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Se refiere a:

01JUN82 1540Z – UKE Washington a FCO. Reunión de Parsons con Clark (USA).

(PREM 19/633) (desclasificado diciembre 2012)

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FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES. (37)

IMMEDIATE

PS
 PS/MR HURD
 PS/MR ONSLOW
 PS/PUS
 PS/LORD BELSTEAD
 MR BULLARD
 SIR I SINCLAIR
 MR GIFFARD
 MR WRIGHT
 MR GILLMORE
 MR URE
 MR BARRETT
 HD/S AM D
 HD/DEF D
 HD/PLANNING STAFF
 HD/UND
 HD/NEWS D
 HD/ERD
 HD/PUSD
 MR REED, PUSD
 EMERGENCY ROOM
 RESIDENT CLERK

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET (2 copies)

PS/S OF S DEFENCE

PS/HOME SECRETARY

PS/HOME SECRETARY (c/o NO 10 DST)

PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL

PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER

PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG

PS/SIR M PALLISER

PS/SIR A DUFF

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MR FULLER

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SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 011540Z JUNE 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1971 OF 1 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

FALKLANDS

1. FOLLOWING THE PRIME MINISTER'S CALL TO ME YESTERDAY, 31 MAY, I SAW JUDGE CLARK AT THE WHITE HOUSE EARLY THIS MORNING. I ASKED FOR A WORD PERSONALLY WITH THE PRESIDENT TOMORROW MORNING BEFORE HE LEAVES FOR EUROPE AND CLARK SAID THAT HE WOULD ARRANGE THIS.

2. IN THE MEANTIME I EXPLAINED TO CLARK, AS INSTRUCTED, THE BRITISH ATTITUDE ON CEASEFIRE, WITHDRAWAL AND THE FUTURE. THE PRIME MINISTER WANTED IT UNDERSTOOD THAT WE HAD NEGOTIATED IN GOOD FAITH FOR WEEKS AND THE ARGENTINIANS HAD SHOWN NO INTEREST IN A SERIOUS SETTLEMENT: NOW THAT WE HAD ENDURED THE EFFORT AND SACRIFICES OF RETURNING IN FORCE TO THE ISLANDS, WE COULD NOT SIMPLY PULL OUT BEFORE OUR TASK WAS ACCOMPLISHED AND MAKE WAY FOR SOME CONTACT GROUP INCLUDING COUNTRIES FROM LATIN AMERICA.

3. I EXPLAINED TO CLARK THE EXTREME DIFFICULTIES OF TIMING AND THE INHERENT PROBLEM OF ACCEPTING A DETAILED PLAN FOR CEASEFIRE WITHDRAWAL AND THE FUTURE WHEN POISED BEFORE A MAJOR BATTLE FOR PORT STANLEY. HAIG HAD ORIGINALLY SUGGESTED THAT THE PLAN SHOULD BE LAUNCHED ONCE WE HAD TAKEN PORT STANLEY, BUT HE HAD GONE BACK ON THIS AND IN HIS LATEST IDEAS HAD STATED THAT WE MUST ACT BEFORE AN ATTACK BECAUSE THAT WAS THE ONLY HOPE OF GETTING LATIN AMERICAN, AND FOR THAT MATTER ARGENTINIAN, ACQUIESCENCE. IT STRUCK ME THAT JUDGE CLARK WAS EQUIVOCAL ABOUT THE TIMING AND INDEED SAW THE DIFFICULTIES OF DOING ANYTHING BEFORE THE ASSAULT. HE RATHER GAVE ME THE IMPRESSION THAT HE THOUGH THE BEST MOMENT WOULD BE IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE SURRENDER OF THE ARGENTINE GARRISON HAD OCCURRED.

4. CLARK SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THE PRESIDENT DID UNDERSTAND THE FIRMNESS OF OUR POSITION. NEITHER HE NOR HAIG WERE WISHING TO UNDERMINE THIS. THE PRESIDENT HAD TOLD CLARK, FOLLOWING HIS CONVERSATION WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, THAT HE WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED BY HER REMARK THAT QUOTE WE ARE GOING IT ALONE UNQUOTE. THIS WAS NOT HOW THE AMERICANS SAW IT. QUOTE WE ARE IN IT WITH YOU UNQUOTE, JUDGE CLARK SAID. THIS WAS VERY MUCH THE PRESIDENT'S CONVICTION. BUT THIS DID NOT PREVENT HIM FROM BELIEVING THAT CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE HAD ALREADY BEEN DONE TO THE USA'S RELATIONS WITH ITS LATIN AMERICAN NEIGHBOURS, THAT THE US SHOULD NOT NEGLECT ANY CHANCE OF PREVENTING FURTHER BLOODSHED AND THE HUMILIATION OF ARGENTINA THAT COULD GIVE A HOSTAGE FOR THE FUTURE, AND THAT IN THE LONG-TERM THERE HAD TO BE A SETTLEMENT ABOUT THE ISLANDS. CLARK SAID THAT THE US GOVERNMENT THOUGHT THAT THERE WOULD BE VALUE IN HAVING BRAZIL ALONGSIDE THEM IN AN ATTEMPT AT A NEGOTIATIONS BUT THIS WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE IF BRAZIL THOUGHT THAT WE WERE INSISTING ON UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER AND THE HUMILIATION OF ARGENTINA.

5. CLARK ALSO MENTIONED THE FEAR THE US GOVERNMENT HAVE THAT THE SOVIETS COULD INCREASE THEIR INFLUENCE IN LATIN AMERICA GENERALLY, AND IN PARTICULAR IN ARGENTINA.

6. I SAID THAT ARGENTINA HAD NOT SHOWN MUCH INDICATION OF A READINESS TO LIMIT THEIR AGGRESSIVENESS. THEY HAD LAUNCHED FREQUENT ATTACKS ON THE BRITISH FLEET, INCLUDING ONE ONLY LAST SUNDAY. IF THEY WERE READY TO LIMIT HOSTILITIES THERE WAS NO DIFFICULTY IN THEM SHOWING IT. AS IT WAS THEY WERE SCURRYING AROUND THE WORLD TRYING TO ACQUIRE WEAPONS, INCLUDING AIRCRAFT AND MISSILES. AS CLARK HAD MENTIONED BRAZIL, I SAID I MUST TELL HIM THAT WE HAD CATEGORICAL EVIDENCE THAT IMPORTANT WAR MATERIEL FROM

MISSILES. AS CLARK HAD MENTIONED BRAZIL, I SAID I MUST TELL HIM THAT WE HAD CATEGORICAL EVIDENCE THAT IMPORTANT WAR MATERIEL FROM LIBYA WAS BEING SENT TO ARGENTINA THROUGH BRAZIL. THE STATE DEPARTMENT KNEW THE DETAILS BUT IF HE COULD DO ANYTHING TO EXERT PRESSURE ON BRAZIL ON THIS MATTER, THIS WOULD BE USEFUL. CLARK UNDERTOOK TO LOOK INTO THIS.

7. FINALLY I MENTIONED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER LOOKED FORWARD TO HAVING A PRIVATE TALK WITH THE PRESIDENT IN FRANCE ON FRIDAY WHERE THEY COULD GO OVER THE WHOLE MATTER CALMLY. JUDGE CLARK SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS ALSO EAGER TO HAVE THIS MEETING AND HE WOULD PURSUE FURTHER THE BEST PLACE AND TIME FOR BOTH SIDES.

HENDERSON

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