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FM FCO 011700Z JUNE 82

TO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 488 OF 1 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

YOUR TELMOS 899 AND 900; FALKLANDS; SECRETARY-GENERAL

1. PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S FIVE-POINT PLAN IS CERTAINLY UNACCEPTABLE AS IT STANDS, BUT I AGREE THAT WITHOUT RAISING FALSE HOPES OR MISREPRESENTING OUR POSITION YOU SHOULD GIVE HIM A REASONED RESPONSE ON THE LINES YOU PROPOSE. WE ASSUME THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IS OBLIGED BY PARA 5 OF RESOLUTION 505 TO REPORT TO THE COUNCIL TOMORROW, 2 JUNE, BUT HOPE THAT AS A RESULT OF THIS TACTIC, TOGETHER WITH EITHER EQUIVOCATION OR DILATORINESS ON THE PART OF THE ARGENTINES, HIS REPORT MIGHT FALL SHORT OF DRAWING A LINE UNDER HIS PRESENT EFFORTS, THUS ENCOURAGING AT LEAST SOME MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL TO ARGUE THAT HE SHOULD MERELY BE MANDATED TO CONTINUE HIS NEGOTIATIONS. THE POINTS TO MAKE HAVE ALREADY BEEN LARGELY COVERED IN YOUR CONVERSATION WITH DE SOTO.

2. YOU SHOULD TELL THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THAT WHILE OTHER ASPECTS OF HIS PLAN GIVE US DIFFICULTY WE APPROVE THE EMPHASIS ON TOTAL ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL WITHIN A FIXED PERIOD OF TIME. WE LOOK FORWARD TO LEARNING OF THE ARGENTINE RESPONSE. MEANWHILE WE HAVE A NUMBER OF COMMENTS AND REQUESTS FOR CLARIFICATION.

3. YOU COULD PRESS THE SECRETARIAT ON THE MODALITIES FOR A CEASEFIRE AND IN PARTICULAR WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IN THE EVENT OF A BREACH. OUR OWN VIEW IS THAT AT THIS STAGE A CEASEFIRE CAN ONLY BE SATISFACTORILY WORKED OUT BY THE MILITARY COMMANDERS ON THE SPOT. IT WOULD OF COURSE BE TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO US THAT OUR HANDS SHOULD BE IN ANY WAY TIED EITHER BY THE WORDING OF THE RESOLUTION OR BY THE PRESENCE OF UN OBSERVERS (PARAGRAPH 7 OF YOUR TELNO 899). (FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION ONLY, WE COULD NOT (NOT) ACCEPT UN OBSERVERS.) WE COULD NOT STAND IDLY BY WHILE ARGENTINE FORCES, IN BREACH OF WITHDRAWAL ARRANGEMENTS.

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RETAINED CONTROL OF ANY PART OF THE FALKLANDS.

4. YOU SHOULD REMIND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THAT OUR POSITION ON BRITISH WITHDRAWAL IS THAT WE CANNOT NOW ACCEPT THAT WITHDRAWAL OF BRITISH FORCES SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN PARALLEL WITH ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. YOU MAY HOWEVER SAY THAT ONCE ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL HAS TAKEN PLACE WE SHOULD NATURALLY WISH TO REDUCE THE BRITISH MILITARY PRESENCE IN AND AROUND THE ISLANDS FROM ITS PRESENT LEVEL AT A TIME OF OUR CHOOSING AND AS AN ACT OF OUR OWN VOLITION PROVIDED THE SECURITY OF THE ISLANDS IS SATISFACTORILY ASSURED. WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THIS POSITION, YOU SHOULD PRESS THE SECRETARIAT TO SAY WHAT THEY MEAN BY 'TOKEN' BRITISH WITHDRAWAL. HOW WOULD SUCH WITHDRAWAL BE GRADUATED THROUGH THE PERIOD OF TOTAL ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL?

5. WITH REGARD TO POINT 5 OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PLAN, YOU MAY SAY THAT WE STAND BY PARAGRAPH 3 OF SCR 502. BUT, AS YOU MADE CLEAR IN EXPLANATION OF VOTE ON SCR 505, WE DO NOT ACCEPT THAT THE POSITION REACHED IN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S EARLIER NEGOTIATIONS IS ANY LONGER RELEVANT. THOSE NEGOTIATIONS IN ANY CASE RELATED TO AN INTERIM PERIOD, NOT TO THE LONGER TERM, WITH WHICH PARA 3 OF SCR 502 WAS CONCERNED. SCR 505 THEREFORE PROVIDES NO RELEVANT 'FRAMEWORK'. YOU SHOULD EMPHASISE THAT SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE UNTIL THE ISLANDS HAVE RETURNED TO NORMAL AND THE ISLANDERS HAVE HAD TIME TO CONSIDER THE FUTURE. THIS COOLING-OFF PERIOD CAN ONLY BEGIN AFTER ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. IT IS IN ANY CASE ESSENTIAL THAT THERE SHOULD BE NOTHING ON NEGOTIATIONS IN THE AGREEMENT WHICH THE ARGENTINES COULD USE AS AN EXCUSE FOR DELAYING THE COMPLETION OF THEIR WITHDRAWAL.

PXM

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HD/PLANNING STAFF

HD/UND

HD/NEWS D

HD/ERD

HD/ECD (E)

HD/FUSD

DEP HD/FUSD

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