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Se refiere al hundimiento de la SHEFFIELD, publicado por el Ministerio de Defensa de Gran Bretaña.

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COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF FLEET

**LOSS OF HMS SHEFFIELD
BOARD OF INQUIRY**

**Report of Captain Salt
Annex C**

CHAFF D FIRING POLICY AND ZIPPO REACTIONS AGAINST EXOCET

1. At the time of the attack SHEFFIELD had both 3" Rocket launchers loaded with 8 N4 missiles each. Another 56 N4s were held onboard plus 13 N1s. There was no immediate prospect of obtaining any more N4s once the ship's outfit was expended although it is believed that some N1s and N2s were available.

2. The firing policy for CHAFF D was the subject of numerous signals. As far as can be recalled the latest instruction at the time of the attack was to fire a pattern of 12 at Zippo 4, thus keeping 4 rockets in reserve to enable a reduced pattern to be re-sown if required before reloading was completed. Under this policy SHEFFIELD therefore had sufficient stocks for 7 CHAFF patterns. Zippo 4 could only be called by the xxxxxx and this was not done.

3. As stated by INVINCIBLE (Enclosure 2) long range presence of Mirage III was expected at the time of the attack and as has already been established EW detections from the Mirage III could easily be confused with those of the Super Etendard. Additionally many spurious and also intermittent friendly contacts were frequent on all radars, some of which were misidentified as enemy. Had full Zippo reactions been applied to all such EW/radar detections on 1st May, most of the Task Group's CHAFF DELTA would have been expended on the first day in the Exclusion Zone. This does not take into account the major EXOCET threat from Surface Ships which had not yet been encountered.

4. Since arriving in the T.E.Z. there had been many occasions when either EW or radar detections or a combination of both had occurred which could have been the initial indications of an air or an Air/Exocet attack. Some of these, as on the 1st of May, were actual enemy transmissions and contacts but the hostile aircraft did not press home an attack. Many more were misidentifications of our own forces transmissions or were detections of our own returning aircraft or helicopters or indeed spurious radar echoes. Only on one important occasion did such indications prove to be an attack on the Task Group.

5. Against this background it was clearly important to strike the right balance between over and under reaction to any given set of circumstances, having perhaps over-reacted to all such detections on the first day when all ships fired CHAFF D after a reported release of Exocet at over 100 miles from the Force (this was in fact the release of an air to air missile). In hindsight SHEFFIELD undoubtedly went too far the other way prior to and during the attack on the 4th of May. A natural desire to conserve material resources on day 4 in the T.E.Z. may also have played a part.