26. Pressure Point Analysis for Human Requirements Sub- net: "Acceptable jobs are available" .....	345



# Chapter 1: Introduction

In the wake of the Cold War, attention has focused on a rising number of territorial disputes, armed ethnic conflicts, and civil wars that pose threats to regional and international peace and may be accompanied by natural or manmade disasters which precipitate massive human suffering. We have learned that effective responses to these situations may require multi-dimensional operations composed of such components as political/diplomatic, humanitarian, intelligence, economic development, and security.

—President Clinton, PDD-56<sup>2</sup>

## Issues this Book Addresses

With respect to complex contingency operations, commanders and analysts alike have given most of their attention to the challenge of establishing a safe and secure environment, especially for concurrent humanitarian and disaster relief efforts. They have good rea-

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<sup>2</sup> Presidential Decision Directive-56 (hereafter PDD-56), 1997, pp. 1–2.

son, since such an environment is a precondition for peace and development. But while establishing a secure environment and caring for the emergency needs of the local populace are necessary for a sustainable peace once the operation has ended, more is needed. Toward this end, the Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC) asked the Naval War College to conduct a study aimed at answering a basic yet complicated question: *How can the US military, during its involvement in a complex contingency operation, support (or at least do no harm to) the longer-term, non-military efforts to create a stable, civil society?*

### **Focusing on the Longer Term**

Since the late 1980s, the term “complex emergency” has become part of the international language of development theorists and practitioners and civil aid agencies. It is defined by the United Nations as

a humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is a total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate [or] capacity of any single agency and/or the on-going United Nations country programme.<sup>3</sup>

For Joanna Macrae and Anthony Zwi, complex emergencies are “intentionally created and . . . sustained in order to achieve their objectives of cultural genocide and political and economic power . . . a potent combi-

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<sup>3</sup> Mezzolama, 1995, as quoted in Mackinlay and Kent, 1997a, p. 39.

nation of political and economic factors driving and maintaining disaster-producing conflicts.”<sup>4</sup> Sue Lautze succinctly characterizes the challenges complex emergencies pose:

Complex emergencies are aptly named. They involve an intricate web of often opposing and hostile political, economic, military and social forces. Unlike natural disasters, complex emergencies entail both the deliberate creation and the unintended consequences of crises. Complex emergencies are highly destructive because they radically increase the demands placed on fragile political, economic, environmental and social systems while simultaneously destroying these same systems. Such disasters are characterized by the strategic exploitation of victims.<sup>5</sup>

Mark Duffield also distinguishes complex emergencies from natural disasters:

So-called complex emergencies are essentially political in nature: they are protracted political crises resulting from sectarian or predatory indigenous responses to socioeconomic stress and marginalisation. Unlike natural disasters, complex emergencies have a singular ability to erode or destroy the cultural, civil, political and economic integrity of established societies. . . . Humanitarian

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<sup>4</sup> Macrae and Zwi, 1994, as quoted in Edkins, 1996, p. 554.

<sup>5</sup> Lautze, 1996, p. 5. Lautze also notes that “complex emergencies damage such hallmarks of civilization as social services, market networks and agricultural enterprises while at the same time increasing demands for the essential services they provide. Unlike natural disasters, however, complex emergencies are also characterized by the deliberate destruction of political, economic, social and environmental systems, rendering complex emergencies fundamentally more devastating than any other type of disaster.” *Ibid.*, p. 8.

assistance itself can become a target of violence and appropriation by political actors who are organic parts of the crisis. Complex emergencies are internal to political and economic structures. They are different from natural disasters and deserve to be understood and responded to as such.<sup>6</sup>

In the PDD-56 context, “complex contingency operations” are operations that respond to complex emergencies. Military involvement in complex contingency operations by itself cannot resolve the underlying causes of complex emergencies. It can help reduce the symptoms (such as hunger or chaos), and it can buy time for other policy tools (such as diplomacy and economic support) to help resolve these issues. Too often, however, the focus of military interventions has been on short-term objectives rather than longer-term goals. Michael Pugh warned the humanitarian community that “peacebuilding requires political activity to resolve disputes. Without it, NGOs [non-governmental organizations] may want to distance their activities from UN [United Nations] missions, particularly if these latter involve the imposition of sanctions and military operations albeit in a peacekeeping guise.”<sup>7</sup> Fen Hampson suggests that the success of peace settlements (and we believe the resolution of complex emergencies as well) relies to a large extent on the ability of those involved to anticipate and devise a means to cope with the issues of the future.<sup>8</sup> But as Andrew Natsios has written, “Con-

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<sup>6</sup> Duffield, 1994, p. 38; quoted in Edkins, 1996, p. 554.

<sup>7</sup> Pugh, 1995, p. 335.

<sup>8</sup> Hampson, 1996, p. 3.

flicts end only when one of two conditions obtain: either one side wins a military victory or both sides accept a negotiated settlement. This proposition is as true in complex emergencies as in conventional war.”<sup>9</sup> In order to promote a negotiated settlement, participants must view the crisis “as a problem to be solved and not as a contest to be won.”<sup>10</sup> The purpose of the project described in this book is to convince military planners of the need to take the long view and to provide them with a tool to do so.

### **A Role for the Military, by Default if Not Design**

“The central issue facing the United Nations and international charities,” writes David Pallister, “is whether force should be used to ensure delivery of humanitarian assistance in a war situation, or whether this will so compromise that mission as to make it unsustainable and endanger those taking part.”<sup>11</sup> Since this issue is so emotionally charged, one might wonder why so many analysts (as well as the services themselves) believe US forces will continue to become involved in complex contingency operations. The simple answer is that all trends point in that direction. Since 1992 nearly a million people have died as a result of complex emergencies, and almost 50 million have been forced to flee their home communities.<sup>12</sup> That is the equivalent of hav-

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<sup>9</sup> Natsios, 1996b, p. 61.

<sup>10</sup> John Burton quoted in Bercovitch, 1984, p. 26.

<sup>11</sup> Pallister, 1994.

<sup>12</sup> Cholmondeley, 1996, p. 3.

ing most of the citizens of New Hampshire killed and the entire populations of Texas and California displaced. This “massive increase in the numbers of internally displaced persons and of refugees, [has] plac[ed] an immense burden on the international community.”<sup>13</sup> Nearly 14 percent of all nations—almost one of every seven—are currently involved in one stage or another of a complex emergency. Hugh Cholmondeley reports:

It is acknowledged that the scale of human suffering has reached levels that demand international attention in some twenty-five [sic] countries. These countries are Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Croatia, Eritrea, Georgia, Guatemala, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Tajikistan.<sup>14</sup>

The problem is not just that conflict is taking place; the concern is for the innocent targets of that strife. As two analysts note, “A frequently cited statistic places civilian casualties, which in World War I had represented about 5 per cent of the total, at an estimated 95 per cent in recent conflicts. No longer incidental victims caught in the crossfire, civilian populations have become explicit targets of military operations.”<sup>15</sup> The enormity of

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<sup>13</sup> According to the US Agency for International Development’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), the number of internally displaced people increased by more than 400 percent from 1985-1994 (from 7 million to 30 million); the number of refugees increased by nearly 60 percent over the same period (from 10 million to 17 million). OFDA, 1996b, p. 5.

<sup>14</sup> Cholmondeley, 1996, p. 3.

<sup>15</sup> Minear and Guillot, 1996, p. 18.

the situation is just beginning to sink in, and the challenges ahead are so staggering that the international community has adopted a “national interests” approach for dealing with them. Thus, reports Cholmondeley, “there are clear limits to international action. . . . And these limits are rapidly approaching a confluence of four disturbing conditions: *chronic volatility, high complexity, diminishing resources and organizational incapacity*.”<sup>16</sup>

Some pundits believe complex emergencies are realms the military had best avoid. For example, Mary Anderson argues that allowing the right of arms to determine who gets access to food legitimizes warlords and thugs.<sup>17</sup> Representatives from the International Committee of the Red Cross/Crescent (ICRC) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) argue that “the work of aid agencies has . . . been prejudiced by close association with . . . military actions.”<sup>18</sup> Others have noted, however, that

the military *will* be called upon to assume responsibilities for domestic security and nation-assistance for a limited period of time in most complex emergency operations. While policy and preference may dictate that civilian agencies should manage civic assistance activities, in fact, the military often end up taking on the tasks because they arrive first and have the manpower, surge capacity, and flexibility to act.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Cholmondeley, 1996, p. 4; emphasis in original.

<sup>17</sup> Anderson, 1996b, p. 5.

<sup>18</sup> Pugh, 1995, p. 337. See also Minear and Guillot, 1996, pp. 33–34.

<sup>19</sup> Hayes and Wheatley, 1996, p. 57; emphasis in original.

Hence, “given the supply of military assets and the demand created by the expanding universe of urgent human need, it is quite possible that what are still ‘non-traditional’ missions of the military may become more traditional.”<sup>20</sup> But military involvement is not necessarily the answer, as President Clinton recognizes:

In many complex emergencies, the appropriate U.S. Government response will incur the involvement of only non-military assets. In some situations, we have learned that military forces can quickly affect the dynamics of the situation and may create the conditions necessary to make significant progress in mitigating or resolving the underlying conflict or dispute. However, we have also learned that many aspects of complex emergencies may not be best addressed through military measures.<sup>21</sup>

It is little wonder, considering the broad array of opinions on this subject, that “the use of military personnel in peacebuilding is,” as Michael Pugh concludes, “a controversial and complex matter.”<sup>22</sup> Whether traditional and non-traditional missions are the military’s by design or default, examining how the military can organize itself to fulfill its missions, while aiding (or, as a minimum, not interfering with) relief and longer-term rehabilitation and development, is of urgent importance.

## **Research Design and Road Map**

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<sup>20</sup> Minear and Guillot, 1996, p. 27.

<sup>21</sup> PDD-56, p. 2.

<sup>22</sup> Pugh, 1995, p. 328.



We designed this project to help planners take the long view. We had two interrelated objectives in mind. First, we wanted to examine the impacts, both positive and negative, that military involvement in complex contingency operations can have on longer-term goals. Second, we wanted to explore the utility of an automated decision support modeling tool, the Situational Influence Assessment Module (SIAM), to see if it could help planners consider cascading effects.<sup>23</sup> Our research design involved four steps.

1. We first conducted background research examining “the issues, conditions, and other variables that operational commanders must consider when planning and executing military peace operations in order to establish a safe and secure environment for follow-on (non-military) civil activities.”<sup>24</sup> We discuss this research in detail in chapters Two and Three. During this phase, we structured the questions that need to be answered and identified potential workshop participants.
2. We then brought together complex contingency operation and development practitioners from a wide variety of communities—foreign and international ser-

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<sup>23</sup> SIAM responds to the requirement for both ‘impact analysis’ tools—which assess the impact of friendly, opposition, or neutral party actions on current operations and future plans—and course of action (COA) development analysis and comparison tools—which support planning, assessment, comparison, estimates of success, risk modeling, and recommendations. A recent review of analytic tools for the United States Pacific Command identified a critical need for automated tools in both areas to supplement current procedures. For a discussion of the various requirements for analysis tools, see Hartley, 1996.

<sup>24</sup> This language is from the formal project tasking from the Joint Warfare Analysis Center to the Naval War College. For an annotated bibliography of relevant works, see Hartley, 1996, pp. 21–24; see also US Army War College Library, 1996.

vice, humanitarian relief and assistance, military, and development—to help identify and clarify the critical elements for the successful transition of a complex contingency operation to civil stability and durable peace. We convened this workshop 14–15 November 1996 in the Naval War College’s Decision Support Center. We summarize the main findings of this conference in chapters Two and Three. Appendix A contains the details of the workshop, as well as other project workshops (see below).

3. Using the information derived from this first workshop, the project team (see below) developed a draft influence net model to map the influences and issues relating to complex contingency operations and the transitions to civil stability and a durable peace. We then reconvened our diverse set of practitioners and analysts (with some changes in participation) for a two-day modeling workshop, 14–15 January 1997, in the Washington, DC, area (see Appendix A). Using their general experience and knowledge, participants helped develop a generic, baseline model that could be tailored to identify critical pressure points and issues and test different strategies in a variety of specific contexts. Chapters Four and Five of this book, written in conjunction with associated research organizations (see below), contain an introduction to SIAM and the documentation of the generic, baseline SIAM complex contingency operations influence net models.
4. We further explored our insights by applying them to a future case study involving a real-world complex contingency operation. The United States Atlantic Command cosponsored this phase of the study. We convened a three-day workshop, with an embedded

simulation exercise, at the Naval War College on 25–27 March 1997 to test our insights and explore the utility of the tailored baseline nets. Appendix A summarizes the broad outlines of this workshop; a separate, classified compact disk reports on its specifics. Where appropriate, we have included in this report unclassified insights from this workshop.

After the completion of the main project tasks, we used the information from all of the tasks to reach our recommendations and conclusions for each of the operational sectors and SIAM, which we report in chapters Three and Five, respectively. In Chapter Six we provide our final impressions, conclusions, and recommendations.

Our goal throughout the project was to ensure that the analysis was structured, traceable, and useful to decision-makers.

- *Structured* and *traceable* means laying out all data, assumptions, and inputs, and the methodology used for reaching conclusions.
- *Useful* means laying out alternative decision paths, with logic chains showing why each path should or should not be followed. Tautologically, of course, information is useful only if used—and deemed useful—by decision-makers.

We believe that the complementary GroupSystems® for Windows® and SIAM approach is particularly valuable for providing sound analysis in this very difficult and subjective area.

## Organizations and Individuals Involved

### The Decision Support Department

We served as overall project coordinators and principal investigators. We conducted this project under the auspices of the Naval War College's Decision Support Department (DSD), which is part of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies.<sup>25</sup> Dr. Don Daniel and Col. Alan Stolberg, USA, supported aspects of the research, as did others in the Decision Support Department.<sup>26</sup>

### Sponsoring Organizations

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<sup>25</sup> The Decision Support Department was established in 1995 to help senior decision-makers in the naval services, joint, and interagency communities make informed decisions on strategic, operational, and programmatic issues. The DSD's Decision Support Center (DSC) is the prototype for a proposed network of nodes that will allow decision-makers at the Pentagon and elsewhere to participate in decision events hosted in Newport or at other sites. The DSC provides an innovative environment designed to bring together a range of tools to aid decision-makers. These include: multimedia tools that allow clear visualization of complex situations; high-tech communications that bring information systems, databases, and expertise together to solve critical problems; analytic methodologies, and decision support and warfare analysis tools that allow groups to brainstorm, evaluate, and prioritize critical problems and weigh alternative courses of action; research and technical staff who can use these tools in facilitating discussion and producing cohesive analysis.

<sup>26</sup> In addition to the DSD's director, Dr. Lawrence Modisett, who edited the manuscript, we would like to acknowledge Professor Theophilus Gemelas for his production of the classified compact disk; Commander Paul Schmidle, USN, Professor Gregg Hoffman, and Professor Henry Kamradt for technical support, and Avon Teague, the DSD's administrative assistant, for other conference support. We also wish to thank Dr. Robert Wood, Dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Naval War College, for his support throughout the project; Mr. Pelham Boyer, Managing Editor of the Naval War College Press, who edited the manuscript; and Mr. Gary Hartman from Sonalyst Corporation, who was instrumental in editing video clips for the classified compact disk.

The Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC) was the principal sponsor for this study.<sup>27</sup> JWAC assists the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and commanders in chief of unified commands in their preparation and analysis of joint operational plans and service Chiefs' analyses of weapon effectiveness. JWAC serves as the Joint Staff Agent for the integration and analysis of data concerning infrastructure networks. The major focus of JWAC's current analysis is supporting traditional military force planning. Yet JWAC's analysis models and infrastructure expertise apply across the spectrum of force application. In view of the frequency of peacetime engagement operations, JWAC's purpose in sponsoring this project was to develop and test a tool for enhancing and refining JWAC infrastructure analysis in support of Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and Unified Commander in Chief (CINC) requirements. As the project progressed, JWAC recognized and supported the broader applicability of the analysis model to Department of Defense and interagency planning, training, and execution. Accordingly, Ms. Katharine Hoffmann, the head of JWAC's Methodology Development Division (J82) and the JWAC Project Director, supported our efforts to keep this broader relevance in mind in the project design and execution.

The United States Atlantic Command (USACOM) co-sponsored the third project workshop, which used USACOM's vision and associated options to explore a country-specific scenario which could lead to regional

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<sup>27</sup> The separate compact disk contains details on individuals and organizations involved in the classified portions of this study.

instability. Major General William T. Hobbins, USAF, Lieutenant Colonel Jorge Fernandez, USAF, and Mr. Olaf Elton, all from USACOM, were the points of contact. They and others from USACOM worked with the project team throughout. In addition, the United States Air Force Institute for National Security Studies supported aspects of the project.

### **Associated Research Organizations**

Dr. Julie Rosen and Mr. Wayne Smith from Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) supported all aspects of our work with the Situational Influence Assessment Module, which they developed and support.<sup>28</sup> Without their assistance, we could not have executed those aspects of this project.

Evidence Based Research, Inc. (EBR), also supported aspects of this project at the request of the Director, Advanced Concepts, Technologies, and Information Systems, National Defense University. In particular, Dr. Richard Hayes, Ms. Lisa Witzig Davidson, and Mr. Kenneth Kaizer helped analysts from SAIC, the United States Atlantic Command, and the Naval War College build and modify the generic baseline and the tailored SIAM influence nets. In addition, Dr. Hayes and Ms. Davidson wrote the initial draft of Chapter Four of this report, "Understanding SIAM."

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<sup>28</sup> The initial work was performed by SAIC using Defense Advanced Research Project Agency funds. For additional details on SIAM, including a background on the Bayesian mathematics involved, see the two papers by Rosen and Smith (1994 and 1997) cited in the bibliography.

While we gratefully acknowledge the efforts of these associated organizations and individuals, we remain solely responsible for the contents and conclusions contained in this report. They should not be construed to reflect the opinions of any other organization or agency, including those of the United States Government.





# Chapter 2: Promoting Relief *with* Development

If damage limitation seems too modest an objective for international military forces, expecting a more positive result such as contributing to the processes of sustainable development and peace may be too great an expectation. Yet even if the commitment of troops from the outset is known to be severely time-limited—or more accurately, precisely because their days are numbered—considerations of sustainability become critical.

— Larry Minear and Philippe Guillot<sup>29</sup>

## Introduction

The clarion call during operations RESTORE HOPE and SUPPORT HOPE was to provide humanitarian relief. The military defined this humanitarian mission very narrowly and confined its efforts to meeting short-term needs. When a military operation fails to transcend immediate humanitarian needs and address future developmental requirements, the best it can hope to achieve is a very limited set of objectives while doing little or nothing to

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<sup>29</sup> Minear and Guillot, 1996, p. 43.

foster long-term stability. Hugh Cholmondeley maintains that the distinctions between relief and development are both artificial and unhelpful, and that those engaged in relief operations must also lay the foundation for development.

In short, relief means saving lives. Development is only different to the extent that the texture of its meaning raises the issue of saving lives to a higher level. At this level, the following question is posed: saving lives for what purpose, and to what end? . . . Effective response therefore requires that the seeds of development are planted at the same time that relief needs are addressed, since it is in volatile conditions that foundations of trust, fairness, openness, sharing and accountability are established. These then, are the building blocks for reconciliation and recovery. And they must go hand in hand with simultaneous attention to issues such as restoring social services, food production systems, economic revival and job creation. These efforts cannot await what is euphemistically called “appropriate conditions for long-term development.” They must be undertaken during crisis.<sup>30</sup>

This study examines the critical transitions between relief and development as well as between conflict and peace. More specifically, it focuses on how the military can promote successful transitions at best, and at worst do nothing to make them more difficult. The goal, as one workshop participant noted, should not be promoting the transition from relief *to* development, but identi-

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<sup>30</sup> Cholmondeley, 1996, pp. 4–5.

fying ways in which the military during complex contingency operations can support the concept of relief *with* development—hence the title of this chapter.

In this chapter, we first introduce and explore the relief-to-development concepts developed by Mary Anderson and applied to the president's interagency Greater Horn of Africa Initiative.<sup>31</sup> Next, using information provided by participants at the first of our workshops, we identify and illustrate different stages within the continuum as they apply to complex contingency operations and examine types of external assistance provided during and in association with these operations. Finally, using the prioritizations and arguments provided by workshop participants, we correlate the types of assistance with the stages of the continuum. This lets us place the military role in complex contingency operations in the context of broader efforts to address the relief-to-development continuum.

## **The Relief-to-Development Continuum**

Typically, US military planners focus on the end state of an operation—the completion of the mission through the withdrawal and redeployment of all military forces to their pre-operation status. Yet, while there may indeed be an end state to a specific complex contingency

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<sup>31</sup> Anderson, 1996a and 1996b; Greater Horn of Africa Initiative, 1996 and forthcoming.

operation, the relief-to-development continuum, within which these operations fall, has no discernible end and no definable beginning.

In support of President Clinton's 1996 Greater Horn of African Initiative, Mary Anderson has written about the relief-to-development continuum—how relief workers can promote relief with development and development workers can promote development that does not lead to situations requiring new relief operations.<sup>32</sup> Relief and development may have different objectives—relief to save lives and alleviate suffering, development to help achieve a sustainable, broad-based improvement in people's living conditions—but both seek to reduce the need within a country or region for external assistance.

Anderson's overall principles and operating guidelines are as follows:

1. *Countries have primary responsibility.* Each country should set its own standards, priorities, and goals. The country—and, to the extent involved, the international community—should take a participatory approach to designing and implementing the longer term plan.
2. *International partners should attempt to ensure their efforts have a positive impact through strategic coordination.* They should seek to maximize the comparative advantages of the various external actors. They should support and supplement—not displace—in-

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<sup>32</sup> Anderson, 1996a and 1996b; Greater Horn of Africa Initiative, 1996 and forthcoming.

digenous efforts. They should neither raise false expectations nor establish unattainable goals. Finally, they should respect local cultures.

3. *Relief for development: Relief programs should reinforce development objectives.* Actors providing relief should first assess existing indigenous capacities and conduct a needs assessment in relation to local capacities. They should tailor their efforts to support existing capacities when identified needs surpass indigenous capacities to respond. They should set sustainable standards of service. Finally, they should sustain livelihoods while saving lives.
4. *Development for disaster prevention: Help prevent disasters or mitigate their effects.* To do so, development actors should identify the vulnerabilities of the target populace and address root causes of those vulnerabilities. Just as importantly, they should incorporate disaster preparedness into their development objectives and programs.

Ambassador Jonathan Moore notes that the concept of the relief to development continuum

makes the useful point that the response to complex emergencies shouldn't be organized or treated in separate categories largely unrelated to one another, but along a continuum—starkly put, from emergency relief and peace-keeping through rehabilitation to long-term development. Moreover, it implies that the help-providing international entities not only must recognize the relationships and interplay among these aspects in their response but also must coordinate their roles with one another accordingly in coaxing the troubled

nation along the spectrum from dependency to sustainability. . . . The continuum can be useful if it isn't seen as static but as a matter of equilibrium, its parts not as chronological phases but more simultaneous and overlapping.<sup>33</sup>

This link between relief and development becomes more operational when considering the often misunderstood term “rehabilitation.” According to Nordic peacekeeping handbooks, rehabilitation can be defined both by what it is not and what it includes.<sup>34</sup> Rehabilitation is not electoral, administrative, or human rights assistance. Rather, it includes a wide variety of assistance activities: providing for humanitarian needs (food, health, housing, etc.); meeting resettlement needs (agricultural production, water supplies, and health and education facilities); restoring, maintaining, and supporting key infrastructure elements (for example, hospitals, schools, communications, and banking); and even training former soldiers for incorporation into the civilian economy.

According to Moore:

Rehabilitation is the linchpin for eventual stability and self-sufficiency. Yet rehabilitation is largely ignored, in the face of, on one hand, priority attention given to humanitarian emergencies, and on the other, a traditional involvement in programmes for long-term development—even though in the least developed countries they, for the most part, can hardly be successful. There is

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<sup>33</sup> Moore, 1996, p. 24.

<sup>34</sup> As discussed by Pugh, 1995.

a gap in the middle, which is not policy conscious, is poorly designed programmatically, and is not targeted by donor country budgets. The challenge is formidable, but there are ways to undertake it which have a chance of success.<sup>35</sup>

He argues that the rehabilitation phase should include the following programs:<sup>36</sup>

- Repair and upgrading of basic infrastructure such as secondary roads and bridges, well and irrigation systems, schools, and clinics
- Restoration of basic water, health, and education services
- Refurbishing of agricultural production, livestock, and fisheries
- Renovation of markets, increase of trade, and creation of jobs
- Rebuilding of capacity in local authorities and institutions of civil society

Moore further suggests that rehabilitation “is a natural process which needs to be stimulated, catalyzed externally but which is essentially internal”; it is a “keystone upon which other positive elements depend.”<sup>37</sup>

## **What Can External Organizations Do?**

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<sup>35</sup> Moore, 1996, pp. 1–2.

<sup>36</sup> Moore, 1996, p. 15.

<sup>37</sup> Moore, 1996, pp. 56 and 59.

The idea behind the continuum is to move from a focus on “conflict intervention” to “conflict prevention”:<sup>38</sup>

The Cold War philosophy held that certain policies and programs—diplomacy and development—were inherently peaceful, while others—military assistance and military intervention—were inherently bellicose.

Current conflict prevention theory states that the whole array of policy tools must be evaluated to see whether they cause or prevent conflicts.

According to Mary Anderson, aid workers can promote a transition to development in two, two-stage steps. First, they must understand the relationship between (a) relief assistance and sustainable development and (b) development assistance and vulnerability to disaster. Next, they must identify and support existing local capacities and then identify and lessen existing vulnerabilities.<sup>39</sup> The overall goal should be to prevent and mitigate conflict by taking “special pains to:

- Do no harm—avoid contributing to the sources of conflict, for instance, by changing an electoral system from a ‘winner-take-all’ formula to reduce ethnic competition.

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<sup>38</sup> Creative Associates International, Inc., 1996, p. 1–13.

<sup>39</sup> Anderson, 1996a and 1996b; Greater Horn of Africa Initiative, 1996 and forthcoming.



- Do better—increase positive impacts in ameliorating conflicts, for example, deliberately hiring laborers from two ethnic groups with tense relations to build a road, or designing social safety nets for a minority-populated region into a structural adjustment program.”<sup>40</sup>

To restate the purpose of this study, then, we ask the following questions:

- During a complex contingency operation, how can the military:
  - Support relief efforts?
  - Promote the transition to development?
  - Promote broad-based, long-term, sustainable and systemic development?
- At the minimum, to use a medical aphorism, how can the military, when it is involved in a complex contingency operation, at least avoid doing harm (that is, avoid undermining the efforts of other actors)?

Participants at our first workshop accepted theoretically the idea that a relief-to-development continuum applies to the general situations to which complex contingency operations are meant to respond. Further, they agreed that the bridges necessary for working through the entire continuum must be nurtured and built from the very beginning. Actions taken in one phase will have impacts later in the continuum. As one participant noted, “Fred

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<sup>40</sup> Creative Associates International, Inc., 1996, p. ix.

Cuny used to say that “the placement of refugee camps is a development situation.” To this another participant responded, “The placement of refugee camps is a development DECISION.”

In the remainder of this chapter, we identify the stages of a relief-to-development continuum as it applies to complex contingency operations, attempt to determine the importance of each phase in general, and examine the role the military should play within the context of the broader set of external assistance provided.

## **An Evolving Mix of Assistance**

After discussing the concept of the relief-to-development continuum, we asked participants to help us apply it to complex contingency operations. Through a series of brainstorming and categorizing activities, participants developed a multi-stage, multi-assistance-type continuum approach.<sup>41</sup> Through two prioritization activities, they also indicated the relative importance they attached to each continuum stage and assistance type.

While recognizing that there could be an infinite number of ways of breaking up and applying the concept of a relief-to-development continuum to the contexts within


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<sup>41</sup> We used commercially available software to facilitate these efforts. We would be happy to relate our experiences with this collaborative tool. We can be contacted through the internet at <[www.usnwc.edu/nwc/dscad.htm](http://www.usnwc.edu/nwc/dscad.htm)>.

which complex contingency operations take place, workshop participants developed a five-stage continuum with the following working definitions (see Figure 2-1):

- *Pre-crisis*. A situation is developing for which a complex contingency operation may yet be mandated, but no external actors have altered existing assistance patterns in response.

**Figure 2-1.**  
**Inferred relative priority of continuum stages<sup>42</sup>**



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<sup>42</sup> Using the vote prioritizations for each assistance type across the continuum, as illustrated in Figure 2-2 below, we can infer the relative priority of the stages by using the mean score for each across the types of external assistance. Using these mean scores, this pie chart shows the percentage of the cumulative mean score for each continuum stage.

- *Expansion.* Policy decisions trigger a significant increase in external assistance. This stage is usually the period of greatest international attention as complex contingency operations are established.
- *Stabilization.* Primarily because of the establishment of the complex contingency operation, the situation on the ground has stabilized, but a return to “normalcy” (i.e., pre-crisis) is still uncertain.
- *Drawdown.* The attention of external actors decreases, as does their presence, as the complex contingency operation begins to wind down (or transition).
- *Post-crisis.* A return to “normalcy,” though under conditions that may differ sharply from those of the pre-crisis stage. The stage extends as far as three years beyond the cessation of the initial complex contingency operation.


As shown in Figure 2-1, each stage of the relief-to-development continuum is important in and of itself, and the stages do not differ significantly in relative importance. Nevertheless, the prioritization exercise with workshop participants suggested that the three middle stages, representing the transitions to and from a complex contingency operation (and the internal transitions within the complex contingency operation itself), may be of relatively greater importance.

Participants then identified six different types of external assistance (without operational definitions): political/diplomatic action, relief efforts, rehabilitation efforts, reconstruction efforts, development efforts, and military

action. We asked participants to vote on the relative importance of each type of external assistance during each stage. As shown in Figure 2-2, participants believed that the relative priority of each type of assistance will vary considerably according to the continuum stage.

For example, working from the back of Figure 2-2, political assistance has the highest priority in the pre-crisis stage but retains a relatively high priority across all

**Figure 2-2. Relative priority of assistance type across continuum stages**



stages.<sup>43</sup> Military assistance increases in priority significantly during the expansion stage and then gradually decreases to near its original priority. Relief assistance follows a similar bell-shaped pattern, though with a smaller peak and higher nadirs at the ends. Rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance follow patterns of relatively low activity during the pre-crisis phase, with a steady increase in importance throughout the rest. Finally, development assistance drops off considerably at the onset of a crisis but then builds back up (perhaps exceeding its original level).

Again, each assistance type is important in and of itself, and their relative importance does not vary considerably overall; political assistance is, however, relatively more important than other assistance types.<sup>44</sup>


But as shown in Figure 2-3 (which tiers the types of assistance by relative priority, from the bottom), participants believed that all types of assistance are important in all stages. Further, there is no one type of assistance that dominates—in the sense of being in the

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<sup>43</sup> Participants indicated strong agreement on the relative importance of political/diplomatic assistance during the pre-crisis stage. The early warning signals of a complex emergency normally manifest themselves in the form of bad political leadership and governance. Political/diplomatic action has the best chance of revealing that the event is coming and, by influencing local regional players, preventing the onset of a crisis or mitigating its effects. Other types of external assistance may be important, but they generally have less potential to avoid or head off altogether the crisis or problem.

<sup>44</sup> Using the vote prioritizations shown in Figure 2-2, we can infer the relative priority of the assistance types by using the mean score for each type across all continuum stages. Using these mean scores, the percentages of relative importance (percent of overall total) are, in order, as follows: political assistance (21 percent), development assistance (17 percent), reconstruction assistance (16 percent), military assistance (16 percent), rehabilitation assistance (15 percent), and relief assistance (15 percent).

**Figure 2-3. Relative priority of assistance type across continuum stage, percent of overall total**



majority—at any point. Even during the expansion stage, military assistance only approaches one-third of the total mix of external assistance.

The point here is not to determine precise priorities across stages or determine statistically significant differences across assistance type within stages. Rather, based on our participants' vote prioritizations, the message is that there is a continuum in which all types of external assistance have a role to play. As OFDA notes in its 1996 Strategic Plan,

The much discussed issue of a relief to development 'continuum' is often misunderstood as implying a linear process of development which is disrupted by a crisis. Rather there are ongoing, often overlapping and irregular, phases of relief, rehabilitation, and development.<sup>45</sup>

## **Operational Sectors**

In order to capture proper cause-and-effect relationships in influence nets, we needed to identify a range of activities. To simplify the process, we asked participants in our workshops to list general areas in which various activities could be placed. As the workshops proceeded, it became evident that the sectors the players selected closely matched those in the Generic Pol-Mil Plan used by the US Government to coordinate interagency activity (see Table 2-1) We decided, therefore, to use the plan's sectors in this report. We discuss these sectors in turn in Chapter Three. In Appendix B, we provide a more extensive list of activities that may be required during a complex emergency.

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<sup>45</sup> OFDA, 1996b, p. 5.



**Table 2-1. Comparison of operational sectors<sup>46</sup>**

<b>Workshop 1 typology</b>	<b>Generic Pol-Mil Plan sectors</b>
Prevention	Diplomacy
Security	Military Activities
	Civil Law and Order/Public Security
Health	Humanitarian Assistance
Reconciliation/Divorce	Internal Politics
Information	Public Information and Education
Physical Infrastructure	Infrastructure and Economic Restoration
Economy	
Social Services	Human Rights and Social Development
Health	
Leadership/Management	N.A.

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<sup>46</sup> The leadership/management sector focused on how third-party actors dealt with each other in responding to a complex emergency. These issues are implicit in the Generic Pol-Mil Plan; i.e., on a national basis, the entire Plan looks at interagency efforts.



# Chapter 3: Operational Sectors— Issues and Strategies

For peace-keeping operations deployed in a failed State, no issue can be considered purely military or purely humanitarian. Action in one sphere can have direct consequences in the other.

—Boutros Boutros-Ghali<sup>47</sup>

## Introduction

In this chapter we discuss issues involved in and explore recommended strategies for each of the eight operational sectors identified in the Generic Pol-Mil Plan that accompanied Presidential Decision Directive 56, signed by the president 20 May 1997.<sup>48</sup> In order of presentation in the plan, the sectors are:

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<sup>47</sup> Boutros-Ghali, 1996a, p. 85.

<sup>48</sup> At our third workshop, a representative from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Resources presented a paper on the "Generic Pol-Mil Plan," derived from the draft Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) then under consideration by an interagency group. Note that the PDD itself does not include a listing of major functional component tasks, but does provide a listing of critical parts

- Diplomacy
- Military Activities
- Humanitarian Assistance
- Internal Politics
- Civil Law and Order/Public Security
- Public Information and Education
- Infrastructure and Economic Restoration
- Human Rights and Social Development

Based on recommendations from workshop participants, we have added a ninth sector on cultural awareness issues.<sup>49</sup> We recognize there is nothing magic about the areas selected here. A draft interagency checklist for restoration of essential services developed for Haiti, identifies twenty functional areas encompassing 113 different services.<sup>50</sup> Nevertheless, we feel that the areas discussed here are sufficiently broad to cover the points that need stressing.

For each sector, discussed in the order shown above, we:

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of the operation that generally (though not precisely) mirrors the operational sectors. Nevertheless, the Generic Pol-Mil Plan's operational sectors are still used by the interagency community in developing a Pol-Mil Plan. We have updated the listing of major functional Security component tasks detailed under each operational sector from a 4 August 1997 version of the Generic Pol-Mil Plan provided by the National Security Council staff.

<sup>49</sup> As a result of our project briefing, cultural issues have been incorporated by the National Security Council staff throughout the initial eight sectors in the current version of the Generic Pol-Mil Plan.

<sup>50</sup> A draft copy (dated 17 October 1994) was provided to the authors by a project participant from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict.

- List the activities in that sector as identified in the Generic Pol-Mil Plan. These activities are illustrative rather than exhaustive. Appendix B includes a more comprehensive (though still not exhaustive) task list.<sup>51</sup>
- Present the issues and identify the strategies (highlighted as headings shown in italics) that emerged from either background research or workshop discussions.<sup>52</sup> Because each complex emergency is unique, the discussions are more descriptive of the various positions offered in the literature and the workshops than prescriptive. This is particularly true for the strategy discussions—strategies are situationally dependent; no single strategy is a template, and no single strategy ever survives reality (the strategy may have looked good on paper, but events never unfold as anticipated).
- Identify direct and indirect tasks the military can pursue to support the recommended strategies.

Finally, we discuss cross-sectoral issues which complement our treatment in Chapter 5 of the results from our analysis of the baseline SIAM influence net models. In a study this size, neither all of the issues nor most of the strategies for dealing with them can be explored. Our intent is to prime the “idea pump” so that planning discussions have something more than a blank sheet

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<sup>51</sup> An excellent source for more detailed military tasks is the *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations* issued by the Joint Warfighting Center. See Joint Warfighting Center, 1995.

<sup>52</sup> Unless otherwise noted, observations without footnotes are those made by participants at one of the three project workshops. Where appropriate, we have documented in footnotes supporting observations from secondary sources.

of paper from which to start. Thus, the sections that follow are intended to be thought provoking rather than conclusive.<sup>53</sup>

During the workshops, when discussing appropriate strategies for dealing with complex emergencies, participants agreed with a quotation from Loreleigh Keashly and Ronald Fisher:

With such a large number of elements, it seems unreasonable to expect that a single intervention strategy could deal fully with all of them. It seems more useful to envision intervention . . . as a *coordinated* series of concurrent and consecutive strategies directed towards the long-term goal of resolving the conflict.<sup>54</sup>

As reluctant as the military is to get involved in complex emergencies, a collaborative approach should prove appealing when it does. Such an approach makes a number of groups responsible for the successful resolution of a crisis, not just the military. It also requires those involved to coordinate (and whenever possible support) each other's efforts.

## Diplomacy

Effective preventive diplomacy is hardly a matter of happen-stance. It requires a delicate mix of timing, negotiating strategies, and the right

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<sup>53</sup> We do not shy away from making our views known, but try to make clear in the text where we are stating our opinions as opposed to those of the participants.

<sup>54</sup> Keashly and Fisher, 1990, p. 424.

personalities for effective mediation, as well as encouragement and properly applied pressure and persuasion from outside parties. . . . It also requires the early generation of international will to take such low-cost action as mediation and conflict prevention and to engage in crisis management and conflict resolution. Combined political and humanitarian action should be taken from the outset, with the possibility of early sanctions and even the use of appropriate small-scale military support for political action.

—John Hirsch and Robert Oakley<sup>55</sup>

Even though history has produced a number of soldier-statesmen, diplomacy primarily remains the realm of foreign service officers. Diplomatic tasks include:

- Collaborating with “Friends Groups,” the United Nations and regional organizations<sup>56</sup>
- Consulting with host nation and other governments
- Consulting with supporting international organizations
- Mediating and negotiating with conflicting parties
- Imposing or lifting sanctions and arms embargoes
- Conducting war crimes investigations, tribunals, and so forth
- Maintaining compliance with peace accord milestones and conditions

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<sup>55</sup> Hirsch and Oakley, 1995, p. 171.

<sup>56</sup> “Friends Groups” are states which join together to help resolve a crisis of common interest. Normally, members of such groups have ethnic, geographical, or economic ties to the state experiencing a complex emergency.

- Appointing special envoys or representatives
- Gaining diplomatic recognition of a government

Of all the operational sectors, diplomacy is perhaps the most perplexing with which to grapple and the most difficult in which to find lasting success. Charles King highlighted this conundrum when he wrote:

On the one hand, most civil wars have ended with the outright military victory of one side over the other, and the most stable peace settlements have been achieved more readily through military victory than through negotiations. On the other hand, military victory in civil wars is also often associated with widespread human-rights abuses, atrocities, genocide, environmental degradation and a host of other ills which make economic reconstruction and political reconciliation especially difficult. Judging by the historical evidence, then, the choice for external powers seems to be between allowing civil wars to 'run their course' and risk massive levels of human suffering and physical destruction, or to promote a negotiated settlement which, if it can ever be reached, may be inherently unstable.<sup>57</sup>

This Faustian dilemma is not an easy one with which to deal. We group our observations in the diplomacy sector under three headings: prevention and early warning, intervention, and the importance of peace agreements. We set off our strategy recommendations under each heading using italicized sub-headings. Finally, we discuss the military's role in the diplomatic arena.

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<sup>57</sup> King, 1997, pp. 12–13.



## Prevention and Early Warning

Although there is broad agreement that prevention is better (and cheaper) than cure, the international community has yet to demonstrate a willingness to invest in prevention. The Rwanda crisis is a perfect example. Except for the enormity of the genocide, there were no surprises. Numerous agencies had predicted trouble, Radio Télévision Libre des Milles Collines was openly calling for violence, and President Juvénal Habyarimana was stalling the implementation of the Arusha Agreement. Trouble was coming, but no one intervened to stop it. When the international community finally did respond, it was too late for the nearly eight hundred thousand who were slaughtered. In terms of national treasure alone, the belated intervention reportedly cost the United States fifty times more than a timely intervention would have, and hundreds of thousands of Rwandans might have been saved.<sup>58</sup>

Boutros Boutros-Ghali decried the obvious lack of international preventive actions and speculated about the reasons:

Despite widespread recognition of the importance of preventive action, there is too little prevention and too much cure. I attribute this lacuna in peace operations to three factors.

First, we lack a culture of prevention. This is a culture where the protagonists are willing to accept international, or judicial settlement—whether or not

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<sup>58</sup> Connaughton, 1996, p. 68.

through the United Nations—and are prepared to act upon the results of such measures. Very often, international mediation, or even action, is accepted by the protagonists after the situation has passed a critical threshold. This leads to greater human and material losses, as well as a considerably more difficult task for negotiators.

Second, we lack diplomats qualified for prevention. We need a greater number of diplomats with the training, with the experience, and with the moral authority, to undertake preventive work on behalf of the United Nations. When such diplomats do exist, they are not always available to spend long months, possibly even years, in delicate negotiations. It is easy to find diplomats or statesmen who will undertake missions of a few days. It is more difficult to find men and women with the skills, the commitment and the time, to undertake the longer negotiations that effective prevention may require.

Third, we lack political will. It is recognized that prevention is less costly, in terms of human and material resources, than cure. But we now see an emerging pattern of unwillingness to prevent, control or stop a wide range of conflicts, followed by a readiness to step in after the killing is over and the carnage has subsided. I recall, here, the Chinese proverb that it is difficult to find money for medicine, but easy to find it for a coffin. Preventive action still needs to come into its own, as a major focus of multilateral diplomacy.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> Boutros-Ghali, 1996b.

