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Se refiere al hundimiento de la SHEFFIELD, publicado por el Ministerio de Defensa de Gran Bretaña.

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COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF FLEET

**LOSS OF HMS SHEFFIELD
BOARD OF INQUIRY**

Annex H

NARRATIVE OF ATTACK

1. Scope. This annex describes operations in the Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) from 1 May 82 up to and including the attack on SHEFFIELD.

2. On Saturday 1 May, the Task Group (TG) commenced operations in the TEZ in an area centred some 50 nm NE of East Falkland Island.

3. SHEFFIELD rated the S/M threat very highly, and realized that conditions much favoured the small 209 Class Argentinian submarines. The surface threat, including surface EKOECET (MM38) although potent did not appear immediate. The possibility of low level SUPER E/EKOECET attack was well understood, but there were reasons why the probability might not be rated very highly (see Annex C).

4. On that first day, the ship went to Action Stations (State 1, Condition ZULU) on numerous occasions at Air Warning YELLOW. These aircraft were engaging the TG's Naval Gunfire Support element inshore and when they closed XXXXXXXXXXXX some were successfully acquired by SHEFFIELD's 90's. State 1 was achieved in 5 minutes and Condition ZULU in 6 to 8 minutes, all of which was in keeping with previous practices. Because the day's experience proved that radar detection ranges of 160 nm were achieved on Argentinian aircraft, it was decided that Action Stations would subsequently be piped at Air Warning RED.

5. SHEFFIELD was dogged by what she (and others) regarded as false alarms on 1 May. In particular, SHEFFIELD believed that MIRAGE III's were being misidentified by UAA1 as SUPER E's because of the almost complete similarity between the radar parameters of the two aircraft. There were no raids on the offshore elements of the TG. However Chaff DELTA was fired on several occasions by other ships and one reduced pattern (4 x M4) by SHEFFIELD.

6. After an uneventful night, the ship went to Action Stations on Sunday 2 May anticipating retaliatory air raids on the TG in light of the heavy Argentinian air losses (five aircraft) the day before over the Falkland Islands. Nothing ensued.

7. The 2 and 3 May were quiet and the ship settled into a routine. The TG maintained its air defence posture eastward of the Islands, working from North-East, through East to South-East. Ships refuelled by night, often in unpleasant and sometimes extreme weather conditions. During this period, PLYMOUTH and BRILLIANT rejoined from South Georgia and the TG detected some aircraft on radar and identified them as Argentinian by ESM. No hostile Combat Air Patrols were detected over the Islands.

8. Throughout these two days, Air Warning YELLOW remained in force and no threatening aircraft came within 200 nm of the group. The weather went from one extreme to the other and a pattern developed; conditions were either heavy seas with good, clear visibility, or calm seas and fog with visibility down to 100 yards. If it was foggy over the Falkland Islands, it was often clear at sea.

Q98

Q110, Q111
Q112, Q113
Q115

Q96

Q106

Q100, Q101
Q106

Q136

Q118

Q139

Q139

Q139

Q142



Time (ZULU)

Event

1350

XXXXXXXXXXXX for permission to transmit on SCOT.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX; leaves Ops Room
for heads.

538, 540,
544

COMMENT. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

XX
XX

536, 538,
540, 544

1351

SHEFFIELD starts attempting to access the satellite
with SCOT transmissions. Access not achieved -
attempts continue.

Q3160

COMMENT. There is no record at RAF
OAKHANGER or CONGEN Whitehall of a
successful access. The SCOT Operator
had occasionally had difficulties
in satellite access.

1355

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX goes to Bridge.

538, 540,
544

1356 30s

GLASGOW intercepts 3 sweeps AGAVE radar (SUPER E)
bearing 245.

COMMENT. Timing was taken from GLASGOW
UAA1 backroll (see Appendix 1). XXXX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

538, 540,
544

1358

GLASGOW calls "AGAVE 245: CONDOR 245" on AAWG UHF
and HF. This was heard in SHEFFIELD as "CONDOR
225" or just "CONDOR".

Q593, Q8101
Q955, Q1029
Q1902, Q887
Q906, Q957
Q976, Q1013

COMMENT. AGAVE radar, fitted in the
AM39 capable SUPER E, had the nickname
CONDOR at the time. SHEFFIELD was not
guarding AAWG HF.

1358 06s

GLASGOW intercepts a further 2 sweeps of AGAVE
bearing 248 (see Appendix 1).

COMMENT. Precise timing.

1358 15s

GLASGOW detects two close but distinct 965 contacts
240 - 40 closing.

Q2553, Q4745
Q4747

1358 48s

GLASGOW achieves AGAVE locked-on intercept
(see Appendix 1).

