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<http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/CorporatePublications/BoardsOfInquiry/LossOfHmsSheffieldBoiPhase3Part1SupplementaryDocuments.htm>

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Se refiere al hundimiento de la SHEFFIELD, publicado por el Ministerio de Defensa de Gran Bretaña.

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COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF FLEET

**LOSS OF HMS SHEFFIELD
BOARD OF INQUIRY**

Annex G

These assessments much influenced SHEFFIELD's thinking in the early days. Nevertheless, CTF's amplifying signals on 26 Apr (1) and 4 May (2), which updated the SUPER E/EXOCET AAR capabilities, modified the ship's appreciation and the implications were well understood.

Q277
Q279
Q2446

10. The Commanding Officer, in evidence, was at pains not to be critical of CTG's threat assessment, nor the way efforts were concentrated on SAG procedures. However, SHEFFIELD felt that both points were contributory factors to the possible confusion that existed over the placing of SUPER E/EXOCET attack in the threat league. Furthermore, he also realized that this carries no weight in the argument on classification of the raid on 4 May. SHEFFIELD was of the opinion that the subsurface threat was as great as the air threat. In short, prevailing water conditions, coupled with the sophistication of the 209 SSK, made it, in his view, a "submariners' paradise".

Q110, Q115
Q113, Q321

11. In summary, SHEFFIELD had not dismissed the possibility of an airborne EXOCET attack. However, it seems probable that the intelligence background, as outlined above, coupled with their experiences of 1 May when they believed the reported SUPER Es were actually MIRAGE IIIs (see Annex H) lulled the ship into a belief that future raids might well develop along similar lines. Indeed during the attack, XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX was "quite convinced that it was not an EXOCET attack" and this was his view until after impact. XXXXXXX did not discover that it was an EXOCET until an hour later, believing till then that it was a rocket projectile. In the hot washup of the attack by the SHEFFIELD team, the SUPER E attack profile was described as "quite unlike that expected" (4).

532,
540,
544

- (1) CTF's 261110Z APR 82
- (2) CTF's 040230Z MAY 82
- (4) ARROW's 19F 050012Z MAY 82