## **Prevention is better than cure—identify early warning mechanisms**

If prevention or, barring that, early intervention are the best and cheapest alternatives for dealing with complex emergencies, then early warning mechanisms should be encouraged. Such mechanisms would look for “crisis triggers.” Consider, for example, stress migration,<sup>60</sup> which, one analyst notes, “can burden the receiving community by fueling cultural or ethnic conflicts or by contributing to wage-depressing competition in labor markets.”<sup>61</sup> An early intervention in a stress migration crisis might well prevent an even larger crisis in a neighboring region. In the case of stress migration, this analyst suggests, crisis triggers would “include military operations, destruction of crops or economic assets, food shortages and collapse of agricultural systems and/or the economy.”<sup>62</sup>

## **Address both causes and symptoms of conflict**

Michael Brown notes that “the idea of conflict prevention has a lot of intuitive appeal. . . . Conflict prevention, however, is far from simple. Conflict is, after all, inherent in political, economic, and social life, even if violent conflict is not. Conflict, broadly defined, cannot be extinguished, only controlled.”<sup>63</sup> Brown suggests that “those

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<sup>60</sup> Stress migration is population movement caused by such things as drought, famine, or widespread disease.

<sup>61</sup> Lautze, 1996, p. 32.

<sup>62</sup> Lautze, 1996, p. 31.

<sup>63</sup> Brown, 1996, pp. 606–07.

interested in conflict prevention should have a two-track strategy. One track would be a series of sustained, long-term efforts [that] focus on the underlying problems that make violence likely. The other track should be a series of more aggressive efforts focused on the proximate causes of internal conflicts—the triggers that turn potentially violent situations into armed confrontations.”<sup>64</sup>

Most foreign service personnel, like Ambassador Robert Oakley, are in the camp of those who believe that prevention is both possible and better than cure. Oakley also argues that the international community must deal both with the triggers as well as the broader conditions which foster complex emergencies. “The best means of achieving that end,” he writes, “is through conventional bilateral and multilateral instruments of assistance to address the causes of both short- and long-term tension, enhance stability, and improve governance. The many different attempts to prevent or resolve conflict by short-term actions have revealed the extreme difficulty of the task and the importance of tackling root causes.”<sup>65</sup>

Since they realize that the root causes of instability have long since infected areas where unrest is likely to erupt, diplomats are trying to mitigate root cause effects. Oakley details some of these causes:

Unrest in troubled states is fueled by long-term, systemic crises such as overpopulation, environmental damage, food shortages, poverty,

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<sup>64</sup> Brown, 1996, p. 607.

<sup>65</sup> Oakley, 1996, p. 82.

income disparity, corruption, and bad governance as well as societal divisions. There is also a propensity to appeal to ethnic, linguistic, cultural, or other forms of separatism for solace, protection, and identity.<sup>66</sup>

King also looks beyond the triggers and discusses “structural components of civil war” that provide incentives for continued violence. They include:<sup>67</sup>

- leadership
- decision-making and enforcement (that is, command and control) processes of antagonist elites
- the perceived calculus between military means and political objectives (that is, the military situation on the ground)
- conflict asymmetries (of assets, commitment, organization, and status)
- security dilemmas (such as developing trust and guarding against human rights abuses)

King believes that addressing the structural problems can lead to increased opportunities for a negotiated settlement.

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<sup>66</sup> Oakley, 1996, p. 82.

<sup>67</sup> King, 1997, pp. 29–53.

## Intervention

Most critics believe that interventions come too late to prevent the concomitant consequences of crises. In Rwanda it was predicted that “without effective and rapid rehabilitation, there [would] be no reconciliation, and without reconciliation, the need for humanitarian assistance [would] only increase as the number of refugees and displaced [grew] with the persistence of tension and conflict.”<sup>68</sup> The response was neither rapid nor sufficient, and the result was increased unrest, which spread to neighboring countries. Laurent Kabilo’s overthrow of Zaire’s dictator, Mobutu Sese Seko in May 1997, can be directly traced to the spillover effects of large numbers of Rwandan Hutu refugees in eastern Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo). Time of exposure is another critical determinant of a community’s eventual capacity to recover from crisis.<sup>69</sup> As Mary Anderson explains,

In the early days of disintegration, many people decry the ‘insanity’ of a war which separates them from friends and family. However, as fighting continues and more people have direct experiences of atrocities (as victims and/or perpetrators), they become more committed to the conflict at a personal and emotional level.<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>68</sup> Minear and Guillot, 1996, p. 67, quoting the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

<sup>69</sup> Lautze, 1996, p. 26.

<sup>70</sup> Anderson, 1996b, p. 46.

In other words, crises generally grow worse over time, as more people are displaced or killed, prejudices become more hardened, and famine and disease become silent co-conspirators. Decisions about if and when to intervene are political, not military. However, delays are not only costly for the victims of a complex emergency, but also for forces that eventually are sent to deal with worsening conditions.

### **Intervene early**

There is general consensus that early action is the next best thing to prevention. Some analysts, like Riamo Väyrynen, believe that the international community has finally recognized the importance of early intervention. Others believe he may be too sanguine when he writes,

There is no doubt we are witnessing an international trend towards quicker reaction policies for mitigating conflicts, as indicated by the policy makers' emphasis on early warning and prevention. The trend derives its momentum from the presumption that violence is easier to prevent and resolve at an early phase, when issues are still specific and hence more amenable to transformation, the number of parties to the conflict is limited, thus reducing its complexity, and early measures are more cost-effective than later efforts.<sup>71</sup>

During much of the Cold War, states were willing to offer resources to United Nations operations as a matter of principle. However, even the most altruistic of states

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<sup>71</sup> Pugh, 1997, p. 22.

now considers whether its “*direct* national security interests” are involved before determining whether, and how deeply, to get involved in international crises.<sup>72</sup> This means that early intervention is unlikely during crises in which no national interests of Western nations are involved.<sup>73</sup> Early intervention is also unlikely in situations where intervening forces may be placed at risk.

In order to start early with diplomatic approaches, states must pay attention to the indicators that make a collapsing state ripe for violence. Because he believes that violent power struggles underlie complex emergencies, Michael Brown asserts that there are three which must be present for unstable situations to explode into complex emergencies:

- Vulnerable political elites; irresponsible leaders must feel threatened by intensifying elite competitions
- Antagonistic group histories must be in play
- A country must be suffering from mounting domestic economic problems

He argues that when all three factors are present, “permissive conditions and active catalysts come together, and the potential for violence is great.”<sup>74</sup> If Brown is cor-

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<sup>72</sup> See Huldt, 1995, p. 114.

<sup>73</sup> According to one review of past preventive interventions, experience suggests that they will be successful only when major powers are involved (with at least indirect US support) through a combination of significant positive and negative inducements brought to bear early. See Creative Associates International, Inc., 1996, pp. 5-20 to 5-21.

<sup>74</sup> Brown, 1996, pp. 576 and 587 (quoted on p. 576); see also Norton and



rect, then changing the permissive environment, removing the catalysts, or mitigating the causative conditions all offer potential avenues to a peaceful solution. The first and third factors (leadership and economic woes) can be addressed by the international community; the middle factor (history) cannot.

### **Respond promptly to resolve or contain crises**

If prevention and diplomatic intervention fail to work, Oakley says, the “next stage would be a prompt response to resolve or contain a crisis to avoid greater problems and large-scale intervention. Usually this involves concerted multinational action of a primarily civilian nature with legitimization and support from regional or international organizations, focused on a rapid delivery of crisis assistance.”<sup>75</sup> He then recommends pursuing supporting diplomatic actions needed prior to any force commitment, which include: “consultations with U.N., international, and regional organizations and governments to communicate and obtain responses to the U.S. proposition that military action should be taken; efforts to create a multinational core group, possibly including regional organizations, willing to assist through political influence, financial support, and/or direct civilian or military participation; diplomatic approaches to U.N. and other international and regional organizations to mobilize support and legitimize intervention.”<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> Oakley, 1996, p. 83.

<sup>76</sup> Oakley, 1996, p. 83.

To prevent, contain, or end a crisis, it is necessary to confront those who would be better served by its continuation. Mary Anderson identifies four such groups and describes their motivations:

- *Thugs*. This group includes those who have been raised as child-soldiers among militias. They learn to enjoy wielding the power gained from the barrel of a gun and often know no other way of life. “These young men intimidate and rob anyone for their own enrichment or, simply, for the pleasure of exerting their power over others. These men feel as if they have everything to lose if war ends.”<sup>77</sup>
- *Irreconcilables*. This group includes those who would lose everything should the war end, such as war criminals or a favored class or clan. There are also the ideologues who believe so strongly in their cause “that there is simply no compromise possible with the enemy. Complete victory is the only outcome they will accept.”<sup>78</sup>
- *Arms merchants and other profiteers*. For this group, the motivation is patently obvious—profit.
- *Some employees of aid organizations*. While aid workers are generally involved because they enjoy doing good, those hired locally to support aid efforts, such as “drivers, secretaries, warehouse guards, programme staff, liaisons with authorities, . . . may

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<sup>77</sup> Anderson, 1996b, p. 11.

<sup>78</sup> Anderson, 1996b, p. 11.

find their survival threatened by the cessation of conflict and the resultant withdrawal of emergency assistance.”<sup>79</sup>

## **The Importance of Peace Agreements**

Interventions rarely achieve long-term success without a peace agreement in place. While that may be bad news, there is worse. One recent analysis suggests that most “civil wars do not end in a negotiated settlement, and [for] those [wars] that do, [the settlements] occur after long years of violence and international attention.”<sup>80</sup> The question is whether such data justify inaction on the part of the international community when a complex emergency does arise.

### **Give diplomats the authority and assets to make crisis diplomacy work**

Crisis diplomacy most often fails when diplomats are given insufficient authority and assets to be effective, not because diplomacy is an impotent art. The Somalia case provides a perfect example. There, Mohamed Sahnoun, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, and Robert Oakley, the US Special Envoy—both able diplomats—achieved very different results. Oakley was more successful than Sahnoun because he was supported by his government and

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<sup>79</sup> Anderson, 1996b, p. 12.

<sup>80</sup> Stephen John Stedman in Daniel and Hayes, 1995, p. 55.

backed by a significant military force while Sahnoun had little force and lacked the full support (he believed) of the Secretary-General.

Several principles for success in crisis diplomacy have been put forward; these include:<sup>81</sup>

- Give negotiators maximum leeway
- Start early (early is much better than late)
- Talk to everyone
- Bring multilateral organizations in from the beginning
- Don't be obsessed with signing ceremonies (signing a bad agreement may be worse than having no agreement at all)

What diplomats are attempting to prevent are violent, intractable crises.

### **Reconciliation may not always be the answer**

"You can have an absence of war," General George Joulwan, USA, noted with regard to the challenge in Bosnia, "but that's not peace; reconciliation is a state of mind."<sup>82</sup> But sometimes even reconciliation may not be enough. As one workshop participant stated, "It may be that the only route to a durable peace is for the parties not to reconcile but rather agree to the terms of an ami-

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<sup>81</sup> Derived from Smock, 1997, pp. 2–4.

<sup>82</sup> Quoted in Chuck Vinch, "Europe, U.N. must push Bosnia effort, Joulwan says," *European Stars & Stripes*, 20 March 1997, p. 3.

cable divorce.” This is a highly contentious area, with proponents on both sides of the argument. Those who believe that amicable divorce is a viable alternative to reconciliation point most often to the “relatively peaceful dissolution of the Soviet Union” and Czechoslovakia’s “velvet divorce”:<sup>83</sup>

Defenders of partition make an argument that runs as follows. When an ethnic war is far advanced, partition is probably the most humane form of intervention because it attempts to achieve through negotiation what would otherwise be achieved through fighting; it circumvents the conflict and saves lives. . . . In fact, its advocates say, the ideal strategy for resolving an ethnic conflict is to intervene and take partition to its logical conclusion by dividing a country along its communal battle lines and helping make the resulting territories ethnically homogenous through organized population transfers.<sup>84</sup>

Such situations, it is argued, are intransigent and have become more so as a result of extended or particularly brutal conflict. Andrew Natsios predicts that situations leading to partition may become the norm:

The human appetite for revenge is insatiable. Each atrocity, real or rumored, by one group is followed by other, even more egregious, human rights abuses in retaliation for the original offense. . . . Skillful diplomacy and military force cannot erase these memories. In some societies, where the atrocities have reached sociopathic levels, peace

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<sup>83</sup> Kumar, 1997, p. 25.

<sup>84</sup> Kumar, 1997, pp. 23–24.

may not be possible for generations. Preventing atrocities by separating populations that have been committing them against one another could become an implied mission of future military interventions.<sup>85</sup>

But by doing so, interveners lay the groundwork for territorial grievances and vendettas. Workshop participants argued that power-sharing arrangements in such circumstances are seldom successful. One participant believed that most political arrangements, including power-sharing, delay rather than promote reconciliation:

Reconciliation is inherently antithetical to politics, it requires a long-term approach with no immediate tangible results. For example, amnesty programs may be necessary to bring parties to the negotiating table, but they often exacerbate the reconciliation process because justice is not served. Conversely, actively pursuing war criminal investigations while peace negotiations are in progress can stretch out that process.

Michael Brown concludes that “electoral systems based on proportional representation have clear advantages over winner-take-all systems, and should therefore be promoted. Formal power-sharing systems, with positions allocated according to strict formulas, intensify ethnic identifications and should be discouraged. They might work in the short term, but they will inevitably come under pressure in the long term as group demographics change.”<sup>86</sup> Other analysts believe that power-sharing

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<sup>85</sup> Natsios, 1996b, p. 59.

<sup>86</sup> Brown, 1996, p. 609.

provisions in any negotiated agreement are “crucial to resolving the problems of ethnic division.”<sup>87</sup> Richard Holbrooke, the man perhaps most responsible for mediating the Dayton accords, agrees: “I believe partition would leave the region in a perpetual state of unresolved tension, keep the international community involved longer and at greater cost, and risk igniting other boundary disputes in the region.”<sup>88</sup> Along similar lines, Radha Kumar argues that partitions undertaken “as the lesser of two evils,” that is, whose primary objective is to prevent sharing power, have historically “fomented further violence and forced mass migration.”<sup>89</sup> Hence, she concludes, partition is not a viable alternative, and the international community needs to work harder to bring about reconciliation.

Another workshop participant averred that “reconciliation—like capacity building—is a cross-cutting issue. If you don’t understand the reconciliation piece of the puzzle, you are doomed to failure over time.” When reconciliation, versus amicable divorce, is the objective, “mechanisms for addressing past human rights violations, including war crimes,” must be established. “The relative merits of war crimes tribunals, truth commissions and human rights monitoring missions should be considered on a case by case basis.” Sometimes a public catharsis will never be reached, and only the careful

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<sup>87</sup> Hampson, 1997, p. 21.

<sup>88</sup> Holbrooke, 1997, p. 170.

<sup>89</sup> Kumar, 1997, p. 24.

education of succeeding generations may complete the reconciliation process. As one participant noted, “policymakers need to recognize reconciliation as a practical, hard-headed approach; not some touchy-feely group hug.” Participants agreed that “peace” and “justice” are two very different, but not necessarily mutually exclusive, concepts.

### **The military should be in a supporting role, if involved at all**

If the military is deployed, it should remember, as George Kennan wrote in his autobiography, that in peacetime soldiers are the servants of diplomats. The challenge, according to General John Shalikashvili, is that “these operations sit in that netherworld between war and peace where the lines between diplomacy and force are intermingled and certainly muddled.”<sup>90</sup> The military’s roles are to contain the crisis, buy time for negotiation, and establish a secure environment that can foster peace accord implementation. Denis McLean noted that the “fundamental determinants of the success or failure of a peace operation are political, not military, in nature. No matter how impressive they might be, military capabilities cannot bring about a successful outcome in the absence of a widely shared sense of collective political responsibility.”<sup>91</sup>

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<sup>90</sup> Shalikashvili, 1996.

<sup>91</sup> McLean, 1996, p. 2.



## Military Activities

While the military was essential in providing internal stability, it was largely irrelevant to the other activities [in Haiti], especially since forces were directed not to conduct nation-building activities.

—Margaret Daly Hayes and Gary F. Wheatley<sup>92</sup>

There are two aspects to security: internal and external. The internal challenge, public security and law and order, will be discussed below. This section discusses external security and those forces normally associated with it. It also discusses the role of intervention forces in complex contingency operations. As the introductory quotation implies, the military has been sharply proscribed in what it has been allowed to undertake. The draft generic interagency integrated plan highlights this by noting an extremely narrow list of military tasks. They include:

- Assessing, training, and equipping coalition forces
- Conducting military operations in support of the mandate
- Providing intelligence support to the operation
- Establishing observer missions
- Implementing weapons control regimes
- Demobilizing, reducing, and/or reintegrating military units

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<sup>92</sup> Hayes and Wheatley, 1996, pp. 42–43.

- Conducting constabulary operations
- Establishing confidence-building and security measures
- Professionalizing and restructuring military forces
- Establishing military-to-military programs
- Coordinating support to the operation (e.g., from NATO)
- Providing security assistance to the host nation
- Conducting transition planning, hand-off, and military drawdown

Unlike other operational sectors, the military should be involved in all of these sector tasks. Nevertheless, participants noted that military involvement in complex emergencies should be limited in both duration and size. The “military should not do what others can—only supplement their efforts when required.” In fact, there remain some in the relief community who feel the military should not be involved at all. Their long-held belief is that military involvement only exacerbates an already bad situation. John Prendergast and Colin Scott note that the skepticism concerning military involvement is still very much present:

Increased external military involvement in complex emergencies both as a protector and provider of humanitarian aid has been a mixed blessing for established aid agencies. While many praise increasing military involvement in humanitarian relief as a positive, rights-protective step, others fear a new pattern of relief-assistance-as-political-

crisis-management. The tremendous costs of military operations are disproportionate to the value of the emergency aid protected.<sup>93</sup>

Mary Anderson takes this position a step further arguing that “when aid agencies negotiate with the leaders of armies to gain access to civilian populations, or when they hire armed guards to protect the goods they bring, they appear to accept as legitimate the right of arms to determine who gets access to food, medical and other human goods.”<sup>94</sup> Acceptance of that logic would rule out the involvement of military forces in humanitarian interventions altogether.

Because of recent history, however, the power of that logic is not as widely accepted as in years past. Today it is unrealistic to think that the military will not continue to get involved. The world can no longer remain blissfully ignorant of what is happening in the world. As William DeMars observed:

It may have been possible to kill tens or hundreds of thousands of people without detection fifty years ago in China, or even fifteen years ago in Cambodia. But today mass killings are likely to be monitored and reported, often by NGOs, in real political time as in Rwanda. To receive such information without having the reliable capacity to act on it creates a troubling moral challenge for the global civil society. It is also a development unprecedented in human history.<sup>95</sup>

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<sup>93</sup> Prendergast and Scott, 1996, p. 22.

<sup>94</sup> Anderson, 1996b, p. 5.

<sup>95</sup> DeMars, 1996, p. 86.

Only by looking to the long term can the military help complex contingency operation activities attain sustainable security.<sup>96</sup> As Denis McLean argues:

Peace operations—representing pragmatic, casualty-averse, control-led responses to seemingly endemic violence in the world—have the potential to become the primary institutional vehicle for collective security. . . . By any calculus of lives saved, humanitarian relief supplies delivered, democracy fostered, or peace processes advanced, peace operations score well.<sup>97</sup>

Oakley agrees that the military will continue to get involved and suggests that the military activities most frequently associated with complex contingency operations will remain—e.g., logistic and other support for humanitarian operations and coalition peace operations in benign environments; support for and direct roles in (to include command of) complex, medium-sized civil-military peace operations in more dangerous environments; and a variety of traditional military activities (such as shows of force, noncombatant evacuation operations, embargoes, or no-fly zones) conducted here in the context of complex contingency operations.<sup>98</sup> Throughout this range of activities, one observer notes, the Civil-Military Operations Center “must become the [military’s

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<sup>96</sup> Pauline Baker and John Ausink define “sustainable security” as the condition where a collapsed state has “the internal capacity to solve its own problems peacefully without a foreign administrative or military presence.” See Baker and Ausink, 1996, p. 21. We discuss the concept of sustainable security in more detail in Chapter Six.

<sup>97</sup> McLean, 1996, p. ix.

<sup>98</sup> Oakley, 1996, p. 82.

top] priority because it represents—through close coordination with the NGOs and the rest of the humanitarian community—the military’s best chance to design and control its exit strategy.”<sup>99</sup>

The findings we use to frame our observations in this sector are: military demobilization and restructuring; disarmament, weapons control, and demining; dealing with chaos and unfulfilled expectations; and force protection.

### **Military Demobilization and Restructuring**

Any sovereign state has the right to maintain sufficient armed forces to protect its borders. For states emerging from collapse, this often means demobilizing and restructuring competing forces into a new military. Ambassador Moore notes that “demobilization occupies a unique role within reintegration efforts, jointly serving security, political and economic needs and connected with disarming and demining activity in trying to preempt resumption of armed conflict and banditry.”<sup>100</sup> Because any new force is likely to be much smaller than the combined total of those previously involved in internal strife, some personnel will have to find new employment. If no jobs or retraining programs are available, their alternatives quickly become banditry or begging.

### **Be prepared to help professionalize and restructure military forces**

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<sup>99</sup> Seiple, 1996, p. 136.

<sup>100</sup> Moore, 1996, p. 21.

Although job retraining may not fall on the shoulders of intervening armed forces, demobilizing, restructuring and professionalizing indigenous military forces will.<sup>101</sup> The military will also be expected to establish military-to-military programs. Workshop participants believed that the military may not be the most appropriate body to ensure that personnel from armed forces and militias are integrated into society or that a restructured government-run military is effective. They believe these activities generally should be addressed by others during longer-term, international responses to complex emergencies. Nevertheless, participants did believe that the military should be prepared to directly influence these areas.

### **Disarmament, Weapons Control, and Demining**

Generally something must be done with the weapons that have flooded a country during a civil conflict. "The management of arms has increasingly become part of mission objectives," notes Fred Tanner, "particularly in the framework of multidimensional operations for implementing comprehensive settlements of civil wars."<sup>102</sup> Disarmament, however, is an extremely complex and highly emotional issue. "In war-torn communities gaining possession of a gun may be more advantageous than trying to find a job."<sup>103</sup> The military is loathe to con-

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<sup>101</sup> For an overview of the challenges and prospects, see Berdal, 1996, *passim*.

<sup>102</sup> Pugh, 1997, p. 126.

duct disarmament, because it is a manpower intensive operation (often requiring risky house-to-house searches) and it is often impossible to determine when an individual has a legitimate need to bear arms. For all these reasons, workshop participants preferred the term “weapons control” over “disarmament,” and most believed a weapons control program was necessary in complex emergencies. The goal of intervention should be to establish conditions under which no one feels a need to resort to the use of arms.

The magnitude of the problem can be demonstrated by a few cases. For the Somalia intervention, for example, the UN Secretary-General wanted the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to conduct an extensive forceful disarmament program before turning the mission over to the United Nations. The United States, which led the operation, strenuously resisted this proposal, and UNITAF only collected weapons when it believed they posed a significant threat to friendly forces. The result was a stress on eliminating heavier weapons. Thus, between December 1994 and February 1995 UNITAF collected 1.27 million rounds of light ammunition along with 2,255 small arms. It also confiscated 636 heavy weapons, including tanks, mortars, grenade-, rocket-, and missile-launchers, and surface-to-air missiles. Ambassador Robert Oakley insisted that “had UNITAF pursued a policy of full-scale disarmament, it would have needed a much greater force for the mission and would almost certainly have become embroiled in a series of local clashes.”<sup>104</sup>

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<sup>103</sup> Pugh, 1995, p. 322.

In Haiti, the stress was on lighter weapons; a cash-for-guns program resulted in the collection of some 33,000 small arms, but no forceful disarmament program was attempted. A gun buy-back program was also conducted in Croatia, and “within three months, the troops had collected some 100,400 rifles, 253,000 reusable anti-tank rocket launchers and nearly as many disposable rocket launchers, 6,271 hand grenades and more than 250,000 rounds of ammunition.”<sup>105</sup>

### **Incorporate evenhanded weapons control programs as part of rehabilitation efforts**

No one argues that these efforts had any significant effect, since the weapons gathered represented only a small portion of those available to antagonists. But analysts argue that a little more effort than has been demonstrated in the past could make a difference. In Somalia, for example, “successful disarmament did not require the removal of every weapon in the country; sufficient disarmament could have been conducted to weaken the warlords enough to make them more reliant on the process of political reconstruction.”<sup>106</sup> Since troop-contributing states have proven time and again that they are unwilling to conduct coercive disarmament,

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<sup>104</sup> Hirsch and Oakley, 1995, p. 104.

<sup>105</sup> Pisik, 1997, p. 10.

<sup>106</sup> Chopra, Eknes, and Nordbø, 1995, p. 44.



workshop participants recommended exploring “the efficacy of various incentive schemes for disarmament, such as cash, land, tools, seeds, and/or food for weapons.”

While systematic and properly organized buy-back programs can have short-term positive effects on the security environment, it matters how one pursues disarmament and weapons control. For example, disarmament of just one faction, as appeared to be the case in Somalia (though the reality was more even-handed), can have destabilizing consequences. Other confidence-building measures are needed for longer-term rehabilitation. Above all else, evidence of progress in the political sphere as part of a coherent strategy will be necessary; otherwise, overcoming military and technical challenges of disarmament and weapons control will prove of little avail.<sup>107</sup>

### **Give special attention to demining activities**

Demining activities, as a subset of disarmament and weapons control, deserve particular attention. “According to a US State Department report based on 1992 data, more than 150 casualties occur around the globe weekly (approximately 7800 per annum).”<sup>108</sup> Michael Pugh described the magnitude of the problem:

Mines, scattered without consideration for their eventual decommissioning, are clearly a menace to social and economic reconstruction. There are

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<sup>107</sup> Berdal, 1996, pp. 30, 33–34.

<sup>108</sup> Runions and Roy, 1997, p. 8.

an estimated 100 million anti-personnel mines in many locations from Cambodia to Afghanistan and Angola (with 2 million laid during the conflict in former Yugoslavia alone). The costs in human life, mutilations, medical support and lost economic production are difficult to estimate, but some indications are available. In Angola, \$32 million of food aid in 1994 had to compensate for lost food production as a consequence of mines. Neutralizing mines is therefore an urgent priority in re-establishing free movement, relieving medical burdens and re-establishing agriculture. Furthermore, de-mining has psychological benefits in peacebuilding. According to Boutros-Ghali: 'Experience has shown that mine clearance is an activity that fosters national reconciliation by involving hostile parties in a mutually beneficial undertaking, thus reinforcing the confidence necessary for the creation of lasting peace and contributing to economic and social rehabilitation.'<sup>109</sup>

Demining activities represent exactly the kinds of military contributions that can positively affect the entire spectrum of stability, from security to health to the economy. They can also have the side benefit of encouraging those involved with demining to become concerned with the welfare of fellow citizens, regardless of which side they supported during the conflict.<sup>110</sup> In most

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<sup>109</sup> Pugh, 1995, p. 322.

<sup>110</sup> In Bosnia, for example, no such concern has yet emerged. This lack of concern has been the source of dark humor. The story is told of a Bosnian Serb who finds a bottle as he is digging through the rubble of a bombed-out house. He opens it and a genie pops out, who grants him three wishes. The twist is that the genie is obliged to offer the Serb's Muslim neighbor a double portion of whatever the Serb wishes. The Serb first wishes for ten million dollars and it is granted—and his Muslim neighbor gets twenty million dollars. The Serb next requests a large, new home in a safe area. His wish is granted, but his Muslim neighbor gets a home twice as big in an even safer area. Finally, the Serb says, "I wish to be beaten half to death." While this has little to do with the potential positive effects of collaborative demining, it is a telling anecdote of the challenges associated with complex emergencies.

recent civil wars, the land mine problem has been so great that the military generally considers demining to be beyond the scope of its limited mission. As a result, military involvement has been confined to clearing areas which directly impact its missions and training indigenous teams to carry out a mine clearance program. Some countries have hired private contractors to help with the clean-up efforts.

### **Dealing with Chaos and Unfulfilled Expectations**

Andrew Natsios has noted that “anarchy does not respect national boundaries: chaos in one country has a way of spilling over its borders into another.”<sup>111</sup> One participant suggested that “a major role of the military is to provide order out of chaos. This is an ongoing process in the transition phase, but it is what is expected of the military.” In other words, the military is expected to take charge, restore order, prevent spillover, and make things happen immediately.<sup>112</sup> According to General Anthony Zinni, USMC, once a mission has seized the initiative, it should try not to lose momentum.<sup>113</sup> This is an extremely difficult challenge, because expectations about what the force will accomplish (especially if it is US-led) will far exceed what is really attainable.

<sup>111</sup> Natsios, 1994, p. 142.

<sup>112</sup> The speed at which things begin to happen is judged differently by NGOs and the military. In Somalia, for example, “from the humanitarian perspective, the Marines were moving at a glacial pace. From the military perspective, however, the Marines were ‘smokin’! For a landing force to be [over 140 miles] inland within six days, under uncertain threat conditions, was a considerable feat.” (Seiple, 1996, p. 123.)

<sup>113</sup> Zinni’s points are drawn from the keynote address he delivered 26 October 1995 in Washington, DC, at the Annual Conference of the Center for Naval Analyses. A video tape of that speech is in the authors’ possession.

## **Open a dialogue with everyone**

Zinni argues the best way to minimize the frustration level is to open a dialogue with everyone in the society, making sure that all have a forum in which they can air complaints and be advised about mission accomplishments, goals, and so forth. UNITAF set up numerous committees to meet this objective, only to see them wither away under UNOSOM II. Hence, UNITAF's successes were not matched during the UNOSOM operation.

## **Force Protection**

Every international force enjoys the right of self-defense, and emphasis on force protection is and should be the *sine qua non* for any military force involved in a complex contingency operation. Overly cautious force protection programs, however, can have a detrimental effect on relief efforts. In Bosnia, US forces were required to move with a minimum of four vehicles. This requirement significantly decreased force mobility and effectiveness. The same thing occurred in Rwanda, where “unarmed women were driving throughout the countryside, alone, as were the rest of the NGO personnel,” but when American troops moved, they used “HUMVEE’s with mounted .50 caliber machine-guns at the front and rear of the convoy. No matter the context, they always wore their flak jacket and helmet.”<sup>114</sup> Hence, “even where and when present, [military forces] were generally less prepared

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<sup>114</sup> Seiple, 1996, p. 163.

to take risks than the humanitarians whom they were there to protect.”<sup>115</sup> These force protection policies were a direct result of learning the wrong lessons in Somalia as well as trying to achieve ambiguous US political aims. While the ultimate objective of such policies is to protect American lives, they can backfire.

A military presence not connected to a clear [political] policy enhances the possibility that the military force will adopt a no casualties/force protection policy. Such a policy, implicit or otherwise, actually endangers the soldier/Marine on the ground. Any potential belligerent recognizes that the U.S. is leery of casualties, which in turn makes the soldier/Marine a high-value target. Because his death can change the course of a government, his humanitarian purpose is dwarfed by the perceived political ramifications of his death.<sup>116</sup>

### **Protect the force, but be prepared to act**

Some analysts insist that the lessons that should have been learned in this area were “not that military officials should not be concerned about protecting their troops but that risk avoidance may limit their utility to the humanitarian effort.”<sup>117</sup> One critic lamented, “It cannot be acceptable for the world’s superpower to be so demonstrably *timid and tentative*.”<sup>118</sup> Sometimes the best de-

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<sup>115</sup> Minear and Guillot, 1996, p. 36.

<sup>116</sup> Seiple, 1996, pp. 134–35.

<sup>117</sup> Minear and Guillot, 1996, p. 156.

<sup>118</sup> Connaughton, 1996, p. 66.

fense is a good offense. Observers have noted that when a significant and properly armed force intervenes in a crisis, it often does not have to fight. As one group of analysts wrote concerning Somalia, “while it was an old peacekeeping dictum that a show of force can avoid the need to use force, it was also true that to be credible there had to be a willingness and competence to use force and threaten it on an on-going basis.”<sup>119</sup> They also noted that the “US strength evoked fear, but also confidence in its capability.”<sup>120</sup> Fostering confidence is important for all parties. For the factions, this confidence makes it easier for them to comply with international demands, because they know that all sides can be coerced to do so. The perception of competence also makes it easier to attract more and better coalition partners, since they understand their own forces will be subject to fewer risks.

Force protection can also be enhanced by civil affairs activities that contribute to winning the “hearts and minds” of the population. One should not rely too heavily on winning the hearts-and-minds battle, however. When high expectations are not met, disappointment and anger are often the next emotions to emerge, and those feelings often find their best release in acts of violence against those intervening. This is another good reason to propagate actively the limits of an operation’s goals and capabilities, even before it begins.

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<sup>119</sup> Chopra, Eknes, and Nordbø, 1995, p. 40.

<sup>120</sup> Chopra, Eknes, and Nordbø, 1995, p. 43.

## Humanitarian Assistance

Humanitarian assistance should strive to revitalize local institutions, enabling them to provide for the needs of the affected community. Humanitarian assistance should provide a solid first step on the continuum of emergency relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction and development.

—Task Force on Ethical and Legal Issues in Humanitarian Assistance, 1994<sup>121</sup>

Complex emergencies—intentionally or unintentionally, but inevitably—damage the delivery of social services in involved states. “Conflict forces administrative authorities to redirect their priorities and funding, usually away from social services to military budgets. . . . Residents can then no longer make claims on the state and must seek alternatives.”<sup>122</sup> Until a functioning government can be fully restored, there are only four alternatives for victims: strengthen self-reliance, locally reproduce services formerly provided by the state, depend on external assistance, or do without.

Tasks falling under this sector include:

- Avoiding generation of population movements
- Providing emergency humanitarian relief

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<sup>121</sup> Task Force on Ethical and Legal Issues in Humanitarian Assistance, 1994, p. 4.

<sup>122</sup> Lautze, 1996, p. 8.

- Providing health services (water, food, etc.)
- Organizing humanitarian assistance zones or relief areas
- Coordinating NGO activities
- Repatriating or resettling refugees and displaced persons
- Providing housing and public services for returning people
- Assisting in capacity-building
- Prepositioning humanitarian relief stocks

The military's primary role is to support local agencies and NGOs, not to lead them. Many believe, however, that "while policy and preference dictate that civilian agencies should manage civic assistance activities, in fact, the military often end up taking on the tasks because they arrive first and have the manpower, surge capacity, and flexibility to act."<sup>123</sup> There may also be situations that could give rise to greater degrees of violence quickly or easily, resulting in increased threats to international peace and security. In situations such as these, some workshop participants suggested that the military should take the lead at first but be prepared to transition to non-military leadership when circumstances permit.

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<sup>123</sup> Hayes and Wheatley, 1996, p. 57.



One area where there is a sharp difference between the military and the relief agencies is establishing an end state. Relief and development aid is likely to be required long after the military withdraws; thus, a military end state is only another (and perhaps not even a very important) milestone for relief organizations. One interesting exception to this premise could be in urban areas, where the rule of thumb is: "When you can no longer identify the differences between the urban displaced and the urban poor, it's time to stop relief distributions."<sup>124</sup> A similar rule was used by Lieutenant General Schroeder in determining when to leave Rwanda.<sup>125</sup>

The aims of "humanitarian assistance" include "respect for human life, and the promotion of health and dignity for all. . . . [It] means caring for all victims, and for them alone, and refusing to accept suffering as legitimate in any circumstances."<sup>126</sup> The priorities of humanitarian assistance are to relieve suffering and stop people from dying. This means that the provision of food, water, and health services is the top priority. Once these basic needs are under control, dealing with refugees and displaced persons often occupies the attention of inter-

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<sup>124</sup> Lautze, 1996, p. 33.

<sup>125</sup> Schroeder wrote, "The mortality rate has fallen dramatically, from over 3,000 per day to less than 500. Soon the camps will no longer qualify as crises under the UN definition of the term (2 deaths/10,000/day)." Connaughton, 1996, p. 64.

<sup>126</sup> Palwankar, 1994, p. 104.

vention forces. We frame our observations under four headings: aid can do harm, food and water, health services, and refugees.

## **Aid Can Do Harm**

When stable nations believe they must intervene with assistance, it is because the target state can no longer meet the needs of its people (especially the most vulnerable segments of its society—the very young, the very old, the disabled, and women). Sue Lautze has noted that it is not even necessary for the entire state to break down in order to create an emergency:

In protracted complex emergencies, . . . services (e.g., health, education, labor exchange, credit and insurance) can be completely destroyed, creating a *de facto* localized 'failed state.' In the absence of a functioning civil society, affected communities are left with only routes to survival and self-sufficiency. They may strengthen or generate self-reliant forms of local administration, the community or extended families (known as 'capacity building'). Alternatively, they might seek (and become dependent on) external assistance, or even do without.<sup>127</sup>

Unfortunately, Lautze notes, the current trend in external support in complex emergencies has been toward *increasing* dependency.<sup>128</sup>

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<sup>127</sup> Lautze, 1996, p. 10.

<sup>128</sup> Lautze, 1996, p. 21.

Those who intervene (be they civil or military personnel) must try to avoid worsening an already bad situation. Prendergast and Scott believe that “humanitarian aid may unintentionally sustain conflict in two ways.

- First, it can be mis-used directly as an instrument of war, providing the *means* for conflict.
- Second, it may contribute less overtly to the dynamics of conflict, exacerbating the *causes* of insecurity and war.”<sup>129</sup>

Mary Anderson agrees and asserts that “the evidence is that aid more often worsens conflict (even when it is effective in humanitarian and/or development terms) rather than helps mitigate it.”<sup>130</sup> She also agrees that aid generally goes wrong by either directly or indirectly supporting warring factions, with indirect support being the most difficult to discern. She writes that “indirect support occurs in four distinct ways:

- First, when external aid takes care of civilian needs, it frees up whatever resources are available internally for support of armies. . . .
- Second, by controlling the passage of aid goods, warring factions are able to manipulate civilian populations. . . .

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<sup>129</sup> Prendergast and Scott, 1996, p. 3.

<sup>130</sup> Anderson, 1996b, p. 14.

- Third, external assistance can distort economies thus making a return to a peace-time economy more difficult and less likely. . . .
- Fourth, the introduction of external resources into a context where resources are scarce and people are already in conflict with each other often feeds into and reinforces the suspicion, enmity and competition for wealth and power of warring groups.”<sup>131</sup>

### **Foster self-sufficiency**

There remains a common human compulsion that something must be done when people are suffering and an eternally optimistic belief that it can be done in a way that helps rather than exacerbates the situation. The key to doing so is to foster self-sufficiency, which Sue Lautze defines as “the capacity of a community to produce, exchange and/or lay claim to the resources necessary to ensure both its survival through and resilience to life-threatening stresses.”<sup>132</sup> International help most often comes in the form of government or non-government foreign aid, be it foodstuffs, medical assistance, or self-help programs. But, according to Lautze much can be done by the people themselves to foster self-sufficiency and productivity. Taylor Seybolt identifies four conditions necessary for success in dealing with humanitarian emergencies. Relief organizations must

- have access to the population in need

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<sup>131</sup> Anderson, 1996b, pp. 16–17.

<sup>132</sup> Lautze, 1996, p. 10.

- engage in continuous dialogue with authorities at all levels in the recipient country
- have control over the entire chain of humanitarian assistance, from planning to delivery
- be able to get resources where they are needed when they are required

Seybolt believes that the military can assist relief organizations in meeting all of these conditions.<sup>133</sup> When external forces provide a secure environment, local funds can start being channeled away from armies and back to social services. An oft repeated caution advanced during the workshops was that the military should not assume total responsibility for the movement of either commercial or relief goods. Our research supports this view: “Use and accommodate the existing logistics-support system,” Geis recommends, “to minimize disruption of relief activities and to ensure sustainability.”<sup>134</sup> He also writes that “the military must take care to avoid raising the expectations of the local population in terms of long-term services and infrastructure improvements.”<sup>135</sup> Regardless of how careful the

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<sup>133</sup> Seybolt, 1997.

<sup>134</sup> Geis, 1996, p. 3.

<sup>135</sup> Geis, 1996, p. 15.

military is, experience shows, rising expectations are inevitable—the real challenge is to minimize and deal with them.

### **Be aware of the political impact of relief efforts**

Determining who really governs (that is, who really controls the ebb and flow of the population's welfare) may prove much more valuable in ensuring that relief reaches the right people. William DeMars has written:

Sending food in the direction of hungry people may or may not help them eat, depending on the local uses of unjust coercive power. . . . Outside food aid may not be the most important factor in determining who survives in complex emergencies that combine hunger, violence, economic stress, and natural disaster. . . . Humanitarian action fails when it becomes immersed in politics to the point of violating its affirmation of human persons, but it is necessarily enmeshed in politics through its links with warring parties, donor constituencies, and other organizations.<sup>136</sup>

He clearly implies that humanitarian action cannot be completely withdrawn from the political arena.

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<sup>136</sup> DeMars, 1996, p. 87.

<sup>137</sup> The Task Force on Ethical and Legal Issues in Humanitarian Assistance believes that neutrality is one of five critical criteria (the others being humanity, impartiality, independence and empowerment) that must be observed when providing relief. "Humanitarian assistance should be provided without engaging in hostilities or taking sides in controversies of a political, religious or ideological nature." (Task Force, 1994, pp. 3–4.)

This notion is quite a change from the past, when the holy grail of humanitarian relief was neutrality—that is, blind succor.<sup>137</sup> While some NGOs (including the International Committee of the Red Cross) remain adamant about their neutrality, “no one regards NGOs as neutral any more,” says Andrew Natsios of World Vision International. “If you respond to need, you’re helping the side that suffers more.”<sup>138</sup> Another commentator notes, “You may not take an interest in politics, but politics will take an interest in you.”<sup>139</sup> Michael Pugh contends that a humanitarian intervention (whether military, civil, or mixed) “has a highly political objective, based on the assumption that peace is preferable to conflict and that the perceived benefits of economic and social development will outweigh whatever might be achieved by war.”<sup>140</sup> John Duffield and John Prendergast argue that neutrality “eschews the need for supporting participatory and accountable structures and institutions, and arguably makes matters worse.”<sup>141</sup> In Bosnia, NATO’s Stabilization Force has begun a new strategy to concentrate reconstruction assistance on the towns willing to allow refugees to return; a policy of deliberate politicization of assistance.<sup>142</sup>

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<sup>138</sup> Quoted in Prendergast and Scott, 1996, p. 13.

<sup>139</sup> K. Menkhaus, quoted in Prendergast and Scott, 1996, p. 13.

