

ACLARACION DE [www.radarmalvinas.com.ar](http://www.radarmalvinas.com.ar)

El siguiente informe se encuentra en el sitio

<http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/CorporatePublications/BoardsOfInquiry/LossOfHmsSheffieldBoiPhase3Part2.htm>

en donde usted puede leerlo directamente en su formato original y acceder al resto del sitio.

Copyright © 2008 MoD UK

Se refiere al hundimiento de la SHEFFIELD, publicado por el Ministerio de Defensa de Gran Bretaña.

A efectos de preservarlo como documento histórico para el caso en que el archivo original o el sitio que lo contiene no figurasen más en internet, a continuación se ha realizado una copia.



**COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF FLEET**

**LOSS OF HMS SHEFFIELD  
BOARD OF INQUIRY**

**Report of Captain Salt  
Annex G**

COMMENTS ON HMS INVINCIBLE REPORT OF EVENTS ANDXXXXXXXXXXXXX QM 052322Z MAY  
COMMENTS ON HMS INVINCIBLE REPORT OF EVENTS (ENCLOSURE 2)

1. The comments below are referred to paragraph numbers in the INVINCIBLE report.

- Para 3. This "reported Neptune sortie" was not known about in SHEFFIELD. XXX S23  
XX
- Para 5. The first GLASGOW report heard in SHEFFIELD was "2 bogies closing from the west". The report of the CONDOR racket came afterwards.
- Para 6. It is considered that these "spurious contacts" were in fact the Super Etendards attacking SHEFFIELD. Air warning RED was called after SHEFFIELD had been hit.
- Para 7. In view of the slow speed it is considered that these contacts were in fact the first of many helicopters coming to aid SHEFFIELD.
- Para 8. The timing in this paragraph is completely incorrect. It was initially thought that two missiles had been fired - subsequent analysis has shown there to be only one.
- Para 9. It is interesting that the XXXXXX was unsure, even the following day, if a further missile had been fired at the task group. In fact a missile was sighted by YARMOUTH passing down her starboard side at 1437. S32  
S40  
SKH
- Para 16. Given that the mid point of impact is about 8-9ft above the water line it would appear that the mid height selection would have been significantly less than 14ft.
- Para 17. The "unclassified rackets by two others" were not reported on UHF.
- Conclusion d. This is an interesting conclusion because INVINCIBLE herself did not fire CHAFF D or call a Zippo at the time of the attack. All the reactions mentioned in this paragraph were taken after SHEFFIELD was hit.
- Conclusion g. Taking an EXOCET on the bow cannot be recommended for a destroyer or frigate since there is a high chance of the missile exploding in a magazine.
- Diagram This diagram does not depict the aircraft that attacked SHEFFIELD.

2. Much of the information in the INVINCIBLE report is duplicated in the xxxxx signal. It is believed that the initial reporting of the raid by GLASGOW was as shown at Annex A. Certainly none of the people manning xxxxxx in SHEFFIELD heard a report of "CONDOR 248" before the "2 bogies closing from the west". GLASGOW's brief detection at 1358 of contacts at 250 range 40 could have been the Super Etendards closing but she certainly did not release them to Link 10 until they were much closer. The 992 contacts tracking 070 seen at 1400 could have been the southerly Super Etendard on his final run in towards SHEFFIELD. There would have been no response to the 'call for info' to SHEFFIELD at 1409 because she had been struck by the missile at 1403. The Zippo One call at 1412 was, again, after SHEFFIELD had been hit.

538  
540  
544