Q553, Q4745

COMMENT. Precise timing.

<u>Time (ZULU)</u>	<u>Event</u>	
1402 02s	First EXOCET launched.	Q962, Q970 Q489
	<u>COMMENT.</u> Believed accurate within + 10 seconds relative to time of impact.	
1402 07s	GLASGOW fires Chaff DELTA.	
	See Appendix 2.	
1402 10s	Second EXOCET fired. On completion aircraft join as a close pair and turn South.	Q962, Q970 Q489
1402 10s	SHEFFIELD XXXX arrives in Ops Room.	Q331
	<u>COMMENT.</u> This timing is of considerable significance, as firing of Chaff DELTA by XXXX would have been too late. Many witnesses put this time much later at within 5 or 10 seconds of missile impact.	Q961 Q810 Q830 Q3104 Q4958 Q5042
1402 15s	SHEFFIELD Bridge visual sighting of missile smoke. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX reports "Two contacts trailing smoke 297" to Ops Room.	S38, S40, S44
	<u>COMMENT.</u> What was seen is consistent with the heavy smoke of two EXOCET boosts, the trails being formed during initial acceleration and the start of the sustainer burn.	Q7340
1402 30s	SHEFFIELD - Re-set/Re-Indicate aircraft to Pwd 909.	
	<u>COMMENT.</u> Time approximate. This may have occurred more than once.	Q1627, Q1360
1402 40s	SHEFFIELD XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX arrives in Ops Room	S38, S40, S44
1402 45s	SHEFFIELD SCOT strangled. UAA1 Situation Display shows locked-on radar.	Q3170, Q616 Q2283, Q595
	<u>COMMENT.</u> Time believed accurate in relation to missile impact.	Q604, Q735 Q742
1402 50s	First missile body visual from SHEFFIELD Bridge.	Q1828 et seq
	<u>COMMENT.</u> Visual descriptions vary completely. In addition to XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX saw the missile from the Bridge.	S38, S40, S44
1402 55s	Locked-on radar strobed by UAA1 Operator. Parameters seen which were subsequently recognized as EXOCET (AN 39).	Q603 Q610
	<u>COMMENT.</u> XXXX saw EXOCET Head lock-on parameters and was in the process of locking them up when the missile struck.	S38, S40, S44

<u>Time (ZULU)</u>	<u>Event</u>	
1403 (Datum time)	First EROCEP impact.	
1403 15s	Second EROCEP splashes approximately 1/2 mile on SHEPPFIELD's port beam.	
	<u>COMMENT.</u> Only one witness, who both heard and saw an "explosion in the sea" That it was an EROCEP is by no means conclusive.	Q4411 Q4420
1404 00s to 1404 30s	COVENTRY gains 6 sweeps on 992 of aircraft in starboard turn 6 miles South of SHEPPFIELD (opening).	Q2345
	<u>COMMENT.</u> Possibly the close pair of attack aircraft departing after sighting missile impact.	

Appendices:

1. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
2. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX Private Tape.

S26
S38, S40,
S44

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XXXXXX CXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXX CXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX

326

XXXXXXXXXX CXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

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326

APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX H TO
SHEFFIELD BOI REPORT
DATED 22 JUL 82

GLASGOW XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXPRIVATE TAPE

S38, S40,
S44

1. Shortly before 1400Z on 4 May, XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX was recording a private cassette tape to his wife. He is heard talking on the telephone to XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX. During his conversation, he states that the "LYNX will go to ALERT 15 at 1400Z, which is in 1 minute and 25 seconds time". This time check has been used as a datum for his subsequent remarks and activities and events in GLASGOW.

S38, S40,
S44

<u>TIME (ZULU)</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>	
1358	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX talking to XXXXXXXX on the telephone.	S38, S40, S44
1358 35s (Datum time)	Remarks: "GLASGOW LYNX to ALERT 15 in 1 minute and 25 seconds".	
1400	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX changing into flying clothing; talking to wife.	S38, S40, S44
1400 23s	GLASGOW pipes Action Stations.	
1400 48s	GLASGOW repeats Action Stations.	
1402 07s	Chaff DELTA (full pattern) fired.	
1402 17s	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX speculative remark: "SUPER Ee broken through".	S38, S40, S44
1404 30s	Moving aft (doors/hatches/etc)	
1405 30s	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX arrives in hanger. Gives instructions to the Flight.	S38, S40, S44
1407	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX gives Main Broadcast SITREP: "Two aircraft have closed the Force".	S38, S40, S44
1407 30s	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX reports "LYNX at ALERT 15" to HQ.	S38, S40, S44