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**<http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/CorporatePublications/BoardsOfInquiry/LossOfHmsSheffieldBoiPhase3Part1SupplementaryDocuments.htm>**

**en donde usted puede leerlo directamente en su formato original y acceder al resto del sitio.**

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**Se refiere al hundimiento de la SHEFFIELD, publicado por el Ministerio de Defensa de Gran Bretaña.**

**A efectos de preservarlo como documento histórico para el caso en que el archivo original o el sitio que lo contiene no figurasen más en internet, a continuación se ha realizado una copia.**



**COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF FLEET**

**LOSS OF HMS SHEFFIELD  
BOARD OF INQUIRY**

**Annex J**







both aircraft turned starboard towards SHEFFIELD. The timing of this turn may have been earlier as it is entirely possible the aircraft shifted target having seen GLASGOW's chaff blooms. It is conceivable that the Chaff DELTA may have developed in time to reduce the chances of a successful EXOCET attack on GLASGOW, persuading the pilot to attack SHEFFIELD instead.

15. In SHEFFIELD, it was not until about 75 seconds before missile impact, just under 20 seconds before the first EXOCET was fired, that the xxx ordered his weapon systems to stand to (see Appendix 5). Fifty seconds before the first AM39 hit, we assess that a second EXOCET may have been fired, 10 seconds behind the first. Both aircraft then reformed as a close pair, broke starboard and headed South. GLASGOW's Link 10 track label followed this contact. It is possible that decorrelation occurred between the Link 10 received track and SHEFFIELD's own sensor confirmed track. The Board has been unable to establish whether or not this happened.

16. ~~XXX~~  
 Bridge personnel sighted two puffs of smoke with trails. These are believed to have been the boost efflux (the puffs) and sustainer motors (trails), from two EXOCETs. The xxx reported to the Ops Room a fast moving contact bearing 297. The Bridge staff were mesmerised by this contact approaching from between GREEN 40 and GREEN 45. It was not until the missile's last moments of flight that they realised the ship was about to be hit by an EXOCET. The xxx had time to yell "Take Cover" on COL, but not time to reach the main broadcast to warn the Ship's Company. All Bridge personnel took cover. No-one saw the crossing SUPER Es 8 miles to the West, nor the possible second AM39 which is thought to have passed ahead of the ship and splashed harmlessly about half a mile to port of SHEFFIELD.

17. One aircraft of the pair was indicated to the FWD 909 just before they turned south. Problems with acquisitions on surface clutter were resolved by re-setting, injection of height and re-indicating. This may have occurred up to three times. This lengthy drill is unnecessary; SP NEG injections having been introduced into the ADAMS 4, Edition 3 program to speed recovery from sea clutter acquisitions (1). These new injections were not used in SHEFFIELD. No targets were indicated to AFT 909 which had clear area to the aircraft initially and to the missile throughout. At no stage was a valid fire control solution achieved for either GWS 30 or GSA1. The 4.5 Mk 8 was never brought to bear, nor was alarm procedure used.

18. There is some evidence that SHEFFIELD's 992 radar was performing below standard. Anaprop was generally giving long ranges for both GLASGOW and COVENTRY, but no such reports have come from SHEFFIELD. Attacking aircraft were seen at about 30 miles by other Type 42s. The missiles were seen beam on by GLASGOW at about 15 miles but not until 8 miles by SHEFFIELD despite the larger radar echoing area of the head-on aspect. Reports that other Type 42s on the screen held strong land echoes on 992, and SHEFFIELD held none, lend weight to the supposition that SHEFFIELD's 992 was off-tune, although she was slightly further from land.

(1) Seadart Newsletter 2/81

338, 341, 344

Q1256  
Q965 - Q971

338, 340, 344

Q1828

Q1829

338, 341, 344

Q4411  
Q4420

Q1250  
Q1454  
Q1488 - Q1494  
Q1455, Q1627  
Q1629  
Q1461  
Q1474

Q1477, Q1565  
Q1561, Q1454,  
Q1471

Q2563  
Q2341  
Q2361\*Q4747  
Q4792


Q2564



HMS SHEFFIELD DPS ROOM MANNING 4 MAY 82


APPENDIX 1  
TO ANNEX J

1200-1600 STARBOARD DEFENCE WATCH




20.8.82

20.8.82







1358-15 SEC. GLASGOW  
DETECTS 2 CONTACTS ON 965  
240-40 CLIMB, SECOND  
AGARRÉ INTERCEPT (2 SWEEPS)  
GAINED AT 1358-06 SEC.  
RESOURCES 248.

1358-15 SEC


1358-15 SEC  
GLASGOW  
2 CONTACTS  
965 240-40

AGARRÉ 1358-06 SEC (2 SWEEPS)

AGARRÉ 1358-30 SEC

000 COUNTRY

UNRECORDED (4 SWEEPS) φ  
MOUNTAIN (M)  
RESOURCES φ  
RESOURCES (PLUS) φ



1400 - 30 SEC. APPROX.  
SHEFFIELD FIRST DETECTION  
GLASGOW SECOND  
DETECTION.

1400-30 SEC.

1400-48 SEC.  
GLASGOW  
(LATER - see  
ABOVE.)

1400-23 SEC.  
GLASGOW TO  
RETURN  
STATIONS!

1400 APPROX  
LINE TO  
TRACK  
(GLASGOW)

SHEFFIELD  
(CALCULATED  
TRACKS)

GLASGOW  
2 COUNTS  
002 SW-15

SHEFFIELD  
012/064 AICs  
AND FIGHTER  
COMMANDER'S  
COMMENTS  
(APPROX)


SHEFFIELD  
016/060  
(COMM. V. SHEFFIELD)

TOWNHAM  
AT D5.8

INVERLECC (AIRC)


INVERMOUTH

HOLMES (F.106)



1402 - 02 SEC  
FIRST AM 39 FIRED (-58 SEC.)  
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX  
XXXXXXXXXXXX

S 35, SUC. 544



1403 PLUS

1403 PLUS  
FIRST AM39 HIT - SECOND MISSED. SCOTY BREWERS OPENING SOUTH

1402-07sec  
GLASSHOW  
(HAFER 'D')

AM39 -  
600 KTS

FIRST AM39 FIRED (-38Sec)

SECOND AM39 FIRED (-50Sec)

PRECIPITATION IN FOOT OF LOOK-SITE, THRESH OUTBOARD

SCOTY BREWERS RIGHT AFTER MISSILE RELEASE

SCOTY SPREADGLED (-15 Sec)

SECOND AM39 MISSED - CRASHED ON FOOT BRAM

CONTRACTOR'S BOAT SOUTH OF SHEPHERD SVA FIELD OPENING

1579-50  
1579  
1579-30  
1579-20

40 NM