<sup>140</sup> Pugh, 1995, p. 326.

<sup>141</sup> Duffield and Prendergast, 1994, p. 15.

<sup>142</sup> This policy of “conditionality” enshrined in the “Open Cities” program offers financial and rebuilding assistance, but the principle of politicization remains the same. See Laura Kay Rozen, “New Bosnia Tack: Reward ‘Open’ Towns,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 1 August 1997, p. 1.

## **Food and Water**

Food has become a weapon in many of the conflicts facing the international community, and the strategies to obtain it have become increasingly sophisticated. In Somalia, the problem was fairly straightforward—armed bandits (often associated with particular factions) seized food by force. Although the looting of relief aid remains a growth industry, more subtle ways of appropriating commodities are emerging. One recent method is for “governments and rebel groups . . . [to] create or expand humanitarian agencies or closely allied NGOs to capture more aid resources.”<sup>143</sup> The issue is food security and it involves developing strategies that provide for long-term self-sufficiency.

### **Pursue ‘food security’ in its broadest sense**

Since attaining adequate nutrition can rely on having a secure source of food, the military may have an important role to play in this area, such as escorting food convoys, securing warehouses, and training mine-removal teams to clear fields and roads. Food security has an even larger non-military dimension that includes reducing populace vulnerability to famine. Education programs in animal husbandry and crop rotation and selection, for example, can have major, long-term impacts. Indigenous peoples have themselves developed an array of coping or survival strategies:

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<sup>143</sup> Prendergast and Scott, 1996, p. 4.



These strategies, which may include migrating for wage labor, selling assets, and eating local 'famine foods,' are not designed primarily to avoid hunger but rather to maintain crucial assets such as seed, tools, and plow oxen necessary for the next growing season. . . . [Recent studies] reveal the links in the causal food chain between the survival of oxen this year, who starves next year, and 'who rules' (if anyone) in the capital city the following year.<sup>144</sup>

Sue Lautze has eloquently expressed why understanding what 'food security' means to the local populace is so important to achieving mission ends:

Even in the face of frank starvation of *its weakest members*, a group's decision-makers (i.e., its power center such as the patriarch, matriarch or village elders) may determine that the highest priority is to protect assets, such as oxen, even at the expense of some of its members. In this case, the provision of emergency food aid may be less effective than the establishment of cattle camps or emergency animal vaccination programs, or the negotiation of a "cease-stealing" to halt cattle raids. Despite obvious nutritional stress, distributed emergency food aid may not be consumed but may be converted, instead, to cash (on grossly unfavorable terms for the beneficiary) or traded for other resources needed to save the oxen, e.g., vaccines or weaponry to protect herds. Only after a group's main priority is met will the group invest in its lower priorities, e.g., providing consumption resources to its weaker members.<sup>145</sup>

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<sup>144</sup> DeMars, 1996, pp. 85, 86.

<sup>145</sup> Lautze, 1996, p. 6.

## **Involve indigenous communities**

Whatever strategies are adopted, “the indigenous communities must be an integral part of the decision-making because they may have better strategies for coping than the external agencies.”<sup>146</sup> During a 1996 USAID-sponsored conference on linking relief and development, Mary Anderson provided two examples of how relief strategies helped promote development and peace:

During the Ethiopia famine, people left their homes and gathered along the sides of roads seeking food assistance. Some agencies set up feeding centers where they provided prepared food for the most needy. This approach to famine relief has negative impacts on development. Though lives are saved, people are also maintained in a setting that is separate from their land, families and homes; they become depressed and passive. Disease is difficult to control. Another agency also provided famine relief in Ethiopia but did so by urging people to return to their villages. Agency representatives guaranteed that they would deliver food “as close as possible” to where people lived (rather than in feeding centers). As a result, villages organized work brigades to build roads that reached into remote areas to enable food deliveries to reach everyone. This relief agency’s approach to providing assistance enabled the people to stay on their own land and maintain their social and psychological capacities. When the rains came, these villagers were ready to plant and their dependency ended.

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<sup>146</sup> Pugh, 1995, p. 338.

In Tajikistan, after the civil war, there was a need for housing and food when people began returning to their homes. An agency initiated a house rebuilding project using food-for-work. However, because the program was designed to rely on village-based building brigades (and the villages in southern Tajikistan were, largely, mono-ethnic villages), this meant that most of the food-for-work assistance was provided to one ethnic group—that is, the group which suffered the greatest destruction of its houses. The “winners” of the civil war, those who had not suffered as much loss, were unhappy when they observed that aid was being given to their “enemies” to rebuild. The agency responded by initiating other food-for-work programs focused on rebuilding commonly-held assets such as roadways, irrigation ditches, and clinics.<sup>147</sup>

The conference report concluded: “Some options leave beneficiaries stronger, more independent, and less vulnerable while other options leave those assisted dependent, depressed, and weaker. It remains a great challenge to transform the impact of assistance, but the relief and development communities have the knowledge, ability, and lessons to make the necessary modifications.”<sup>148</sup>

## **Health**

Providing health services is one of the most critical humanitarian assistance activities. “In armed conflict, independent of the length or intensity of the fighting, the

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<sup>147</sup> OFDA, 1996a, p. 7.

<sup>148</sup> OFDA, 1996a, p. 7.

health of the people concerned will be profoundly affected. The health infrastructure, already uncertain, quickly becomes inefficient due to transport problems, maintenance and fuel problems, lack of medical reserves and difficulties in restocking, and, of course, the flight of civil servants and health personnel.”<sup>149</sup> The importance of health services in complex emergencies is best demonstrated by the Somalia experience. There it has been estimated that at least 70 percent of the famine-related deaths—which involved as many as 238,000 people—“could have been prevented had proven primary health strategies been implemented earlier and more widely.”<sup>150</sup> As William Lyerly explains:<sup>151</sup>

Historically, the health burden in ‘post’-conflict situations has been particularly heavy. This is due both to the long-term indirect consequences of conflict which promote widespread poverty and increased exposure to communicable diseases such as measles, TB and HIV, and to the direct effects of injury, rape, and extreme psycho-social stress. Few people realize that since 1985, the number one cause of death during . . . [complex emergencies] worldwide has been measles. Additionally, during the extended civil war in Mozambique, more people are reported to have died as a result of the destroyed health system than those who died during the fighting.

## **Target the public health sector**

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<sup>149</sup> Jean, 1992, p. 135.

<sup>150</sup> Seiple, 1996, p. 98.

<sup>151</sup> Lyerly, 1997.

Lyerly believes that “strategically-targeted interventions in the public health sector can become a uniquely effective, apolitical (i.e., politically neutral) vehicle for promoting the recovery and rehabilitation process across the relief-to-development continuum.” He cites a number of reasons, including:

- a universal desire for health that crosses cultures and conflicts
- the achievement of health is a non-competitive domain of interest that transcends physical and political frontiers
- health outcomes are benchmarks for transitions in the relief-to-development continuum

Naysayers could point out, however, that since civilian populations are often the targets of violence in complex emergencies, assistance rendered to victims generally supports the side suffering most. Health education plays an important role in any sustainable program. Lyerly argues that the best approach is the “train-the-trainer” model developed by the International Medical Corps in Angola in 1996. For US forces, Special Operations Force medical personnel are uniquely qualified to provide instructional programs in the treatment of civilians.<sup>152</sup> The areas which workshop participants felt needed to be addressed were nutrition, food preparation, hygiene,

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<sup>152</sup> USSOCOM Medical Planner, 1993.

prevention of sexually transmitted diseases, injury prevention (including mine awareness), and the importance of clean water.

### **Provide sustainable health care programs**

The military is organized primarily to deal with post-conflict trauma, and therefore, it comes equipped with portable hospitals, trauma specialists, etc. In recent complex emergencies during which there has been heavy fighting, "casualty care for the multiple trauma civilian victim usually is not available in the NGO community during the emergency phase. As in Somalia, surgical care for victims of arms conflict was provided by U.S. military medical resources until coalition force hospitals were constructed."<sup>153</sup> Even so, the military has often been criticized for the type of medical assistance it provides during complex emergencies. The military's trauma facilities and services have often been used to provide elective, reconstructive surgery. Although these operations may be necessary and welcome, NGOs complain that they unnecessarily raise the expectations of the local populace, which must face the fact that such care is temporary and unsustainable. What the people need are basic care and preventive medicine programs that are beyond the ken of the normal military mission. "The object is to reduce dependency and create an environment in which self-sufficiency is realized."

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<sup>153</sup> Burkle *et al.*, 1995, p. 55.

One group of analysts has identified three trends that have emerged from experience with complex emergencies that critically affect military medical support:

- Civilian injuries and disease are enormous, especially among the most vulnerable groups of children, women, elderly, and handicapped. War-related civilian deaths from some 40 conflicts now number more than 5.2 million and average about 500,000 for any given year. The political violence associated with these conflicts causes public-health catastrophes that the major participants are ill-equipped to solve.
- Military decision-makers now recognize that military casualty rates in complex emergencies are likely to be higher than in an operation in which a decisive force is employed. This is related directly to the highly complex defensive positioning in which the lightly armed peace-keeping forces find themselves.
- Relief workers who usually enjoy protection guaranteed them under international humanitarian law and the Geneva Conventions also suffer from indiscriminate violent acts of reprisal from warring factions.<sup>154</sup>

In adjusting to these trends, military medical planners must now worry as much about force protection as providing succor. Even the types of health services provided are changing. Most care-givers recommend that the military support efforts to establish sustainable health care programs—such as disease prevention, immuni-

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<sup>154</sup> These bulleted points are a quotation from Burkle *et al.*, 1995, p. 54.

zation, inoculation, health information, maternal child health, AIDS prevention, sanitation services (garbage removal and disposal), waste-water treatment, water purification and distribution, mortuary services, laboratory services, and medical assessments—rather than narrowly focus on trauma cases. As in other areas, there lies danger in doing good. “As soon as all parties cannot be served, the perception of favoritism emerges.”

## **Refugees**

Dealing with refugees and displaced persons is often the first order of the day. As noted in Chapter 1, nearly 50 million people have been displaced as a result of complex emergencies since 1992. These people become economic liabilities, have increased health risks, and form the core of politically discontent groups. Therefore, getting them out of refugee camps is one of the international community’s highest priorities. However, resettling these individuals involves a completely different set of challenges than dealing with them in camps. Workshop participants raised the concomitant resettlement and reconciliation issue of property adjudication. This issue arises whenever large numbers of individuals have been displaced. If refugees are urged to resettle but upon returning find their property being claimed by another, mistrust, anger and instability will result unless a mechanism exists for dealing justly with the problem. “Guatemalan, Afghani, Khmer and many other refugees, when asked about their hesitation to repatri-

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<sup>155</sup> Hansch, 1993.



ate, cite the fact that they believe their family lands have been appropriated and there is no place for them to farm.”<sup>155</sup>

### **Support refugee reintegration**

Andrew Natsios identifies three operational principles the military must observe if involved in refugee operations:

- First, avoid military actions that will encourage population movements and the subsequent creation of displaced camps;
- second, work with humanitarian relief organizations to develop a mix of incentives so people will not leave their home villages in the first place; and
- third, if camps are already formed, work with humanitarian relief groups—as the military did so successfully in Kurdistan—to return people voluntarily and as soon as practicable to their homes.<sup>156</sup>

Moore argues that the “reintegration into society of millions of repatriated refugees, returned displaced [persons], and demobilized soldiers presents an opportunity for wholesale progress in recovery and renewal.”<sup>157</sup> The goal is to reintegrate refugees as soon as possible be-

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<sup>156</sup> Natsios, 1996b, p. 54.

<sup>157</sup> Moore, 1996, p. 20.

<sup>158</sup> Anderson, 1996a, p. 6. Mats Berdal suggests that if cantonment is likely to be prolonged, provisions must be made to reduce the incentives for desertion and violence. Berdal, 1996, p. 44.

cause “the longer people are refugees, the more dependent they become.” In addition, “camps breed disease, discontent, and boredom.”<sup>158</sup> One participant cautioned that eventually reintegration of all refugees may prove impossible, and reminded the group that there have been refugee camps “in central Africa for 40 years.” Nevertheless, the support of refugee reintegration should be pursued and supported during complex contingency operations, despite concerns about “mission creep.”<sup>159</sup>

### **The military should perform (or support) humanitarian assistance tasks**

Participants believed very strongly that the military should take on humanitarian assistance tasks when responding to complex emergencies; indeed, they ranked the humanitarian assistance task area highest among all task areas, including those in the military task section.<sup>160</sup> This reflects ambivalence on the part of participants toward taking on security-related tasks in com-

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<sup>159</sup> US forces serving with NATO's Stabilization Force in the Summer of 1997 quietly began to help refugees return home, even though NATO had previously maintained that protecting returned refugees was not part of its mandate. These programs were limited to a few areas, and to American troops. European officers, even those under American command, said that they would not be able to provide the protection of returnees now being provided by American forces in Brcko. “Someone is going to call this ‘mission creep,’” said a UN refugee official, “but it's the best news I've had in months.” Mike O'Connor, “Bosnians Back Home, With Quiet U.S. Help,” *New York Times*, 29 July 29 1997, p. 3.

<sup>160</sup> The Canadian Department of National Defense has taken these ideas to heart, setting up a Disaster Assistance Response Team capable of responding rapidly to a request for humanitarian assistance or disaster relief anywhere in the world. Some humanitarian groups objected, arguing that military assistance can endanger them and will duplicate services that the groups could provide more cheaply. See Dalhousie University's *Defence Newsletter*, Vol. 15, No. 6 (June 1996), p. 6.

<sup>161</sup> For more detail, see the discussion on cross-sectoral strategies at the end of this chapter, beginning on page 91.

plex emergencies; that is, participants seemed more willing for the military to assume humanitarian assistance tasks than even traditional security-related tasks. Based on our own analysis,<sup>161</sup> the military should be prepared to conduct or to support the humanitarian assistance tasks listed in the Generic Pol-Mil Plan (in the order of their listing) as follows:

- Tasks the military should be willing to perform directly:
  - Avoiding generation of population movements
  - Providing emergency humanitarian relief
  - Providing health services (water, food, etc.)
  - Organizing humanitarian assistance zones or relief areas
  - Coordinating NGO activities
  - Assisting in capacity building
  - Prepositioning humanitarian relief stocks
- Tasks the military should be prepared to support others in performing:
  - Repatriating or resettling refugees and displaced persons

- Providing housing and public services for returned people

## Internal Politics

Unless local institutions, including police forces, the judiciary and local administration [are] re-established, rehabilitation efforts [will] only have a limited impact.

—Boutros Boutros-Ghali<sup>162</sup>

Durable peace and stable civilian rule are impossible without a firm underpinning of the right kinds of institutions. Mark Walsh argues that the “targeted country’s institutions are important to the mission’s plans and activities; they determine the long-term success of the intervention. Whatever attention can be given to the sustainability of these local institutions will reap great rewards, whether a mission is deployed to implement, make, enforce, or keep a peace, or to assist in rebuilding a nation.”<sup>163</sup> Tasks in this area include:

- Establishing an effective transition government
- Establishing a mechanism for constitutional reform
- Staffing and funding the transition government
- Conducting nationwide elections

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<sup>162</sup> Boutros-Ghali, 1996a, p. 37.

<sup>163</sup> Walsh, 1996, p. 34.

- Training newly elected political leaders
- Providing advisors to government officials
- Monitoring and reporting on corruption by government officials
- Transferring control of government functions to host nation officials
- Monitoring government power-sharing arrangements

Our comments fall under the following headings: the importance of legitimate institutions of governance and the relationship between government and relief; cultivating local leadership; and military roles.

### **The Importance of Legitimate Institutions of Governance**

Case studies have shown that “a general lack of governance, and the lawlessness this implies, increases the risk that aid resources will be manipulated to support conflict.”<sup>164</sup> As one workshop participant noted, the goal is to “help people create institutions in which they have confidence.” Another asserted that “all attributes of sovereignty need to be created (including legitimacy, institutional strength, coercive force, and international recognition).”

### **Support the establishment of fair and effective institutions of governance**

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<sup>164</sup> Anderson, 1996b, p. 47.

Trust and legitimacy can flow from the results of free and fair elections, but participants felt that elections were not necessarily required. They posed the same question as Michael Pugh:

What is the rationalization for introducing western constitutional ideas and practices where there is limited demand for them and where people have so little by way of material sustenance that the notion of political participation has limited relevance? Indeed the introduction of elections and associated adversarial politics can heighten tensions between groups and communities rather than dampen them.<sup>165</sup>

Many workshop participants feared that intervention forces often believed that only Western notions of governance were acceptable—which simply may not be true. In most places where interventions are likely to occur, “there is no legacy or heritage of American-style institutions or practices.” Hugh Cholmondeley, by contrast, believes that “a single hope unites nationals and their international partners, namely, the desire for a *future and truly representative elected government*.”<sup>166</sup> While he emphasizes both representative and elected aspects of government, we believe that the most immediate need is for representative political processes that provide hope, create opportunities for dialogue and conflict management, and point the way toward institutional development.

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<sup>165</sup> Pugh, 1995, pp. 322–23.

<sup>166</sup> Cholmondeley, 1996, p. 7 (emphasis in original).

Regardless of what governance system is adopted, participants believed, the most important factor for long-term stability was a population's perception that its needs were being represented in the halls of power. "Essentially," one analyst notes, "the critical factor seems to be confidence. Confidence that the political agreements are credible and will continue to hold. Confidence that an end to major hostilities means an atmosphere where families can begin to return home and engage in productive endeavor."<sup>167</sup>

Confidence in whatever institutions are established increases when they are free to operate independently (i.e., when they cannot be easily manipulated or corrupted). This is particularly essential for the judiciary. This cannot occur if public funds are not available to pay individuals for their services or if public servants cannot be adequately protected. Hence, those involved in complex emergencies should give urgent consideration to establishing equitable (or alternative) tax systems and "mechanisms to guard against reprisals."

### **Cultivating Local Leadership**

Michael Brown asserts that "most major internal conflicts are triggered by internal, elite-level actors—to put it bluntly, bad leaders—contrary to what policymakers, popular commentary, and the scholarly literature on the

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<sup>167</sup> Cholmondeley, 1996, p. 6.

<sup>168</sup> Brown, 1996, p. 571.

subject generally suggest. . . . Bad leaders are usually the catalysts that turn potentially volatile situations into open warfare.”<sup>168</sup> Brown believes that bad leaders and bad behavior (which may occur in bad neighborhoods) are all “discrete problems that can be identified and targeted for action. . . . [They] are not necessarily immune to international pressure: they mark moments when distant international powers can try to use their leverage and influence the course of events.”<sup>169</sup> His arguments suggest that having to rely on indigenous leadership, for any reason, may prove fatal to an operation. Mary Anderson avers, for example, that “to rely on local leadership structures for delivery of goods, without careful analysis of who will gain and who will lose if aid is channeled to/through this group, can play into the hands of contending factions or empower one group to exert its control over others in ways that cause tensions to fester and grow.”<sup>170</sup>

Finding the right indigenous political leadership is difficult. Those who have assumed leadership roles during a conflict generally believe they deserve a place in any new scheme of governance. Unfortunately, they are not often the right leaders for the reconciliation process, because they come with too much wartime baggage and may in fact have been responsible for criminal atrocities. “The warlord represents the new archetypal figure of the post–Cold War world: a militia leader of little conviction or even ideology, with some military training but

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<sup>169</sup> Brown, 1996, pp. 600-01.

<sup>170</sup> Anderson, 1996b, p. 33.

<sup>171</sup> Natsios, 1996b, p. 51.



little skill at governing, who rules by brute force and cunning.”<sup>171</sup> Many negotiations have failed because leadership acceptable to all sides has been impossible to identify.

### **Cultivate indigenous leadership**

Brown argues that power struggles among political elites, “driven mainly by personal, political motivations,” are by far the most common sources of internal conflict. Therefore, concentrating on getting the indigenous leadership right offers the greatest potential for achieving mission success. As Robert Oakley has written, “It is the indigenous leadership which must assume responsibility from the international community and which must bring local value and beliefs into the process of rebuilding.”<sup>172</sup>

According to the World Bank, a supportive indigenous leadership is one of the three conditions required for local capacity building. The conditions are:<sup>173</sup>

- Human development, especially provision of basic health, education, nutrition and technical skills
- The restructuring of many public and private institutions to create a context in which skilled workers can function effectively
- Political leadership that understands that institutions are fragile entities, painstakingly built up, easily destroyed, and therefore requiring sustained nurturing

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<sup>172</sup> Oakley, 1997, p. 17.

<sup>173</sup> Lautze, 1996, p. 20.

Without credible local leadership, most missions are doomed to failure. "More often than not, local ratification of the mission's political strategy for ending the crisis is a prerequisite for success."<sup>174</sup> In Somalia, for example:

Later tragedies might have been avoided if UNITAF had been authorized to use its overwhelming advantages in military force, command and control, logistics, and communications to support a political agenda. This would have required political tactics to undercut the power of the warlords in favor of normal Somalis who were striving against mighty odds and a lot of firepower to reinstate local authorities, create self-help groups, open schools, reopen farms and shops, and restore community services.<sup>175</sup>

Incumbent government and faction leadership may have to step aside so that others more acceptable to all sides can assume the mantle of leadership. As the experience with Aideed proved in Somalia, however, trying to marginalize those who strongly believe they deserve a central role in governing a state can prove extremely problematic and dangerous. When faced with this kind of situation, mission planners need to carefully reevaluate their courses of action. As a United States Institute of Peace workshop concluded:

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<sup>174</sup> Walsh, 1996, p. 36.

<sup>175</sup> Clarke and Herbst, 1997, p. 13.

When local authorities refuse to cooperate with international forces whose intervention seeks to reestablish the rule of law, international forces need to evaluate what status and power these officials have, how much they hinder the success of the peace operation, and how the situation will be transformed if actions by participants in a peace operation are perceived as an external attack on an individual or movement rather than a necessary part of reestablishing stability and providing humanitarian relief.<sup>176</sup>

Mary Anderson suggests that intervention operations should use the indigenous political energy of those seeking peace to promote mission aims. She notes that “people who are willing to take risks by asserting their opposition to war are, for the most part, committed to a ‘return’ to governance which they can respect. In most cases, those who work toward disengagement also work for the establishment of what they name as ‘democratic’ institutions.”<sup>177</sup> But again this does not necessarily imply Western democratic institutions.

## **Military Roles**

In Somalia and Haiti, US military planners established, as part of their plans for transferring authority to the United Nations military force, the practice of “twinning”—UN military officers working closely with US military officers covering the same functional responsibility prior to the formal transition. In Haiti, US Civil Affairs officers

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<sup>176</sup> Sismanidis, 1997, p. viii.

<sup>177</sup> Anderson, 1996b, pp. 46–47.

worked with local government officials in a similar “twinning” process, as part of both the US and UN complex contingency operations. Workshop participants suggested that working to ensure that institutions of governance are effective and fair (in part through eliminating corruption and increasing competence, thereby enhancing people’s confidence) is a role the military should at least be prepared to take on and possibly even pursue directly.

Drawing from the Generic Pol-Mil Plan’s notional internal political tasks list, during complex contingency operations the military can:

- Support the restoration or transfer of government functions to host nation officials by providing advisors to government officials and improving government infrastructure;<sup>178</sup> the areas of clearest relevance are those related to traditional security functions (including policing) but could also include areas related to the broader concept of “sustainable security” (primarily through civil affairs activities)
- Support the conduct of elections, as was done for the September 1996 elections in Bosnia through the printing and distribution of voter lists and ballots
- Support, through the use of military intelligence assets
- The monitoring of corruption by government officials
- The monitoring of government power-sharing arrangements through the use of military intelligence assets

<sup>178</sup> On military support to infrastructure tasks, see the discussion in the Infrastructure and Economic Reconstruction operational sector below.

US military civil affairs personnel can play a particularly important role in the transition to a fair and effective indigenous leadership. Those who prove acceptable to all sides may not have all the necessary qualifications to govern, but they can be educated and trained while the military presence during a complex contingency operation is at its height. In Haiti, for example:

U.S. Army Reserve civil affairs officers took over key roles in almost every Haitian ministry, cataloguing what assets were available, trying to get activities underway, and to some degree informally directing activities. . . . Once the effective collapse of Haitian government institutions was apparent, Special Operations units acquired additional responsibilities of a civil affairs nature throughout the countryside, and for many months constituted almost the only civil administration.<sup>179</sup>

Working side by side with newly appointed officials, civil affairs personnel can train them in efficient and effective methods of governance.

## **Civil Law and Order/Public Security**

If you ask people what they want most, what is most needed to rebuild their lives, . . . they want protection, they want the establishment of law and order.

—Kathi Austin<sup>180</sup>

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<sup>179</sup> Hayes and Wheatley, 1996, p. 41.

<sup>180</sup> Austin, 1994, p. A19.

Most of the conflicts which have confronted the international community in the 1990s (with the major exception of the Gulf War) have involved civil strife. Thus, the overwhelming majority of issues that have had to be resolved have concerned the security of internal, often displaced, populations. For that reason, many humanitarian organizations have recognized that "in some circumstances, a show of force may provide a deterrent effect, causing fewer casualties and bringing peace sooner."<sup>181</sup> Tasks in this area include:

- Reforming or disbanding existing police forces
- Establishing a new police force
- Conducting police training
- Establishing a police monitoring activity
- Providing advisors to police and criminal justice organizations
- Supporting the establishment of local police operations
- Assisting in establishing humane penal systems
- Eradicating corruption
- Assisting in establishing a legitimate legal system
- Supporting judicial reform and local dispute resolution
- Safeguarding institutions of governance and key officials

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<sup>181</sup> Task Force, 1994, p. 11.

The most critical topic in this sector is the importance of civilian police and the rule of law. We discuss additional topics, such as rules of engagements, weapons control, judicial and penal systems, and under the heading of “other public safety issues.”

### **The Importance of Civilian Police and the Rule of Law**

When people discuss security in the context of complex emergencies, they are most often referring to internal security—the maintenance of law and order. This emphasis has inevitably led to an increased appreciation for what international civilian police forces can bring to a complex contingency operation. A recent United States Institute of Peace (USIP) workshop on “Police Functions in Peace Operations” concluded that “non-governmental organizations, particularly humanitarian-relief organizations, now appreciate the crucial role that police and the military play in establishing the security and order necessary for the success of peace operations.”<sup>182</sup>

Internal security rests primarily on the rule of law. In failed states like Somalia, the problem can be so acute that even identifying which body of law should prevail may prove difficult. But the police must have something to enforce, and the courts must have something to rule

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<sup>182</sup> Sismanidis, 1997, pp. vii–viii.

on. Oakley noted that “reestablishment of a Somali police force was key to improving security in Mogadishu and other cities.”<sup>183</sup>

The USIP workshop on police functions concluded that:

- Guaranteeing the safety of persons and property as well as restoring the public’s trust that order and stability will be maintained are keys to any effort at reestablishing a working society after a destructive conflict.
- Reestablishing or maintaining the rule of law is crucial to the success of complex contingency operations, and civilian police play an important role in this area.
- Retraining an indigenous police force must be a high priority.
- Although rebuilding entire criminal justice systems might be necessary, undertaking that task requires a serious and extensive commitment of personnel and resources. Political realities that emphasize exit dates make it difficult to muster the will to design and implement effective long-term operations.

### **Separate military and police public security functions**

Workshop participants believed that police and military functions should be carried out by separate organizations. As one participant argued:

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<sup>183</sup> Hirsch and Oakley, 1995, p. 87.



It should be made clear that internal security, including crowd control, is not the role of the military. It is the role of the police. Crowd control training may be made available to the military under the clear understanding that they be used only as a last resort (that is, when the situation has gone beyond the capacity of the police to handle) and only when so directed by their civilian authority.

### **Try to limit the number of contributors to coalition police operations**

International police contingents are, in some ways, more difficult to assemble and manage than military forces. One reason is that few countries, if any, can provide more than a few dozen police officers. Thus, group integration becomes extremely difficult. Secondly, this enormous diversity results in severe language problems. Even though English has become more or less the standard mission language, many policemen arrive with modest English abilities. (Even a good facility in English does not mean that an individual will be able to communicate with the indigenous population.) Third, driving skills are often lacking in policemen from developing countries. Finally, the integrity and impartiality of some police officers can be questioned. Fortunately, standards for civilian police participating in peacekeeping operations are emerging, and candidates are now often tested against them before being allowed to deploy. While beggars cannot be choosers, and increasing the number of countries contributing to coalition police operations may have political advantages, the associated challenges suggest that the number of contributors should be as small as possible.

To overcome some of these problems, Erskine Childers and Brian Urquhart have recommended that the United Nations develop a “Humanitarian Security Police as a distinctive force to protect UN and NGO emergency personnel, their transport, and their supplies. . . . The Police should have specially established rules of engagement, with a graduated range of weapons including armored transport, able to act without the presence of UN military forces.”<sup>184</sup>

### **The military may have to perform constabulary functions, requiring a broad array of expertise**

General George Joulwan, recently retired NATO commander, has argued that “soldiers make poor policemen . . . SFOR would not do civil police functions. That’s right in the guidance. . . . And if we’re not careful, we’ll find the military sliding down this slippery slope to do more and more of these (police) functions. I would recommend against that.”<sup>185</sup> Nevertheless, there are often no alternatives to military forces carrying out constabulary functions. Whenever it must do so, the military should immediately begin training a police force that can relieve it of such duties. The United States resisted this approach in Somalia, but “when U.S. Marines started to suffer casualties patrolling the streets of Mogadishu and the hazards of combining military duties with policing became abundantly clear, Washington become more supportive of the police force idea.”<sup>186</sup>

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<sup>184</sup> Childers and Urquhart, 1994, p. 204.

<sup>185</sup> Interview, *Army Times*, 1 September 1997, p. 6.

<sup>186</sup> Hirsch and Oakley, 1995, p. 89.

Despite the recommendation that police and military duties be separated, both workshop discussions and our research suggest that the military should be prepared to support the rebuilding of criminal justice systems. The US military, always reluctant to assume constabulary tasks, has nevertheless found itself thrust into a law-and-order role in Panama, Somalia, and Haiti. Of the tasks in the Generic Pol-Mil Plan's Public Security/Law and Order sector, four stand out as particularly appropriate for the military to pursue:

- Safeguarding institutions of governance and key officials. (Participants noted that this is a traditional military public security function in many countries.)
- Providing advisors to police and criminal justice organizations and assisting in establishing a legitimate legal system. (These are activities for which participants suggested that Civil Affairs personnel are particularly suited.)
- Supporting judicial reform and local dispute resolution. (Participants believed that protecting property rights, or supporting the resolution of disputes over property rights, is one of the most appropriate public security functions in which the military should be directly involved. As noted above, this function can have a particular impact in facilitating the return of displaced populations to their homes.)

This suggests that military commanders might want to draw on a broad array of experts associated with the criminal justice system in establishing their staffs, to include prosecutors, lawyers, judges, and criminologists.

## **Other Public Safety Issues**

### **Deal directly with the challenges associated with rules of engagement**

Constabulary rules of engagement usually differ significantly from military rules of engagement—although in Haiti the constabulary rules were changed to permit the use of deadly force to prevent Haitian-on-Haitian violence. Normally, however, constabulary rules of engagement are much more restrictive than their military counterparts.

One reason constabulary rules of engagement are more restrictive is that most police personnel prefer to operate like London bobbies rather than Los Angeles cops—they favor being unarmed, for four reasons:

- Bearing arms increases the likelihood of human rights violations by police personnel
- If police have both weapons and executive power, they are likely to be drawn into situations where they will be compelled to use them
- Restoring confidence in a criminal justice system requires the powers of decorum, respect, negotiation, and diplomacy, which can be undermined by being armed
- Police sidearms are generally no match for the weapons local forces possess, and therefore won't increase effectiveness<sup>187</sup>

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<sup>187</sup> Sismanidis, 1997, p. 5.

Those who prefer armed police normally advance self-defense as the reason. The use of less-than-lethal weapons by military forces conducting constabulary functions offers a way to mitigate some of the concerns on both sides.<sup>188</sup>

### **Support civilian weapons control programs**

Since arming police remains an area of debate, analysts have attempted to find complementary strategies to promote public safety and security. Weapons control programs are often mentioned in this regard. Although generally considered a military mission, weapons controls programs are increasingly seen as a police function. As the USIP workshop concluded:

Weapons . . . confer power, status and income on their owners, who are understandably reluctant to give them up. Disarmament must be overseen by functioning police forces, and alternative livelihoods or vocational training must be provided. Otherwise, crime and unemployment will rise, undermining the security climate and requiring further stabilization. Such developments obviously complicate police functions in peace operations.<sup>189</sup>

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<sup>188</sup> In response to clashes with protesters, the United States began in the late summer of 1997 to equip its troops serving with the NATO Stabilization Force with what we term less-than-lethal weapons. US forces on peace operations were first equipped with this class of weapons for Operation UNITED SHIELD, the coalition operation that helped the United Nations withdraw from Somalia in 1995.

<sup>189</sup> Sismanidis, 1997, p. 6.

## **Security requires fair judicial and humane penal systems**

In addition to effective police forces, analysts often cite the importance of fair judicial and humane penal systems. As one participant noted, “effective administration of justice and humane prison conditions are vital security functions from the perspective of refugees, who might be wondering whether it is safe to return.” US civil affairs officers were deeply involved in reestablishing the judicial system in Haiti. But others believe that establishing humane prisons is too often a goal that far exceeds the reach of intervening forces. It is “a goal most societies in the world have not yet reached, even in the absence of a complex emergency, and therefore should not be an objective of such.”<sup>190</sup>

## **The military may need to perform other essential civil functions**

Other areas of public safety, such as fire protection, emergency medical care, air traffic control, and port management, must also receive attention in order to reassure the populace that life is returning to normal. As one participant noted, “The military may need to perform essential functions when local individuals are incompetent or unduly biased. For example, IFOR should have been given the mission of keeping the Sarajevo suburbs from burning, so as to avoid an alienation that now will last for decades.”

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<sup>190</sup> Natsios, 1996b, p. 62.

## Public Information and Education

When it comes to the media, you're either a target or a source. Be a source and let your example speak for itself.

—Workshop Comment

There has been much discussion of the “CNN effect” following the international community’s experiences in Somalia. The media were widely accused of dragging the world into Somalia by transmitting pictures of starving and diseased children, who were dying in droves. They were then accused of provoking a precipitous US departure after broadcasting pictures of a dead American soldier being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. Those in the media, however, have been quick to denigrate such claims. “To give television credit for so powerful an influence is to flatter us who toil there,” wrote Dan Rather, “but it’s wrong. . . . Some may wish for the power to direct public opinion and to guide American policy—but they don’t have it.”<sup>191</sup> Mr. Rather’s modesty aside, the media do tell the story and have a tremendous impact on the success or failure of an operation, both through their influence within the affected country and their impact on public support for complex contingency operations within assisting countries. Hence, public information is as important domestically as it is for the target country and commanders need to plan for media billeting, transportation, equipment han-

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<sup>191</sup> Dan Rather, “Don’t Blame TV for Getting Us into Somalia,” *The New York Times*, 14 October 1993, p. A22.

dling, and briefings. The tasks most often associated with this sector are primarily focused on indigenous populations. They include:

- Conducting public information operations
- Promoting civic education
- Providing unbiased historical information on the conflict
- Sponsoring journalist training and professionalization

We discuss first public information and then education and training (including the requirements for intervention forces).

## **Public Information**

Sandra Newett insists that as self-evident as it may appear, an early step in the information campaign must be “developing a message to support the mission’s objectives.”<sup>192</sup> The broad language of many mission mandates makes the development of a coherent and believable message difficult. But getting a message out is important both to support mission objectives and to minimize unrealistic expectations by the populace. Newett goes on to state that an information campaign should be developed around three pillars:

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<sup>192</sup> Newett, 1996, p. 35.



- *Intelligence/Information.* The intelligence or information required in complex emergencies is different from that needed during combat operations. There is also a requirement to share information much more widely than the military normally does.
- *Psychological Operations.* A robust psychological operations plan, according to Newett, “is the vital link to the population.”<sup>193</sup> Several target audiences might be identified, each requiring a separate campaign.
- *Media.* Both local and international media need to be considered in any information program. Media cooperation, not control, is the objective of the program.

Not only must the story get out, it must be received by the target audience. In country, the target audience probably has few avenues for receiving news. As one analyst noted:

In a country like Rwanda where more than 60% of the population could not read or write, the existence of a free press only had meaning for the literate sector of the population, who were already politically aware anyway. The audiovisual scene was a tremendously important battlefield and here the government still reigned supreme: its version of events was the one carried out to the hilly countryside by radio. The license given to ‘free’ extremist radio RTLMC (and to nobody else who might have supported a more moderate line) only made things worse.<sup>194</sup>

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<sup>193</sup> Newett, 1996, p. 35.

<sup>194</sup> Prunier, 1995, p. 133.

This raises the final issue, almost all recent humanitarian interventions have encountered factions using violence-inciting media to achieve their ends. As one workshop participant noted, “The military may be asked to take out or jam ‘hate-radio’ broadcasts which spark mass people movements and/or genocide.”

### **Collectively develop a message and get it out**

During the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) operation in Cambodia, “UNTAC’s radio station broadcast news, civic education and variety programmes up to 15 hours a day. It became the most popular and credible station in the country. UNTAC personnel also distributed nationwide nearly 300,000 radio sets, donated by a Japanese non-governmental organisation.”<sup>195</sup> These actions ensured that the mission’s message could be received. Alvin and Heidi Toffler insist that what is needed “is a rapid reaction contingency broadcasting force that can go anywhere, set up, and beam news to those cut off from it—and not just on radio, but television as well.”<sup>196</sup> In Bosnia in 1993–94, the “Radio Boat” initiative—undertaken by a European NGO and financed by the European Union—“attempted to counteract the xenophobic propaganda being circulated in the former Yugoslavia with objective news and public affairs programming.”<sup>197</sup>

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<sup>195</sup> James A. Schear, in Daniel and Hayes, 1995, p. 257.

<sup>196</sup> Toffler, 1995, p. 27. Recently, in a pilot effort supported by the United Kingdom, NGOs have begun to hand out “crank-style” radios that are inexpensive, do not require electricity, and are easily maintained.

<sup>197</sup> Manoff, 1997.

Gaining or preserving momentum is often the result of a well-planned and executed information campaign. The military is equipped to support information campaigns in a number of ways, but as the primary source of information it would always remain suspect. A partnership between UN agencies, NGOs and the military—as in Cambodia—will produce the most effective information campaign. The aims of an information campaign are to articulate mission goals and intentions, provide factual information, and control rumors which can cause the situation to deteriorate. Information management may be the single most important weapon in winning the battle for the hearts and minds of the people. According to workshop participants, any such program must demonstrate “good intent, authority, credibility” and must “contribute to the end state.”

### **Work to counter competing messages**

The other side of the public information coin is the need to remove violence-inciting media from the air—what the Tofflers call “an embargo on hate propaganda.”<sup>198</sup> This suggests a task for which the military is particularly suited—targeting hate propaganda sources, in the sense of doing whatever is necessary to ensure that such propaganda does not reach its intended audience. Too often, hate-mongering media have been left unmo-

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<sup>198</sup> Toffler, 1995, p. 27.

lested to spin their poison among the populace. Eliminating those who incite violence is often as important as mounting a pro-active information campaign.<sup>199</sup>

If atrocities have already occurred, then preventing retaliatory attacks becomes a concern. According to Andrew Natsios, “the best way to avoid retributive violence is to deal with it through a carefully planned strategy. A commander could initiate an aggressive public affairs campaign using radio broadcasts and newspapers to warn against any resort to violence for revenge. Religious and political leaders could be encouraged to make similar broadcasts.”<sup>200</sup>

## **Education and Training**

Education and training need to be considered in a much broader framework. Often more than just the “three R’s”—reading, ’riting, and ’rithmetic—needs to be taught, and to a wider segment of the population than the young. If a conflict has been especially brutal, a long-term educational approach to reconciliation is necessary. In Cambodia, UNTAC’s objectives required it “to undertake mass human rights education, training and information programmes throughout the country.”<sup>201</sup>

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<sup>199</sup> In August 1997, for example, after supporting Bosnian Serbian president Biljana Plavsic in her struggle with Radovan Karadzic, NATO forces took control of a transmitting tower previously controlled by Karadzic’s supporters to prevent further incitement of violence against Stabilization Force troops. In September 1997, NATO troops yielded control back in exchange for agreement to stop anti-NATO rhetoric and assurances that they would open the airwaves to their rivals.

<sup>200</sup> Natsios, 1996b, p. 59.

<sup>201</sup> ICRC, 1994, p. 26.

## **View education as a security function**

Revitalizing a nation's education system is often as much a security activity as a humanitarian one. The mischief young people can create when they have time on their hands should not be underestimated. Getting children into schools and off the streets is important for a number of reasons. Doing so eliminates one major source of civil unrest and frees parents to return to work. School attendance also gives children hope for the future and provides them an alternative to joining factional militias. Curtis Runyan has pointed out that "deliberate recruitment of children for action in combat has dramatically increased."<sup>202</sup> They are used as executioners, assassins, spies, informers, cooks, porters and messengers. Despite the danger, some children, or their parents, see enlistment in an army or militia as a child's best alternative. "They may be offered into service by impoverished families, they may be in need of a meal or shelter, or they may decide that joining is simply the safest way to guarantee their own protection."<sup>203</sup>

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<sup>202</sup> Runyan, 1997, p. 26.

<sup>203</sup> Runyan, 1997, p. 26.

## Tailor education to local needs

Helena Norberg-Hodge believes a rethinking of education is required. “Modern education,” she laments, “is training children around the world for the centralised global economy.”<sup>204</sup> She recommends a much more locally focused educational program:

Promoting regional and local adaptation in the schools would be an essential part of the revitalization of local economies. Training in locally-adapted agriculture, architecture, artisan production—book-printing, pottery, weaving, furniture-making, etc.—and training in appropriate technologies suited to the specifics of climate and local resources would further a real decentralization of production for basic needs.<sup>205</sup>

A concomitant benefit of this kind of education, she believes, is reinstilling a sense of connection between the people and the place where they live. It would encourage them to remain on the land, preserve their culture, and invest in the community. Workshop participants agreed that targeting education and training to available jobs is a good idea.

What often occurs when a populace is overeducated is that children leave rural agricultural areas for urban areas seeking work consistent with their schooling. The urbanization of many countries is causing a major social problem even without an accompanying complex

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<sup>204</sup> Norberg-Hodge, 1997.

