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Se refiere a:

01JUN82 1630Z – UKE Cape Town a FCO. Comunicación con Van Dalsen de Sudáfrica.

(PREM 19/633) (desclasificado diciembre 2012)

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[PLEASE RETURN COPY TO TYPISTS]

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES (37)

S/ MR HURD
S/ MR ONSLOW
S/ PUS
S/ LORD BELSTEAD
R BULLARD
R I SINCLAIR
R GIFFARD
R WRIGHT
R GILLMORE
R URE
MR BARRETT
HD/ S AM D
HD/ DEF D
HD/ PLANNING STAFF
HD/ UND
HD/ NEWS D
HD/ ERD
HD/ PUSD
MR REED, PUSE
EMERGENCY ROOM
RESIDENT CLERK

IMMEDIATE

Ha Staff

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET (2 copies)
PS/S OF S DEFENCE
PS/HOME SECRETARY
PS/HOME SECRETARY (c/o NO 10 DSt)
PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL
PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER
PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG
PS/SIR M PALLISER
PS/SIR A DUFF
MR WADE-GERY
MR FULLER
MR COLVIN
MR O'NEILL HD ASSESS-
MENTS STAFF
DIO
MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MOD
~~DIRECTOR G.C.H.Q. (via Room 8)~~

CABINET
OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL

FM CAPE TOWN EMBASSY 011630Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 383 OF 1 JUNE
INFO PRETORIA

FROM REID

OUR TELNO 58 TO PRETORIA : FALKLANDS : ARMS

1. WHEN I CALLED ON HIM THIS AFTERNOON, VAN DALSEN SAID HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED BY MINISTERS TO TAKE UP THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(A) WE HAD NOT RESPONDED TO THE QUESTION IN THE FINAL SENTENCE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN SPEAKING NOTE OF 11 MAY (OUR TELNO 327) IN WHICH THE SOUTH AFRICANS ENQUIRED (IN ORDER TO GIVE FURTHER INFORMATION TO OUR REQUEST TO SUSPEND ARMS DELIVERIES TO

IN WHICH THE SOUTH AFRICANS ENQUIRED (IN ORDER TO GIVE FURTHER CONSIDERATION TO OUR REQUEST TO SUSPEND ARMS DELIVERIES TO ARGENTINA) WHETHER WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO GUARANTEE THE SUPPLY OF DEFENCE EQUIPMENT AND OTHER STRATEGIC MATERIAL TO SOUTH AFRICA.

(B) WE HAD NOT RESPONDED TO THE REQUEST WHICH HE PUT TO ME ON 25 MAY THAT WE SHOULD COMMENT ON PERSISTENT RUMOURS THAT WE HAD SECRETLY INSPIRED THE ARGUS GROUP'S REPORT OF 24 MAY IN AN ATTEMPT TO FORCE THE SAG INTO MAKING A STATEMENT.

(C) WE HAD SUPPLIED MINES AND OTHER MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO OTHER COUNTRIES AND TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS (SWAPO, ANC ETC) WHICH HAD BEEN USED TO KILL SOUTH AFRICAN SOLDIERS.

(D) BY VOTING IN FAVOUR OF SCR 432 (OF JULY 1978) WE HAD CHALLENGED SOUTH AFRICA'S SOVEREIGNTY OVER WALVIS BAY. AND YET WE NOW CONTINUED TO ASSERT OUR CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE FALKLANDS, A CLAIM WHICH WAS BASED ESSENTIALLY ON THE SAME GROUNDS AS THEIR CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY OVER WALVIS BAY.

(E) WE NEVER CRITICISED SWAPO, WHO WERE CONDUCTING A WAR AGAINST NAMIBIA AND HAD FREQUENTLY COMMITTED ACTS OF TERRORISM.

2. TO (A) ABOVE I REPLIED THAT I WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO GIVE ANYTHING MORE THAN A PERSONAL REPLY, WHICH WAS THAT I TOOK THE SOUTH AFRICAN QUESTION TO BE RHETORICAL. THE SOUTH AFRICANS MUST SURELY REALISE THAT THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF OUR BREACHING THE MANDATORY ARMS EMBARGO. I ADDED THAT OUR REQUEST HAD BEEN THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS SHOULD STOP THE DELIVERY OF ARMS OF ALL KINDS AND ANY MILITARY EQUIPMENT OR SUPPLIES WHICH THE ARGENTINIANS MIGHT USE AGAINST BRITISH FORCES IN THE FALKLANDS. WE WERE NOT COMPLAINING ABOUT MILITARY EQUIPMENT WHICH THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAD SUPPLIED TO ARGENTINA BEFORE THE ARGENTINE INVASION.

COMPLAINING ABOUT MILITARY EQUIPMENT WHICH THE SOUTH AFRICANS
HAD SUPPLIED TO ARGENTINA BEFORE THE ARGENTINE INVASION.
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NOR WERE WE NECESSARILY ASKING THEM TO SUSPEND SUPPLIES AFTER
THE FIGHTING IN THE FALKLANDS HAD FINISHED. OUR REQUEST TO
THE SOUTH AFRICANS WAS THEREFORE OF AN ALTOGETHER DIFFERENT
CHARACTER FROM THEIRS TO US.

