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<http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/CorporatePublications/BoardsOfInquiry/LossOfHmsSheffieldBoiPhase3Part1SupplementaryDocuments.htm>

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Se refiere al hundimiento de la SHEFFIELD, publicado por el Ministerio de Defensa de Gran Bretaña.

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COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF FLEET

**LOSS OF HMS SHEFFIELD
BOARD OF INQUIRY**

Annex N

6. Following recovery of XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX further inspection from the air indicated that the forward part of the superstructure was burning fiercely and extensively, there was probably still some fire in the FAMR/PER, but there were no signs that the fire had spread to the AAMR. The after superstructure was intact.

S38, 240,
244
Q6915

7. After the second survey two reports were received from helicopters that there was no evidence of smoke and the fires might be out (pm 5 May), and that the ship was glowing red from bridge to flight deck (night of 5/6 May).

Q6927

Third Survey

8. This was undertaken by XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX together with a party of ME Ratings from HERMES at about 061900Z, two days after the attack. The principal objectives were again to assess the condition of the ship and to attempt to recover some of the five Rover Gas Turbine Pumps onboard SHEFFIELD. A careful visual inspection was carried out before the ship was approached. It was immediately evident that there had been a very large fire in the after superstructure/Hangar area, although it appeared to be out. The after 909 dome had disappeared and screen paintwork was very badly charred. There were wisps of smoke forward but the Foc'sle appeared cool.

S38, 240, 244
Q6929

9. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX were winched down, together with two MEMs. The forward part of the Foc'sle was cool, but the after end was hotter, the bridge screen hotter still and, by observation, both masts appeared to be very hot indeed. Two Rover Gas Turbine Pumps and a quantity of BA and other fire fighting equipment were salvaged. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

S38, 240
244

10. In summary, at this time it would appear that a large fire had spread aft and subsequently died out. Some weapons in the Hangar area had exploded (a torpedo had been blown out onto the Flight Deck) there was probably still fire in the midships section below 1 Deck which was very hot. Neither Sea Dart nor 4.5" magazines had exploded. The indications were that the fire in the forward superstructure may well have burnt out, and the fires in the FAMR and PER were probably out. The ship was still upright and had no noticeable trim or unusual draught.

Q6929
Q6931
Q6940

Q6934

Q6941

11. Following the third survey it was decided to attempt to tow SHEFFIELD out of the TEE, although it was recognized that this would be difficult to accomplish. The alternative of scuttling was still in mind, as was the idea of leaving her in the TEE as a decoy.

Q6943
Q6881
Q6880
Q6879.

Fourth Survey

12. This was again conducted by XXXXX at about 071030Z and was the occasion on which a number of still and video photographs were taken. (See Appendix 1). XXXX was winched down onto the Foc'sle and found conditions little changed from the previous evening. Deck and screen

S38, 240,
244

Q6943

temperatures were much the same; and in particular it was evident that the waists were very hot and these decks appeared to be rippled. There was no change in heel or trim, or apparently in draught. Conditions were still calm. It was evident that patching of the missile entry hole would be particularly difficult because of the ragged edges and general distortion in the area. The feasibility of taking the ship in tow seemed reasonable.

Q6944

Q6952

Towing

13. It was decided to pass a light weight tow initially, and to attempt to tow SHEFFIELD out of the TEE during the hours of darkness on the night 8/9 May. To this end two of HERMES' eight-inch barthing hawsers and other towing equipment was dumped on SHEFFIELD's POC'side on 8 May. It was well understood that before a long tow could be undertaken some sort of patch over the missile entry hole would be necessary, but that this would require access to the inside of the ship which was too dangerous at this stage.

Q6953

14. The tow was successfully passed very early on the morning of 9 May and YARMOUTH began to tow SHEFFIELD eastwards, initially at about 6 to 7 knots. There was little if any sign of fire onboard at this stage. The sea state was still calm. However over the next 24 hours the wind increased to NE Force 4 to 5, and there is some evidence that SHEFFIELD began to settle lower in the water until the missile entry hole was only about three to four feet above the waterline. (1). The ship also began to list to starboard and, to attempt to reduce this, and thus prevent water from flooding in through the missile hole, YARMOUTH altered to the North. However this put the wind on the starboard bow and increased the water lap into the hole. It was evident at this stage that there was nothing YARMOUTH could do to keep the water out while continuing with the tow.

Q6881

Q6954

Q6881

15. At about 100645Z SHEFFIELD developed a 5° to 10° list to starboard and the tow was slipped. This list increased until the ship heeled over to about 90°. She then sank at about 100700Z May. Observation was difficult, due to darkness and poor visibility, but the ship is thought to have sunk with a 90° list to starboard on an even trim. No plunging was observed. YARMOUTH's DR assessment of the wreck position is 52°11'S 53°50'W - accuracy undetermined. The depth of the water in this area is about 1000 fathoms.

Q6881

Q6883

16. At daybreak, approximately 101100Z, a ship and helicopter search was carried out around the last known position. Life rafts, mostly inverted and several with the canopy supporting hoops not properly inflated, oil fuel slicks, general debris, AGRs and other floats clearly indicated that the sinking position had been found. No bodies or papers of possible security significance were observed. The security aspects were reported separately (see Appendix 2). No further gear was salvaged.

Q6891

(1) YARMOUTH's 250/2 dated 10 May 82

Appendices:


1. Photographs - Post Abandon Ship
2. BOI's letter to Fleet Security Officer - Loss of HMS SHEFFIELD -
Classified Material



APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX N POST ABANDON SHIP NI-1



APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX N POST ABANDON SHIP NI-2



APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX N POST ABANDON SHIP N1-3