<sup>205</sup> Norberg-Hodge, 1997.

emergency. Since many developing nations' economies are heavily reliant on agriculture, education programs in animal husbandry, crop selection and rotation, and proper use of pesticides can have a major long-term impact. "In the Third World," writes Helena Norberg-Hodge, "the majority are still living in small towns and rural communities, to a large extent dependent on a local economy. In this era of rapid globalization, the most urgent challenge would be to stop the tide of urbanization and globalization by strengthening these local economies."<sup>206</sup>

Where individuals have been displaced and there is no land to which they can return, other strategies need to be developed. Education and training, for example, could focus on the creation of micro-enterprises. Sue Lautze also believes that migrants, "especially those with agrarian backgrounds, [require] urban-oriented employment" training.<sup>207</sup> And, as noted earlier, basic survival skills need to be taught. Health education in such areas as food preparation, hygiene, and so forth, is particularly important.

### **Military support must include education and training**

Children are not the only group requiring education. As discussed later in the infrastructure section, "the military should consider the level of technology the host nation is able to sustain (for example, digging wells with

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<sup>206</sup> Norberg-Hodge, 1997.

<sup>207</sup> Lautze, 1996, p. 35.

hand pumps rather than electric or battery-operated pumps). . . . [Education and] training must be provided to those who will be responsible for using and maintaining the equipment.”<sup>208</sup> Participants believed that working toward an education system tailored to jobs is a task the military should be prepared to carry out in complex emergencies.<sup>209</sup>

### **Provide training and education for intervention forces**

Training and education issues also arise when military personnel respond to complex emergencies. Intervention forces require a number of skills not typically part of their training schedules. These include conducting convoys, operating checkpoints, applying search techniques, and performing urban patrols. Increasingly, they also need to be competent in handling less-than-lethal crowd-control technologies. Participants agreed with General Zinni and other analysts that military personnel need some rudimentary education in “recent local history, various ethnic groups, religion, local customs, and so forth. Although familiarity with some basic phrases in the local language would be useful, . . . experience has shown that this is difficult to achieve.”<sup>210</sup> Negotiation skills also deserve mention. “These skills help [military personnel] avoid the unnecessary use of

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<sup>208</sup> Geis, 1996, p. 16.

<sup>209</sup> The recommendation was for military civil affairs personnel to “train the trainers” and help them set up the program, not run the program itself.

<sup>210</sup> LaMon, 1996, p. 13.



force, fostering goodwill and the image of the military. Success in [complex contingency operations] can often depend heavily on what image the military projects.”<sup>211</sup>

## **Infrastructure and Economic Restoration**

Reestablishing power and water is important for humanitarian and security reasons. It assists in reopening businesses, thus putting people back to work and rebuilding the nation. If people are working, they are less likely to cause trouble.

—Workshop Comment

Infrastructure and economic restoration are inextricably connected. While many economic areas are beyond the ken of the military, most infrastructure challenges are not. Sue Lautze argues that “the earned or endowed right of citizens to basic public services and infrastructure is necessary for any community to achieve ‘self-sufficiency.’ In the absence of functioning public roads, markets, schools, clinics, etc., emergency interventions should be geared to assist communities to (re)claim essential publicly provided resources.”<sup>212</sup>

Denis McLean labels this segment of complex contingency operations “reconstruction.” It includes “wide-ranging involvement, by civilian and/or military personnel, in

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<sup>211</sup> LaMon, 1996, p. 13.

<sup>212</sup> Lautze, 1996, p. 4.

rebuilding the infrastructure of society once war is over. . . . The aim is to build and secure an environment in which representative institutions can take over the management of a society severely disrupted by civil war or state collapse.”<sup>213</sup> McLean may be too optimistic in believing that all reconstruction can wait for the war to end. In order to meet some military objectives, reconstruction activities must often begin before peace is declared or the consent of the parties secured. As Jonathan Moore writes:

Engaging in socio-economic reconstruction even before the most desperate humanitarian needs are met, often in the line of fire, might well seem beyond the pale. . . . Several years ago Tony Lake [former National Security Advisor to President Clinton] . . . provided a rationale: “A failure to help settle these conflicts or their renewal in the future, could once again lead to the costly and destructive involvement of outsiders, including ourselves. . . . It would be better to spend funds now on reconstruction than to spend them later on new relief programmes.”<sup>214</sup>

Tasks falling under this sector include:

- Restoring basic public services
- Targeting development assistance such as road building
- Providing job training and employment for discharged military personnel

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<sup>213</sup> McLean, 1996, p. 3.

<sup>214</sup> Moore, 1996, p. 3.

- Reforming government economic policy
- Assisting in economic integration and cooperation
- Streamlining government licensing and eliminating corruption
- Initiating privatization under a market economy
- Managing natural resources
- Seeking investment capital

We discuss first infrastructure and then economic development.

## **Infrastructure**

Physical infrastructure is a large sector covering numerous sub-areas, such as transportation, communication, sanitation, water, and power. Although it is a broad category, “its importance cannot be ignored. Functioning power systems, schools, water systems, etc., all contribute to a generally calm environment within a fractured society.” Many planners and analysts have noted the importance of rebuilding infrastructure to achieve mission goals. “Lost assets (whether blown up bridges or drought-dead cattle) do not restore themselves; the speed of dislocated households’ ability to rehabilitate their livelihoods is significantly dependent on appropriate supporting measures and resource allocations; restoring human capacity and building service and market access is a complex, tedious and expensive process.”<sup>215</sup>

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<sup>215</sup> Green and Mavie, 1994, p. 77.

**With military involvement, assess infrastructure needs early**

Exactly which infrastructure deserves the most attention depends not only on the circumstances of a particular crisis but on the stage of the crisis in which a mission finds itself. As one participant suggested, “Military surveys of capabilities and needs will often provide the beginning point for planning. When they are conducted in association with NGOs and host governments, they can become authoritative plans of action.” These assessments need to begin as quickly as possible, preferably before forces arrive in-country. “Such assessment will,” according to Mark Geis, “ensure that the initial arrival of forces supports both civil and military actions through the appropriate division of access to ports, airfields, warehouses, and other facilities; support equipment major supply routes; and so forth.”<sup>216</sup>

Most infrastructure projects undertaken by the military are ostensibly in support of its own operations. Rare is the commander, however, who fails to understand that reconstruction efforts—or lack thereof—can have far-reaching impact. “Long-term rehabilitation and redevelopment efforts by the follow-on organization,” Mark Geis concludes, “can be stymied if . . . the military do[es] not take appropriate measures to ensure that long-term reliance on the military logistics and engineering effort is minimized.”<sup>217</sup> In the engineering area, he recom-

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<sup>216</sup> Geis, 1996, p. 8.

<sup>217</sup> Geis, 1996, p. 3.

mends that the military “ensure that the relief community/host nation can sustain any infrastructure improvements after the military leaves by minimizing reliance on military equipment, providing appropriate training, and ensuring the technology required to sustain the effort is at an appropriate level for the local population.”<sup>218</sup>

One of the military’s best contributions is identifying critical infrastructure. Although it may help to reconstruct some of it, properly identifying the most critical projects can help all relief providers determine which group is to assume responsibility for which task. Good assessments and sound analysis can help ensure that facilities most needed and having the greatest impact on long-term stability are undertaken first. Mark Geis goes so far as to recommend building infrastructure profiles for countries which are likely to experience complex emergencies in the future.<sup>219</sup>

### **Get local input during assessments**

Both the physical and political dimensions of infrastructure rebuilding must be considered when selecting a project. “At the village level, the placement of a water well or health post can spark conflict between two communities. Not only the location but also its choice of employees can create tensions.”<sup>220</sup> Hence it is critical to have local input when selecting infrastructure projects. Just as important is ensuring that projects are sustain-

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<sup>218</sup> Geis, 1996, p. 3.

<sup>219</sup> Geis, 1996.

<sup>220</sup> Prendergast and Scott, 1996, p. 9.

able. As noted earlier, a population benefits little from a new well that depends upon a pump that cannot be maintained locally.

### **Focus military efforts on restoring basic public services and lines of communication**

Participants agreed that rebuilding infrastructure which supports the provision of basic services (including housing), the distribution of goods (transportation), and the dissemination of information (banking and communications) should be a military priority during complex emergencies. In doing so, the military should address market and economic development in identifying and prioritizing projects. Some may disagree that the military should concern itself at all about markets, but “the market’s potential for serving as part of the solution remains largely untapped by the international relief community”—and that includes the military. In addition, it is an “abiding principle of complex emergencies . . . that invisible economic forces drive conflicts more than is commonly understood.”<sup>221</sup> Sue Lautze agrees that infrastructure related to market functions is likely to be particularly important:

Markets fail or perform poorly when infrastructure is damaged and destroyed by war. Strategic military targets include transportation (road, rail or air networks) and communication (radio, television and newspaper) systems. . . . Where market functions are inhibited, relief interventions to repair vital infrastructure should be supported.<sup>222</sup>

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<sup>221</sup> Natsios, 1996b, p. 56.

<sup>222</sup> Lautze, 1996, p. 41.

She provides two examples of how the military can assist in this area:

- Assuring “access to natural resources . . . by negotiating safe passage or demining water sheds, forest, common grazing areas, etc.; . . . and
- [Ensuring] transportation routes are kept open between markets (e.g., demining and rehabilitating roads. . .).”<sup>223</sup>

Helping to provide housing is also an important aspect of security and reconciliation. Refugees and demobilized militia all need adequate housing. Participants noted, however, that the emphasis should be on self-help: “Give refugees and demobilized forces materials for their houses, but don’t build the homes for them. Stimulate local industry for pre-fab housing. As in Bosnia, allocate resources for housing repair.”

Civil affairs units are particularly useful in this area. Their contractual expertise can be used to facilitate agreements between local labor and project sponsors (being mindful of how such agreements can affect the local economy). “The key to using civil affairs or other military assets in linking relief and development,” noted one participant, “is to give strategically determined, clearly defined tasks of short duration which are beyond the immediate capabilities of the NGOs but which directly support the outcomes that the NGOs are attempting to

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<sup>223</sup> Lautze, 1996, p. 41.

achieve.” Whenever possible, local capacities should be used and improved in preference to imported capabilities, which are neither permanent nor sustainable.

When planning for a complex emergency, Geis recommends different functional areas be considered. They are (in no order of priority):

- Roads, bridges, and rails
- Mines and unexploded ordnance
- Water
- Fuel
- Power
- Hygiene and sanitation
- Facilities construction and repair
- Food
- Transportation
- Supplies
- Camps and support structure

This list, which Geis prepared for the Marine Corps, is geared primarily toward meeting the immediate infrastructure needs of the people. During the workshops, participants advocated the construction of facilities that would have a longer-lasting effect on the community, such as, government buildings, police stations, meeting halls, schools, medical clinics, and so forth.



Regardless of the precise functional breakout, we agree with Geis that for each functional area “the military should think through whether providing this support will undermine current relief efforts and the ability of the follow-on organization to sustain the accomplishments of the military.”<sup>224</sup> That is, infrastructure projects can have a dramatic effect on a nation’s economy—for good or ill. As noted above, infrastructure projects can help open markets, move goods, and get populations back to work. Some projects, however, put people out of work. As one participant wryly noted, water projects in Mogadishu, Somalia, “put 1,500 water-carrying mules and their owners out of business.” Infrastructure projects can negatively impact a crisis in other ways; consider efforts to provide facilities for institutions of governance. Adequate facilities must be available for effective governance. Workshop participants believed that ministries of justice and police stations were particularly important early on. Even in this area, there are dangers. Rebuilding government buildings could be viewed as an attempt to support one faction over another, and thus could rekindle conflict.

There was also considerable debate during project workshops about the benefits or dangers of rebuilding public gathering facilities, particularly before the security situation is stable. Community centers received more participant support than sports facilities as structures best suited to societal needs. Religious buildings were

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<sup>224</sup> Geis, 1996, p. 21.

the most controversial: “Unless engineers or other troops expend equal time and resources to help all religious faiths, there will be charges of partiality.”

## **Economic Development**

Economic development is inextricably tied to a successful infrastructure rebuilding program, but it also involves other activities, such as demining. As former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali noted: “[Land-mines in Somalia] were hazardous to the civilian population and also posed one of the main obstacles to the recovery of the rural economy, as areas littered with land-mines were thereby rendered unsuitable for farming or grazing.”<sup>225</sup>

Sue Lautze reminds us that “economic assets, infrastructure and networks are targets of war. The strategic destruction and manipulation of productive systems characterize complex emergencies.”<sup>226</sup> Getting the economy of a shattered nation back on its feet is critical. Boutros-Ghali preached that “the creation of work [is] essential, not only to provide income but also to help restore stability by channeling young men from the militias and armed gangs into peaceful, productive pursuits.”<sup>227</sup> Workshop participants believed that resurrecting economies should follow a course similar to Abraham Maslow’s hierarchy of needs for individuals: that is, start with the basics—food, water, shelter and sanitation—

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<sup>225</sup> Boutros-Ghali, 1996a, p. 36.

<sup>226</sup> Lautze, 1996, p. 10.

<sup>227</sup> Boutros-Ghali, 1996a, p. 36.

and build from there. “Food is the most basic element of survival, and agriculture in most societies where we are seeing conflict these days is both the principal economic activity as well as the means to food security for the nation. Thus measures to ensure rapid recovery of long-term agricultural productivity are essential, along with immediate short-term food relief.”

The economy is an area where the threat of doing more harm than good is very real. A large influx of outside foodstuffs, provided free to large portions of the population, can quickly cause local markets to collapse. Conversely, the insertion of large numbers of well-funded relief and/or military personnel can artificially inflate prices as they compete with local populations for available resources. Either situation can exacerbate the challenges at hand. Attempts to buy local products and contract with local labor can help stimulate the economy, but they can also result in charges of factional preference and favoritism.

Economic areas that should be assessed by both the military and other organizations when intervening in a humanitarian emergency include:

- *The banking system.* Large amounts of money will enter the country during a crisis, including pay for participants, and it needs protection. Without adequate banking facilities, these funds are at considerable risk, and as markets and businesses become more active, the money they generate won't be secure. A banking system is also essential for establishing credit arrangements and protecting government funds (such

as taxes and international loans or grants). According to Mark Walsh, mission participants must “become aware of the ability of local organizations to absorb investment and to sustain change and development. A relief plan in excess of a billion dollars was initiated in Haiti in 1995, yet two years earlier the country had difficulty absorbing several million dollars in foreign assistance. The international financial and development communities presumably understand this weakness and are directing resources to strengthen Haiti’s capability to receive, administer, and apply the assistance it so desperately requires.”<sup>228</sup>

- *Monetization programs.* Even though all normal monetary systems had collapsed in Somalia, goods and services continued to be exchanged and a working currency accepted. In some conflicts, regime opponents have introduced large amounts of counterfeit currency into a country to undermine the monetary system.<sup>229</sup>
- *The finance ministry.* Stable civil government cannot exist without a reliable source of effectively managed funds. Taxation and customs schemes must provide the foundation for government financing. The danger is that a taxation system can become an extortion system if riddled by graft and corruption. During and immediately following a crisis, however, there are likely to be few taxes to collect. As one participant concluded, “The problem is like trying to get blood from a

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<sup>228</sup> Walsh, 1996, p. 35.

<sup>229</sup> For further discussion, see Natsios, 1996a, pp. 83–84.

rock. No blood (i.e., money) available means that tax collectors are more likely to feel the angry end of a rock than the cool caress of cash.”

- *External funding.* Relief assistance alone cannot jump start an economy, nor can limited foreign aid. Adequate external funding must include foreign investment, which in turn relies on a stable and promising investment climate. Unfortunately, the trend in this area is mixed. Although “total resource flows continue to grow, official aid to poor countries unable to attract private capital has declined. This has resulted in a mounting volume of private investment going only to a select number of dynamic economies in the developing world, [which are] highly concentrated in a dozen or so of the most robust economies in Asia and Central and Southern [sic] America.”<sup>230</sup>

### **Pursue economic development on a local level**

Contrary to expectations, the economies of failed states often do not have to be rebuilt from the ground up. In Somalia, for example, the currency remained relatively stable, and the economy actually started to improve even before violence ended. This was primarily due to the fact that Somalia has a locally, versus nationally, based economy. Too often economic development is considered only on the macro level, sometimes with devastating results. Helena Norberg-Hodge recounts the fate of a small, largely self-reliant village that found itself caught up in “economic development”:

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<sup>230</sup> UN News Service, 1997. “Official development assistance . . . now makes up 29 percent of total net resource flows, compared to 55 percent in 1990.”

Economic development . . . meant the dismantling of the local economy; decision-making power was almost overnight shifted from the household and village to bureaucracies in distant urban centers; children were educated for a lifestyle completely unrelated to the local context and alien to that of their elders; and people were suddenly bombarded with media and advertising images telling them that urban life was glamorous, exciting and important, making the life of a farmer seem backward and primitive.<sup>231</sup>

The majority of those likely to be involved in complex emergencies live in small towns and rural settings. Believing that small farmers “are the key to rebuilding a healthy agricultural base for stronger, more diversified economies,” Norberg-Hodge makes several recommendations for stopping the tide of urbanization and preserving small farms. Her recommendations include:<sup>232</sup>

- Establishing community banks and loan funds, which increase the capital available to local residents
- Creating “buy local” campaigns to help small, rural businesses survive
- Developing “local currencies” to generate alternative sources of capital for investment<sup>233</sup>

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<sup>231</sup> Norberg-Hodge, 1997.

<sup>232</sup> Norberg-Hodge, 1997.

<sup>233</sup> There are programs in eight US states using this model. For instance, a delicatessen in Massachusetts issued “Deli-Dollars”—similar to gift certificates—to raise capital when a bank turned it down for a loan. Ithaca, NY, also has a successful local currency known as Ithaca HOURS. (Norberg-Hodge, 1997.)

- Establishing local exchange trading systems—large-scale barter systems—which allow cash-strapped individuals to exchange goods and services and bolster the local economy
- Creating “tool lending libraries,” which allow locals to share agricultural or other tools on a community-wide basis
- Instituting Community Supported Agriculture movements, whereby local farmers link themselves directly
- Establishing farmers’ markets

### **Job creation is a security as well as an economic concern**

Whether on the farm or in the city, the creation of jobs is important for both security and economic reasons—that is, the greater the availability of acceptable jobs, the better the stability (directly through satisfaction of immediate needs, and indirectly through lessening the comparative attractiveness of crime and looting). As a result, participants ranked supporting the creation of acceptable jobs high among the tasks for the military to pursue during complex emergencies.

Sue Lautze suggests that “a balanced approach to providing economic opportunities to displaced populations may include:

- Lowering the cost of living by providing short-term relief assistance with land for gardens for home food production, establishing production or consumption cooperatives or providing basic social services free of charge.
- Subsidizing the cost of living through targeted feeding for small children or the establishment of cheap, effective transportation systems.
- Creating direct job opportunities, bearing in mind that artificial settlements require the creation of artificial jobs.
- Locating development projects near displaced settlements to create demand for migrant labor, and reserving such jobs for displaced persons.
- Promoting micro-enterprise development in the settlements, especially through the establishment of small, community-based, revolving loan arrangements.<sup>234</sup>
- Providing access to new markets, especially through the facilitation of transportation and communication.
- Training displaced persons, especially those with agrarian backgrounds, for urban-oriented employment.<sup>235</sup>

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<sup>234</sup> Not all observers believe that micro-enterprises are a good idea. Helena Norberg-Hodge, for example, believes "introducing micro-loans for small-scale enterprise may actually contribute to the destruction of local, non-monetized economies and create dependence on a highly volatile and inequitable global economy, where currency devaluation, etc., can prove disastrous." (Norberg-Hodge, 1997.)

<sup>235</sup> Lautze, 1996, pp. 34–35.



Participants agreed that the military should not play a leading role in the economic area. But they also agreed that it can have a vital indirect role in helping reinvigorate the economy. Major General William Nash, USA, admitted in an interview after rotating out of Bosnia in December 1996, that “he wished he had ‘raised more hell’ to spur economic and social reconstruction efforts” during his time commanding the 1st Armored Division as part of the NATO Implementation Force.<sup>236</sup> Military logistics expertise may prove useful in getting an economy up and running through infrastructure improvements, as discussed above. But NGOs, UN agencies, other states, and commercial investors must work with the government to formulate macro economic policies, establish micro-enterprises, promote agricultural recovery, ensure availability of capital assets, and discourage overly ambitious credit schemes.

Prospects for great economic inroads during an emergency intervention are slight. As one Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) official commented, “There is such a dearth of resources for rehabilitation and so much for relief; it’s feast and famine.”<sup>237</sup> Moreover, as Sue Lautze writes: “Expectations about laying foundations for economic growth are probably unrealistic, but interventions to strengthen a community’s capacity to prevent or mitigate disasters are an essential part of furthering self-sufficiency.”<sup>238</sup>

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<sup>236</sup> “Army chief in Bosnia steps down,” *European Stars & Stripes*, 7 May 1997.

<sup>237</sup> Prendergast and Scott, 1996, p. 29.

<sup>238</sup> Lautze, 1996, p. 5.

Whatever actions are taken, they must be carefully coordinated with all players or they could result in security challenges, as the following experience demonstrates:

Relief agencies operating in southern Somalia were unable to standardize local labor wages for offloading relief ships, a failure that caused considerable difficulty among the agencies. The local Somali labor committee pitted one agency against another when negotiating wages, threatening one relief agency head who resisted higher wages that another agency head had been coerced into paying. Indeed, the January 1993 assassination of Sean Deveraux, a member of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) staff in Kismayo, was traced to attempts by UNICEF to eliminate such coercive labor practices.<sup>239</sup>

Reconciliation also includes reintegrating faction forces back into civil society. This may require some initial cash compensation and housing, but the medium- and longer-term programs to increase the potential for economic and social reintegration of ex-combatants and their families are just as critical. These programs could include enrollment in vocational training programs; initiation of job-placement schemes, providing credit for small enterprises, allocating land and providing other incentives for ex-combatants to resume agricultural activity.<sup>240</sup> "NGOs," one participant recommended, "should determine the likely desirable pursuits of ex-combatants." This would allow aid-givers to target their training programs

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<sup>239</sup> Walsh, 1996, p. 44.

<sup>240</sup> Berdal, 1996, pp. 39–49.

better. Similarly, an assessment is needed to determine where ex-combatants want to settle. The problem of refugees is even more difficult than dealing with demobilized militias, because there are generally so many more of them.

## **Human Rights and Social Development**

The military must be impartial with the factions, but never neutral with respect to vulnerable groups. The overriding reason for bringing in military assets to complex humanitarian emergencies is to alleviate the acute suffering, casualties, and stop horrific human rights violations.

—Workshop Comment

In the final workshop, one participant noted that presence of foreigners (regardless of whether they represent the United Nations, NGOs or military forces) has a dramatic positive effect on a host nation's observance of human rights. The tasks normally associated with this sector include:

- Monitoring human rights practices
- Promoting human rights standards
- Establishing civil affairs operations in local areas
- Assisting in capacity-building for social institutions

We first discuss human rights and then social development.

## **Human Rights**

Workshop participants agreed that providing a safe and secure environment is the military's principal task, but they couldn't agree as to whether this equated to protecting human rights. Writing on Cambodia, where UNTAC was entrusted with carrying out the broadest human rights mandate ever given to a UN mission, Sergio de Mello concluded that "the military and civilian police components played an essential logistical and protection role with regard to vulnerable civilian populations." He went on to say that "all such activities could not have been carried out without military and police support and protection."<sup>241</sup> Finally, he stressed that a balance must be struck between the diplomatic, political, and military processes. In addition to the atrocities brought about by conflict, human rights violations can result when leadership is either incompetent or untrained. As mentioned earlier, those elevated to leadership positions following the restructuring of civil governments may not have all the necessary credentials to govern. When that is the case, civil affairs personnel can play an important and unique role.

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<sup>241</sup> ICRC, 1994, pp. 25 and 26, respectively.

The high moral tone that discussions of human rights always assume belies the fact that there are few recognized norms. Prendergast and Scott note that “local perceptions of group and individual rights are often little understood by outsiders and may be used to justify certain abuses.”<sup>242</sup> This is particularly true when discussing group versus individual rights. At-risk groups are often more concerned with community survival than with individual survival, and actions resulting from this perspective can erroneously be viewed as showing a lack of concern for human rights. But as Prendergast and Scott note, “humanitarian focus on individuals’ rights can ignore and undermine survival strategies based on commitment to group survival and preservation of a way of life.”<sup>243</sup>

The military is not alone in wondering if its primary mission complements or includes the protection of human rights. For years there has been a dichotomy, which has separated relief agencies from human rights monitoring groups. According to Prendergast and Scott, “the mandates of most operational agencies prevent them from speaking out aggressively and publicly on human rights issues.”<sup>244</sup> Drawing from a UNICEF study, they note that “complex emergencies are breaking down the former dichotomy between human rights and aid operations as massive, systemic rights abuses force donors to confront the ‘sheer inadequacy of providing

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<sup>242</sup> Prendergast and Scott, 1996, p. 39.

<sup>243</sup> Prendergast and Scott, 1996, p. 39.

<sup>244</sup> Prendergast and Scott, 1996, p. 40.

goods and services without seeking to protect rights' and make the latter a fundamental aspect of assistance."<sup>245</sup> The military will find itself in just such a predicament. Establishing a safe and secure environment will be linked inextricably with the protection of human rights.

### **Protecting human rights is part and parcel of any military mission**

As we have noted throughout this chapter, complex emergencies always generate displaced persons and/or refugees, and these groups suffer an abnormally high number of human rights violations. In his seminal work *Just and Unjust Wars*, Michael Walzer writes, "A legitimate act of war is one that does not violate the rights of the people against whom it is directed."<sup>246</sup> One of the basic problems with complex emergencies is that those involved more often than not ignore international norms and deliberately make innocent civilians the targets of their actions. Rape and murder are common abuses. Walzer notes that

Rape is a crime, in war as in peace, because it violates the rights of the woman who is attacked. . . . When soldiers respect these bans [on rape and murder], they are not acting kindly or gently or magnanimously; they are acting justly. If they are humanitarian soldiers, they may indeed do more than is required of them—sharing food with

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<sup>245</sup> Prendergast and Scott, 1996, p. 40.

<sup>246</sup> Walzer, 1977, p. 135.

civilians, for example, rather than merely not raping or killing them. But the ban on rape and murder is a matter of right.<sup>247</sup>

Whereas a state exists to protect the rights of its citizens, in complex emergencies states have often turned on vulnerable sectors of society.

Those intervening in complex emergencies cannot afford to ignore human rights abuses. As unconscionable as some indigenous groups may appear, experience has demonstrated that they prefer to work their vile deeds quietly and anonymously. Hence, the presence of human rights monitors has proven to be a significant deterrent to abuse. For that matter, participants noted, the presence of any foreign individuals (military or civilian) has been shown to have a deterrent effect. Sometimes, however, presence is not enough. Numerous stories have circulated about women raped or people killed in the presence of international troops who stood by and watched helplessly because their rules of engagement did not permit them to intervene. During Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, US troops were given ROE which permitted them to intervene in areas within their control: "For example, when a rape was occurring within sight of a guard post, US forces came to the aid of the victim and apprehended the assailant."<sup>248</sup>

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<sup>247</sup> Walzer, 1977, pp. 134–135.

<sup>248</sup> Joint Warfighting Center, 1995, p. 51.

## But “peace comes before justice”

Dealing with alleged war criminals is much more problematic. Once an individual is declared a war criminal (and fighting is still underway), that individual has immediately changed from someone with whom negotiations might have been possible to one with whom no compromise is possible. Admiral Leighton Smith, USN, believes that “peace comes before justice. This is particularly true when there are no winners or losers and evenhandedness is the modus operandi.”<sup>249</sup> Intervention should stop human rights abuses even if they cannot immediately punish the perpetrators of past offenses. As witnessed with respect to Bosnia in the summer of 1997, precisely who should be responsible for apprehending war-crimes suspects is a matter of open debate.<sup>250</sup>

## Social Development

Social services are almost always the first segment of the government to collapse during complex emergencies. Consensus emerged from our workshops that the most important social service was health. It was followed closely by public safety services (both of which were

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<sup>249</sup> Smith, 1996b, p. 1.

<sup>250</sup> In July 1997, British special forces in Bosnia, under separate command from those serving with NATO's Stabilization Force, captured one Bosnian Serb war-crimes suspect and shot and killed another when he resisted arrest. By contrast, the former Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvili, “maintained that the soldiers we send to Bosnia are not the proper soldiers to get involved in arresting war criminals.” As quoted in Philip Shenon, “Shalikashvili Sees No Role for U.S. Troops in Bosnia War-Crimes Mission,” *New York Times*, 29 August 1997.



discussed more fully above). According to participants, the indigenous “government must be willing to accept responsibility for its people’s needs.” Too often, intervening organizations free local authorities from their social contracts by assuming social welfare responsibilities.<sup>251</sup> In order to promote local responsibility, “the host government should be involved in the decision making as well as the general discussions on any action to be taken” during an intervention. The term “engagement” has been coined by the relief community to describe “the process whereby agencies maintain contact with authorities to uphold humanitarian principles and welfare responsibilities.”<sup>252</sup> The military’s primary role is to support local agencies and NGOs, not to take the lead. But as noted in the introduction to this report, many believe that the military will end up executing relief tasks because they arrive first and have the resources to act.<sup>253</sup>

### **Civic action programs are not “mission creep”**

Recently Argentina and others have recommended establishing a UN civil affairs contingent whose personnel would be designated “White Helmets”—“volunteers from every walk of life—engineers, nurses, lawyers, technicians, social workers, administrators, teachers and police officers—[who] would work together to better the lives of citizens in countries where their skills and talents are needed.”<sup>254</sup> As Charles-Philippe David reports:

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<sup>251</sup> Prendergast and Scott, 1996, p. 11.

<sup>252</sup> Prendergast and Scott, 1996, p. 35.

<sup>253</sup> Hayes and Wheatley, 1996, p. 57.

There is widespread recognition in the international community of the need to increase substantially civilian involvement in peacekeeping and development missions, in order to respond more effectively to emergency situations. This would relieve the Blue Helmets of the civilian tasks they currently perform, as their role and mandate are military in nature.<sup>255</sup>

David insists that such a group of White Helmet volunteers could be used further in “preventive development,” that is development aimed at preventing future crises. These volunteers would strengthen the UN’s effort in seven high-demand areas (which roughly correspond to the operational sectors discussed in this chapter):

- Delivery of emergency humanitarian aid and health services to the victims of forced migration
- Logistical and administrative support for coordinating units in the deployment of emergency assistance
- Technical support for the repatriation of displaced persons and refugees
- Support for human rights initiatives and for various trust-building and conflict-resolution efforts
- Assistance in the demobilization and retraining of combatants and participation in mine-clearing efforts
- Support for sanitation, hospitals, education, food distribution, and housing efforts

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<sup>254</sup> David, 1997, p. 6. UN military personnel have long been called “Blue Helmets.” See also, Nordquist, 1997.

<sup>255</sup> David, 1997, p. 3.

- Reintegrating citizens into a functioning socio-economic system

David nevertheless acknowledges that four major obstacles face this concept:

- It has yet to be fully studied for all its implications
- Some NGOs are concerned that there would be significant overlap between White Helmet responsibilities and those of their organizations
- White Helmet security would present a problem
- Program funding would have to be worked out. Few nations are ready to establish a new and costly international program

Nevertheless, the United Nations General Assembly has backed the concept, with resolution A-50-144. In an accompanying memorandum, the Assembly notes that the objective of such a program would be to “make men and women of good will available to the United Nations, with the aim of strengthening the reserve capacity of developing countries in support of United Nations activities in the field of emergency humanitarian assistance and the gradual transition from relief to rehabilitation, reconstruction and development.”<sup>256</sup>

Should the “white helmets” concept ever come to fruition, military civil affairs personnel could work closely with them in addition to working directly with local popu-

lations. Civic action programs deserve special mention, because of their wide applicability in complex emergencies. Recently, some critics have viewed civic action programs pejoratively and deemed them outside the military's appropriate focus areas. They label forays into civic action programs "nation-building" and decry such activities as "mission creep." Dayton Maxwell laments, "Political sensitivities connected with 'mission creep' are currently keeping the range of on-the-ground military activities in peacekeeping operations to a minimum, even though traditional military assistance programs for years have worked in civic action programs."<sup>257</sup> He goes on to note that many military commanders are using what flexibility they do have to experiment with non-military activities. For example, prior to the Dayton Accords, the British battalion in Bosnia was acclaimed for facilitating the organization of Croat-Muslim committees in Gornj Vakuf, encouraging cross-border marketing, and participating in radio call-in shows.

## **Cultural Awareness**

During the final workshop, some participants noted the lack of specific references to culture, ethnicity, religion, and related topics in the baseline influence nets. While true that these are important areas that require attention during a complex emergency, we believe that they

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<sup>256</sup> Quoted in David, 1997, p. 4.

<sup>257</sup> Maxwell, 1997, p. 2.

are inherent in the nets. For example, a judicial system that is perceived as fair and effective can only be achieved if it is in harmony with the population's basic religious beliefs concerning justice and mercy. A system of governance will only be viewed as representing the interests of the people if it protects the rights of all its citizens, regardless of race, creed or color. Having said that, we believe it is important to provide a few words concerning cultural awareness.

### **Cultural Factors Matter**

Michael Brown argues that

international actors need to address the cultural and perceptual factors that lead some countries toward violence. This means working to overturn patterns of cultural discrimination by safeguarding rights with respect to language, religion, and education. This also means working to revamp the distorted histories groups often have of each other....Pernicious group histories play important roles in galvanizing internal conflicts, and they need to be given much greater attention in conflict prevention circles.<sup>258</sup>

While such factors are unmistakably important, they go far beyond what military forces should involve themselves with. General Zinni believes that the two most important aspects to learn are how decisions are made and by whom.<sup>259</sup> It is not necessary for military personnel, or others providing relief, to understand all cultural aspects of a targeted society (such as arts, music, etc.) in order to accomplish their objectives in a complex

<sup>258</sup> Brown, 1996, p. 611.

emergency. But clearly knowing other aspects of a country's culture is important. For example, religious dietary restrictions could be important in some crises.

**Interpreters—of language and culture—are critical to mission success**

During Operation GUANTANAMO, the US military discovered that the most well-intentioned and best-laid plans are not necessarily the most productive. As Sandra Newett recounts:

The migrant population (consisting of Haitians) preferred food prepared by its own people. Also, use of the laundry system prepared for the Haitians was curtailed because, within the context of the Haitian culture, laundry and washing practices serve as a social function that the Haitians preferred to conduct themselves.<sup>260</sup>

Understanding and accommodating these cultural preferences resulted in increased migrant morale as well as reduced personnel requirements for cooking and laundry. Andrew Natsios believes that the military often fails to understand the social and economic effects of its actions, and that a better understanding of the local culture would allow military leaders to make decisions that would account for those effects.<sup>261</sup>

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<sup>259</sup> Dixon and Wigge, 1995, p. 19

<sup>260</sup> Newett, 1996, p. 12.

In addition to being sensitive to local culture, military personnel need to be sensitive to the culture of the international civilian humanitarian relief community as well. A UN High Commissioner for Refugees handbook notes that “experience indicates that many failures of cooperation and misunderstandings have resulted from the neglect to consider the diverging perspectives of the military and civilian actors.”<sup>262</sup>

### **Language skills are a must**

One of the most basic cultural problems which needs to be overcome is the language barrier. It should therefore come as no surprise that “interpreters are critical to mission success.”<sup>263</sup> In addition, almost all military personnel need to know a few phrases in the local language and receive some rudimentary education in recent local history, ethnic groups, religion, and local customs.

## **Cross-Sectoral Strategies**

### **Importance of Sectors**

The importance of individual operational sectors, and indeed of specific tasks within sectors, will vary in accordance with the specifics of each complex emergency.

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<sup>261</sup> Dixon and Wigge, 1995, p. 53.

<sup>262</sup> UNHCR, 1995, Section 7.2.

<sup>263</sup> Joint Warfighting Center, 1995, p. 17.

To give a sense of the relative importance to the sectors, we asked participants at our first workshop to rate the priority of sectors in a generic context. Participants voted, on a scale of 1 to 10, on the relative importance of “end-state” sectors (somewhat different from that of the Generic Pol-Mil Plan) within specific phases of a complex emergency—in other words, how important a specific sector was for achieving the desired end state of civil stability and durable peace with minimum external assistance. Note that participants considered providing humanitarian assistance a given, and hence did not include it as an “end state” sector. We then took the average across all phases, reallocated the prioritizations to match the Generic Pol-Mil Plan’s operational sectors, and calculated the percentage of the overall vote.<sup>264</sup> The results are shown in Figure 3-1; in Table 3-1 we provide the supporting data.

As suggested by the groupings in Figure 3-1, excluding humanitarian assistance, there are three groups of sectors of relatively equal importance, dealing with:


- *Politics.* Diplomatic and Internal Political tasks
- *Security.* Military and Civil Law and Order/Public Security tasks
- *Rehabilitation.*<sup>266</sup> Economic Restoration, Human Rights and Social Development, and Public Information and Education tasks

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<sup>264</sup> Participants voted twice, at the beginning and the end of the workshop; the average of the two votes is reported in Table 3-1.



**Figure 3-1. Relative importance of operational sectors (percent of total)<sup>265</sup>**



\* Excludes Humanitarian Assistance, a necessary precondition

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<sup>265</sup> Excludes the Humanitarian Assistance operational sector, which participants did not consider to be an “end-state” sector.

Given this indication of the relative priority of operational sectors in a generic context, we can now consider the importance of military roles (see table 3-1).

### Role of Military Across the Sectors

**Table 3-1. Sector vote prioritizations (percent)<sup>267, 268</sup>**

Generic Pol-Mil Plan Sectors	November Workshop Sectors									
	Leadership / Management	Prevention	Reconciliation /Divorce	Institutions of governance	Security	Physical Infrastructure	Economy	Social Services	Health	Information
Diplomatic	18	5	7	7						
Internal Political	16	5		11						
Military	15				15					
Civil Law & Order / Public Security	15				15					
Infrastructure & Economic Restoration	18					10	8			
Human Rights & Social Development	13							7	6	
Public Information & Education	6									6
Humanitarian Assistance	0									

<sup>266</sup> As noted in Chapter Two, we use the term “rehabilitation” in a broad context.

<sup>267</sup> Prioritization averages were rounded; the total does not add to 100 due to rounding errors.

<sup>268</sup> Participants did not establish a sector that could be related to the Generic Pol-Mil Plan’s Humanitarian Assistance sector.

The first step is to identify where the military might have the most relevance. Using the illustrative tasks noted above in each operational sector, we assessed the degree to which the military should, on a generic basis:


- be willing to perform tasks directly
- be prepared to support others in performing tasks
- seek to avoid any involvement in the performance of tasks

Using a rating system of 0 to 2, we then identified the relative importance of the operational task sectors *to the military*. Figure 3-2 summarizes this analysis; the scores for each task, which we derived from both literature review and the comments of the participants in our workshops, are noted in Appendix B.

As shown

- The military should be prepared to perform military and humanitarian assistance tasks
- The military should be prepared to support the performance of
  - public information and education tasks
  - human rights and social development tasks
  - public security and law and order tasks
  - infrastructure and economic restoration tasks

**Figure 3-2. Role of military across sectors<sup>269</sup>**



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<sup>269</sup> The line in between bars identifies statistically significant break points in the data.

- Generally, internal political and diplomatic tasks should fall outside the purview of the military

While this analysis seems to make sense generically, it does not take into account how important each sector might be to the overall success of promoting relief with development in complex emergencies.


### **Prioritizing Roles for the Military**

In Figure 3-3, we correlate the importance of the sectors, as determined by workshop participants (using the scale on the left), with the relative value of the military within each sector, based on our research (using the scale on the right).

Moving from left to right in Figure 3-3:

- The first two column sets are the political sectors, which the military should only support (if be involved in at all).
- Next is humanitarian assistance, a necessary precondition for success and a task for which the military is particularly suited (in association, of course, with non-military agencies and NGOs).
- The next two column sets are the security sectors. While the military, if involved, must perform the military tasks, it is also important for the military to support (to the extent possible) tasks in the Civil Law and Order/Public Security sector.

**Figure 3-3. Where should the military focus its efforts?**



- The final three column sets are the rehabilitation sectors, which the military is roughly equally suited to support. However, given the relative importance of the individual sectors, the military should focus its efforts on the sectors in the order shown (left to right).

Development of specific plans requires an evaluation of actual circumstances. Nevertheless, the analysis in Figure 3-3, and the approach it takes, can be used as a guide to developing specific plans for the military when responding to a complex emergency.

## Final Thoughts

We noted at the beginning of this chapter that strategies are situationally dependent; no single strategy is a template, and no single strategy ever survives reality. Thus, as Michael Brown writes, “International efforts to prevent, manage and resolve internal conflicts face formidable obstacles. The forces that drive internal conflicts are many and powerful. . . . Different international actors have radically different perceptions of problems, fundamentally different interests at stake, and wildly different ideas about what should be done and who should do it.”<sup>270</sup> The best that appears achievable is a general harmonizing of objectives. Brown recommends that the international community make conflict prevention its top priority, and that if those efforts fail, it should intervene selectively. These “conflict resolution efforts should be guided by a simple principle: help those who would help themselves.” When there is no indication that the parties are willing to work for peace, intervention “should only be employed when important interests are at stake or when crimes against humanity, such as genocide, are being committed.”<sup>271</sup>

The focus of the workshops, as well as this report, is on the military and its primary mission—to provide a safe and secure environment so that other activities can take place. Within that mission, we examined what else the military can contribute to the objective of establishing a durable peace and stable civilian rule. In this chapter, we identified a broad array of potential activities the

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<sup>270</sup> Brown, 1996, p. 603

military can undertake during a complex contingency operation. Few militaries are as well equipped as US forces to perform, within a single complex contingency operation, such a broad range of concurrent tasks. But the US military labors under legal restrictions as to how much it can do. Most tasks must be shown to be a primary military requirement which may concomitantly have civil benefits. Nevertheless, the breadth of support remains impressive.

In Haiti, for example:

The US military was not given the task to make substantial long term improvements in Haitian infrastructure. Certain tasks, however, were deemed mission essential and qualified for use of DOD funds: street clean-up and basic sanitation measures, landfill operations, repair of critical roads and bridges, and restoration of electrical power. A Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) was established to coordinate efforts. Civil Affairs officers, many of them reservists, helped restore the power plant to operation with fuel provided by the [Multinational Force]. Ports were opened and repaired, police stations were reopened and new ones built, and schools were reopened. Assistance was provided to NGOs to distribute humanitarian supplies and help reopen hospitals. Civil Affairs officers from the reserves were assigned as advisors to each ministry of the Haitian government to get them moving in a hurry. Each action was calculated to contribute directly to the objectives of restoring civil order and confidence in the new government.<sup>272</sup>

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<sup>271</sup> Brown, 1996, p. 606.