3. TO (B) I USED THE TALKING POINT IN YOUR TELNO 196. VAN DALSEN
DID NOT CHALLENGE THIS. I ADDED THAT WE HAD SAID TWO THINGS ON
THE RECORD - IE, THAT WE HAD NOTED AND REPORTED GENERAL MALAN'S
STATEMENT THAT SOUTH AFRICA HAD NOT SUPPLIED ANY MISSILES OR
AIRCRAFT PARTS. WE LATER SAID THAT WE HAD NOTED THE LIMITED SCOPE OF
GENERAL MALAN'S STATEMENT ETC (CF PARA 4 OF GUIDANCE TELNO 109).
I SAID THE PRESS HAD BEEN QUITE UNSCRUPULOUS IN EMBELLISHING
WHAT OUR SPOKESMAN HAD SAID. I WENT ON TO ASK WHETHER VAN DALSEN
WAS SAYING THAT WE HAD DRAWN WRONG INFERENCES FROM GENERAL
MALAN'S STATEMENT. NOTHING WOULD PLEASE US MORE THAN TO HAVE A
COMPREHENSIVE ASSURANCE. VAN DALSEN FELL BACK ON A RECAPITULATION
OF HIS SPEAKING NOTE OF 11 MAY : BUT HE DID NOT REPLY TO MY QUESTION.

4. TO (C), I SAID THAT I HAD NOTICED REPORTS IN THE AFRIKAANS PRESS
THAT WE HAD SUPPLIED LAND MINES TO SWAPO. THE SADF HAD ON AT LEAST
TWO PAST OCCASIONS APPROACHED US OVER BRITISH MADE MINES.
WE HAD REPLIED IN DETAIL. THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF OUR SUPPLYING
ANY WEAPONRY TO SWAPO OR THE ANC. I COULD TELL HIM IN CONFIDENCE
THAT SOME MONTHS AGO THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT HAD SOUGHT TO
BUY FROM US 24 X 40 MM BOFORS AA GUNS. ALTHOUGH THEY WERE STRICTLY
FOR DEFENCE, AND FOR USE ONLY IN ANGOLA, WE HAD REFUSED AN
EXPORT LICENCE OUT OF CONCERN THAT THEY MIGHT BE USED TO KILL
SOUTH AFRICANS. THIS MADE QUITE AN IMPRESSION. VAN DALSEN
WAS CLEARLY UNAWARE OF THE HISTORY OF EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE
SADF AND OUR DEFENCE STAFF ABOUT THE MINES. I SAID I HAD SEEN
MENTION IN THE PRESS TODAY OF CLAYMORE MINES. IF THE SOUTH
AFRICANS COULD PROVIDE DETAILS WE WOULD LOOK INTO THIS.

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AFRICANS COULD PROVIDE DETAILS WE WOULD LOOK INTO THIS.

5. TO (D) I SAID THAT I WOULD SEEK LEGAL ADVICE, BUT MY UNDERSTANDING
WAS THAT WE DID NOT QUESTION SOUTH AFRICA'S CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY
OVER WALVIS BAY (AND THE PENGUIN ISLANDS). HAVING BEEN CLOSELY
INVOLVED IN RESOLUTION 432 AT THE TIME I WOULD MAINTAIN THAT ITS
REAL MEANING WAS TO DEFER NEGOTIATION OVER THE FUTURE STATUS OF
WALVIS BAY UNTIL NAMIBIA HAD BECOME INDEPENDENT. I DID NOT THINK
WE CONSIDERED THAT THE RESOLUTION CALLED IN QUESTION THE CURRENT
STATUS OF WALVIS BAY. ITS TERMS WENT, OF COURSE, FURTHER THAN
WE WOULD HAVE WISHED, BUT THAT WAS THE PRICE WE HAD HAD TO PAY
FOR AN AGREED RESOLUTION.

6. TO (E) I SAID THAT WE DEPLORED VIOLENCE OF ANY KIND IN SUPPORT
OF POLITICAL OBJECTIVES. THE LATEST OCCASION ON WHICH WE HAD
COMMENTED WAS THE RECENT SWAPO INCURSION (TEXT IN FCO TEL TO CAPE
TOWN NO 164). VAN DALSEN DID NOT SEEM TO BE AWARE OF IT.

7. VAN DALSEN ENDED BY STRESSING THE VERY SERIOUS CONCERN WITH
WHICH HIS GOVERNMENT LOOKED ON OUR HANDLING OF THIS MATTER. THERE
WERE OBVIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR
TWO COUNTRIES.

8. THE INTERVIEW WHICH LASTED 25 MINUTES WAS COURTEOUS ON BOTH
SIDES. I APOLOGISED FOR NOTHING, AND HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT, AT
THE END, VAN DALSEN WAS SOMEWHAT ON THE DEFENSIVE.

9. I FELT IT UNAVOIDABLE TO GIVE SOME REPLY TO (A) ABOVE, BUT
HAVE LEFT IT OPEN TO BE CHANGED IF YOU WISH. GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS
IF MY REPLY TO (D) IS INCORRECT OR INCOMPLETE.