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Se refiere al hundimiento de la SHEFFIELD, publicado por el Ministerio de Defensa de Gran Bretaña.

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COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF FLEET

LOSS OF HMS SHEFFIELD BOARD OF INQUIRY

**Report of Captain Salt
paragraphs 01 to 08**

REPORT OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE LOSS OF HMS SHEFFIELD

INTRODUCTION

1. On the afternoon of Tuesday 4th May 1982, SHEFFIELD was one of three Type 42s in AA Picket Station 18 miles up threat of the Task Force operating in the Falklands Total Exclusion Zone. She was in State 2 Condition YANKEE and the Air Threat warning was YELLOW after 3 days of enemy air inactivity. At approximately 1400 SHEFFIELD received a warning from GLASGOW of "2 bogies closing from the West". Shortly after, SHEFFIELD herself gained 992 contact on the 2 bogies and attempted to indicate one of them to 909 without success. Three minutes after GLASGOW's initial warning SHEFFIELD was struck by an Air Launched EXOCET missile fired by an Argentinian aircraft at 1403. The first indication of missile release at about 7 miles occurred about 36 seconds before impact when the xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx on the Bridge saw but did not immediately recognise smoke from Aircraft and missile. Very shortly afterwards UAA1 detected missile homing head.

338
540
544

2. The missile approached from a relative bearing of about Green 40° in calm conditions and struck SHEFFIELD amidships about 7 feet above the waterline outboard of the Fwd AMR. SHEFFIELD's position was 52° 50' South 57° 14' West. Very shortly after entry into the Fwd AMR, the missile, with over half its propellant remaining, exploded outwards and upwards into the Fwd AMR, Fwd Engine Room and Galley area. The resulting gash in the Ship's side was 15ft long and 4ft high and extended mainly across the Fwd AMR but overlapped the Fwd Engine Room as well. Major fires were immediately caused in all three areas. Blast effect was felt from 2 November Cross passage forward to the Ops Room on 2 deck and up onto 1 and 01 decks. Several 2 deck YANKEE doors and hatches were distorted. On missile impact, half electrical power, full main broadcast, damage control communications and all fire main were lost. MCR, HQ1 and the Bridge all had to be evacuated because of thick smoke within the first 3 minutes.

3. Attempts to restore ship's firemain pressure were never successful and out of a total of 5 Rover Gas Turbine pumps only one could be set to work satisfactorily. Gallant attempts by HMS ARROW and HMS YARMOUTH to provide firemain pressure and boundary cooling were unable to contain the fire. The lasting memory of all members of the Ship's Company will be the incredible speed with which thick acrid smoke was literally pumped around the ship from bilge to bridge between Golf and Mike sections inclusive in all compartments except the after AMR very early on. Four and a half hours after missile impact (which seemed like 30 minutes) Major fire extended from 2 M/N doors up 2 deck to 2F/G doors, upwards extensively into the Fwd superstructure and downwards into the Fwd AMR and Fwd ER.

/The Fire...

The Fire was still escalating and was within 1 Section of the Seadart magazine. The ship could no longer be fought, the force was under submarine attack in our vicinity and apparently under air attack as well, and we were buying up the total effort of 2 escorts and a number of helicopters. At 1830 The Commanding Officer HMS SHEFFIELD gave the order to cease firefighting and abandon ship. As a result of this attack 20 members of the Ship's Company lost their lives and a further 24 were injured (Details at Annex J).

4. For the next 3 days the ship burnt fiercely and during this time she remained upright and dry in calm conditions. At approximately 0200 on 9th May SHEFFIELD was taken in tow towards South Georgia by HMS YARMOUTH. At 0645 on 10th May in deteriorating weather, SHEFFIELD developed a sudden list to starboard, rolled over and sank at 0702 in 1100 fathoms in position 52°11' South 53°50' West.

AIM

5. The aim of this document is to report on the circumstances of the loss of HMS SHEFFIELD, covering in particular operational, material and personnel aspects.

SITUATION

6. Situation within the Task Force. On the morning of Tuesday 4th May, TU 317.8.4 consisting of HM Ships HERMES, INVINCIBLE, SHEFFIELD, COVENTRY, GLASGOW, BRILLIANT, BROADSWORD, ARROW, ALACRITY and YARMOUTH accompanied by RFAs OLMEDA, APPLELEAF and RESOURCE was patrolling the Total Exclusion Zone (T.E.Z.), in a defensive formation, to the South East of the Falklands. The previous two days had seen the prosecution of numerous sonar contacts, all ending in classification Marine Life or dubious POSSUB LOW, but there had been little or no enemy air activity. During the early part of the afternoon the Task Force was steaming towards the Falklands and by 1345 the leading ships, of which SHEFFIELD was one, had reached a position some 60 miles from the coast.

7. Situation within the ship. The ship was in NBCD State 2 Condition & being fully prepared for war and secured for action. The Ship's Company were closed up at Defence Watches, the Starboard watch having relieved Port at 1200.

8. Material Condition.

- a. WE Department. The Weapons Engineering Department was in good shape and had no defects which affected this attack on the ship.
- b. ME Department. The Marine Engineering Department had two defects which were relevant. M2 Diesel Generator could not be run following a piston seizure in March 1982 which resulted in damage to the engine frame and lubricating oil supply arrangements. This was OPDEF ME 13-82. N Firepump was unservicable following a motor bearing seizure during Exercise Springtrain. Since removal of the motor or even its rotor, required a hole to be cut in the deckhead of 4NZ Avcat Pump Space no progress could be made on rectification. This was OPDEF 17-82.

In other respects the ME Department was in good shape.