This example demonstrates how military actions in various sectors work together to achieve mission objectives. But many military officers and their political bosses believe that providing such support constitutes mission creep—an insidious term that entered the military’s lexicon during the Somalia operation—and should be avoided at all costs.<sup>273</sup> One observer noted that during subsequent operations in Rwanda the Americans were so intent “on preventing mission creep that ultra-caution led to mission shrink.”<sup>274</sup> General Zinni believes not getting involved in these areas may not be an option. “Even though people will say that [it] is ‘mission creep,’ the military commander will often become directly involved because there is no one else to do the job.” He goes on to say, “I am in the minority, but I believe that we need to take on some of these missions.”<sup>275</sup> General William Nash, USA, commander of the 1st Armored Division during the Implementation Force (IFOR) mission in Bosnia, noted recently that military support to civilian agencies “is not mission creep—it’s mission.”<sup>276</sup> Admiral Leighton Smith, USN, commander of IFOR, noted that even when a military commander is willing to

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<sup>272</sup> Bentley, 1996, pp. 3–4.

<sup>273</sup> Michael Pugh writes: “Horizontal mission creep is the unintended engagement of forces in non-military activities such as police work, humanitarian relief and refugee protection. In particular, there has been an effort, both on the military and civilian side, to divorce humanitarian relief from peacekeeping/coercion activities. . . . It is this author’s view that the less coercive the military presence, the easier it is to integrate with political and civilian programmes. Moreover it is not necessarily desirable or feasible to prevent peacekeepers from engaging in humanitarian activities; the main challenge is to manage the military-humanitarian link, not to ban it.” (Pugh, 1997, p. 192.)

<sup>274</sup> Connaughton, 1996, p. 61.

undertake civil tasks, he must establish some limits. At one time or another, IFOR was asked to take over police, transport, dispute resolution, political mediation, and other functions. But the more it did, the greater were the demands.<sup>277</sup> In fact, Andrew Natsios insists that military reluctance to engage in a broad range of activities actually makes it harder for the force to extricate itself from an operation.

*Thus, the problem becomes one of identifying which missions are most essential and how the military can contribute to them. That is the crux of this project.* This of course can only be determined on a case-by-case basis, generally by the civilian authorities in charge of an operation. But in the absence of civilian direction, which tasks should the military be willing or prepared to perform? To get at this problem, and to differentiate among the operational sectors the military should be prepared to support, we needed to get a sense of how the full range of potential military tasks during a complex contingency operation correlates with the relative prioritization of the sectors the military missions might affect. As discussed in chapters 4 and 5, we needed a framework, which we pursued through the process of building and testing the baseline SIAM influence net models. These influence net models can help planners focus in on specific tasks within sectors that the military

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<sup>275</sup> Zinni, 1996, p. 16.

<sup>276</sup> Discussion at the CJCS Peace Operations Seminar/Game, 10–12 June 1997; quoted with permission.

<sup>277</sup> Smith, 1996a, p. 36.

may want to take on or avoid. We document our exploration of SIAM influence net models in the next two chapters of this report.



# Chapter 4: Understanding and Using SIAM

## Introduction

The Situational Influence Assessment Module (SIAM) was developed at Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) with funds from the US Department of Defense's Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) by a team headed by Dr. Julie Rosen and Mr. Wayne Smith. They were generous with their time and energy both in introducing SIAM's technical features and in developing the specific models and applications for this project. In this chapter, we explore what SIAM is, how it works, and how it can be used to examine an issue.<sup>278</sup> Throughout this process, we use examples from the SIAM influence net models developed to support this project. We will explore the generic baseline influence nets in some detail in Chapter 5.

## What is SIAM?

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<sup>278</sup> This chapter is based, in part, on a briefing paper prepared by Ms. Lisa Witzig Davidson and Dr. Richard Hayes, of Evidence Based Research, Inc., and delivered by Dr. Hayes at the March 1997 workshop.

The Situational Influence Assessment Module is an automated decision support application that implements the principles of *Influence Net* modeling. Influence Net modeling helps user experts in the situation under investigation construct graphic depictions of complex, cause-and-effect relationships involving uncertainty. In other words, the networks created in SIAM can be used to identify important issues, actions, or factors that can and do influence a specific outcome in a given situation. SIAM uses Bayesian probability techniques to assess the relationships among factors.<sup>279</sup> This makes SIAM results probabilistic, not deterministic (i.e., not predictive). Since SIAM is used to perform rapid modeling analysis of causal relationships, it can help structure a problem, identify the various elements that come into play, and explore how those elements interact. Because SIAM is automated and performs computations quickly, it is a useful tool for performing “what if” analysis. For example, when a military leader (or any other decision-maker) is planning how to affect the outcome of a situation, SIAM can help identify the primary factors that could influence it and demonstrate where the military (or any other organization) can get the most “bang for the buck.”

SIAM can also take this process a step further. Once the influence net model is constructed, users can examine the potential effect of an action on the outcome. They can also identify unintended consequences, which result from SIAM’s calculations. Because SIAM displays

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<sup>279</sup> Rosen and Smith, 1994.

the causal linkages among events and factors, users can show how a change in one event could reverberate throughout the net. Hence, SIAM can highlight the causal linkages that could change a scenario's outcome. Finally, users can document (i.e., produce a paper trail of) the expert reasoning underlying each of the judgments incorporated into the SIAM model. This feature can help clarify the analysis for other experts or decision-makers, record the logic used, and establish a baseline for investigating a set of different network models based on systematic changes in definitions, assumptions, or relationships.

## How Does SIAM Work?


The theory behind the landscape of SIAM influence nets is that “a picture is worth a thousand words.” To illustrate, Figure 4-1 portrays the Immediate Causal Nodes net model, which identifies the goal for our project (the *root node*) and the nodes that have the most immediate causal effect on it (the *immediate causal nodes*).<sup>280</sup> The root node for our project is “Civil stability and durable peace exist.” It is both the starting point for our investigation and the ultimate goal of the exercise.

Immediate causal nodes have a direct effect on the root node and may affect other nodes in the net as well. As the net expands, causal nodes that do not directly affect the root node nevertheless affect it indirectly through linkages. *Initial causal nodes* are nodes that effect other

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<sup>280</sup> This model is a sub-set of the Basic Sources of Influence net model described in more detail in Chapter Five.

**Figure 4-1. Immediate Causal Nodes net model**



nodes but are not affected themselves. To visualize this relationship, think of initial nodes as beginning a series of chain reactions that ultimately lead, through a set of intermediate causal nodes, to the root node. Nodes that are neither initial nor root nodes are called *internal causal nodes*.

Looking at the Immediate Causal Nodes net model we have, by definition, both internal and initial causal nodes. For example, the node “Immediate needs of the people are satisfied” is an internal causal node. It also is a target node for “Economy is sound.” The node “Economy is sound,” however, is an initial node. No other nodes feed into it. No matter how complex a net becomes, it will be made up primarily of internal and initial nodes.

### **Defining Nodes**



The user can determine specific attributes of each node. Figure 4-2 shows the information contained in a Node Dialog window<sup>281</sup> for the root node, “Civil stability and a durable peace exist.”

The Node Dialog window contains a description of the node and enables the user to provide useful background or clarifying comments and to reference sources as necessary. The description helps users communicate to each other what they mean when they use specific terms, such as civil stability and durable peace. In the comments section, users can elaborate further on why

**Figure 4-2. Node Dialog, root node: Civil stability and durable peace exist**



<sup>281</sup> This is a PowerPoint® graphic that depicts the relevant information contained in the actual SIAM Node Dialog window.

a specific definition is used or what other issues are under consideration. The comments feature should be used to document the rationale as well as provide guidance. If outside sources are used to develop the node, they can be listed as well. Finally, a user can establish a belief value that indicates either a user-assigned or calculated probability that the node's statement is true. If the node is an internal node, the belief represents a calculated probability; the user assigns values to initial nodes. In either case, the node's belief is displayed by the position of the Node Belief slider bar: left indicating false, right indicating true. In the case illustrated in Figure 4-2, the belief was calculated to be a FALSE statement.

For initial nodes, the user assigns the value. For internal nodes and the root node, the belief is calculated using Bayesian belief propagation, which accumulates all cause-and-effect relationships that influence an event. Each node has a color associated with its belief—the more red the node, the more false it is (that is, the lower the confidence that the event will occur). The more blue the node, the more true the statement is (or the stronger the belief that it will happen). If the truth of a situation is not known, the node is colored gray. In Figure 4-1, values were “set” using workshop results and background research; “calculated” values were computed by the SIAM program, as noted earlier.

- Initial nodes

- “Civil (internal) unrest is present” was set as an extremely TRUE statement
- “Economy is sound” was set as a very FALSE statement
- “Institutions of Governance are effective and fair” was set as a very FALSE statement
- Internal nodes
  - “Government has domestic legitimacy” was calculated as a reasonably FALSE statement
  - “Immediate needs of the people are satisfied” was set as an extremely FALSE statement
  - “People are tolerant of the status quo” was calculated to be an extremely FALSE statement
  - “Safe and secure environment is perceived” was calculated to be an extremely FALSE statement
- Root node
  - “Civil stability and durable peace exist” was calculated to be an extremely FALSE statement

## Establishing Links

The lines between the nodes in Figure 4-1 are called *links*. They terminate with either an arrow or a circle to indicate a *direct* or *reversing* link, respectively. When a direct link connects two nodes, it indicates that the causal node, when it is TRUE, promotes the achievement of the target node statement. If the causal node is FALSE, then it inhibits the achievement of the target node statement. For example, “Government has legitimacy domestically”

has a direct link to “Civil stability and durable peace exist.” The more legitimate a government, the greater the likelihood it will promote civil stability and durable peace. Similarly, the less likely the government’s legitimacy, the more civil stability and durable peace will be inhibited.


Some of the causal nodes, however, have a reversing effect on the target node; reversing links operate in a manner opposite from the direct links. When a reversing link connects two nodes, it indicates that if the causal node is `TRUE`, it will inhibit achievement of the target node statement. If the causal node is `FALSE`, it promotes the target node statement. In Figure 4-1, the “Civil Unrest is present” node has a reversing linkage to the “Civil Stability and durable peace exist” node. Widespread civil unrest reduces the likelihood of civil stability and durable peace. These causal relationships in SIAM are the foundation for “what if” analysis.

We can examine the links in more detail by examining the link window (see Figure 4-3).<sup>282</sup> Like the node window, the link window shows two important criteria for a link:

- If the likelihood of the causal node (or influencing event) were absolutely `TRUE`, what would be the impact on the target node? Would it be more likely? Less likely? No impact at all?
- If the likelihood of the causal node were absolutely `FALSE`, what would be the impact on the target node? ~~Would it be more likely?~~ Less likely? No impact at all?

<sup>282</sup> This is a PowerPoint® graphic that depicts the relevant information contained in the actual SIAM Node Dialog window.

**Figure 4-3. Link Dialog: “Immediate needs of the people are satisfied” and “Civil stability and durable peace exist”**



Looking at the link window for the link between the nodes “Civil stability and durable peace exist” and “Immediate needs of the people are satisfied,” we can see the link strengths indicated by the slider bars. At the leftmost position the slider bar implies that the cause significantly inhibits the occurrence of the effect, or target node. As we move towards the right, the effect becomes increasingly more likely to occur. It is important to note that a causal node can influence the effect either through its presence or its absence. It should also be pointed out that the two slider bars do not have to mirror each other. In other words, assessments of the influence of this node

on a target node, either by its presence or absence, can be asymmetric. This feature allows users to tailor the net to their perceptions of relationships among factors and to capture critical nuances within a situation. As in the node window, a comments section is available to record why a link strength was set the way it was and to specify “what if” assumptions. The sources section allows users to document reference materials underlying the reasoning recorded in the comments section.

Figure 4-4 depicts a Reversing Link between two nodes: “Civil stability and durable peace exist” and “Civil (internal) unrest is present.” As the link strengths indicate, this relationship is reversing (that is, the presence of civil unrest will inhibit the promotion of civil stability).


## **Influence Net Assessment Techniques**

Four automated assessment techniques or “tools” provided by SIAM allow users to explore “what if” changes to the scenario and identify key causal nodes that most affect the modeled situation.

### **Belief Evaluation**

The first SIAM assessment tool is Belief Evaluation. Using Bayesian belief propagation, this tool allows the user to view the accumulated effect of all cause-and-

**Figure 4-4. Link Dialog: “Civil (internal) unrest is present” and “Civil stability and durable peace exist”**



effect relationships within the influence net.<sup>283</sup> For example, if we change the belief strength of one of the initial nodes, we can use the automated Belief Evaluation to show the cumulative effect that the change will have on the entire net. Similarly, we could use “Action nodes” to help test “what-ifs.”<sup>284</sup>

## Driving Parent Analysis

The second SIAM assessment tool, called “Driving Parent Analysis,” identifies the degree to which immediate causal “parents” (i.e., preceding linked initial or internal nodes) drive the current belief of a selected node. Figure 4-5 shows the results of a Driving Parent Analysis for the root node “Civil stability and durable peace exist.”

Again, the color of the node boxes depicts the belief (set or calculated) of the node. The numbers listed under relative impact are the percentages of the selected node’s current belief determined (based on the link strengths) by that “parent” node; e.g., the EXTREMELY TRUE belief propagation of the first causal node (a reversing


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<sup>283</sup> For further details on Bayesian belief propagation, see Rosen and Smith, 1994, and 1997.

<sup>284</sup> Action nodes allow users to create the equivalent of initial nodes that represent some action or policy event that could potentially affect the net, and hence the root node. They can be used to document proposed courses of actions and indicate anticipated results of those actions. The current version of SIAM will not allow an action node to be caused by a new action or initial node.



**Figure 4-5. Driving Parent Analysis for “Civil stability and durable peace exist”<sup>285</sup>**



<sup>285</sup> Note that the relative impact numbers do not add up to 100, due to rounding errors.

influence) and the EXTREMELY FALSE belief of the next three causal nodes drive belief strength of the root node to be EXTREMELY FALSE. Overall, that is, these four nodes account for some 76 percent of the root node's calculated belief strength.

### **Pressure Parent Analysis**

The third SIAM assessment tool, called "Pressure Parent Analysis," tests immediate causal nodes (initial or internal "parents") to see which of them has the greatest potential effect on the target node (see Figure 4-6). Performing this evaluation, we can view all of the nodes linked directly to the target node and determine which has the greatest potential influence on the outcome.

The first column, labeled Sensitivity, looks at the overall swing in the selected node's belief value that can be obtained if the belief in that—and only that—parent node is changed. This sensitivity is determined by calculating from the complete set of influence paths connecting the initial or internal "parent" nodes to the target node. Because SIAM allows for multipath connections, a causal node with several paths of moderately strong links may hold greater potential for change than another node with a stronger, but single-path, connection. This is why SIAM can be used to identify the areas where actions taken will provide the "biggest bang for the buck." The second and third columns note the directionality of the change that can occur beyond the current situation. The "Promoting Potential" of a causal node refers to its ability to advance the target node's belief. For example, if the

**Figure 4-6. Pressure Parent Analysis for “Civil stability and durable peace exist”**

Selected Node: Civil stability and durable peace exist

Parent Node	Sensitivity	Promoting Potential	Inhibiting Potential
Civil (internal) unrest is present	Reversing <span style="background-color: #008000; color: white; padding: 2px 5px;">5</span>	<span style="background-color: #008000; color: white; padding: 2px 5px;">5</span>	0
Immediate needs of the people are satisfied	<span style="background-color: #008000; color: white; padding: 2px 5px;">2</span>	<span style="background-color: #008000; color: white; padding: 2px 5px;">2</span>	0
Safe and secure environment is perceived	0	0	0
People are tolerant of the status quo	0	0	0
Economy is sound	0	0	0
Government has domestic legitimacy	0	0	0
Institutions of governance are effective and fair	0	0	0

belief value for the causal node “Civil (internal) unrest is present” moves from absolutely TRUE to absolutely FALSE, it would have a promoting effect of five points (of 100) on the target node “Civil stability and durable peace exist.” (Remember, this is a reversing link; hence, the more FALSE the parent causal node, the more TRUE the selected target node.) Similarly, making “Immediate needs of the people are satisfied” an EXTREMELY TRUE statement would move the selected node two points towards TRUE. Because both these parent nodes are currently “pegged” on their belief scales (one being EXTREMELY TRUE and the other EXTREMELY FALSE), neither has any inhibiting potential (that is, things really cannot get much worse when considering these two causes).<sup>286</sup> In this case, the Pressure Parent Analysis indicates the compacted nature of most complex emergencies; there are no “easy” fixes, and sustained work is needed in all sectors to increase the long-term prospects for civil stability and durable peace.

## Pressure Point Analysis

The fourth SIAM assessment tool is Pressure Point Analysis. This is similar to Pressure Parent Analysis but identifies and evaluates the critical *initial nodes* that have the greatest potential to increase or decrease the likeli-

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<sup>286</sup> This is true for any pegged value; that is, either its promoting or inhibiting potential will be zero. Assuming that “good” equals promote and “bad” equals inhibit, if a situation is already as good as it can get, one cannot make it better (no promoting potential); if a situation is as bad as it can get, one cannot make it worse (no inhibiting potential). Changing the strength of the link between the cause and target node, however, can have an effect, given the Bayesian belief propagation algorithm.

hood of occurrence of a specified event. For example, a Pressure Point Analysis performed on the root node will identify the one or two initial nodes most likely to cause the “root” objective to occur. This type of analysis, therefore, is a starting point from which decision-makers can identify potential courses of action that will address the issues contained in the most critical initial nodes. The main difference between Pressure Parent Analysis and Pressure Point Analysis is that the former does not consider the multipath causal relationships. Pressure Parent Analysis does, however, help the user see the overlapping effects that nodes may have in different subnet models. We will distinguish further between the uses of the two in our discussion of the Basic Sectors of Influence net model, in Chapter 5.

In this chapter we examined only a very simple Immediate Causal Node net model surrounding the root node. In support of the project, however, the project team and participants constructed elaborate, detailed networks for determining the relationships between the operational sectors discussed above. Overall, the project team used SIAM to look at nearly 300 causal relationships between more than 100 factors.<sup>287</sup>

## Summarizing SIAM’s Uses

To sum up the various uses for SIAM, users can:

- Compare cause-and-effect relationships

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<sup>287</sup> We report on about half of those in this report; the others were contained in analyses for our classified workshop.

- Identify critical pressure points
- Assess the impact of policy/actions, and
- Identify unintended consequences of selected actions.

## **What the Tool Isn't**

As Richard Hayes cautioned our workshop participants, the SIAM tool

is not a panacea; it won't replace judgment. In fact, it won't work without a user's best judgment. As mentioned at the beginning, it is probabilistic, not deterministic. That means there is no guarantee that two groups of very good experts would not draw very different nets. However, if they did draw different networks, and they saw one another's, they would have an excellent mechanism for debating. The result would be a remarkable speed of convergence as they discovered how—by choice of language, relationship, or example—they had constructed different nets. This kind of tool has its greatest powers in getting people to focus on what matters.

We always return to that point. This is a tool. It is not the solution. It is a collaborative tool that is useful for exploring alternatives, and as the situation changes users must update the model to reflect those changes. Over time some nodes become more important and others less important. If one solves security problems, for example, associated causal nodes lose their leverage to affect the root node. Therefore, other linkages become more important, requiring new or modified courses of

action. One of the values of this kind of tool is that it makes a team able to capture its expertise and keep it up to date.

### **Not a Substitute for Judgment**

SIAM cannot, and was never intended to, substitute for expert judgment. SIAM should be possible to capture expert judgment and allow others to argue about it. The utility of belief analysis is in its ability to construct a network model and structure a debate about whether the network is right. In some situations, that is the most important step that can be taken toward finding a solution. As Richard Hayes concluded in his presentation to workshop participants,

I do a lot of research using formal methods and there are two answers that I cringe on. One is: "I already knew that." Well, the guy usually did. He knew that and nine other things. But now that we've done some analysis, he knows which ones really are true and can use that knowledge to act. The other one is: "I know about all those things, but they're so complex I can't act on them." Essentially the person is saying, "I'm prepared to ignore this because it is in the too hard pile." This class of tools can help you get organized on those things that are in the too hard pile, and get through to those things that you know are true that actually reflect a core set of actions and plans that make some sense.





# **Chapter 5: The Generic, Baseline SIAM Influence Net Models**

## **Introduction**

In this chapter, we summarize the generic, baseline SIAM influence net models the study team developed in support of the project. This was a collaborative process, more so than any other aspect of the project. Nonetheless, while we could not have reached this point without our colleagues, we alone are responsible for the discussion and analysis that follow. We first explain the process used to build the generic, baseline SIAM influence nets. We then explore the Basic Sources of Influence net model in some detail. Additional information about this net—as well as the supporting Civil Unrest, Governance, and Human Requirements sub-net models—can be found in Appendix C.

## **Building the Nets**

The study team used a multi-stage process for developing the SIAM influence nets for this project.

- In our first workshop, held in November 1996, we elicited information from international, interagency, military, and NGO participants regarding their roles and missions during the transition from conflict to peace. The discussion focused on how these activities interrelate in a generic situation.
- We then established generic settings for node definitions, belief values, and link strengths. Next, we compiled this information into a baseline influence net model that could be used to describe a wide variety of complex emergencies. We established belief and link strengths such that the results would at least be consistent with sector prioritizations made by participants at the first workshop.
- In the second workshop, held in January 1997, the influence net created from the earlier inputs served as the point of departure for the comparison of the generic case with several real world peace operations, including Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. We elicited specific node definitions, belief and link strengths. Participants also prioritized the importance of the nodes and identified the degree to which the military could and should be involved in affecting the nodes through specific actions.<sup>288</sup>
- After the second workshop, the project team incorporated the results into a more complex, generic influence net model that could be used to examine the transition period from conflict to peace. The original

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<sup>288</sup> The views of participants as to the roles of the military in effecting change in the nodal beliefs are reported in Chapter 6.

generic net model was quite large and complicated. To deal with the problem of too much information on a single, complicated net model, the team divided this “Super Net” into an Immediate Causal Nodes net model (shown in Chapter Four) and a series of sub-net models (detailed in Appendix C): Actual/Perceived Civil Unrest sub-net model; Governance sub-net model; and Human Requirements sub-net model. These sub-net models used the immediate causal nodes (depicted in Figure 4-1) from the primary net model as their root nodes.

- The project team then tailored the generic nets to the specifics of the country and the scenario used in our combined research and modeling workshop in March. Participants at that workshop further modified the nets based on their perceptions and actions.
- Finally, we (without the broader project team) used the information gathered in the March 1997 workshop to “repair” the generic, baseline nets. We worked on the three sub-nets first, then used information derived from our analysis of these sub-nets to build the Basic Sources of Influence net model reported on below.

Hence, we alone are responsible for the final series of nets. They are living documents; improvements can always be made. Users can tailor them to the specifics of the situation they are considering. The analysis we performed using them, and report here, should be considered illustrative only.

## **The Basic Sources of Influence Net Model**


## Description

This influence net looks at basic sources of influence that could affect civil stability and durable peace in a country experiencing a complex emergency. As such, it summarizes the key information contained in the three sub-net models described in Appendix C. The root node in this net model is “Civil stability and durable peace exist.” The seven immediate causal nodes of the root node are themselves root nodes or immediate causal nodes in the three sub-net models.

Figure 5-1 portrays the Basic Sources of Influence net model and the relationship of the most important elements of the three sub-net models:

- The Immediate Causal Nodes net model, with the root node “Civil Stability and Durable Peace Exist,” is shown at the center with a gray background.
- The main elements of the Civil Unrest sub-net model are shown at the bottom, with a green background. Note that four of the root node’s immediate causal nodes appear in this sub-net model.
- The main elements of the Governance sub-net model are shown at the upper-left, with a blue background. Note that two of the root node’s immediate causal nodes appear in this sub-net model.
- The main elements of the Human Requirements sub-net model are shown in the upper right, with a yellow background. Note that three of the root node’s immediate causal nodes appear in this sub-net model.

Figure 5-1. Basic Sources of Influence net model



Recall that the nodal beliefs are color-coded—the more blue the more TRUE the node’s statement, and the more red the more FALSE. In the generic setting, we have defined our beliefs such that most of the nodes are FALSE. In Annexes C-1 and C-2 to Appendix C, we provide full documentation for all nodes and links that appear in this net model and in the accompanying sub-net models.

In order to relate these influence net models to our previous discussion of the operational sectors in Chapter 3, it is useful to note where the tasks from the Generic Pol-Mil Plan’s operational sectors affect nodes and causal relationships in the four influence net models:

- All operational sectors would affect nodes in the Basic Sources of Influence net model.
- In terms of the sub-net models:
  - Tasks in the diplomatic and internal politics sectors affect relationships in all three sub-net models
  - Tasks in the Military Activities and Public Security/Law and Order sectors affect only the Civil Unrest sub-net model
  - Tasks in the humanitarian sector affect the Civil Unrest and Human Requirements sub-net models
- Tasks in the public information and education sectors affect the Civil Unrest and Governance sub-net models

- Tasks in the human rights and social development sectors affect the Governance and Human Requirements sub-net models
- Tasks in the infrastructure and economic development sector affect the Human Requirements sub-net model

Figure 5-2 shows these correlations in a Venn diagram. We will discuss this diagram in more detail in Chapter 6.

## Discussion

Using our settings for initial beliefs and link strengths, Tables 5-1 and 5-2 show a tabular presentation of the results of Driving Parent and Pressure Parent Analysis on the root node, “Civil stability and durable peace exist.”<sup>289</sup>

The node that manifested the greatest influence on the root node was the “Civil unrest is present” node. While this may appear to be a matter of tautological, circular, or self-evident logic, it isn’t. Civil unrest can manifest itself in many ways besides rioting and violence; this node deserves further inquiry. It is closely related to the third most influential node, “Safe and secure environment is perceived by the populace.” Analysis confirmed the overall importance of these two nodes vis-à-vis the root node and validated that this area deserves a net model of its own.

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<sup>289</sup> Note that Table 5-1 shows the same information as Figure 4-5, but in a different format. Likewise, Table 5-2 shows the information depicted in Figure 4-6.

**Figure 5-2. Correlation between the Generic, Baseline Influence net model and the Generic Pol-Mil Plan's operational sectors**





<sup>290</sup> Percentages do not add to 100, due to rounding.

**Table 5-1. Driving Parent Analysis for “Civil stability and durable peace exist” <sup>290</sup>**

Immediate Causal Nodes for “Civil stability and durable peace exist” (EXTREMELY FALSE)	Causal Node belief	Influence	Relative Impact
Civil (internal) unrest is present	Extremely TRUE	Reversing	23
Immediate needs of the people are satisfied	Extremely FALSE		22
Safe and secure environment is perceived by the populace	Extremely FALSE		17
People are tolerant of the status quo	Extremely FALSE		14
Economy is sound	Very FALSE		11
Government has domestic legitimacy	Reasonably FALSE		5
Institutions of governance are effective and fair	Very FALSE		5

**Table 5-2. Pressure Parent Analysis for “Civil stability and durable peace exist”**

Immediate Causal Nodes for “Civil stability and durable peace exist” (EXTREMELY FALSE)	Causal Node belief	Influence	Sensitivity	Promoting Potential	Inhibiting Potential
Civil (internal) unrest is present	Extremely TRUE	Reversing	5	5	0
Immediate needs of the people are satisfied	Extremely FALSE		2	2	0
Safe and secure environment is perceived by the populace	Extremely FALSE		0	0	0
People are tolerant of the status quo	Extremely FALSE		0	0	0
Economy is sound	Very FALSE		0	0	0
Government has domestic legitimacy	Reasonably FALSE		0	0	0
Institutions of governance are effective and fair	Very FALSE		0	0	0

Through our analysis of the Civil Unrest sub-net model, detailed in Appendix C, we reached the following conclusions:

- Internal political factors, especially the resolution of differences by competing groups (peacefully or by conflict), are the most critical factors in explaining the presence or absence of civil (internal) unrest and perceptions of a safe and secure environment; they offer the greatest leverage areas.<sup>291</sup>
- Once internal political factors are resolved, demobilization and disarmament of armed and paramilitary forces (both regime- and opposition-sponsored) become critical.<sup>292</sup>
- Factors such as police force effectiveness and the fair administration of justice—as well as factors relating to education, governance, and the media—are of lesser (or perhaps longer-term) importance in this sub-net model.

The second most influential immediate causal node in the Basic Sources of Influence net model turned out to be the “Immediate needs of the people are satisfied” node (see Tables 5-1 and 5-2). This node focuses on the basic needs of the populace, including food, water, and shelter. It is closely related to the fourth-ranking node, “People are tolerant of the status quo” (reflecting

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<sup>291</sup> The causal logic is as follows: Competing groups don’t resolve differences, which leads the opposition party to try to dominate by force; the presence of paramilitary forces available to the opposition party complicates the situation.

<sup>292</sup> The causal logic is as follows: If demobilization of armed forces and regime-sponsored non-military armed forces does not take place, broader disarmament efforts (if any) will be ineffective; along this same line, demobilization and disarmament will be ineffective if competing groups don’t resolve their differences.

the population's overall level of satisfaction with their "lot" in life), as well as to "Economy is sound." All three of these Immediate Causal Nodes were grouped together to form the foundation of the Human Requirements sub-net model. Our analysis of the Human Requirements sub-net model led to the following conclusions:<sup>293</sup>

- Failing to meet people's immediate needs and to ensure that human rights are protected account for nearly half of the intolerance ascribed to people's perceptions of the status quo in complex emergencies.
  - No single factor satisfies immediate needs; rather, a combination of sufficiency in food, potable water, and housing—as well as meeting health requirements—is necessary.
  - The productivity of the agricultural system and the effectiveness of the transportation infrastructure are critical in the short term, especially in the absence of a relief effort. Long-term self-sufficiency requires progress in these areas.
- Longer-term needs relating to the economy, social services, jobs, and educational infrastructure account for most of the remaining influences.
  - A sound economy directly or indirectly drives satisfaction of longer-term needs.

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<sup>293</sup> See Appendix C for more detail.

- The availability of foreign investment, both through short-term relief programs (an “investment” in the future) and long-term investment, is a critical factor in meeting human requirements.

Finally, the Basic Sources of Influence net model includes two immediate causal nodes related to the issues of governance—“Institutions of governance are effective and fair,” and “Government has domestic legitimacy.” They have a relatively modest overall sensitivity and promoting potential. Nevertheless, they were used to set the foundation for the third sub-net model—“Governance.” Our analysis of the Governance sub-net model led to the following conclusions:<sup>294</sup>

- People’s perceptions that their interests are represented is the most important factor in determining whether a government has domestic legitimacy.
- The effectiveness and fairness of institutions of governance are also significant, both directly and indirectly through the provision of social services.
- The administration of justice can drive the effectiveness and fairness of institutions of governance.
- Protecting human rights and eliminating corruption can also affect government domestic legitimacy, but to a lesser extent.

## Conclusions

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<sup>294</sup> See Appendix C for more detail.

To summarize, our analysis of the Basic Sectors of Influence net model suggests these analytic insights.

- The net model suggests that dealing with the physical well-being (that is, the security and health) of the population can help reduce instability. This conclusion may appear intuitively obvious, but some workshop participants questioned it, believing it reflected an acceptance of the traditional theory of revolution, which has not proven historically accurate.
- Stopping fighting and resolving conflicts (that is, human security) proved to be the most critical issues. These challenges, by their nature, are extremely time-sensitive, and are best met by early intervention.
- The basic needs of the people—water, food, and shelter—followed in importance. These, too, are short-fused problems requiring immediate attention.
- Following these were issues of governance. While important, these issues are less urgent than those involving physical security or other humanitarian requirements.<sup>295</sup>

Hence, even at a generic level, we found that the SIAM net models help to order and prioritize issue areas. To learn more requires a closer examination of each of the major sub-net models in the context of specific operations.

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<sup>295</sup> As USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance reported to Congress in 1996, one of the lessons learned from the experience with the new Office of Transition Initiatives is that "Security [comes] first—until people feel a degree of safety, they are not ready for political development of any kind." United States Agency for International Development, 1996, p. 21.

# Chapter 6: Conclusions

The widening gap between the political and institutional priorities of the contributing organisations act [sic] against the realistic needs of the crisis zone. . . . Where a population has been divided by inter-communal fighting involving the slaughter of civilians, the healing process takes decades and may even transcend generations. . . . In this context individual organisations cannot act in isolation of each other: the stabilisation process in a civil conflict involves every element of the relief community and takes years to achieve. The problem involves the entire network of civil organisations, international military and political leaders at every level. . . . The stabilisation process requires a holistic approach. . . . that gives more weight to the realities of the crisis zone and draws all elements of the international intervention into a united response.

—John Mackinlay and Randolph Kent<sup>296</sup>

## Introduction

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<sup>296</sup> Mackinlay and Kent, 1997b.

In a world where people increasingly desire instant gratification and expect quick solutions to problems (including short, immaculate conflicts), the extended attention required to rescue failed states frustrates governments and wearies their taxpaying publics. Even if operations are successful in the short term, significant external assistance is likely to be required long after the military withdraws at the conclusion of a complex contingency operation. NGOs have managed to maintain the long view and generally see military end states as markers along the way, not the end of the journey. When a military operation fails to understand the connection between its activities, humanitarian actions, and future requirements, it ultimately fails to achieve its objectives. Fortunately, the attention now being given to successful transitions indicates that appreciation of this relationship is growing.

This appreciation, however, has yet to be translated into operational changes. The US military, encouraged to a large extent by political processes, still focuses primarily on developing the quickest possible exit strategy (for itself), which in turn drives it to an obsessive concern with mission creep. But as Andrew Natsios has averred, "Mission creep and exit strategy, . . . rather than being complementary, are inversely related. The more narrowly defined the military mission in a complex emergency and the more rigorously mission creep is avoided, the more difficult it becomes to design an exit strategy that carries out the political objectives of American foreign policy."<sup>297</sup>



Workshop participants were well aware that in the development of strategies to deal with complex emergencies, past successes or failures are not necessarily the best guideposts. If there is one constant, it is that such emergencies are situationally dependent. Even so, there are predictable phases and some recurring events that can be examined.

We first discuss some overarching principles that should guide military responses to complex emergencies, regardless of the context. We offer comments on strategies for success, taking into account how the military can measure progress in these non-traditional military complex contingency operation mission areas. Next, we address the often heard argument that the military, in effect, shouldn't "do windows" (i.e., the dirty, labor-intensive jobs that others are "better suited" to perform) when responding to complex emergencies. Finally, we identify ways in which SIAM could be used to facilitate interagency integration on a national or even international basis.

## **Overarching Principles**

Ambassador Jonathan Moore argues that

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<sup>297</sup> Natsios, 1996b, p. 52.

What is now needed is to design operational guidelines—rules, standards and procedures for field use—for the agencies which portray how they can function individually and collaboratively so that a coherent . . . effort gives life to the precepts of dynamic integration which the [relief to development] continuum is suggesting. To the extent that efforts exist to rationalize programme efforts across the continuum, particularly when flexibility is needed to respond to shifting conditions, they are ad hoc and ineffectual. Such guidelines—starting with the precept that relief should “do no harm” to development—would be devoted to reducing dependency, building capacity, and progressing toward sustainability.”<sup>298</sup>

Based on our research and workshops, we believe that there are several clear principles or guidelines for responding to complex emergencies that remain consistent even during idiosyncratic operations. These principles serve to answer two questions:

- What should external actors do in dealing with each other?
- What should external actors do to achieve a sustainable end state characterized by civil stability and durable peace?

Within each discussion, we focus on what the US military should do.

### **What Should External Actors Do in Dealing**

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<sup>298</sup> Moore, 1996, p. 25.

## with Each Other?

### **Achieve better coordination and cooperation**

Regardless of the types of forces used to intervene in complex emergencies, none of them will be effective unless there is an overall strategy guiding their actions. As one practitioner has written, “Perhaps the most important consideration regarding future peace operations . . . is the requirement to develop a sound strategy, one that makes the best possible use of the partnership that assembles to solve the problem.”<sup>299</sup> Workshop participants considered leadership a key to the successful achievement of mission goals. That is, good leadership and competent management are required in every operational sector if the long-term goals of stable civil government and durable peace, requiring minimum external involvement, are to be achieved.

There are three levels of leadership involved: first, that required to ensure the overall effectiveness of international efforts; second, that required to ensure effective coordination between international efforts and the target country; and, third, that required by an indigenous population so that it can effectively govern itself. The latter two are subjects for later discussion. Here we look at international mission coordination requirements.

Although there is consensus by all communities—political, humanitarian, and military—that an overall strategy is required and that partners in a crisis should work toward the strategy’s goals, that consensus has not

<sup>299</sup> Walsh, 1996, p. 45.

translated into coordinated action. As Andrew Natsios notes, “the absence of comprehensive strategies for dealing with complex humanitarian emergencies is one reason that the international response to them has been so troubled and so often frustrated.”<sup>300</sup> That does not mean that coordination does not take place—it does. But it is on a more ad hoc basis than most people would like to see. In Somalia, for example, “various ideas and strategies existed, [but] none was accepted by everyone as a common or shared approach to the situation. There was no concept at the [UN’s Humanitarian Operations Center] as to where the humanitarian community wanted Somalia to be in three or six months.”<sup>301</sup>

Michael Pugh summed up the situation this way:

Virtually every analysis of international responses to disasters and complex emergencies emphasizes the need for co-ordination of effort between actors. . . . Without carefully-managed co-ordination, peacebuilding can be derailed by factions who might have maintained local territorial advantages and access to weaponry, and who might pick off the more vulnerable elements of an operation, or play off one element against another. Yet it seems unlikely that the incremental, atomized character of responses can be overcome. A myriad of different interests will be represented in peacebuilding efforts. A basic harmonization of goals may be the best that can be achieved.<sup>302</sup>

## **Involve all parties in planning**

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<sup>300</sup> Natsios, 1996b, p. 60.

<sup>301</sup> Seiple, 1996, p. 100.

Whereas past civil operations could be reasonably characterized as sincere but disjointed efforts, there is an increasing recognition that future missions should be guided by a civilian comprehensive campaign plan.<sup>303</sup> This civilian plan of action should be complemented by the military's whenever military forces are involved. Former Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali asserted that "it is necessary to enunciate a coherent vision, strategy and plan of action which integrate all the relevant dimensions of the problem, including humanitarian, political and security."<sup>304</sup> Aid workers themselves "frequently cite the confusion and lack of coordination among aid providers as one factor which undermines their own ability to work effectively in relation to conflict."<sup>305</sup>

Most analysts agree, however, that, whatever its source, a successful plan must be generated using inputs from all participating organizations. "The relief mission," observes one practitioner, "must actively encourage coordination, cooperation, and teamwork among groups that are often unprepared for any constraints on their operations. As with so many other responses to complex, often unprecedented challenges, success depends on leadership and vision."<sup>306</sup> As he implies, this is a much easier observation to make than to achieve.

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<sup>302</sup> Pugh, 1995, p. 340.

<sup>303</sup> Such an approach has been adopted by the US Southern Command. See Dewey, 1996.

<sup>304</sup> Boutros-Ghali, 1996a, p. 85.

<sup>305</sup> Anderson, 1996b, p. 48.

“Collegiality notwithstanding,” two analysts note, “there [are] three areas in which structural differences [between communities are] particularly difficult to resolve: planning and co-ordination, continuity of presence, and approach to security concerns.”<sup>307</sup> In our workshops, participants recommended a new, coordinated approach for dealing with complex emergencies within the framework of a civilian comprehensive campaign plan. The real sticking point becomes who will be in charge of actual coordination, and therefore coordination of the planning effort.

Given experience in deliberate and crisis action planning, the organization perhaps best equipped to coordinate overall planning efforts is the military, but neither it nor the relief community are comfortable with that arrangement. One reason is that “the role of the military is to make effective use of force to achieve what the diplomats have failed to accomplish. The central notion behind peace operations is that military means can support diplomatic ends.”<sup>308</sup> Further, on the issues of continuity of presence and approach to security concerns, the military will likely approach planning from a different perspective than most other organizations involved. For the most part, workshop participants concurred that the military should not take the lead. It will be tempted to do so because many military people get extremely frus-

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<sup>306</sup> Walsh, 1996, p. 36.

<sup>307</sup> Minear and Guillot, 1996, p. 155.

<sup>308</sup> McLean, 1996, p. 2.

trated when confronted with chaos, and although inter-agency and international cooperation is improving, it remains unsatisfactory.

When the United Nations is directly involved in field operations, it is arguably the most logical locus for coordinating planning. But which part of the UN? The Secretary-General's Special Representative? The High Commissioner for Humanitarian Affairs or Refugees? A representative from one of the other UN agencies? The International Committee of the Red Cross/Red Crescent? One workshop participant suggested that the UN's Department of Humanitarian Affairs, with input from Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Political Affairs (DPA), should take the lead in drafting the civilian comprehensive campaign plan. UN staff have at various times advocated to us that an ad hoc UN committee or the UN lead department for a particular crisis draft such a document.<sup>309</sup> This would have the benefit of underpinning the UN's credibility and fortifying its claim to leadership. None of these proposals has yet won acceptance by all communities.

Coordination is not just an international problem, but an interagency one as well. For the United States in Haiti, for example, "organizational and 'cultural' differences between [US] civilian and military organizations explained a lot of problems, but the bottom line was that interagency operational-level coordination was incom-

<sup>309</sup> The idea for a UN committee emerged from polling we conducted of UN Secretariat staff from a number of departments; see Hayes and Sands, 1997, reporting on a visit to the UN Secretariat on 29 May 1997. In an earlier visit, some UN Secretariat personnel recommended that the lead department for a particular crisis draft such a document; interviews, 13 February 1997.

plete in the preparation phase.”<sup>310</sup> The situation did not improve once the arena moved from Washington, DC, into the field. “U.S. military planners were surprised that their civilian counterparts were not immediately ready with nation-building programs. Development planners were upset that the military refused to accept responsibility for civic action and nation-building efforts at the outset, although that policy had been determined at the strategic level.”<sup>311</sup> The challenge of managing these operations led the President to issue PDD-56:

To foster a durable peace or stability in these situations and to maximize the effect of judicious military deployments, the civilian components of an operation must be integrated closely with the military components. While agencies of government have developed independent capacities to respond to complex emergencies, military and civilian agencies should operate in a synchronized manner through effective interagency management and the use of special mechanisms to coordinate agency efforts. Integrated planning and effective management of agency operations early on in an operation can avoid delays, reduce pressure on the military to expand its involvement in unplanned ways, and create unity of effort within an operation that is essential for mission success.<sup>312</sup>

Table 6-1 provides a summary of the components of the Political-Military Plan called for in PDD-56. While interagency coordination needs to be improved on a national basis, the need is just as great on an interna-

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<sup>310</sup> Hayes and Wheatley, 1996, pp. 37–38.

<sup>311</sup> Hayes and Wheatley, 1996, p. 38.



tional basis. The relevant components of the Political-Military Plan could be used as a departure point for the development of an international Political-Military Plan.

### **The “all” in “all parties” must include the military**

Ideally, the strategy should be developed in partnership with government agencies and non-government organizations. It should not primarily be a product of the military. Nevertheless, the military should be involved in interagency or international planning. This is the case for three reasons:

- First, the military has considerable experience in planning for contingency operations, on both a deliberative and a crisis response basis. Interagency or international planning efforts can only benefit from this experience.
- Second, perhaps to a degree beyond that of most if not all organizations that might be involved in planning, the military brings an array of expertise and resources that could be made available to such planning.
- Finally, involving the military in planning can be an important tool in bridging the perception gap that has hindered operations in the past.

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<sup>312</sup> PDD-56, p.2. During our third workshop, we were struck by the relative lack of agreement among participants as to what specifically the US Government wanted to accomplish in a hypothetical complex contingency operation or how to accomplish it. This suggests that policy makers are reticent to envision end states, or can't agree on such end states. The PDD-56 process institutionalizes a requirement to do so.

**Table 6-1. Illustrative Components of a Political-Military Plan<sup>313</sup>**

<b>Component</b>	<b>Description</b>
Situation Assessment	A comprehensive assessment of the situation to clarify essential information that, in the aggregate, provides a multi-dimensional picture of the crisis.
U.S. Interests	A statement of U.S. interests at stake in the crisis and the requirement to secure those interests.
Mission Statement	A clear statement of the USG's strategic purpose for the operation and the pol-mil mission.
Objectives	The key civil-military objectives to be accomplished during the operation.
Desired Pol-Mil End State	The conditions the operation is intended to create before the operation transitions to a follow-on operation and/or terminates.
Lead Agency Responsibilities	An assignment of responsibilities for participating agencies.
Transition / Exit Strategy	A strategy that is linked to the realization of the end state described above, requiring the integrated efforts of diplomats, military leaders, and relief officials of the USG and the international community.
Organizational Concept	A schematic of the various organizational structures of the operation, in Washington and in theater, including a description of the chain of authority and associated reporting channels.

**Table 6-1. (cont'd.)**

<b>Component</b>	<b>Description</b>
Preparatory Tasks	A layout of specific tasks to be undertaken before the operation begins (congressional consultations, diplomatic efforts, troop recruitment, legal authorities, funding requirements and sources, media coordination, etc.).
Functional Tasks / Agency Plans	Key operational and support plans written by USG agencies that pertain to critical parts of the operation (e.g., political mediation/reconciliation, military support, demobilization, humanitarian assistance, police reform, basic public services, economic restoration, human rights monitoring, social development, public information, etc.).

While it is not as much of a concern today as it was just a few years ago, the relationship between the military and NGOs—and mutual perceptions driving that relationship—can be a matter of concern.<sup>314</sup> As noted by one analyst:

The most important operational conclusion is that the NGO/military dialogue must begin as soon as possible, ideally stateside. It should be actively and aggressively sought by both communities. This process is imperative for three reasons. First, if the emergency situation is to stabilize, there must be some sort of coordination. Second, such a dialogue ensures that the humanitarian intent remains primary. If hearing the other community's interpretation of the humanitarian intent is the only accomplishment, it is a significant one. Third, a candid and continuous dialogue keeps the military and NGO united against a common enemy: the absence of political resolve.<sup>315</sup>

The problem is greater between the military and developmental groups than it is between the military and relief groups. One reason for this is that experience in Somalia inclined the military and the broader defense community toward excessive constraint in terms of goals and commitments. For example, “military participants

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<sup>314</sup> There remains a cultural bias among some groups which paints the military with a broad brush of intolerance and insensitivity. They say that the “military’s take-charge mode may work against the engagement of local leadership, obscuring the reality that in disaster after disaster, ‘people’s self-help efforts are cumulatively more important than external aid.’ . . . If stronger and more accountable civilian institutions are an essential element in a more secure future for disaster-prone nations, international military presence may not represent a positive influence.” (Minear and Guillot, 1996, p. 43.) Characterizing all military interventions as insensitive does grave injustice to the documented efforts of those involved in operations PROVIDE COMFORT and RESTORE HOPE, among others. The point remains, better cooperation and collaboration on the part of all parties must be the goal, and the military is learning by experience.

recognized that many more civil affairs personnel had been needed in Haiti, but in the post-Somalia environment, ‘this was hampered by DoD fears about doing nation-building.’<sup>316</sup>

## **What Should External Actors Do to Achieve a Sustainable End State Characterized by Civil Stability and Durable Peace?**

### **There are consistent principles to follow**

An advisory group assembled by the United Nations to develop complex emergency strategies reached consensus on several basic principles:

- “That domestic commitment, fiscal and non-fiscal resources hold primacy of place in crisis response;
- That political negotiations must embrace economic and social considerations that build confidence;
- That the foundations for reconciliation reside in agreed terms of accountability for past actions;
- That a legal framework is crucial for ensuring respect for human rights and protection of investments;
- That building capacity at the local, community and national levels reaps huge future benefits;
- That a secure environment is unlikely to be created without disarmament linked to job creation;

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<sup>315</sup> Seiple, 1996, p. 135.

<sup>316</sup> Hayes and Wheatley, 1996, p. 40.

- That re-integration is entirely dependent on availability of basic services and productive opportunities;
- That strategies that save lives must be harmonized with strategies that build and protect livelihoods.”<sup>317</sup>

Our workshop participants agreed with all of these principles, but added a few principles of their own:

- Civilian control of the military should be the norm
- Graft and corruption must be eliminated
- Basic freedoms (e.g., speech, movement, and assemblage) must be fostered
- Access to information must be widespread

Table 6-2 summarizes the principles detailed in Chapter 3.

Taylor Seybolt identifies four conditions necessary for successful intervention to help reduce death and human rights violations in complex emergencies:

- Coordination is necessary between humanitarian and military organizations
- Intervening military forces must be able to neutralize violent opposition to humanitarian objectives either in concert with diplomats or independently

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<sup>317</sup> Cholmondeley, 1996, p. 3.

**Table 6-2. Operational Sector Recommendations**

<b>Operational Sector</b>	<b>Recommended Strategy</b> <i>(specific military strategies in italics)</i>
<b>Diplomacy</b>	Prevention is better than cure—identify early warning mechanisms
	Address both causes and symptoms of conflict
	Intervene early
	Respond promptly to resolve or contain crises
	Give diplomats the authority and assets to make crisis diplomacy work
	Reconciliation may not always be the answer
	<i>The military should be in a supporting role, if involved at all</i>
<b>Military Activities</b>	<i>Be prepared to help professionalize and restructure military forces</i>
	<i>Incorporate evenhanded weapons control programs as part of rehabilitation efforts</i>
	<i>Give special attention to demining activities</i>
	<i>Open a dialogue with everyone</i>
	<i>Protect the force, but be prepared to act</i>

**Table 6-2. (cont'd.)**

<b>Operational Sector</b>	<b>Recommended Strategy</b> <i>(specific military strategies in italics)</i>
<b>Humanitarian Assistance</b>	Foster self-sufficiency
	Be aware of the political impact of relief efforts
	Pursue 'food security' in its broadest sense
	Involve indigenous communities
	Target the public health sector
	Provide sustainable health care programs
	Support refugee reintegration <i>The military should perform (or support) humanitarian assistance tasks</i>
<b>Internal Politics</b>	Support the establishment of fair and effective institutions of governance
	Cultivate indigenous leadership
	<i>The military can help, both directly and indirectly</i>



**Table 6-2 (cont'd.)**

<b>Operational Sector</b>	<b>Recommended Strategy</b> <i>(specific military strategies in italics)</i>
<b>Civil Law and Order/Public Security</b>	Separate military and police public security functions
	Try to limit the number of contributors to coalition police operations
	<i>The military may have to perform constabulary and other public security functions, requiring a broad array of expertise</i>
	Deal directly with the challenges associated with rules of engagement
	Support civil weapons control programs
<b>Public Information and Education</b>	Security requires fair judicial and humane penal systems
	Collectively develop a message early and get it out
	Work to counter competing messages (e.g., hate-propaganda sources)
	<i>View education as a security function</i>
	Tailor education to local needs
<i>Military support must include education and training</i>	
<i>Provide training and education for intervention forces</i>	

- Military, humanitarian and political actors must possess a sophisticated understanding of local institutions and the causes of conflict
- Humanitarian and military organizations must have consistent strategic objectives

As he argues:

While humanitarian aid is critical, it is really a Band-Aid solution. Humanitarian aid can abate human suffering and open up the possibility for real problem-solving, but it can't deal with the source of conflict. The conflicts that result in humanitarian crises require sophisticated, long-term strategies to resolve conflict and build sustainable self-reliance in the recipient country.<sup>318</sup>

Andrew Natsios suggests that there are eleven “iron laws” for responding to complex emergencies:<sup>319</sup>

1. “Save those lives of the people who are most vulnerable.” This generally involves five disciplines: food, medicine, water, sanitation, and shelter.
2. Prepare for the operations you are going to undertake.
3. “Respond only to assessed needs.”
4. “People in the developing world . . . are the best responders to an emergency, not us. We should help them use the natural coping systems that operate in the culture, not try to replace or damage those mechanisms.”

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<sup>318</sup> Seybolt, 1997.

<sup>319</sup> Adapted from Natsios, 1995.

5. “Do no harm, . . . an old medical aphorism that we can easily forget.”
6. “Keep your response simple. . . . Complex plans will not work; [they] get lost in a mire of bureaucratic detail and organizational confusion.”
7. “Prevention and mitigation save more lives than relief. . . . The best time to introduce prevention and mitigation measures is in the immediate aftermath of a disaster; people are most willing to change because of what they have just experienced.”
8. “Speed is essential. . . . If you plan properly ahead of time, move quickly in a disciplined way, focus on the essentials, and do a response based on assessed needs, you can save a lot of lives.”
9. “Move from relief to rehabilitation as rapidly as possible, [even] instantly.”
10. “Make people accountable.”
11. “Work through traditional authority structures.”

Finally, as listed in Table 6-3, there are helpful, practical lessons from past experience that analysts have drawn together as a guide for practitioners.

### **Move beyond coping strategies to pursue sustainable security**

Some analysts believe that

relief strategies should support local coping mechanisms, but with caution—helping one group survive can burden another. Moving people from war to safety zones, which can support military

depopulation strategies, can also lead to competition between displaced and host populations and local resentment of large-scale aid to the displaced.<sup>320</sup>

Sue Lautze cautions that “long-term reliance on coping mechanisms is unsustainable and ultimately counter-productive.”<sup>321</sup> The objective, she continues, should be to move *beyond* coping strategies to sustainable development strategies. “It is essential to note that, for victims of complex emergencies, there is no distinction between relief and development. Strategies employed by victims of protracted complex emergencies are about survival in both the present time frame and the aftermath of a crisis.”<sup>322</sup>

We believe that the key for the military is to look at sustainable development from a security standpoint—i.e., to pursue sustainable security. Pauline Baker and John Ausink maintain

The autonomy of four key state institutions (the military, the police, the civil service, and the judicial system) is a precondition for sustainable security, that is for a [formerly-]collapsed state to have the internal capacity to solve its own problems peacefully without a foreign administrative or military presence. By autonomy, we mean that state institutions cannot be controlled by, or be seen to be operating in the interest of, competing parties or factions.<sup>324</sup>

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<sup>320</sup> Prendergast and Scott, 1996, p. 9. Coping mechanisms are strategies used to survive crises. For example, during a famine a farmer may reduce the size of his herd so that he can concentrate on saving his most valuable breeding stock.

<sup>321</sup> Lautze, 1996, p. 6.

<sup>322</sup> Lautze, 1996, p. 7.

**Table 6-3. Beneficial attitudes and behavior: tips from professionals<sup>323</sup>**

<b>Suggestion</b>	<b>Discussion</b>
Be clear about goals	Those wishing to prevent and resolve conflict should make explicit to themselves and to others what they seek to accomplish.
Be clear about the role one is playing	Practitioners in conflict intervention should avoid confusing roles. Attempting to play multiple roles—advocate, negotiator, mediator, facilitator, provider of humanitarian relief, compliance enforcer—impedes effectiveness
Maintain frequent active communication, dialogue, and information-sharing between all parties	Participants must seek to identify areas of mutual interest. Interveners must be skilled listeners.
The spiritual dimension of human nature is central to conflict resolution and prevention	Religious themes and values, such as serenity, non-violence, openness, transparency, fairness, reconciliation, redemption, healing, mutual respect, and honesty, are the basis for conflict prevention and resolution. Attitudes of hatred, bitterness, desire for revenge and retaliation are unproductive. Not surprisingly, religious leaders and organizations are often key players in conflict amelioration.
Know the historical, social, cultural and psychological context of the conflict	Interveners must be fully apprised of people, issues, emotions, mores, and political relationships. Generic methods or principles do not succeed. Instead, what can and cannot be done must be tailored to the realities, constraints and opportunities presented by each particular milieu.

<sup>323</sup> This table is adapted from Creative Associates International, Inc., 1996, pp. 5-1 to 5-2. All words, save the column headings, are directly quoted from that source.

**Table 6-3. (cont'd.)**

<b>Suggestion</b>	<b>Discussion</b>
Encourage initiative from the parties who are in or closest to conflicts themselves	Practitioners should empower these parties to undertake responsibility for limiting violent pursuit, to be accountable for results, and to strengthen indigenous, national, and regional institutions. Effective outcomes ultimately require conflicting parties' willingness to work toward solutions; solutions cannot be imposed.
Use informal, non-public activities and interactions with non-official representatives	Public leaders often find it difficult to free themselves from polarizing issues
Principles—human rights, social and economic justice, free economic enterprise, democratic representation and rule of law—are the ultimate guiding light for conflict prevention and resolution	Practitioners must aim to create a dynamic, ongoing, peaceful process of change that pursues these goals by transforming existing relationships into ones of reciprocity and joint pursuit of mutually acceptable solutions.

**Table 6-3. (cont'd.)**

<b>Suggestion</b>	<b>Discussion</b>
Successful efforts require several forms of intervention	These may include tools implemented by governments, NGOs, donor organizations and others in development, humanitarianism, diplomacy, and other functional areas. These actors should coordinate their interventions.
Interventions and practices must be modified as the situation on the ground evolves	Practitioners and policymakers must be flexible.

Achieving sustainable security is a tall order, and it will recover taking the long view. Some have argued that achieving sustainable security takes ten to fifteen years, a much longer period than Congress or the American people will support. This is certainly true with respect to maintaining US troops in place, but it is also true with respect to committing resources towards achieving it in the first place. Nevertheless, this is a *security* mission, not just a development task. Pursuing sustainable security is not an anomaly or a distraction, but the key to mission success. Hence, it is a task that the military can and must do within its mandate and time schedule in order to maximize its contribution to achieving the over-all international mission objectives.<sup>325</sup>

### **Prevention, Mitigation, and Preparedness are the keys to sustainable security**

According to Sue Lautze:

From the late 1980's to present, disaster prevention, mitigation and preparedness (PMP) specialists have produced a wealth of useful research and practical frameworks that directly address issues of mitigating natural disaster and fostering recovery. . . . PMPP [the division within USAID/HBR/OFDA that has responsibility for issues of disaster PMP]<sup>326</sup>

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<sup>324</sup> See Baker and Ausink, 1996, p. 21.



has not substantially invested in complex emergencies as a special category of disaster, despite the fact that complex emergencies claim the majority of OFDA's budget. . . . Issues of PMP in complex emergencies are different from those in natural disasters. . . . Natural disaster *prevention* strategies focus on physical construction (e.g., housing designs) and *preparedness* strategies include the establishing of early warning and response mechanisms.<sup>327</sup>

She goes on to recommend that OFDA focus on disaster PMP in complex emergencies and pay attention to local (that is, national) interventions. The objective “is to ensure that relief strategies are as effective as possible in supporting local capacities, and, where appropriate, . . . facilitat[ing] the linkage between . . . traditional relief and rehabilitation efforts and the rehabilitation and development efforts of . . . USAID and other international actors.”<sup>328</sup>

We see PMP (pronounced, “pump”) as a mnemonic to guide external actors in pursuing sustainable security, but we switch the meaning of the “p’s”:

- *Prevention*. Conflict prevention “is an orientation that can be applied to a variety of techniques, programs and projects in many fields—[including] development, humanitarian affairs, democracy-building, military af-

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<sup>325</sup> This was the conclusion of many high-level participants at the CJCS' Peace Operations Seminar/Game 1997, 10–12 June 1997.

<sup>326</sup> The PMPP division switches the order of the first two “p’s”—that is, it is the Preparedness, Mitigation, and Prevention Programs division.

<sup>327</sup> Lautze, 1996, pp. 27–29; emphasis in the original.

fairs, and diplomacy. These activities prevent or mitigate conflict when they are consciously designed and operated with attention to conflicts' sources and manifestations."<sup>329</sup> Conducted early enough, preventive efforts may help defuse tense situations and, to use an old phrase, nip complex emergencies in the bud. To date, however, recognizing that few situations improve by themselves has not translated into widespread preventive action.<sup>330</sup> As Oakley concludes, "There is no sign of a diminution in the troubled-state phenomenon and attendant unrest in the next decade."<sup>331</sup> "Perhaps most notable" in the recent spate of complex emergencies, notes OFDA in its 1996 Strategic Plan, "has been the inability or lack of political will of the international political leaders to resolve these largely political and socioeconomic problems."<sup>332</sup> Thus, opportunities for conducting preventive diplomacy will be plentiful.

- *Mitigation*. Disaster mitigation refers to efforts for rapid recovery to the *status quo ante*.<sup>333</sup> If prevention fails (or is not tried), the fall-back is to pursue strategies to mitigate the effects of this failure; that is, to deal with the immediate effects of the complex emergency. The goal should not necessarily be to return to the *status*

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<sup>328</sup> OFDA, 1996b, pp. 14–15.

<sup>329</sup> Creative Associates International, Inc., 1996, p. ix. This analysis (on page 3-15) defines conflict prevention as those "actions, policies, procedures or institutions undertaken in particularly vulnerable places and times in order to avoid the threat or use of armed force and related forms of coercion by states or groups as the way to settle the political disputes that can arise from the destabilizing effects of economic, social, political and international change. Conflict prevention may also include action taken after a violent conflict to avoid its recurrence."

<sup>330</sup> One of the challenges is that the US government "lacks an overall conflict prevention strategy and capability. . . . Except with the most compelling global or regional threats, to be crisis preventers, most US officials and policy-makers must

*quo ante*, but pursue progress along the relief-with-development continuum through societal rehabilitation in the broadest sense.

- *Preparedness*. Once mitigation efforts are underway, external actors can focus on meeting the longer-term physical and meta-physical requirements for sustainable security. As with disaster preparedness, external actors should focus on capacity building at the national and sub-national level.

We consider pursuing PMP programs shorthand for the recommendations in each Generic Pol-Mil Plan operational sector plus cultural awareness (noted above in Table 6-1). That is, preventing complex emergencies from occurring, mitigating their effects once they occur, and preparing in advance for long-term actions will make the pol-mil planning process most effective.

### **Integrate existing capacities of all elements of society (especially elements from the most vulnerable groups)**

Planning can help actors focus on the long-term goals for a troubled country—which go beyond relieving violence and suffering. The ultimate aim is to produce self-sufficiency, defined by Lautze as “the capacity of a

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work outside established job descriptions, functional program mandates, and bureaucratic routines. US preventive policy has not achieved the status of foreign policy doctrine or standard operating procedure.” Creative Associates International, Inc., 1996, p. 1–25.

<sup>331</sup> Oakley, 1996, p. 82.

<sup>332</sup> OFDA, 1996b, p. 3.

<sup>333</sup> Lautze, 1996, p. 27.

community to either produce, exchange or lay claim to resources necessary to ensure both survival through and resilience to life-threatening stresses.”<sup>334</sup> In our context, self-sufficiency means the resources necessary to ensure civil stability and durable peace with a minimum of external involvement. According to Mary Anderson, “The key to self-sufficiency is capacity building.”<sup>335</sup> Increasing *good* capacity must be complemented by the reduction of *bad* capacity (that is, those things which inhibit self-sufficiency). According to Moore, capacity building “is the antitheses of dependence—the replacement of dependency by capacity, of incapacity by self-sufficiency.” He adds that one key to achieving success is patience: “Capacity-building programmes must learn better to contain the appetites and impatience of their sponsors, and to work painstakingly with local institutions rather than out-running them.”<sup>336</sup> Capacity-building can begin in isolated enclaves, but eventually existing capacities must be integrated across all elements of society.

### **Meet the challenges of displaced populations**

PMP programs must first and foremost meet the challenges of displaced populations. Achieving sustainable security requires civil order, a growing economy and a healthy population. That is one reason that meeting the challenges of displaced populations is so critical. People

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<sup>334</sup> Lautze, 1996, p. 2.

<sup>335</sup> Anderson, 1996a.

on the move do not contribute to the economy, and, in fact, can have a devastating impact on it. The Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) reports that the “search for fuelwood and other resources by at-risk and migratory populations can have a devastating environmental impact which can damage the resource base and deplete the carrying capacity of the land.”<sup>337</sup> The resulting desertification and deforestation of the land can lead to other, more intractable, humanitarian emergencies. Additionally, migratory populations have a 30 percent higher disease and death rate than non-migratory populations.<sup>338</sup> Unfortunately, displaced and refugee populations are growing. During the decade from 1985 to 1995, the number of internally displaced persons rose by over 400 percent and the number of refugees rose nearly 200 percent. Most of these migrant populations are a result of complex emergencies. Nearly 90 percent of all funds distributed by OFDA now support operations resulting from complex emergencies. A decade ago, 80 percent of OFDA assistance went toward relief of natural disasters.<sup>339</sup>

### **Foster local institutions and programs**

Those involved in relief have come to realize that it is impossible to completely disentangle themselves from politics. In complex emergencies, relieving suffering inevitably assists the side suffering most. The key is to

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<sup>336</sup> Moore, 1996, p. 20.

<sup>337</sup> OFDA, 1996b, p. 11.

<sup>338</sup> OFDA, 1996a, p. 8.

use indigenous political energy to foster the right kinds of institutions and programs. These need not be national institutions. As Andrew Natsios has observed, “Countries can survive without national government, even prosper.”<sup>340</sup> He uses Somalia as an example. There, with the support of NGOs, women’s groups, elders and others, schools have reopened, morbidity and mortality rates have dropped, and a merchant class has begun to assert itself. “Civil society has begun to repair itself and the social order has gradually been sewn back together by the Somali people themselves.”<sup>341</sup> As Lain Guest notes, “It’s communities that hold a state together, that’s where people must face common problems such as transportation, water and electricity.”<sup>342</sup> Experience demonstrates that it is the perceived legitimacy of the government, rather than a particular model of government, that is most important. In this as in other areas, the most important objective is to build local capacities.

### **Properly select and use measures of effectiveness (MOEs)**

As anyone who has ever tried to develop MOEs can testify, criticizing MOEs selected by others is easier than selecting them. Just because something can be measured does not mean that it is an indicator of effective-

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<sup>339</sup> OFDA, 1996b, pp. 4, 5 and 14.

<sup>340</sup> Natsios, 1996a, p. 90.

<sup>341</sup> Natsios, 1996a, p. 90.

ness. Analysts from the Center for Naval Analyses suggest that there is a hierarchy of measures that parallel the traditional military mission-analysis process:

- Political and policy level objectives are addressed through mission-level MOEs
- From these objectives, tasks are derived, and these are addressed through task-performance MOEs
- From the tasks, required capabilities and forces are derived, and their actions are addressed by level-of-effort measures<sup>343</sup>

Sandra Newett explains:

The military may be asked to clear debris from roads so that relief convoys can bring food to food distribution centers to feed the people and reduce starvation. . . . In this case, a task MOE would be the percentage of roads cleared of debris; a transition measure would be the percentage of crews made up of host nation or relief organization personnel clearing debris; and an overarching humanitarian MOE (that policy-makers are inclined to examine) would be the starvation rate the humanitarian effort is ultimately trying to reduce.<sup>344</sup>

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<sup>342</sup> PeaceWatch, 1996, p. 1.

<sup>343</sup> Nelson, Newett, Dworken, McGrady, and Lamon, 1996, p. 2.

Mark Geis argues that “developing clearly defined measures of effectiveness to track progress toward an end state is [a] key consideration in transition planning.”<sup>345</sup> He goes on to assert that “logistics- and engineering-related MOEs are likely to be some of the most important measures in tracking progress toward a military end state.”<sup>346</sup> The challenge is to choose MOEs carefully, and use MOEs appropriately.<sup>347</sup>

In complex emergencies, MOEs become particularly complex. Andrew Natsios believes that improved deliberate planning and forethought can greatly enhance this aspect of mission strategy. “Because political leaders and military strategists alike have had great difficulty in designing defensible exit strategies in these emergencies, they have instead settled on arbitrary measurements, usually by setting fixed time deadlines as the United States has done in Bosnia.”<sup>348</sup> Thinking through the challenges of a complex emergency ahead of time (even if the particulars of an actual contingency change) makes overcoming unanticipated difficulties much easier. It also helps in developing MOEs that accurately reflect mission progress.

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<sup>344</sup> Newett notes that “tons of debris cleared is not a task MOE; it is a level-of-effort measure that does not reflect what the military is trying to accomplish.” Both quotations are from Newett, 1996, p. 24.

<sup>345</sup> Geis, 1996, p. 15.

<sup>346</sup> Geis, 1996, p. 15.

<sup>347</sup> Nelson, Newett, Dworken, McGrady, and Lamon, 1996, p. 3.



Natsios has offered five measurable objectives which will return most societies to some degree of normalcy and self-sufficiency:

- *Repatriation and Resettlement.* Refugees should be repatriated and displaced persons resettled in their own homes. Absent either of these outcomes, identify locations where these vulnerable people can reconstitute community life and support themselves economically.
- *Food Security.* In rural societies food security is relatively easy to define and achieve: planting the next crop and reconstituting the animal herds. In urban areas it means sufficient economic activity for people to eke out a living on a modest wage. The root of the definition is the same—a secure source of affordable food to sustain life—because without it either relief efforts must continue or starvation will recur.
- *Morbidity and mortality rates.* The inoculation of children under five and the establishment of some locally based system, even in the absence of a national government, to maintain this coverage will reduce the morbidity and mortality rates in the population most vulnerable to disease. The resettlement and repatriation of displaced persons and refugees out of camps to normal community life, with access to clean water, will reduce the risk of epidemics for the rest of the population.

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<sup>348</sup> Natsios, 1996b, p. 61.

- *Restoration of markets and economic activity.* Markets will not resume their functions until the principal source of income of the country has been restored, which in most poor societies is agriculture. When farmers can bring their surplus and herders their animals to markets, economic activity will quickly resume. Trade will create jobs, which will nurture and sustain forces of stability in the social order so that life can begin to return to some degree of normalcy.
- *Restoration of physical security.* The establishment of a fully developed, fair, and honest criminal justice system is a goal most societies in the world have not yet reached, even in the absence of a complex emergency, and therefore should not be an objective as such. What is both essential and achievable is a police system to keep order in the community and to protect it from the lawless elements that proliferate during a complex emergency. Traditional societies have their own systems for maintaining justice. Whatever that system had been before the complex emergency occurred should, to the extent possible, be patched back together again. What worked before is what is most likely to work again because of its familiarity and acceptability. Traditional justice systems that are rooted in clan, ethnic, and tribal custom are finally the most sustainable.<sup>349</sup>

Not all analysts are sanguine about the possibility of establishing clear measures of effectiveness which help define a meaningful end state. Michael Pugh, for example, is of the opinion that “it may not be possible to determine clear criteria for deciding when peacebuilding

should stop.”<sup>350</sup> Even so, the military will (and should) develop an exit strategy. When it does, it is best based on verifiable conditions rather than on arbitrary dates.

### **Rebuild key infrastructure elements**

Another area where the military can make an impact, but one which remains highly controversial, is rebuilding infrastructure. Often a collapsed state needs the jump start that can be provided by a focused reconstruction program. It is in the area of infrastructure that military structural analysts can make their most valuable contribution. Assessments concerning which infrastructure elements can have the greatest *positive* impact on a country if rebuilt is simply the reverse of assessing which infrastructure elements would have the greatest *negative* impacts if destroyed. In his closing remarks at the final workshop, one participant noted:

Heretofore, at least, it's been my belief that the military sees infrastructure as networks of things and people: institutions, facilities, wires, railroads, airfields and the like. Our discussion has pushed us into a whole new element of cultural and societal networks and systems that I think would be extremely fruitful for military commanders to look at as targeting nodes, and political leaders to look at as leveraging processes.

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<sup>349</sup> Natsios, 1996b, pp. 61–62.

<sup>350</sup> Pugh, 1995, p. 325.

A country's infrastructure is not simply something to be destroyed. Things can also be targeted for rebuilding. Since most developing states' economies rely heavily on agriculture, getting that sector functioning is important because it affects so many others. Another key for breaking the cycle of dependence is an infusion of foreign investment. There is simply not enough relief or foreign aid available to make a difference. Providing succor evenhandedly is also important. Should one side feel slighted, previous good work could disintegrate again into conflict.

## **Doing Windows**

Through the course of this study, two competing views emerged. First, many believe that the military's complex contingency operations assistance tasks should continue to be narrowly construed, with the focus remaining on achieving a safe and secure environment. Proponents of this view believe that when the military gets involved in a broad range of activities, a "mission creep" warning bell should go off. An alternative view is that the military can do a lot in the context of its short-term security mission to have a broader impact on the long-term security of a failed state. But in order to do so, the military must look beyond traditional roles to see how it can assist rehabilitation and development. This will involve the military in "doing windows" during complex emergencies. We favor the second view.

### **"Mission Creep" and "Mission Cringe"**

The vast majority of strategic assessments agree that during the next several decades complex emergencies are the most likely activities in which the military will be used. This study has not and cannot answer the question as to whether or not the US military should get more widely involved in them; that is a political question, and ultimately politicians must answer it. When the military does get involved, we believe that it could and should play a wider role than it has in the past. Even some who would eliminate or drastically reduce military participation in complex emergencies grudgingly recognize “that many militaries pursue activities in the humanitarian sphere with more willingness to learn from experience than is exhibited by humanitarian agencies.”<sup>351</sup> In Rwanda, for example, many soldiers spent their off-duty hours pursuing humanitarian projects. “Off-duty projects were important not only for what they accomplished in Rwanda but also for the sense of involvement they promoted among people ‘back home.’ Soldiers from many troop-providing countries enlisted their families and communities in the broader effort.”<sup>352</sup> The strategic goal of the United States should be to export stability rather than run the risk of importing instability.<sup>353</sup> The further this can be done from US shores, the better.

When the military does get involved in a broad range of activities, there is always someone quick to complain about mission creep. The competing theme is that the

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<sup>351</sup> Minear and Guillot, 1996, p. 46.

military should not be in the nation-building business. Currently when it gets involved, the military is so focused on achieving an end state (that is, meeting pre-established conditions that, once met, allow it to withdraw with a clear conscience), it often fails to support longer-term objectives. Consider, for example, the experience of IFOR in Bosnia. According to Richard Holbrooke, IFOR's

reluctance to go beyond a rather narrow definition of its role and mandate has inevitably reduced the chances that the political and economic reconstruction effort in Bosnia will succeed. To be sure, what IFOR did, it did magnificently, with no casualties from hostile action, an astonishing record that attests to the...skill with which the NATO/IFOR commanders carried out their military mission. But despite its enormous capabilities and an 'excess capacity,' IFOR avoided most opportunities to support the civilian parts of the agreements, even when the risk was minimal. Such activities, they often said, went beyond not only their obligations, but their responsibilities.<sup>354</sup>

The military has been encouraged in this position by some NGOs and segments of the US Congress. Michael Pugh refers to this phenomenon as "mission cringe."<sup>355</sup>

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<sup>352</sup> Minear and Guillot, 1996, p. 88.

<sup>353</sup> This notion is borrowed from Ronald D. Asmus in Khalilzad, 1996, p. 43. Numerous recent events have raised the awareness of terrorism in the United States. Promoting a more stable world abroad enhances America's chances of controlling terrorism at home.

Even within the military, however, there is a growing belief that US forces will continue to get involved in complex emergencies. Securing at-risk populations has been complicated by the fact that the nature of civil conflicts has changed, and many of those changes require accommodation by the military and relief agencies. John Darnton highlighted some of these changes:<sup>356</sup>

Since conflict is often ethnic or religious, the killing tends to be widespread and aimed at a specific civilian population. The realization of this alone is enough to cause panic and flight. . . . In some of the conflicts, as a United Nations report . . . put it, “displacement of people is not the byproduct of war but one of its primary purposes.” This is seen, for example, in the “ethnic cleansing” campaign by Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. . . . In others, like those in Bosnia, Somalia and Afghanistan, the state has virtually withered away, leaving the field to warlords who plunder the countryside with medieval abandon, chasing out large groups of people. . . . The weaponry involved, some of it pumped in by the superpowers during years of proxy warfare, is highly destructive, consisting of multiple-launch rockets, missiles, artillery, mortars and—most pernicious from the point of view of repatriation—land mines. The indiscriminate carnage speeds the exodus. . . . The combatants do not shrink from using food as a weapon, either by blocking relief convoys or engaging in “slash and burn” techniques of warfare. In places like the Horn of Africa, the combination of drought and war

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<sup>354</sup> Holbrooke, 1997, p. 171.

<sup>355</sup> Pugh, 1997, p. 191.

<sup>356</sup> Darnton, 1994, p. A6.

has so savaged the land that it can no longer provide a livelihood. Whether the hundreds of thousands who leave are fleeing starvation or war is academic. . . . If the state itself is a party to the conflict it may use the media to fan the flames. In Rwanda, Government-controlled radio whipped up hatred in April [1994] to bring about the Hutu massacres of Tutsis and afterwards sowed fears among the Hutus that they would be killed in retaliation.

Not everyone believes that the military's involvement in providing humanitarian assistance is a good thing. Some cynically believe that all Cold War military civic action programs "had controlling political agendas" and that this legacy continues to color military participation in humanitarian emergencies.<sup>357</sup> These same critics continue: "Unlike aid organisations for whom humanitarian objectives are by definition primary, military forces have multiple objectives, the humanitarian rarely preeminent."<sup>358</sup> Motive, like beauty, is apparently determined in the eye of the beholder. Regardless, the increased involvement of the military in relief operations has caused at least one donor agency to consider getting out of food aid altogether and to concentrate on rehabilitation efforts because "the military is not interested in . . . rehabilitative inputs."<sup>359</sup> Military traditionalists would differ on the reasons but agree with the conclusion; "real soldiers don't do complex emergencies" would be their battle cry.

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<sup>357</sup> Minear and Guillot, 1996, p. 43.

<sup>358</sup> Minear and Guillot, 1996, p. 43.



Critics aside, all indications are that the military—including and perhaps especially the US military—will continue to find itself involved in complex emergencies in the future. This belief is based in part on the fact that there is no convincing evidence that the United States, or any other international actor, is ready to invest heavily in preventive action. When the military does get involved, it should do its best to be part of a long-term solution. As noted in US joint doctrine:<sup>360</sup>

Military operations end when the objectives have been attained. The NCA define conflict termination objectives and direct the cessation of operations. Termination plans are designed to secure the major policy objectives that may be attained as the result of military operations. Termination plans must cover the transition to postconflict activities.

As an analysis of a Marine Corps humanitarian assistance and peace operation (HA/PO) exercise concluded:

The military and policy-makers should plan and execute tasks during a HA/PO so that a follow-on organization or host nation can sustain the military's accomplishments and continue moving toward host-nation self-sufficiency. If the military and policy-makers do not plan and operate with rehabilitation in mind, the military may be asked to intervene again or the mission may appear to be a failure.<sup>361</sup>

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<sup>359</sup> Prendergast and Scott, 1996, p. 29.

<sup>360</sup> Extracts from Joint Publication 5-0, quoted in Air Land Sea Application, 1994, p. 4-20.

Because the military carries so much baggage in terms of motive, capabilities and national interest, involving the military often adds to the complexities of a difficult situation. "All who engage in such crises need to be prepared to struggle with the complexities. In fact, given the particular nature, scale, and timing of military interventions, the military need to be particularly astute in their interventions."<sup>362</sup> Larry Minear and Philippe Guillot may have said it best:

As a single element in a multifaceted international response, [the military] have indispensable contributions to make in fostering a secure environment for civilians and for humanitarian activities, preventing bloodshed and protecting human life. After all is said and done, their comparative advantage may be precisely in what they know best: war and security. They may also play an important role in supporting the work of humanitarian organisations and even, in extreme circumstances, in carrying out relief activities themselves.<sup>363</sup>

The military will be in the best position to do this if it carries out contingency planning and recommends intervening sooner rather than later. Hence, the military should be fully supportive of any prevention efforts, and particularly peace negotiations, since the prospects for a lasting solution increase dramatically if an agreement has been reached.

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<sup>361</sup> Newett *et al.*, 1996, p. 3.

<sup>362</sup> Minear and Guillot, 1996, p. 158.

<sup>363</sup> Minear and Guillot, 1996, p. 164.

## The Military's Supporting Role

One purpose of this study was to identify military tasks that contribute to the long-term goals of establishing stable civil government and durable peace. Workshop participants tended to agree with former Defense Secretary William Perry, who in late 1994 remarked, "Generally the military is not the right tool to meet humanitarian concerns. We field an army, not a Salvation Army."<sup>364</sup> Nevertheless, participants recognized that in many complex emergencies the military, in particular the US military, does have a role. And the US military now appears much more willing to tackle humanitarian roles than in the past. For example, the theme for the 1997 CJCS Peacekeeping Seminar/Game was identifying what the military could do to support non-military efforts to create a sustainable peace in complex emergencies.<sup>365</sup> How these sustainable security missions are conducted may change depending on what ends the military has in mind. That is why adopting long-term objectives is critical to achieving lasting success. Keeping these goals in mind may or may not change how individual military tasks are conducted, but consciously trying to contribute to those aims (or least doing them no harm) could change how a commander views his responsibilities and may result in a broader range of military activity.

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<sup>364</sup> Perry, 1995.

<sup>365</sup> Drawn from personal observation of the CJCS' Peace Operations Seminar/Game 1997, "Creating a Sustainable Peace in Complex Emergencies," held at the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College, 10–12 June 1997. The conference was conducted under the auspices of the USA Peacekeeping Institute, directed by Colonel Larry M. Forester, USA.

Traditionally, the military's complex contingency operations assistance tasks have been narrowly construed to include "needs assessments, communications and ground logistics support, airlift/airdrop capacity, and assistance in the fields of medicine, transport, power, water purification, and feeding."<sup>366</sup> These remain core tasks during conflict, along with maintaining a safe and secure environment. By taking the long view, forces will also be able to understand how demining, disarmament, and infrastructure repair activities can have an enormous impact well beyond their immediate military benefit. Further, they will be able to "discuss and recommend an appropriate role for military forces in facilitating the establishment of the core elements (e.g., public order, judicial system, and other institutions) of a sustainable security environment in a failed state."<sup>367</sup> Although such activities contribute to the overall political goal of achieving a stable civil society, they are still well within the military arena. Two facts must be accepted, however: first, the military is not going to focus on humanitarian missions; and, second, it will disengage from a crisis as quickly as it can. For those reasons, the military will and should remain a supporting agency. "For long-haul tasks of reconciliation, economic development, and the building of justice systems which respect fundamental human rights, non-military—and sometimes non-governmental actors—often have the advantage."<sup>368</sup>

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<sup>366</sup> Minear and Guillot, 1996, p. 36.

<sup>367</sup> Quotation from Colonel Forester's introduction to the CJCS Peace Operations Seminar/Game 1997.

In the civil affairs area, lines often blur, but without a coordinated country plan there are few ways of determining where comparative advantages lie. The transitions from relief to rehabilitation to reconciliation to reconstruction to development require very special skills, most of which are found in Civil Affairs units. The objectives of civil affairs activities are to:<sup>369</sup>

- Facilitate a commanders' mission capability by obtaining civil support and reducing civilian interference with military operations
- Assist commanders' compliance with operational law requirements, insofar as military circumstances permit, by providing those resources necessary to meet essential civil requirements, avoiding damage to civilian property and usable resources, and minimizing loss of life and suffering
- Assist commanders in achieving developmental goals in friendly or foreign countries by assisting or reinforcing the political and socio-economic viability or efficiency of public institutions and services of host forces
- Assist or supervise the stabilization or reestablishment of civil administration, when directed by the National Command Authorities, in friendly, neutral, hostile, or occupied territory in support of US and multinational objectives

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<sup>368</sup> Minear and Guillot, 1996, p. 37.

<sup>369</sup> As quoted in Joint Pub 3-57, p. I-8.

Civil affairs units are particularly effective at interfacing with NGOs and civilian agencies. At the beginning of the US intervention into Somalia, for example, OFDA had concluded that “Civil Affairs units should be used as the liaison between U.S. military units and OFDA/DART [Disaster Assistance Relief Team] and NGO/UN personnel.”<sup>370</sup> In Operation PROVIDE COMFORT in northern Iraq, as well as in the complex emergencies which have followed, “the presence of large numbers of soldiers drawn from US national guard units, many of them with specialties paralleling skills found in the ranks of the humanitarians, fostered positive working relationships.”<sup>371</sup> As Chris Seiple has noted, “The military needs to incorporate Civil Affairs personnel into its planning process from the very beginning. Civil Affairs personnel are responsible for the military’s doctrinal interface with civilian agencies.”<sup>372</sup>

The problem, of course, is that the bulk of US civil affairs personnel—including those most in demand for dealing with complex emergencies—are in the Army or Marine Corps Reserve. If complex contingency operations do become the primary tool of collective security, and if the United States participates broadly in these missions, then civil affairs units will soon be overwhelmed. The most logical solution to this problem is to expand the civil affairs sector and develop a method of

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<sup>370</sup> OFDA, 1992.

<sup>371</sup> Minear and Guillot, 1996, p. 41.

<sup>372</sup> Seiple, 1996, p. 137.

compensation that satisfies both the reservist and his or her employer for their repeated and prolonged absences.<sup>373</sup>

## The Situational Influence Assessment Module

As noted in Chapter 1, one of JWAC's principal aims in sponsoring this project was to develop and test the utility of SIAM for enhancing and refining JWAC infrastructure analysis in support of JCS and Unified CINC requirements. As the project progressed, our JWAC sponsor and project participants recognized the broader applicability of the SIAM-based analysis model to DoD and interagency planning, training, and execution. In this section, we address SIAM's utility and identify ways in which it could be used to facilitate interagency integration. We considered SIAM's use for both planning and training. While we focused on the value in a US interagency context, we offer comments on SIAM's applicability at the international level as well.

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<sup>373</sup> A less preferable solution is to incorporate more Civil Affairs personnel in the active forces. To make this latter alternative work, the Army and Marine Corps would have to make its members available, free of charge, to employers in select US civilian sectors (such as, power generation, sanitation, banking, etc.). But this is probably a non-starter. Much the same arguments could be made with respect to Psychological Operations (PSYOP) units. Both civil affairs and PSYOP units are leverage forces (low investment, force multipliers) with expertise in dealing with civilians and civilian organizations. In the context of complex contingency operations, their efforts are mutually supportive. See Siegel, 1996, and Headquarters, Department of the Army Field Manual 33-1. The bulk of the active U.S. military civil affairs and PSYOP resources are in the U.S. Army's Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command in Fort Bragg, North Carolina. However, most personnel are in the reserves. Both type of units fall under the operational cognizance of the US Special Operations Command.

## **SIAM as a Planning Tool**

### **SIAM places participants on a common playing field**

SIAM proved to be a valuable collaborative, analytic tool. It enabled participants from differing backgrounds to speak a common language and bring their expertise to bear on separate but related problems. In this sense, SIAM served as a vehicle for interagency collaboration. Given the opportunity and the willingness to overcome differences of language, it could do so on an international basis as well.

### **When mature, SIAM can help collaborative planning efforts**

For purposes of interagency and even international planning, SIAM's strengths include its ability to facilitate collaborative cross-checks on planning pursued through traditional methods, and its capability to capture expert opinion. It helps planners focus on what matters and allows them to challenge assumptions. On the other hand, SIAM does have drawbacks. For one, it is static. SIAM looks only at a snapshot in time, requiring nets to be tailored for each phase of an operation. Another drawback is that building useful nets is both time consuming and manpower intensive. The value of the net is directly related to the quality of the data included in it and, even then, the final net requires validation. Finally, like many other tools, as one participant noted in a slight exaggeration (on both ends), SIAM takes "15 minutes to learn,



two years to become proficient.” That is, even though participants can learn how to use the tool relatively quickly, becoming proficient takes considerable practice.

### **Its value is in cognition, not prediction**

We are convinced that influence nets, if properly developed and weighted, can help an operational commander think through how to deal with very complex contingencies. Like a critical pathway in medical case management, SIAM can help identify the key things that must occur for a patient (in this case, a country or region that has undergone a complex emergency) to achieve the desired outcomes.<sup>374</sup> There is also value added in helping him determine how to get the most bang for his scarce resource bucks. As Mark Walsh points out, “balancing the mission’s resources becomes a key challenge once the intervention is underway. If the central problem has been correctly identified and if the mission has been properly resourced, reasonably successful outcomes can be expected.”<sup>375</sup>

Nevertheless, as one workshop participant concluded,

A SIAM influence net should not be considered as a ‘model’ in the traditional sense. It provides useful information about relative impacts, but should not be used to predict behavior. For the types of situations ‘modeled,’ the potential for gaps in knowledge is very high, which prohibits any kind

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<sup>374</sup>We thank Dr. F. M. “Skip” Burkle, Jr., for the analogy to critical pathways.

of truly useful predictive modeling. SIAM's strength lies in its ability to encourage collaboration in ways that may not have been possible otherwise.

### **Creating useful SIAM influence nets takes time**

One major caveat to this optimistic assessment is that developing useful nets takes time. Creating them should be part of a deliberate, rather than a crisis action, planning process. "Good" nets can document and validate the logic used in decision-making, help develop meaningful measures of effectiveness, and assist in determining an appropriate exit strategy. "Bad" nets can confuse, at best, and lead to misadventure, misuse of resources, and loss of life, at worst.

### **SIAM is not a substitute for good judgment**

As one participant concluded:

Many of the so-called failures of the interagency process have not been process problems at all, but bad judgments. Decision-makers were advised by experts of the unhappy potential consequences of actions, but those warnings were dismissed because they conflicted with some immediate political imperative. People got what they bargained

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<sup>375</sup> Walsh, 1996, p. 36.

for. SIAM is helpful because it gives experts credibility (but sole reliance on it could prove costly because experts can be wrong).

## **SIAM as a Training Tool**

Many of the strengths and weaknesses of SIAM as a planning tool are also reflected in its utility as a training tool. Many workshop participants believed SIAM was particularly well suited for training because it was designed to encourage collaboration. SIAM also encourages “out-of-the-box” thinking and can be valuable in introducing a subject to an unfamiliar audience.

As a training tool, however, SIAM is expensive (when compared to database programs which can run on standard personal computers) and requires a significant investment in hardware.<sup>376</sup> It also requires a significant investment in manpower, not just to build the training net but to attend and participate in the training. The broader the participation, the more valuable the training.

Because the development of “good” SIAM nets is time consuming, its value as a real-time planning tool is significantly proscribed. Thus, many workshop participants believed it has greater potential for training than for planning. Attention can be given to developing a few “good” SIAM nets. One or more of these nets might help planners think through the challenges in potential or even

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<sup>376</sup> SIAM's developers are now working on a personal computer version of the software application. This should reduce the overall software and hardware costs (taking into consideration the potential costs of the software upgrade itself).

actual real-world complex emergencies. In the meantime, using “good” nets in a focused training effort can help create a cadre of personnel in the diplomatic, relief and military communities who understand and appreciate the challenges faced by others.

## **The Road Ahead**

SIAM, like any tool, has both strengths and weaknesses. The effort to explore SIAM’s utility would not have advanced as far as it did without the cooperation of the very talented individuals who participated in the workshops. Although the baseline nets failed to reach the level of detail required by JWAC analysts, the project did push the development process a good way down what we believe to be the right path.

### **A dual-track, seminar-to-simulation approach**

The right path begins with collaboration. If SIAM can be used as a tool for getting people from different backgrounds to work together, then it will be valuable. SIAM provides a common ground for deliberate planning and, as one participant stated, its usefulness increases the closer the “relationship between net builders and users” becomes. These observations and those above suggest a dual-track, seminar-to-simulation approach.

This approach begins by recognizing the need for policy integration in planning, as now codified in the United States at the national strategic level by Presidential Decision Directive-56, signed by the president on 20 May 1997. The aim of this approach is “to integrate the diplomatic, military, humanitarian, informational, and other dimensions of US instruments of policy to achieve success in conducting complex contingency operations.”<sup>377</sup> Such efforts can help to:

- identify appropriate missions and tasks, if any, for U.S. Government agencies in a U.S. Government response
- develop strategies for early resolution of crises, thereby minimizing the loss of life and establishing the basis for reconciliation and reconstruction
- accelerate planning and implementation of the civilian aspects of the operation
- intensify action on critical funding and personnel requirements early on
- integrate all components of a U.S. response (civilian, military, police, etc.) at the policy level and facilitate the creation of coordination mechanisms at the operational level
- rapidly identify issues for senior policy makers and ensure expeditious implementation of decisions<sup>378</sup>

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<sup>377</sup> Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance, cited hereafter as ODASD (PK/HA), 1997. While PDD 56 itself is classified, this description is based on a briefing presented at an unclassified conference that included NGO and academic representation.

The key elements of the now-codified political-military planning process include:

- *Development of a Political-Military Implementation Plan.* The process of developing the plan drives a comprehensive assessment and forges a consensus on purpose, mission, and ends.<sup>379</sup>
- *Use of the Executive Committee (ExComm) for day-to-day crisis management with US participation.* The ExComm has responsibility for policy development, planning, oversight and implementation.<sup>380</sup>
- *An Interagency Rehearsal.* Executed before the operation and prior to key milestones, interagency “rehearsals” help refine pol-mil planning.<sup>381</sup>
- *An Interagency After-Action Review (AAR).* Sponsored by the ExComm and conducted within one to two months, the interagency AAR captures specific lessons and offers application to future policy and procedures.

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<sup>378</sup> PDD-56, p. 3.

<sup>379</sup> The plan embodies the integrated strategy and outlines coordinating mechanisms; clarifies agency responsibilities and priorities; provides visibility and promotes accountability; and identifies legal disconnects and resource shortfalls. ODASD (PK/HA), 1997. For an illustration of a plan's components, see Table 6-1 above.

<sup>380</sup> The ExComm is a standing crisis action group of assistant secretaries established by the interagency Deputies Committee. It includes all relevant agencies, including some normally outside the Interagency Working Group structure. The ExComm keeps pace with and assesses current activities, anticipates problems, assigns tasks, and proceeds with next steps (including raising policy issues to the Deputies Committee for decision). The ExComm uses the pol-mil plan for anticipating required action and coordinating the execution of tasks by: identifying appropriate critical issues; establishing priorities for integrated action; evaluating individual agencies' concepts of operations; organizing the interagency plans review session; refining the pol-mil plan as necessary; and conducting interagency After Action Reviews. ODASD (PK/HA), 1997.

We recommend SIAM's use in association with this process. People trained in SIAM's use could observe ExComm deliberations, capturing the theories embedded in the pol-mil plan deliberations. The resulting nets could be used during the Interagency Rehearsal to examine the pol-mil plan's robustness prior to its presentation to the Deputies Committee for final approval. Once the operation begins, supporting staff could update the nets and the ExComm could use it during Interagency Rehearsals prior to each operational milestone (e.g., stabilization, transition, termination, and follow-on). Finally, the nets could be used in the interagency AAR as part of the operation's comprehensive assessment.

This dual-track, seminar-to-simulation approach is a long-term goal. Exploring its potential utility should be a task for the PDD 56 implementation process.

### **Showing promise is just a first step**

Understanding what must be done is much simpler than implementing what must be done. No single community—military, diplomatic or relief—can develop an overall strategy for dealing with all essential areas. SIAM holds promise for helping to plan, train and integrate disparate strategies. In order to be useful, SIAM needs to sat-

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<sup>381</sup> Before the operation, the Interagency "Rehearsal" is directed by the Deputies Committee. The goal is to: review agency plans to accomplish the overall mission; resolve oft-competing perspectives; synchronize US government efforts in theater; highlight accountability of supporting agencies; and identify resource and funding issues. ODASD (PK/HA), 1997. Presumably, after the operation begins, it would be directed and executed by the ExComm.

isfy some of the same MOEs used in the field.<sup>382</sup> A group of analysts and practitioners (some of whom participated in the JWAC workshops) examined how MOEs could help judge the “outcome or success of a humanitarian assistance operation. Desirable characteristics of MOEs include that they:

- be operationally credible
- have predictive value
- be sensitive to factors known to influence the outcome
- be measurable
- support decision making
- show analytic tractability or the ability to complement how the system operates and interacts.”<sup>383</sup>

All of these characteristics, with the exception of having predictive value, are inherent in the weighting placed on SIAM links and nodes. Hence, even if the links are not weighted exactly right, they can nevertheless provide valuable insights for the commander and help him develop his best course of action. Through this project, we have demonstrated the plausibility that SIAM can satisfy these MOEs. The real test, however, will come only when it is used by practitioners in dealing with real complex emergencies.

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<sup>382</sup> Burkle *et al.*, 1995. See also Nelson, Newett, Dworken, McGrady, and Lamon, 1996.

<sup>383</sup> Burkle *et al.*, 1995, p. 49.



## **Quo Desiderat Pacem, Praeparet Pacem**

Complex emergencies are ugly creatures, and in no danger of extinction. At times, however, it has appeared that responses to them might be. Kofi Annan has argued, “Aside from the overriding fact that inaction in the face of massive violence is morally indefensible, non-involvement is an illusory option. The illusion is due to domestic political imperatives in an age of media-driven popular awareness, as well as to international political realities.”<sup>384</sup> Nations have partially accepted his arguments, but still take a sober, bottom-line look before getting involved in failed states.

When states do intervene, they want to make sure that national treasure is well spent. The best way to ensure this is to try to get all those involved to move in consonance with one another. Our workshops demonstrated that SIAM offers one method of helping disparate groups discuss and work through their differences. It is not a panacea for current planning ills, nor will it replace sound judgment. There may even be better collaborative methods available. In complex emergencies, the need to act quickly and use scarce resources wisely means that international actors can no longer afford to ignore each

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<sup>384</sup> Annan, 1996.

other or pursue competing agendas. This is as true for the military as for any other group. If the military wants to help win the peace, it must prepare for peace.

# Appendix A: Workshops

## Introduction

Three workshops supported this project:

- We convened the first conference, a research workshop, in the Naval War College's Decision Support Center (DSC) on 14–15 November 1996.
- SAIC convened the second conference, a modeling workshop, at the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency's Advanced High Performance Computing Applications facility in Arlington, Virginia, on 14–15 January 1997; we served as workshop facilitators.
- We convened the third and final workshop, a combined research and modeling workshop, at the Naval War College on 25–27 March 1997.

In this appendix, we document the first two of these workshops. The third workshop, which was classified SECRET, is documented in the project Compact Disk listed in the bibliography. Table A-1 at the end of this appendix lists the participants at each of the workshops.

## **Research Workshop, 14-15 November 1996**

We convened a diverse set of peace operations practitioners and analysts from the military, the United Nations, relief and development organizations, and the diplomatic community at the Naval War College's Decision Support Center, 14–15 November 1996. As detailed in Chapter 2 in the main body of this report, participants applied the concept of the relief-to-development continuum to peace operations, developing a multistage, multi-assistance continuum approach discussed in the main body of our paper. During the remainder of the workshop, using GroupSystems<sup>®</sup>, participants identified, prioritized, and elaborated upon different operational sectors to which the different types of external assistance could apply. In the main body of the report, we included participant comments in our discussion of eight operational sectors identified in an integrated interagency planning document supporting Presidential Decision Directive 56. Here, we report the prioritizations participants gave to the sectors they developed.

## **Modeling Workshop, 14-15 January 1997**

SAIC convened the second workshop 14–15 January 1997 in the Washington, D.C. area. It involved an eclectic group of experts similar to the first (including some

of the same people). During this workshop, participants evaluated the baseline net which the broader project team had developed using the background research and the results of the previous workshop. They offered detailed suggestions for improving various aspects of the influence net and applied the “net in progress” to Somalia, the challenge facing the Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia at the commencement of the operation, and those facing the new Stabilization Force (SFOR). Participants then voted on the relative priority of the 22 initial causal nodes in the refined influence net model. Finally, they evaluated whether the military should be involved—and whether the military would be the most appropriate body—in influencing each of the then 84 distinct nodes in the influence net model.

After the second workshop, the broader project team continued to refine the baseline influence net, deconstructing it into an immediate causal node net and three supporting nets. We then tailored these nets to the scenario developed for our third workshop. For more detail on SIAM and the influence net models, see Chapters 4 and 5.

## **Combined Workshop, 25-27 March 1997**

The 25–27 March 1997 workshop, co-sponsored by JWAC and the United States Atlantic Command (USACOM), had three separate but related components: a seminar workshop, a tabletop simulation, and a model analysis workshop.

1. For most of the first day, participants met in plenary session to hear briefings on and to discuss:
  - the overall project sponsored by JWAC (see Chapters 1 and 2)
  - USACOM's vision with respect to the country in the workshop scenario
  - workshop strategies for using SIAM (see Chapters 4 and 5)
  - the emerging efforts to integrate the interagency community in Pol-Mil Planning<sup>385</sup>
2. The majority of the workshop was spent in an embedded simulation exploring interagency planning and the utility of the SIAM application by working through a scenario developed by the project team and co-sponsors.
3. Finally, participants focused on the utility of SIAM for interagency planning and interagency training.

We have incorporated the general comments presented and discussed at this combined workshop into the main body of this report.<sup>386</sup>

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<sup>385</sup> Mr. Robert Scher from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Strategy and Resources) briefed participants on the on-going efforts, initiated in the Defense Department, to introduce an Integrated Interagency Planning process for comprehensive emergencies. We discuss this effort in Chapter 6 of our report. Mr. Scher also provided participants with a draft "Generic Pol-Mil Plan." We used this information in Chapter 3 of our report.

## Participants

The workshops were held on a not-for-attribution basis. However, to give a sense of the breadth and depth of the expertise of participants, we have provided names and affiliations in Table A-1.

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<sup>386</sup> Readers interested in the simulation should contact us directly using the contact information provided at the beginning of the report.

**Table A-1. List of workshop participants**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Affiliation</b>	<b>Workshops</b>		
		<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>
Dr. Mats Berdal	IISS	†		
BG Mono Bhagat, India	United Nations (DPKO)		†	
Dr. Frederick “Skip” Burkle, Jr.	University of Hawaii	†		
LTC Sam Butler, USA	US Army Peacekeeping Institute			†
Mr. William Byrne	Naval War College (ONI-DET)			†
Ms. Anne Claxton	World Vision Relief & Development, Inc.	†	†	



**Table A-1. (cont'd.)**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Affiliation</b>	<b>Workshops</b>		
		<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>
Mr. Christopher Coleman	United Nations (DPKO)	†		
Dr. Donald Daniel	Naval War College (CNWS/SRD)	†		
Ms. Lisa Davidson	Evidence Based Research, Inc.	†	†	†
Mr. Arthur Dewey	Congressional Hunger Center	†		
CDR Kevin Donlon, USN	Joint Staff (J5 UN Division)		†	
Mr. John Donnelly	JWAC			†

**Table A-1. (cont'd.)**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Affiliation</b>	<b>Workshops</b>		
		<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>
Mr. Jonathan Dworken	Center for Naval Analyses	†		
Ms. Wendy Eaton	DFI International	†		
Mr. Olaf Elton	USACOM (JTASC/J73)	†	†	†
Mr. Sam Engelstad	The Collaborative for Development Action		†	
COL Stephen Epstein, USAR	358th Civil Affairs Brigade		†	†
MAJ Jeff Fargo, USA	USSOUTHCOM (J5)			†

**Table A-1. (cont'd.)**

Name	Affiliation	Workshops		
		1	2	3
CDR Michael P. Farrell, USCG	Commandant, US Coast Guard (G-OPL-2)			†
Lt Col Jorge Fernandez, USAF	USACOM (J5)	†	†	†
Ms. Ruth Anne Fitzimmons	CIA (CID/TSTI)			†
Mr. Bruce Friedman	US Department of State	†		
Prof. Theophilos Gemelas	Naval War College (CNWS/DSD)		†	†
Dr. Lester Gibson	Center for Naval Analyses		†	†

**Table A-1. (cont'd.)**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Affiliation</b>	<b>Workshops</b>		
		<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>
BGen Wallace “Chip” Gregson, USMC	HQMC (ADC/S PP&O (Plans))		†	†
Dr. Michael Haxton	JWAC		†	
Dr. Richard Hayes	Evidence Based Research, Inc.	†	†	†
Prof. Bradd Hayes	Naval War College (CNWS/DSD)	†	†	†
MSgt. Michael S. Hinchey	Atlantic Intelligence Command			†
Maj Gen William Hobbins, USAF	USACOM J5			†

**Table A-1. (cont'd.)**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Affiliation</b>	<b>Workshops</b>		
		<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>
Prof. Gregory Hoffman	Naval War College (CNWS/DSD)			†
Ms. Katharine Hoffmann	JWAC	†	†	†
LTC Paul Hughes, USA	OASD (Strategy and Resources)	†		
LT Troy Jackson, USN	JWAC			†
Ms. Janice Jacobs	US Department of State			†
Mr. Ken Kaizer	Evidence Based Research, Inc.		†	

**Table A-1. (cont'd.)**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Affiliation</b>	<b>Workshops</b>		
		<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>
Prof. Henry Kamradt	Naval War College (CNWS/DSD)			†
COL Paul Kappelman, USA	OASD (SO-LIC)		†	
Prof. Erik Kjonnerod	National Defense University (Wargaming and Simulation Center)			†
Mr. Michael Kozak	US Department of State			†
Dr. Steven Kurth	JWAC		†	
Col John Langdon, USMC	MARFORLANT (HQ, SJTF)			†

**Table A-1. (cont'd.)**

Name	Affiliation	Workshops		
		1	2	3
Mr. William H. Lyerly, Jr.	USAID (Bureau of Africa)	†	†	†
BG Thomas Matthews, USAR	CG, 353d Civil Affairs Command	†		
CDR Paul Mazich, USN	USACOM (J5)	†	†	†
Dr. Ann Miller	Center for Naval Analyses (CG IMEF)			†
Mr. David Mitchell	OASD (SO-LIC)		†	†
Dr. Lawrence Modisett	Naval War College (CNWS/DSD)	†		†

**Table A-1. (cont'd.)**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Affiliation</b>	<b>Workshops</b>		
		<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>
Ambassador Jonathan Moore	Harvard University	†		
Mr. Andrew Natsios	World Vision Relief & Development, Inc.			†
BGen Greg Newbold, USMC	HQMC (Manpower Plans and Policy)	†		
COL George Oliver, USA	US Mission to the United Nations		†	
Mr. Thomas O'Loughlin	USACOM (J2)			†
Mr. Peter Orr	USAID			†



**Table A-1. (cont'd.)**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Affiliation</b>	<b>Workshops</b>		
		<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>
Dr. Karen Toombs Parsons	JWAC		†	†
COL John Petrella, USAR	353d Civil Affairs Command	†		
Mr. Randy Pherson	National Intelligence Council			†
Chief Sup. J.O.G. Pouliot	RCMP (Retired)	†		
Mr. Steve Rader	Science Applications International Corporation		†	
Mr. James Roberts	OASD (SO-LIC)	†		†

**Table A-1. (cont'd.)**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Affiliation</b>	<b>Workshops</b>		
		<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>
CDR Paul Schmidle, USN	Naval War College (CNWS/DSD)	†	†	†
LTG Daniel Schroeder, USA (Ret)		†	†	
Capt Chris Seiple, USMC	HQMC (ADC/S PP&O (Plans))	†		†
Mr. Wayne Smith	Science Applications International Corporation	†	†	†
MAJ David Stockwell, USA	18th Airborne Corps			†
COL Al Stolberg, USA	Naval War College (CNWS)	†	†	†

**Table A-1. (cont'd.)**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Affiliation</b>	<b>Workshops</b>		
		<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>
LtCol Bert Tussing, USMC	Office of Program Appraisal, DON	†		
Mr. Matthew Vaccaro	OASD (Strategy and Resources)			†
MAJ Dan Walker, USAF	USACOM (J35)			†
Lt. Col. Jeffrey Walls, USAF	Joint Staff (J33)		†	†
CDR Greg Wells, USN	Naval War College (CNWS/WGD)			†
Dr. Robert Wood	Naval War College (CNWS)	†		

**Table A-1. (cont'd.)**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Affiliation</b>	<b>Workshops</b>		
		<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>
Ambassador Peter Romero	US Department of State	†		
Dr. Julie Rosen	Science Applications International Corporation	†	†	†
Mr. Stan Samkange	United Nations (DPA)	†		
Prof. Jeffrey Sands	Naval War College (CNWS/DSD)	†	†	†
Maj Michael Santacroce, USMC	USACOM (J5)			†
Mr. Robert Scher	OASD (Strategy and Resources)			†

# Appendix B: Peace Operations Task List

In this appendix, we first detail the analysis we performed on the operational tasks in the Generic Pol-Mil Plan and reported in Chapter 3. We then provide a more detailed task list we modified from work conducted by Dr. Thomas H. Johnson.<sup>387</sup>

## Where Should the Military Focus its Efforts?

To review, we wanted to determine tasks the military should perform that are aimed at long-term goals of civil stability and a durable peace. One way to get at this question is to identify those tasks the military should be willing to perform even *in the absence of civilian direction to do so*. Based on our literature review and the views of participants provided during the workshops, we addressed the degree to which the military, on a generic basis, should:

- Be willing to perform the task directly (a score of 2)
- Be prepared to support others in performing the task (a score of 1)

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<sup>387</sup> See Johnson, 1997, Table 1.

- Seek to exclude military involvement in the performance of the task (a score of 0)

We then determined the average score for each operational sector (that is, the sum divided by the number of tasks in that sector), and reported this information in Chapter 3. The individual task scores are as shown in the following table.

We recognize that in averaging we transposed from a discrete (0, 1, or 2) to a linear scale (0–2) and back again. For purposes of illustration, however, this analytic technique is sufficiently representative of the data. For more detailed distinctions among task categories, we would turn to the SIAM tool in the context of a specific complex emergency.

## **A More Detailed Task List<sup>388</sup>**

**Table B-1. Peace Operations Task List**

<b>Diplomatic Tasks</b>	
Collaborating with “Friends Groups,” the United Nations and regional organizations	0
Consulting with host nation and other governments	1
Consulting with supporting international organizations	0
Mediating and negotiating with conflicting parties	1
Imposing or lifting sanctions and arms embargoes	1
Conducting war crimes investigations, tribunals and so forth	1
Maintaining compliance with peace accord milestones and conditions	1
Appointing special envoys or representatives	0
Gaining diplomatic recognition of a government	0
<b>Sub-total/n</b>	<b>0.6</b>

**Table B-1. (cont'd.)**

<b>Military Tasks</b>	
Assessing, training, and equipping coalition forces	2
Conducting military operations in support of the mandate	2
Providing intelligence support to the operation	2
Establishing observer missions	2
Implementing weapons control regimes	2
Demobilizing, reducing, or reintegrating military units	2
Establishing demilitarized zones or regions	2
Conducting constabulary operations	2
Establishing confidence-building and security measures	2
Professionalizing and restructuring military forces	2
Establishing military-to-military programs	2
Coordinating support to the operation (e.g., from NATO)	2
Providing security assistance to the host nation	2
Conducting transition planning, hand-off, and military draw-down	2
<b>Sub-total/n</b>	<b>2.0</b>



**Table B-1. (cont'd.)**

<b>Humanitarian Assistance Tasks</b>	
Avoiding generation of population movements	2
Providing emergency humanitarian relief	2
Providing health services (water, food, etc.)	2
Organizing humanitarian assistance zones or relief areas	2
Coordinating NGO activities	2
Repatriating or resettling refugees and displaced persons	1
Providing housing and public services for returning people	1
Assisting in capacity-building	2
Prepositioning humanitarian relief stocks	2
<b>Sub-total/n</b>	<b>1.8</b>

**Table B-1. (cont'd.)**

<b>Internal Political Tasks</b>	
Establishing an effective transition government	0
Establishing a mechanism for constitutional reform	0
Staffing and funding the transition government	0
Conducting nationwide elections	1
Training newly elected political leaders	1
Providing advisors to government officials	2
Monitoring and reporting on corruption by government officials	1
Transferring control of government functions to host nation officials	1
Monitoring government powersharing arrangements	1
<b>Sub-total/n</b>	<b>0.8</b>

**Table B-1. (cont'd.)**

<b>Civil Law and order/Public Security Tasks</b>	
Reforming or disbanding existing police forces	1
Establishing a new police force	1
Conducting police training	1
Establishing a police monitoring activity	1
Providing advisors to police and criminal justice organizations	2
Supporting the establishment of local police operations	1
Assisting in establishing humane penal systems	1
Eradicating corruption	1
Assisting in establishing a legitimate legal system	2
Supporting judicial reform and local dispute resolution	2
Safeguarding institutions of governance and key officials	2
<b>Sub-total/n</b>	<b>1.2</b>

**Table B-1. (cont'd.)**

<b>Public Information and Education Tasks</b>	
Conducting public information (e.g., PSYOPS) operations	2
Promoting civic education	1
Providing unbiased historical information on the conflict	1
Sponsoring journalist training and professionalization	1
<b>Sub-total/n</b>	<b>1.3</b>

**Table B-1. (cont'd.)**

<b>Infrastructure and Economic Restoration Tasks</b>	
Restoring basic public services	2
Targeting development assistance such as road building	2
Providing job training and employment for discharged military personnel	1
Reforming government economic policy	1
Assisting in economic integration and cooperation	1
Streamlining government licensing/eliminating corruption	1
Initiating privatization under a market economy	1
Managing natural resources	1
Seeking investment capital	0
<b>Sub-total/n</b>	<b>1.1</b>

**Table B-1. (cont'd.)**

<b>Human Rights and Social Development Tasks</b>	
Monitoring human rights practices	1
Promoting human rights standards	1
Establishing civil affairs operations in local areas	2
Assisting in capacity-building for social institutions	1
<b>Sub-total/n</b>	<b>1.3</b>

Dr. Johnson created his list of tasks for the military to perform by examining functions performed during 29 peace operations. We recategorized the tasks into the Generic Pol-Mil Plan's eight operational sectors. Although some tasks could be placed in more than one operational sector, we have not done so for purposes of clarity and analysis.

### **A. Diplomacy**

Arbitrate; Local Disputes or Fights  
Choose; Diplomatic Course of Action  
Conduct; Liaison with Opposing Parties in the Conflict  
Conduct; Visits and Meetings with other Diplomats  
Create; Diplomatic Courses of Action  
Deny; Diplomatic Privileges  
Mediate; Cease-Fires, Armistices or Peace Agreements  
Mediate; Conflicts  
Mediate; Local Dispute  
Mediate; Regional Dispute at Political Level  
Negotiate; Tactical Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)  
Participate; Diplomatic Negotiations between Belligerents  
Perform; Fact-Finding Missions  
Perform; Negotiation and Mediation  
Perform; Deterrent Trip-Wire Activities/Preventive Deployment  
Plan and Coordinate; Agreements between Countries  
Provide; Early-Warning Capabilities

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<sup>388</sup> See Johnson, 1997, Table 1. For a comprehensive listing of Operations Other Than War Joint Mission Essential Task Lists, see Hartley (1996), Appendix E.

Provide; Liaison between Parties  
Supervise; Negotiations  
Support; Local Authorities to Create Conditions Necessary for Consensual Operations  
Support; Political Efforts at Mediation

## **B. Military Activities**

Accompany; Neutral Shipping  
Acquire; Land Radars for Targeting  
Assist; Troop Withdrawals  
Assist; Weapon Collection/Confiscation  
Buffer or Contain; Belligerents  
Clear; Mines  
Collect; Human Intelligence  
Conduct; Air Defense Against High-Level Air Threats  
Conduct; Air Defense Against Medium-Level Air Threats  
Conduct; Air Defense Against Low-Level Air Threats  
Conduct; Chemical Decontamination  
Conduct; Coercive Antiproliferation  
Conduct; Combat Operations  
Conduct; Conventional Observer Missions  
Conduct; Counterfire Operations  
Conduct; Field Operations  
Conduct; Intelligence Operations  
Conduct; Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield  
Conduct; Liaison Visits to Peacekeeping Forces  
Conduct; Nonpermissive Noncombatant Evacuation Operations  
Conduct; Operations Against Piracy  
Conduct; Permissive Noncombatant Evacuation Operations



Conduct; Presence Patrols and Deterrent Deployments  
 Conduct; Raids and Weapons Seizures  
 Conduct; Reconnaissance  
 Conduct; Show of Force Overflights  
 Conduct; Special Forces Operations  
 Confiscate; Weapons at Checkpoints  
 Construct; Base Camps  
 Construct; Base to Maintain Force  
 Construct; Fences, Bunkers, and Fighting Positions  
 Construct; Forward Airfield or Landing Zone  
 Construct; Protective Shelters and Defensive Positions  
 Construct; Support Buildings  
 Coordinate; Military Activities with Others  
 Cordon and Search; Built-Up Areas  
 Create; Visible Buffer or Demilitarized Zones  
 Deny; Supply Privileges  
 Deny; Trading Privileges  
 Demilitarize; Forces  
 Disarm; Belligerents  
 Discourage; Infiltration and Confrontations  
 Dismantle; Militia and Paramilitary Forces  
 Dispose of; Explosive Ordnance  
 Distribute; Flyers on Dangers of Unexploded Ordnance  
 and Mines  
 Emplace; Obstacles  
 Employ; Air Surveillance  
 Employ; Maritime Surveillance  
 Enforce; Cease-Fire/Disarmament  
 Enforce; Exclusive Economic Zones  
 Enforce; Economic Sanctions  
 Enforce; Maritime Agreements  
 Enforce; Sanctions

Engage; Belligerents in Confidence-Building Measures  
Escort; Maritime Vessels  
Establish; Limited Military and Limited Armament Area  
Establish; Base Areas  
Establish; Checkpoints and Road Blocks  
Establish; Command, Control, and Communication Facilities  
Establish; Command Relationships between Services, Forces, and Organizations  
Establish; Disengagement Zones  
Establish; Lodgment  
Establish; Logistical Bases  
Establish; Rear Area Security  
Establish; Significant and Visible Military Presence  
Establish; Static Defenses  
Establish; Surveillance of Planned Points of Entry  
Exercise; Trading and Other Economic Sanctions  
Expand; Lodgment  
Harden; Structures Against Direct and Indirect Fires  
Implement; Cease-Fire Agreements  
Inspect; Demilitarized Zones and Weapon Sites  
Inspect; Selected Ships and Aircraft  
Integrate; Space Systems  
Interdict; Arms Smuggling  
Interdict; Contraband Supply Routes  
Interdict; Narcotics  
Interdict; Sea and Air Traffic  
Interpose; Forces between Combatants or Belligerents  
Investigate; Alleged Violations of Peace Agreements  
Investigate; Cease-Fire Violations or Boundary Incidents  
Limit; Freedom of Movement (Land, Air, Sea)  
Maintain; Custody of War Supplies

Maintain; Information on Disposition of Belligerents  
 Man; Checkpoints  
 Man; Observer Posts  
 Monitor; Boundaries  
 Monitor; Combatants or Belligerent Activities  
 Monitor; Conditions in Potential Conflict Areas  
 Monitor; Disengagement of Forces  
 Monitor; Withdrawal of Occupation Forces  
 Monitor; Exclusive Economic Zones  
 Observe and Report; Alleged Violations  
 Observe and Report; Developments  
 Patrol; Borders or Lines of Demarcation  
 Patrol; Cease-Fire Lines  
 Perform; Battlefield Engineering Functions  
 Perform; Countermine Operations  
 Perform; Maintenance on Mission Equipment  
 Perform; Maritime Interception Operations  
 Perform; Show of Force  
 Prevent and Contain; Outbreaks of Hostilities  
 Protect; Offshore Installations  
 Protect; Sea and Air Traffic  
 Provide; Combat Support  
 Provide; Area and Route Reconnaissance  
 Provide; Command and Control Functions  
 Provide; Command, Control, and Supervision to Subordinates  
 Provide; Evacuation Unit for Embassy  
 Provide; Fire/Counterfire Support  
 Provide; Lift, Tactical for Rapid Reaction Force  
 Provide; Medical Care to Supported Force  
 Provide; Reaction Force  
 Provide; Self-protection for Static Positions

Perform; Interpretive Services for the Commander and his Staff  
Perform; Security for Interpretive Services  
Repair; Vehicles and Equipment  
Rescue; Hostages  
Restore; Territorial Integrity  
Search for; Refugees, Weapons, and Explosives  
Secure; Buffer or Demilitarized Zone (Air Exclusion Zone)  
Secure; Facility or Embassy from Attack  
Secure; Intelligence on Local Personalities and Facilities  
Secure; Lines of Communication and Enclaves  
Seize; Airfield  
Seize; Buildings  
Seize and Hold; Ports of Entry  
Seize and Hold; Territory  
Share; Intelligence  
Stabilize; Conflict among Belligerents  
Supervise; Demilitarization and Demobilization  
Supervise; Free Territories  
Supervise; Truces  
Supervise; Withdrawals and Disengagements  
Supervise and Monitor; Cease-Fires, Armistices, or Peace Agreements  
Support; Checkpoint Security  
Support; Counterdrug Operations  
Support; Evacuation of Unit or Embassy  
Support; Facility or Embassy  
Support; Cease-Fire Monitoring  
Support; Airfield Seizure  
Support; Specified Route Security

Support; Strikes and Raids  
Train; Local Forces  
Verify; Cease-Fires, Cantonments, and Disarmaments  
Verify; Destruction of Military Equipment  
Verify; Weapon Destruction

### **C. Humanitarian Assistance**

Airdrop; Humanitarian Aid  
Assist; NGO Activities (e.g., Provide Excess Material or Volunteers)  
Conduct; Interviews with NGOs and PVOs  
Conduct; Medical Operations including Surgery  
Conduct; Medical Research and Lab Tests  
Conduct; Pre-Mission Reconnaissance Assessment Missions  
Conduct; Resettlement  
Construct; Latrines and Trash Pits Daily  
Construct; Refugee Camps  
Construct; Sanitation Facilities  
Control; Environmentally Related Disease  
Coordinate; Foreign Support  
Coordinate; NGO/PVO Support  
Deliver; Relief Assistance  
Dispose of; Human Remains  
Distribute; Clothing  
Distribute; Food  
Distribute; Potable Water  
Escort; Convoys  
Establish; Civil-Military Operations Center  
Establish; Humanitarian Operations Center  
Establish; Transient Centers and Camps

Establish; Maintenance and Repair Facilities along Supply Routes or with Convoys  
Evacuate; Civilians  
Evacuate; Medical Casualties  
Evacuate; Victims  
Implement; Humanitarian Aid Airlift  
Inventory; Food Supplies  
Operate; Refugee Camps  
Participate in; Humanitarian Relief Operations  
Perform; Logistic Functions  
Perform; Movement of Humanitarian Aid  
Perform; Search and Rescue Activities  
Prevent; Refugee Flows  
Protect; NGO and PVO Humanitarian Relief Efforts  
Protect; Refugees  
Provide; Clothing  
Provide; Clothing Exchange and Bath Facilities  
Provide; Direct Medical Support Operations  
Provide; Emergency Relief  
Provide; Escort for Humanitarian Aid Convoys  
Provide; Essential Services  
Provide; Food  
Provide; Health Services  
Provide; Laundry, Bath, and Light Textile Renovation Facilities  
Provide; Lift Support  
Provide; Logistic Support to Peace Operations  
Provide; Logistic Support to Move Supplies  
Provide; Medical Services to Civilians  
Provide; Military Support to Humanitarian Tasks  
Provide; Mobility Support to Relief Efforts  
Provide; Water to Civilians

Provide; Shelter Support to Civilians  
Provide; Security and Delivery Support to Humanitarian Assistance Operations  
Provide; Temporary Shelter for Refugees  
Provide; Transportation to Civilian Relief Agencies  
Provide; Potable Water  
Provide; Wells for Potable Water  
Relocate; Civilians  
Resettle; Dislocated Civilians  
Screen; Refugees  
Secure; Refugee Camps  
Setup; Tents with Electrical Power  
Supply; Military Information and Liaison  
Support; Humanitarian Aid Convoys  
Transport; Relief Supplies and Civilians  
Transport; Supplies from Main Support Centers to Distribution Centers  
Transport; Large Volumes of Supplies and Equipment  
Transport; Displaced Individuals  
Transport; Supplies and Rations to Camps and Checkpoints

#### **D. Internal Politics**

Administer; Temporary Civil Functions  
Assist; Interim Civil Authorities  
Assist with; Election Security  
Assist with; Partition of Territory  
Encourage; Resumption of Normal Interparty Relations  
Facilitate; Transfer of Power from Interim to Permanent Government  
Marginalize; Belligerent Faction Leaders

Participate in; Civil Affairs Operations  
Perform; Civil Affairs  
Perform; Civil Affairs Support  
Provide; Civil Affairs Liaison and Coordination  
Provide; Election Support  
Provide; Interpretive Services for Civil Affairs  
Reestablish; Constitutional Structures  
Restore; Government Functions  
Supervise or Assist with; Elections  
Support; Civil Affairs Operations  
Support; Development of Competent Civil Authority  
Use; Civil Affairs Interpreters

## **E. Civil Law and Order/Public Security**

Administer; Local Justice Codes  
Arrest; War Criminals  
Assist; Conflict Diffusion, Stabilization, and Resolution  
Assist; Law Enforcement  
Assist; Public Safety  
Conduct; Security Patrols  
Control; Riots  
Detain; Suspected Felons  
Deter; Violent Acts  
Develop; Procedures for Dealing with Violations  
Dispose of; Personal Property  
Eliminate; Snipers  
Enforce; Curfews  
Establish; Law Enforcement Forces  
Evacuate; Refugees  
Facilitate; Safe Conduct for Agricultural Activities and Food Production



Guard; Victims and Damaged Homes  
Handle; Detainees  
Impose; Curfews  
Incarcerate; War Criminals  
Investigate; Cease-Fire Breaches  
Locate; War Criminals  
Maintain; Law and Order  
Monitor; Indigenous Law Enforcement  
Patrol; Urban Areas  
Perform; Claims and Liability Adjudication  
Perform; Harbor Security and Protection  
Perform; Law Enforcement Operations (Traffic Control, Riot Control, etc.)  
Perform; Local Area Security  
Perform; Wide Area Security  
Prevent; Looting  
Prevent; Pilferage  
Prosecute; War Criminals  
Protect; Facilities  
Provide; Awareness Training  
Provide; Checkpoint Security  
Provide; Crowd Control  
Provide; Law, Order, and Stability  
Provide; Legal Services  
Provide; Technical Assistance to Humanitarian Relief Operation Projects  
Provide; Traffic Control  
Provide; Transportation to Police  
Restore; Law and Order  
Restore; Order after Riot  
Safeguard; Valuable Cultural Properties

Secure; Humanitarian Relief Operation Compounds, Offices, and Warehouses

Secure; Installations

Secure; Routes from Points of Departure to Destinations

Support; Airfield Security

Threaten; Use of Force to Deter Violent Actions and Restore Order

Train and Equip; Law Enforcement Forces

Use Force to; Deter Violent Actions and Restore Order

## **F. Public Information and Education**

Assist; Broadcast (TV/Radio) Reestablishment

Assist; Teachers and other Educators

Conduct; Counter-Propaganda Operations

Conduct; Liaison with Local Authorities

Conduct; Liaison Visits with other Interveners

Conduct; Liaison Visits with Population

Conduct; Presence through Information Campaign

Conduct; Psychological Operations

Disseminate; Public Information

Establish; Emergency Communications

Perform; Analysis

Perform; Basic Communication Services

Perform; Topographical Surveying/Mapping

Plan; Counter-Propaganda Operations

Provide; Communication between Parties

Provide; Information on Democracy

Provide; Information on Human Rights

Provide; Maps and Imagery Products

Translate; Verbal and Written Communications and Documents

Transmit; Messages

## **G. Infrastructure and Economic Development**

Assist; Community Projects

Assist; Infrastructure Rebuilding

Clear; Debris

Conduct; Airfield Operations

Construct; Bridges

Construct; Civil Infrastructure

Construct; Dams

Construct; Roads

Ensure; Availability of Critical Infrastructure (i.e., Hospitals and Water/Power Generation)

Establish; Infrastructure

Establish; Rudimentary Surface Transportation Systems

Hand over; Operations and Facilities

Improve; Main Supply Routes

Improve; Roads

Improve; Water Supply

Install; Water Purification Units

Operate; Port Support Activity

Operate; Transportation System

Perform; Rudimentary Construction and Repair Public Facilities

Perform; Sanitation and Waste Disposal

Perform; Snow Removal

Plan; Support Structure

Provide; Air Traffic Control

Provide; Construction Material

Provide; Engineering Assistance  
Provide; Initial and Immediate Facilities Engineering  
Provide; Power Generation  
Provide; Well Drilling and Pipeline Installation  
Provide; Pipeline Repair and Services  
Rebuild; Economies  
Rehabilitate; Livelihoods  
Rehabilitate; Port Facilities  
Rehabilitate; Railroads  
Rehabilitate; Transportation System  
Repair; Essential Infrastructure  
Repair; Bridges  
Repair; Dams  
Repair; Religious Structures  
Repair; Roads  
Repair; Vital Facilities  
Repair; Well Equipment  
Secure; Transportation System  
Upgrade; Airfields  
Upgrade; Port Facilities

## **H. Human Rights and Social Development**

Assess; Political Asylum Requests  
Assist; Prisoners of War  
Distribute; Social Welfare Benefits  
Ensure; Maximum Freedom of Movement for Civilian Populations  
Guarantee; Freedom of Movement (Land, Air, Sea)  
Guarantee; Rights of Passage  
Identify; War Criminals  
Investigate; War Crimes

Investigate; Complaints and Violations  
Investigate; Human Rights Violations  
Monitor; Human Rights Violations  
Monitor; Refugee Flows  
Perform; Refugee Escort Operations  
Protect; At-Risk Populations  
Provide; Counseling  
Provide; Temporary Refuge  
Provide; Reintegration and Rehabilitation Assistance to  
Returnees  
Report; Human Rights Situations  
Supervise; Prisoner Releases  
Trace; Displaced Persons  
Supervise; Exchange of POWs, Civilians, and Remains



# Appendix C: SIAM Influence Nets

## Introduction

In this appendix, we provide complete documentation for the three baseline influence sub-nets that support the Basic Sectors of Influence net model discussed in Chapter 5 of this report, the three sub-nets being

- Actual/Perceived Civil Unrest
- Governance
- Human Requirements

Each sub-net is portrayed and summarized in turn; Annexes C-1 and C-2 present summary tables of the nodes (Annex C-1) and links (Annex C-2) across all sub-nets and the overall net.

We use the following terminology in this Appendix and the Annexes.

## Nodes

SIAM's Bayesian belief propagation algorithm allows the user to assign a (continuous variable) belief to initial nodes. To assist the user in this assignment, an "English" guide is provided. This discrete guide uses a nine-point scale broken into the following categories:<sup>389</sup>

- FALSE belief (probability 0.0 to 0.44)
  - Extremely certain to be a FALSE statement
  - Very certain to be a FALSE statement
  - Reasonably certain to be a FALSE statement
  - Slightly certain to be a FALSE statement
- Uncertain as to the belief of this statement (probability 0.44 to 0.55)
- TRUE belief (probability 0.55 to 1.0)
  - Slightly certain to be a TRUE statement
  - Reasonably certain to be a TRUE statement
  - Very certain to be a TRUE statement
  - Extremely certain to be a TRUE statement

Of course, typologies are arbitrary, whether based on words or numbers. Because the actual values have to be determined in the context of a specific situation, we here report the categories only.<sup>390</sup>

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<sup>389</sup> The "English" guide SIAM uses a 0 to 1 scale evenly broken into nine bins (i.e., a .11 range for each belief).

<sup>390</sup> To illustrate with an example, if the value on an illustrative initial node was calculated at .77, we report it below as reasonably certain to be a true statement.



We describe three different node types—the root node and two types of causal nodes, initial nodes and internal nodes (i.e., those with an antecedent causal or parent node in the net). We report any comments about the node definitions or the reasons for our setting beliefs for initial nodes in Annex C-1.

## Links

For the links between each premise (causal node) and corresponding conclusion (target node), SIAM's graphical user interface provides an "English" guide to allow the user to assign (continuous variable) link strengths via two seven-point scales (one for the assumption that the premise is absolutely TRUE, the other for a premise assumed absolutely FALSE ) broken into the following categories:<sup>391</sup>

If the premise (causal) node is TRUE/FALSE , it

- strongly inhibits
- inhibits
- slightly inhibits

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Of course we cannot make a meaningful distinction between a value .77 (reasonably certain to be a true statement) and .78 (very certain to be a true statement); hence, we do not report the numerical values. The categorical belief values for the nodes is listed in Annex C-1; they are consistent when a node appears on more than one net.

<sup>391</sup> The links use a continuous scale of 0 to 1, with unequal (though parallel) category ranges because of conditional probabilities within Bayesian belief propagation, i.e., the greater categorical variance from "no impact," the greater the mathematical cause-and-effect. This variance has been minimized by making the ranges unequal. Link categories are consistent when a link appears on more than one net; because of the lack of embedding in SIAM's current version, we were forced to manipulate actual link values slightly to make category values consistent.

- has no impact on
- slightly promotes
- promotes
- strongly promotes

the conclusion (target) node

Again, we here use only categorical information. Table C-1 lists the combinations of links found in the generic baseline influence net models; the actual link descriptions are determined by an algorithm that combines the TRUE and FALSE link strengths.

## **Actual/Perceived Civil Unrest Influence Sub-net**

### **Description**

This sector looks at the perceptions and reality of civil unrest. The root node in this sub-net is “Safe and secure environment is perceived by populace”; “Civil (internal) unrest is present” is a “sub-root” (not the only, but the most important, immediate causal node of the root node), acting to inhibit or promote those perceptions. Actual or perceived civil unrest can only be evaluated in a specific context. But on a generic basis, what causes actual or perceived civil unrest? We summarize

<sup>392</sup> Some theoretical combinations, such as inhibits/strongly promotes or inhibits/slightly inhibits, were not evidenced in the nets.

**Table C-1. List of link types in generic baseline influence nets<sup>392</sup>**

<b>Effect on conclusion</b>		
<b>If premise TRUE</b>	<b>If premise FALSE</b>	<b>Link is</b>
strongly inhibits	strongly promotes	strong reversing
strongly inhibits	promotes	strong reversing
strongly inhibits	slightly promotes	strong reversing
inhibits	promotes	moderate reversing
inhibits	slightly promotes	moderate reversing
slightly inhibits	promotes	moderate reversing
slightly inhibits	slightly promotes	weak reversing
slightly promotes	slightly inhibits	weak
slightly promotes	no impact	weak
no impact	slightly inhibits	weak
no impact	inhibits	moderate
slightly promotes	inhibits	moderate

**Table C-1. (cont'd.)**

<b>Effect on conclusion</b>		
<b>If premise TRUE</b>	<b>If premise FALSE</b>	<b>Link is</b>
promotes	slightly inhibits	moderate
promotes	inhibits	moderate
promotes	no impact	moderate
no impact	strongly inhibits	strong
promotes	strongly inhibits	strong
slightly promotes	strongly inhibits	strong
strongly promotes	slightly inhibits	strong
strongly promotes	inhibits	strong
strongly promotes	strongly inhibits	strong

our theory in the Civil Unrest sub-net shown in Figure C-1; Annexes C-1 and C-2 provide the nodes' beliefs and link strengths.<sup>393</sup>

The objective of this net is to identify those factors most likely to promote tranquillity or civil unrest and their perception among the populace. The military, or other external organizations, can then target these factors. Tasks from four of the Generic Pol-Mil Plan's operational sectors target nodes in this sub-net: Diplomacy, Military, Public Information and Education, and Public Security/Law and Order.


## Discussion

Given our initial belief settings and link strengths, Table C-2 shows the results of a Driving Parent Analysis for the root node, "Safe and secure environment is perceived." As explained in Chapter 4, Driving Parent Analysis provides the relative impact of all modeled causal nodes which have an effect on the current (calculated) belief in the selected node.

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<sup>393</sup> Note that we set two nodes—"Expatriates return to country" and "Police are distinct from military"—as uncertain in a generic context. For the first node, this is because expatriates could work either for or against good governance, thus their effect and the direction of the link between the nodes have yet to be determined. In SIAM parlance, a link whose direction and strength have yet to be determined, is called a "blue link" because it remains that color until its parameters are assigned by the user. For the second node, "Police are distinct from the military," even though the existence of an adequate prison system is scenario dependent, its link is not blue because the effects of having an adequate prison system can be determined.

Figure C-1. Civil Unrest Sub-Net



384 Percentages do not add to 100 due to rounding.

**Table C-2. Driving Parent Analysis for Civil Unrest Sub-Net:  
 “Safe and secure environment  
 is perceived”<sup>394</sup>**

Immediate Causal Nodes for “Safe and secure environment is perceived” (Extremely FALSE )	Causal Node belief	Influence	Relative Impact
Paramilitary forces are present	Extremely TRUE	Reversing	18
Civil (internal) unrest is present	Extremely TRUE	Reversing	18
Competing groups resolve differences	Extremely FALSE		18
Government-run military is effective	Extremely FALSE		16
Government police force is effective against crime	Very FALSE		12
Administration of justice is effective and fair	Extremely FALSE		10
Education infrastructure is adequate	Slightly FALSE		5
Government has domestic legitimacy	Reasonably FALSE		0
Expatriates return to country	Uncertain		0

The root cause is over-determined in this case; that is, there are many influences. Three immediate causal nodes have equal strength—with a fourth, fifth, and sixth close behind—in explaining why the root node is an extremely FALSE statement in complex emergencies. These nodes fall into three groups:

- Actual internal civil unrest is inflamed by the presence of paramilitary forces, and the government-run military is ineffective in dealing with it.
- Competing groups are unable (or unwilling) to resolve their differences.
- The police force is ineffective and the justice system is administered unfairly.

When examining those areas where external actors can exert the most leverage, however, there are some significant differences (see Tables C-3 and C-4). Clearly, the area with the greatest promoting potential is internal politics; that is, if competing groups resolve their differences, that would have a significant influence on the populace's perceptions both directly and indirectly (through the potential demobilization of regime-sponsored non-military armed forces—see Figure C-1).

The next potential area of influence is the presence of civil (internal) unrest, which acts as a “sub-root” node (the most important immediate causal node) in this net. Tables C-5, C-6, and C-7 show the results of Driving Parent, Pressure Parent, and Pressure Point Analyses for this node.



<sup>395</sup> Pressure Parent Analysis, as explained in Chapter 4, considers only the immediate causal nodes to see which of them has the greatest potential effect on the target node.

**Table C-3. Pressure Parent Analysis<sup>395</sup> for Civil Unrest Sub-Net:  
“Safe and secure environment is perceived”**

Immediate Causal Nodes for “Safe and secure environment is perceived by populace” (Extremely FALSE )	Causal Node belief	Influence	Sensitivity	Promoting Potential	Inhibiting Potential
Competing groups resolve differences	Extremely FALSE		47	47	0
Civil (internal) unrest is present	Extremely TRUE	Reversing	3	3	0
Paramilitary forces are present	Extremely TRUE	Reversing	1	1	0
Government police force is effective against crime	Very FALSE		1	1	0
Government-run military is effective	Extremely FALSE		1	1	0
Administration of justice is effective and fair	Extremely FALSE		0	0	0
Government has domestic legitimacy	Reasonably FALSE		0	0	0
Education infrastructure is adequate	Slightly FALSE		0	0	0
Expatriates return to country	Uncertain		0	0	0

**Table C-4. Pressure Point Analysis<sup>396</sup> for Civil Unrest Sub-Net:  
“Safe and secure environment is perceived”**

Initial Nodes for “Safe and secure environment is perceived” (Extremely FALSE )	Causal Node belief	Sensitivity	Promoting Potential	Inhibiting Potential
Competing groups resolve differences	Extremely FALSE	47	47	0
Government controls domestic media’s reporting of events	Reasonably FALSE	0	0	0
Police are distinct from the military	Uncertain	0	0	0
Education infrastructure is adequate	Slightly FALSE	0	0	0
International media has open access to the reporting of events	Reasonably FALSE	0	0	0
Expatriates return to country	Uncertain	0	0	0

<sup>396</sup> Pressure Point Analysis, as explained in Chapter 4, identifies and ranks initial nodes that have the greatest potential impact on the target node.

<sup>397</sup> Percentages do not add to 100 due to rounding.

**Table C-5. Driving Parent Analysis for Civil Unrest Sub-Net:  
“Civil (internal) unrest is present”<sup>397</sup>**

Immediate Causal Nodes for “Civil (internal) unrest is present” (Extremely TRUE)	Causal Node belief	Influence	Relative Impact
Demobilized armed forces are integrated into society	Extremely FALSE	Reversing	20
Competing groups resolve differences	Extremely FALSE	Reversing	20
Paramilitary forces are present	Extremely TRUE		19
Opposition party attempts to dominate by force	Very TRUE		16
Regime-sponsored non-military armed forces are demobilized	Extremely FALSE	Reversing	12
Disarmament is effective	Very FALSE	Reversing	9
Government controls domestic media’s reporting of events	Reasonably FALSE		0
International media has open access to the reporting of events	Reasonably FALSE		0

As shown in Table C-5, six factors explain the presence of civil (internal) unrest; these can be broken into two groups of three factors each:

- Issues dealing with internal politics (55 points overall): Competing groups don't resolve differences, which leads opposition party to try to dominate by force, a situation complicated by the presence of paramilitary forces.
- Demobilization and disarmament (42 points): Because of issues dealing with internal politics, demobilization of armed forces and regime-sponsored non-military armed forces has not taken place, and broader disarmament efforts (if any) have not been effective.

In terms of leverage areas, the resolution of differences between competing groups again dominates, followed by demobilization of the regime's official and unofficial armed forces (see Tables C-6 and C-7).

## **Summary**

To recapitulate,

- Internal political factors, especially the resolution of differences by competing groups (peacefully or by conflict), are the most critical factors in explaining the presence or absence of civil (internal) unrest and perceptions of a safe and secure environment; they offer the greatest leverage areas.

**Table C-6. Pressure Parent Analysis for Civil Unrest Sub-Net: “Civil (internal) unrest is present”**

Immediate Causal Nodes for “Civil (internal) unrest is present” (Extremely TRUE)	Causal Node belief	Influence	Sensitivity	Promoting Potential	Inhibiting Potential
Competing groups resolve differences	Extremely FALSE	Reversing	79	0	79
Demobilized armed forces are integrated into society	Reasonably FALSE	Reversing	28	0	28
Regime-sponsored non-military armed forces are demobilized	Extremely FALSE	Reversing	26	0	26
Paramilitary forces are present	Extremely TRUE		2	0	2
Disarmament is effective	Very FALSE	Reversing	2	0	2
Opposition party attempts to dominate by force	Very TRUE		0	0	0
International media has open access to the reporting of events	Reasonably FALSE		0	0	0
Government controls domestic media’s reporting of events	Reasonably FALSE		0	0	0

**Table C-7. Pressure Point Analysis for Civil Unrest Sub-Net:  
“Civil (internal) unrest is present”**

Initial Nodes for “Civil (internal) unrest is present” (Extremely TRUE)	Causal Node belief	Influence	Sensitivity	Promoting Potential	Inhibiting Potential
Competing groups resolve differences	Extremely FALSE	Reversing	79	0	79
Armed forces are restructured	Extremely FALSE	Reversing	0	0	0
International media has open access to the reporting of events	Reasonably FALSE		0	0	0
Police are distinct from military	Uncertain	Reversing	0	0	0
Expatriates return to country	Uncertain		0	0	0
Government controls domestic media’s reporting of events	Reasonably FALSE		0	0	0

- Once internal political factors are resolved, demobilization and disarmament of armed and paramilitary forces (both regime- and opposition-sponsored) become critical.
- Factors such as police force effectiveness and the fair administration of justice—as well as factors relating to education, governance, and the media—are of lesser (or perhaps longer-term) importance in this sub-net.

## Governance Sub-Net


### Description

This sector looks at the indigenous institutions and administration of governance. The root node in this sub-net is “Government has domestic legitimacy.” Participants in our workshops debated whether the root node should be democracy-related, with legitimacy having to do with participation and representation, or whether non-governmental traditional leadership forms could be just as legitimate and acceptable. Legitimacy of the form of governance has to be examined, of course, in a specific context. But on a generic basis, what causes good governance? We summarize our theory in the governance sub-net shown in Figure C-2; Annexes C-1 and C-2 provide the nodes’ beliefs and link strengths.<sup>398</sup>

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<sup>398</sup> Note that we set two nodes—“Expatriates return to country” and “Prison structure is adequate”—as uncertain in a generic context. For the first node, this is because expatriates could work either for or against good governance. For the second node, the existence and adequacy of a prison system is strictly scenario-dependent.

Figure C-2. Governance Sub-Net





The objective of this net is to identify those factors most likely to cause good governance. The military, or other external organizations, can then target these factors. Tasks from four of the Generic Pol-Mil Plan's operational sectors target nodes in this sub-net: Diplomacy, Human Rights and Social Development, Internal Politics, and Public Information and Education.

## Discussion

Given the initial belief settings and link strengths, Table C-8 shows the results of a Pressure Parent Analysis on the root node "Government has domestic legitimacy."

The four immediate causal nodes have relatively equal strength in explaining why the root node is expected to be a reasonably FALSE statement in complex emergencies.<sup>399</sup> In terms of external actor leverage areas, however, there are some significant differences (see Table C-9).

As shown in Table C-9, people's perceptions are the most significant leverage point. Affecting people's perceptions to the maximum extent possible can significantly influence a government's domestic legitimacy, though with some potential downside if the attempt fails. The other significant leverage point is social services, which can be affected here through institutions of gov-

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<sup>399</sup> The first causal node, "People perceive that their interests are represented," can capture the relationship between local and national institutions of governance, whereas the "Institutions of governance are effective and fair" deals more with local perceptions of the national institutions. Note that the second and last nodes also appear on the Human Requirements and Civil Unrest sub-nets, respectively.

**Table C-8. Driving Parent Analysis for Governance Sub-Net:  
“Government has domestic legitimacy”<sup>400</sup>**

Immediate Causal Nodes for “Government has domestic legitimacy” (Reasonably FALSE )	Causal Node belief	Relative Impact
People perceive that their interests are represented	Very FALSE	27
Social services are adequate	Very FALSE	26
Institutions of governance are effective and fair	Very FALSE	23
Government controls domestic media’s reporting of events	Reasonably FALSE	21

<sup>400</sup> Percentages do not add to 100 due to rounding.

**Table C-9. Pressure Parent Analysis for Governance Sub-Net: “Government has domestic legitimacy”**

Immediate Causal Nodes for “Government has domestic legitimacy” (Reasonably FALSE )	Causal Node belief	Sensitivity	Promoting Potential	Inhibiting Potential
People perceive that their interests are represented	Very FALSE	88	74	15
Social services are adequate	Very FALSE	49	45	4
Institutions of governance are effective and fair	Very FALSE	21	16	5
Government controls domestic media’s reporting of events	Reasonably FALSE	19	14	5

ernance but are more in the province of the Human Requirements sub-net (see below). As shown in Table C-10, the government can affect its own legitimacy to some extent by controlling the domestic media's reporting of events; the countervailing effect of international media is contained in the Civil Unrest sub-net. For external actors, this leaves the institutions of governance as a potential area of influence.

Tables C-11, C-12, and C-13 show the results of Driving Parent, Pressure Parent, and Pressure Point Analyses for "Institutions of governance are effective and fair."

Currently, administration of justice is driving the result and has less of a potential downside than affecting central authority (because increased effectiveness of central authority can also hinder progress towards relief with development, depending on the nature of the central authority). As shown in Table C-13, corruption in central authority is also a potential leverage point, but with downside potential about half that of the promoting potential. Hence, the military (or other external actors) should try to effect change in the perception of the administration of justice as effective and fair.

**Table C-10. Pressure Point Analysis for Governance Sub-Net: “Government has domestic legitimacy”**

Initial Nodes for “Government has domestic legitimacy” (Reasonably FALSE )	Causal Node belief	Influence	Sensitivity	Promoting Potential	Inhibiting Potential
People perceive that their interests are represented	Very FALSE		88	74	15
Government controls domestic media’s reporting of events	Reasonably FALSE		19	14	5
Corruption in central authority is rampant	Slightly FALSE	Reversing	9	6	3
Human rights are protected	Very FALSE		4	4	0
Corruption in law enforcement is rampant	Slightly FALSE	Reversing	1	1	0

**Table C-11. Driving Parent Analysis for Governance Sub-Net:  
“Institutions of governance are effective and fair”<sup>401</sup>**

Immediate Causal Nodes for “Institutions of governance are effective and fair” (Very FALSE )	Causal Node belief	Relative Impact
Administration of justice is effective and fair	Extremely FALSE	63
Central authority is effective	Reasonably FALSE	36

**Table C-12. Pressure Parent Analysis for Governance Sub-Net:  
“Institutions of governance are effective and fair”**

Immediate Causal Nodes for “Institutions of governance are effective and fair” (Very FALSE )	Causal Node belief	Sensitivity	Promoting Potential	Inhibiting Potential
Administration of justice is effective and fair	Extremely FALSE	49	48	1
Central authority is effective	Reasonably FALSE	35	27	8

**Table C-13. Pressure Point Analysis for Governance Sub-Net: “Institutions of governance are effective and fair”**

Initial Nodes for “Institutions of governance are effective and fair” (Very FALSE )	Causal Node belief	Influence	Sensitivity	Promoting Potential	Inhibiting Potential
Corruption in central authority is rampant	Slightly FALSE	Reversing	23	15	8
Human rights are protected	Very FALSE		11	10	1
Corruption in law enforcement is rampant	Slightly FALSE	Reversing	4	2	2

The analyses in Tables C-14 and C-15 suggest that protecting human rights should be the first place to turn in effecting change in the administration of justice.

## **Summary**

To recapitulate,

- People's perceptions that their interests are represented is the most important factor in determining whether a government has domestic legitimacy.
- The effectiveness and fairness of institutions of governance are also significant, both directly and indirectly through the provision of social services.
- The administration of justice can drive the effectiveness and fairness of institutions of governance.
- Protecting human rights and eliminating corruption can also affect government domestic legitimacy, but to a lesser extent.

## **Human Requirements Sector**

### **Description**

This sector looks at both the short- and long-term requirements populations need to survive and thrive; meeting those requirements in turn promote civil stability and a durable peace. The root node in this sub-net is "People are tolerant of the status quo"—with the preferred status quo characterized by civil stability and du-



<sup>402</sup> Percentages do not add to 100 due to rounding.

**Table C-14. Driving Parent Analysis for Governance Sub-net:  
“Administration of justice is effective and fair”<sup>402</sup>**

Immediate Causal Nodes for “Administration of justice is effective and fair” (Extremely FALSE )	Causal Node belief	Influence	Relative Impact
Human rights are protected	Extremely FALSE		61
Corruption in law enforcement is rampant	Reasonably FALSE	Reversing	38


**Table C-15. Pressure Parent Analysis for Governance Sub-Net: “Administration of justice is effective and fair”**

Immediate Causal Nodes for “Administration of justice is effective and fair” (Extremely FALSE )	Causal Node belief	Influence	Sensitivity	Promoting Potential	Inhibiting Potential
Human rights are protected	Extremely FALSE		23	20	3
Corruption in law enforcement is rampant	Reasonably FALSE	Reversing	8	5	3

nable peace. Again, this node can only be examined in a specific context. Note that in this sub-net, we have set the belief of numerous nodes as uncertain, more than in the other sub-nets. There are also several more “blue links” in this sub-net than in others. Much of what causes people’s tolerance is scenario dependent, and factors which might support tolerance in one scenario could breed intolerance in another set of circumstances. Hence, any of the conclusions drawn from this sub-net must be considered illustrative. Still, on a generic basis, we try to identify what most affects people’s tolerance. We summarize our theory in the Human Requirements sub-net shown in Figure C-3; Annexes C-1 and C-2 provide the nodes’ beliefs and link strengths. The unique complexity of this sub-net violates our goal of using a picture to replace a thousand words. Nevertheless, SIAM’s analytic tools provide a clarifying sense of relationships among factors.

The objective of this net is to identify those factors most likely to cause people to be tolerant of a status quo characterized by civil stability and durable peace. The military, or other external organizations, can then target these factors. Tasks from five of the Generic Pol-Mil Plan’s operational sectors target nodes in this sub-net: Diplomacy, Humanitarian Assistance, Human Rights and Social Development, Internal Politics, and Infrastructure and Economic Development.

Figure C-3. Human Requirements Sub-Net



## Discussion

Given the initial belief settings and link strengths, Table C-16 shows the results of a Pressure Parent Analysis of the root node “People are tolerant of the status quo.”

**Table C-16. Driving Parent Analysis for Human Requirements Sub-Net: “People are tolerant of the status quo”<sup>403</sup>**

Immediate Causal Nodes for “People are tolerant of the status quo” (Extremely FALSE )	Causal Node belief	Relative Impact
Immediate needs of the people are satisfied	Extremely FALSE	25
Human rights are protected	Very FALSE	20
Economy is sound	Very FALSE	12
Social services are adequate	Very FALSE	12
Acceptable jobs are available	Reasonably FALSE	9
Population is forced to move	Uncertain	8
Education infrastructure is adequate	Slightly FALSE	7
Changes in population composition improve outlook	Uncertain	2
People’s spiritual needs are met	Uncertain	0

<sup>403</sup> Percentages do not add to 100 due to rounding.

Failing to meet people's immediate needs and to ensure that human rights are protected account for nearly half of the people's satisfaction (in this case, dissatisfaction) with the status quo. The longer term needs dealing with the economy, social services, jobs, and education infrastructure account for most of the remaining influences. The only area that offers leverage in and of itself is meeting the immediate needs of the people (offering three points of swing, all with promoting potential).<sup>404</sup> Tables C-17 and C-18 show the results of Driving Parent and Pressure Point Analyses for "Immediate needs of the people are satisfied." As the tables illustrate, no single immediate need typically dominates in a complex emergency, and no single need offers significant leverage by itself.

Tables C-19 and C-20 provide the background requirements for self-sufficiency in food. As the tables illustrate, outside the context of a relief setting, the productivity of the agricultural system and the ability to transport food to the marketplace go a long way toward enabling self-sufficiency in meeting the immediate needs of the people.

Meeting immediate needs dominates the short-term perspective of human requirements. Almost as important are longer-term economic requirements. Based on our inputs, not having a sound economy accounts for

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<sup>404</sup> For purposes of simplicity, we have not included a Pressure Parent Analysis of the root node. A similar story emerges from a Pressure Point Analysis; only "Foreign investment is available" offers any leverage (1 point of promoting potential). See the discussion below.

<sup>405</sup> Percentages do not add to 100 due to rounding.

**Table C-17. Driving Parent Analysis for Human Requirements  
Sub-Net: “Immediate needs of the people are satisfied”<sup>405</sup>**

Immediate Causal Nodes for “Immediate needs of the people are satisfied” (Extremely FALSE )	Causal Node belief	Relative Impact
Food is sufficient	Very FALSE	25
Housing stock is sufficient	Reasonably FALSE	21
Health requirements are met	Extremely FALSE	20
Potable water is sufficient	Slightly FALSE	11
Property ownership issues are resolved	Extremely FALSE	11
Economy is sound	Very FALSE	8

**Table C-18. Pressure Parent Analysis for Human Requirements Sub-Net: “Immediate needs of the people are satisfied”**

Immediate Causal Nodes for “Immediate needs of the people are satisfied” (Extremely FALSE)	Causal Node belief	Sensitivity	Promoting Potential	Inhibiting Potential
Food is sufficient	Very FALSE	10	8	2
Housing stock is sufficient	Reasonably FALSE	6	5	1
Economy is sound	Very FALSE	5	4	1
Potable water is sufficient	Slightly FALSE	4	2	2
Health requirements are met	Extremely FALSE	0	0	0
Property ownership issues are resolved	Extremely FALSE	0	0	0



<sup>406</sup> Percentages do not add to 100 due to rounding.

**Table C-19. Driving Parent Analysis for Human Requirements  
Sub-Net: “Food is sufficient”<sup>406</sup>**

Immediate Causal Nodes for “Food is sufficient” (Very FALSE )	Causal Node belief	Relative Impact
Agricultural system is productive	Reasonably FALSE	67
Transportation infrastructure is in place	Slightly FALSE	28
Efficient markets are restored	Slightly FALSE	4

**Table C-20. Pressure Parent Analysis for Human Requirements Sub-Net:  
“Food is sufficient”**

Immediate Causal Nodes for “Food is sufficient” (Very FALSE )	Causal Node belief	Sensitivity	Promoting Potential	Inhibiting Potential
Agricultural system is productive	Reasonably FALSE	52	36	16
Transportation infrastructure is in place	Slightly FALSE	43	31	12
Efficient markets are restored	Slightly FALSE	7	5	2

some 12 percent of the people's intolerance of the status quo (see Table C-16). One could take the analysis further by arguing that having a sound economy is an important factor in creating "excess" resources to ensure adequate social services and education infrastructure, which together account for an additional 19 points of influence.

Tables C-21, C-22, and C-23 show the results of Driving Parent, Pressure Parent, and Pressure Point Analyses for "Economy is sound."

All three immediate causal nodes of the economy are, or could be, important. Given our settings, it is also possible that the economy could get worse in the long term, which would only serve to exacerbate the existing or contribute to the emergence of a new complex emergency. The greatest single leverage point, however, comes in the availability of foreign investment. This node also provides the only single leverage point for an initial node to this sub-net's root node due to the multi-path relationships it affects.

The leverage paths from foreign investment to the root node depend upon the availability of acceptable jobs and a sound economy. We have already detailed the areas of influence for the economy; Tables C-24, C-25, and C-26 show the factors currently affecting the availability of acceptable jobs and potential leverage immediate and initial causal nodes.

**Table C-21. Driving Parent Analysis for Human Requirements  
Sub-Net: “Economy is sound”<sup>407</sup>**

Immediate Causal Nodes for “Economy is sound” (Very FALSE )	Causal Node belief	Relative Impact
Commercial sector contributes to national welfare	Reasonably FALSE	45
Efficient markets are restored	Slightly FALSE	37
Financial system is sufficient	Uncertain	16

**Table C-22. Pressure Parent Analysis for Human Requirements Sub-Net:  
“Economy is sound”**

Immediate Causal Nodes for “Economy is sound” (Very FALSE )	Causal Node belief	Sensitivity	Promoting Potential	Inhibiting Potential
Efficient markets are restored	Slightly FALSE	37	24	13
Commercial sector contributes to national welfare	Reasonably FALSE	29	20	9
Financial system is sufficient	Uncertain	21	12	9

**Table C-23. Pressure Point Analysis for Human Requirements Sub-Net:  
“Economy is sound”**

Initial Nodes for “Economy is sound” (Very FALSE )	Causal Node belief	Influence	Sensitivity	Promoting Potential	Inhibiting Potential
Foreign investment is available	Slightly FALSE		51	41	10
Financial system is sufficient	Uncertain		21	12	8
Corruption in law enforcement is rampant	Slightly FALSE	Reversing	4	3	1
Basic natural resource management is in place	Uncertain		4	2	2
Property ownership issues are resolved	Extremely FALSE		0	0	0

<sup>408</sup> Percentages do not add to 100 due to rounding.

**Table C-24. Driving Parent Analysis for Human Requirements  
Sub-Net: “Acceptable jobs are available”<sup>408</sup>**

Immediate Causal Nodes for “Acceptable jobs are available” (Reasonably FALSE )	Causal Node belief	Relative Impact
Economy is sound	Very FALSE	43
Commercial sector contributes to national welfare	Reasonably FALSE	22
Educational system is tailored towards jobs	Slightly FALSE	14
Tourism industry is robust	Reasonably FALSE	14
Critical industries are sound	Slightly FALSE	2
Financial system is sufficient	Uncertain	1

**Table C-25. Pressure Parent Analysis for Human Requirements Sub-Net:  
“Acceptable jobs are available”**

Immediate Causal Nodes for “Acceptable jobs are available” (Reasonably FALSE )	Causal Node belief	Sensitivity	Promoting Potential	Inhibiting Potential
Commercial sector contributes to national welfare	Reasonably FALSE	52	36	16
Economy is sound	Very FALSE	40	35	5
Tourism industry is robust	Reasonably FALSE	26	19	7
Financial system is sufficient	Uncertain	26	14	12
Educational system is tailored towards jobs	Slightly FALSE	24	12	12
Critical industries are sound	Slightly FALSE	15	9	6



**Table C-26. Pressure Point Analysis for Human Requirements Sub-Net:  
“Acceptable jobs are available”**

Initial Nodes for “Acceptable jobs are available” (Reasonably FALSE )	Causal Node belief	Influence	Sensitivity	Promoting Potential	Inhibiting Potential
Foreign investment is available	Slightly FALSE		79	57	21
Financial system is sufficient	Uncertain		26	14	12
Educational system is tailored towards jobs	Slightly FALSE		24	12	12
Basic natural resource management is in place	Uncertain		6	3	3
Corruption in law enforcement is rampant	Slightly FALSE	Reversing	2	1	1
Property ownership issues are resolved	Extremely FALSE		0	0	0

## Summary

To recapitulate,

- Failing to meet people's immediate needs and failing to ensure that human rights are protected account for nearly half of the intolerance ascribed to people's perceptions of the status quo in complex emergencies.
- No single factor satisfies immediate needs; rather, a combination of sufficiency in food, potable water, and housing—as well as meeting health requirements—dominates.
- The productivity of the agricultural system and the effectiveness of the transportation infrastructure are critical in the short-term, especially in the absence of a relief effort. Long-term self-sufficiency requires progress in these areas.
- Longer-term needs relating to the economy, social services, jobs, and educational infrastructure account for most of the remaining influences.
- A sound economy directly or indirectly drives satisfaction of longer-term needs.
- The availability of foreign investment, both through short-term relief programs and long-term venture capital, is a critical factor in meeting human requirements.

## Annex C-1:

## Nodes for Generic Baseline Influence Net Models

In this annex, we document the nodes that appear in the Basic Sectors of Influence Net and the three sub-nets. In describing each node, we use the following key:

- If two letters precede the dash:
  - The first letter means
    - E = Extremely certain
    - R = Reasonably certain
    - S = Slightly certain
    - V = Very certain
  - The second letter means
    - T = TRUE statement
    - F = FALSE statement.
- If the single letter “U” precedes the dash, U = Uncertain whether this is a TRUE OR FALSE statement.
- After the dash:
  - “Initial” means an initial causal (parent) node
  - “Root” means the final (ultimate) node in the influence net
  - “Internal” means a determined causal (child or conclusion) node

Note that nodes can appear in more than one net, sometimes with different node types. When this occurs, the categorical value (manually set or calculated) remains consistent.<sup>409</sup>

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<sup>409</sup> Recall that the values are set or calculated on a continuous 0 to 1 scale, later broken into categorical data. We manually set individual belief or link strengths to ensure that the categorical values remained consistent across nets. The current version of SIAM cannot automatically “embed” one sub-net in other nets so that its values remain consistent throughout them all.

## Annex C-1. Nodes for Generic Baseline Influence Net Models

Node	Basic Sectors of Influence	Actual/Perceived Civil Unrest	Governance	Human Requirements
Acceptable jobs are available	RF-Internal			RF-Internal
Administration of justice is effective and fair	EF-Initial	EF-Internal	EF-Internal	
Agricultural system is productive				RF-Internal
Armed forces are restructured		EF-Internal		
Basic natural resource management is in place				U-Initial
Central authority is effective	RF-Initial		RF-Internal	
Changes in population composition improve outlook				U-Internal
Civil (internal) unrest is present	ET-Internal	ET-Internal		

### Annex C-1. (cont'd.)

Node	Basic Sectors of Influence	Actual/Perceived Civil Unrest	Governance	Human Requirements
Civil stability and durable peace exists	EF- <del>Root</del>			
Commercial sector contributes to national welfare	RF-Initial			RF-Internal
Competing groups resolve differences	EF-Initial	EF-Initial		
Corruption in central authority is rampant			ST-Initial	
Corruption in law enforcement is rampant			ST-Initial	ST-Initial
Corruption in social services is rampant				RT-Initial
Critical industries are sound				SF-Internal

### Annex C-1. (cont'd.)

<b>Node</b>	<b>Basic Sectors of Influence</b>	<b>Actual/Perceived Civil Unrest</b>	<b>Governance</b>	<b>Human Requirements</b>
Demobilized armed forces are integrated into society	EF-Internal	EF-Internal		
Disarmament is effective	VF-Initial	VF-Internal		
Displaced population increases				RT-Internal
Economy is sound	VF-Internal			VF-Internal
Education infrastructure is adequate		SF-Initial		SF-Initial
Educational system is tailored towards jobs				U-Initial
Efficient markets are restored	SF-Initial			SF-Internal
Energy supply and distribution are sufficient				SF-Internal
Expatriates return to country		U-Initial	U-Initial	U-Initial

### Annex C-1. (cont'd.)

Node	Basic Sectors of Influence	Actual/Perceived Civil Unrest	Governance	Human Requirements
Financial system is sufficient	U-Initial			U-Initial
Food is sufficient	VF-Initial			VF-Internal
Foreign investment is available				SF-Initial
Government controls domestic media's reporting of events	RF-Initial	RF-Initial	RF-Initial	
Government has domestic legitimacy	RF-Internal	RF-Internal	<b>RF-Root</b>	
Government police force is effective against crime	VF-Internal	VF-Internal		
Government-run military is effective	EF-Internal	EF-Internal		
Health infrastructure is adequate				VF-Internal



### Annex C-1. (cont'd.)

Node	Basic Sectors of Influence	Actual/Perceived Civil Unrest	Governance	Human Requirements
Health requirements are met	EF-Initial			EF-Internal
Housing stock is sufficient	RF-Initial			RF-Internal
Human rights are protected	VF-Initial		VF-Initial	VF-Initial
Immediate needs of the people are satisfied	EF-Internal		EF- <i>Root</i>	EF-Internal
Instability contributes to migration				ET-Initial
Institutions of Governance are effective and fair	VF-Internal	VF-Internal	VF-Internal	

## Annex C-1. (cont'd.)

Node	Basic Sectors of Influence	Actual/Perceived Civil Unrest	Governance	Human Requirements
International media have open access to the reporting of events		RF-Initial		
Migrants leave country				ET-Internal
Opposition party attempts to dominate by force	VT-Initial	VT-Internal		
Paramilitary forces are present	ET-Initial	ET-Internal		
People are tolerant of the status quo	EF-Internal			<i>EF-Root</i>

### Annex C-1. (cont'd.)

Node	Basic Sectors of Influence	Actual/Perceived Civil Unrest	Governance	Human Requirements
People perceive that their interests are represented	VF-Initial		VF-Initial	
People's spiritual needs are met				U-Initial
Police are distinct from the military		U-Initial		
Population is forced to move				U-Initial
Population is free to move				SF-Internal

### Annex C-1. (cont'd.)

Node	Basic Sectors of Influence	Actual/Perceived Civil Unrest	Governance	Human Requirements
Potable water is sufficient	SF-Initial			SF-Internal
Prison structure is adequate			U-Initial	
Property ownership issues are resolved				EF-Initial
Regime-sponsored, non-military armed forces are demobilized	EF-Internal	EF-Internal		
Safe and secure environment is perceived	EF-Internal	<i>EF-Root</i>		

### Annex C-1. (cont'd.)

Node	Basic Sectors of Influence	Actual/Perceived Civil Unrest	Governance	Human Requirements
Social services are adequate	VF-Initial		VF-Internal	VF-Internal
Telecom infrastructure is in place and maintainable				SF-Internal
Tourism industry is robust				RF-Internal
Transportation infrastructure is in place				SF-Internal
Water distribution infrastructure is sufficient				SF-Internal



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# Glossary

AAR	After-Action Review
ADC/S PP&O	Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans, Policy & Operations (HQMC)
BG, BGen	Brigadier General (USA and USMC, respectively)
CDR	Commander
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CINC	Commander in Chief
CG	Commanding General
COA	Course of Action
COL	Colonel
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CMOC	Civil-Military Operations Center
CNA	Center for Naval Analyses
CNWS	Center for Naval Warfare Studies
COL, Col	Colonel (USA and USMC, respectively)
CRM	CNA Research Memorandum
DARPA	Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DHA	UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs
DOD	Department of Defense
DON	Department of the Navy
DPA	UN Department of Political Affairs
DPKO	UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DSC	Decision Support Center (NWC)
DSD	Decision Support Department (NWC)
EBR	Evidence Based Research, Inc.
ExComm	Executive Committee
GHAI	Greater Horn of Africa Initiative
HQMC	Headquarters, US Marine Corps
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross/ Crescent

IFOR	Implementation Force (Bosnia)
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JWAC	Joint Warfare Analysis Center
LT	Lieutenant, USN
LTC, Lt Col, LtCol	Lieutenant Colonel (USA, USAF, and USMC, respectively)
LTG	Lieutenant General, USA
MARFORLANT HQ,	Marine Forces Atlantic, Headquarters,
SJTF	Standing Joint Task Force
Maj Gen	Major General, USAF
MEF	Marine Expeditionary Force
MSgt	Master Sergeant
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCA	National Command Authority
NEO	Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
NWC	Naval War College
OASD	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
ODASD (PK/HA)	Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance
OFDA	USAID Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance
ONI-DET	Office of Naval Intelligence-Detachment
PDD	Presidential Decision Directive
PMP	Prevention, Mitigation, and Prevention
Pol-Mil	Political-Military
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
ROE	Rules of Engagement
RTLMC	Radio Télévision Libre Mille Collines
SAIC	Science Applications International Corporation
SFOR	Stabilization Force (Bosnia)
SIAM	Situational Influence Assessment Module
SO-LIC	Special Operations-Low Intensity Conflict
SRD	Strategic Research Department (NWC)
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund



UNITAF	Unified Task Force (Somalia)
UNOSOM	United Nations Operations in Somalia
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
US	United States
USA	US Army
USACOM	US Atlantic Command
USAF	US Air Force
USAID	US Agency for International Development
USAR	US Army Reserve
USIP	United States Institute of Peace
USMC	US Marine Corps
USN	US Navy
WGD	US NWC Wargaming Department

