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Se refiere a:

05JUN82 0020Z – UKE Washington a FCO. Conversación con USA sobre la votación en el Consejo de Seguridad de ONU.

(PREM 19/633) (desclasificado diciembre 2012)

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UKDEL VERSAILLES TELNO 003: FALKLAND ISLANDS:
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1. I HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH SEVERAL TIMES TODAY WITH STOESSEL TO KEEP HIM ABREAST OF OUR THINKING AND TO TRY TO MAKE SURE THE STATE DEPARTMENT DID NOT WOBBLE, GIVEN THE ABSENCE FROM WASHINGTON OF BOTH HAIG AND EAGLEBURGER. I HAD TOLD STOESSEL THIS AFTERNOON IN GENERAL TERMS ABOUT THE LINES WE WOULD NOW BE TAKING, (UKDEL VERSAILLES TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE). HE UNDERSTOOD THE LOGIC OF OUR POSITION, BUT WAS WORRIED ABOUT HOW TO EXPLAIN A US VETO AGAINST A RESOLUTION THAT CONFIRMED SCR 502 AND 505.
 2. I SAID THAT WHAT WE NOW NEEDED WAS A SERIOUS EFFORT FOR A CEASE-FIRE, NOT ONE WHICH LEFT OPPORTUNITIES WIDE OPEN FOR ARGENTINA TO CONTINUE TO PROCRASTINATE. I EXPLAINED THE POINTS WHICH SIR A PARSONS WAS LIKELY TO BE MAKING IN A UK EXPLANATION OF VOTE (PARA.8 OF YOUR TELEGRAM TO PARIS NO.334) AND REMINDED HIM THAT THE SITUATION HAD CHANGED RADICALLY SINCE SCR 502 HAD BEEN ADOPTED. THE POSITION ON THE GROUND WAS NOW SUCH THAT WE NEEDED AN ABSOLUTELY CLEAR LINKAGE BETWEEN CEASE FIRE AND WITHDRAWAL, WITH A STARTING TIME FOR WITHDRAWAL AND A CLEAR TIME LIMIT FOR COMPLETION. STOESSEL SEEMED TO AGREE THAT THIS WAS RIGHT, BUT IT WAS CLEAR THAT HE WAS UNDER SOME PRESSURE. I TOLD HIM THAT HAIG HAD ASSURED YOU IN VERSAILLES THAT MRS KIRKPATRICK HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO VOTE WITH SIR A PARSONS. STOESSEL SAID, SLIGHTLY HESITANTLY, THAT THIS WAS TRUE: BUT HE RETURNED TO THE PROBLEM FOR THE U.S. OF COMING UP WITH AN ADEQUATE EXPLANATION OF VOTE. HE WOULD BE DISCUSSING THIS WITH HAIG AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
 3. LATER I SPOKE TO STOESSEL AGAIN ABOUT THE NEED TO PERSUADE THE JAPANESE TO ABSTAIN, AS A POSSIBLE MEANS OF AVOIDING THE NEED TO VETO. I SAID THAT I UNDERSTOOD WE WOULD BE RAISING THIS WITH THE JAPANESE DELEGATION AT VERSAILLES AND SUGGESTED THAT THE AMERICANS MIGHT DO THE SAME. STOESSEL UNDERTOOK TO TRY TO SPEAK TO HAIG AT ONCE ABOUT THIS.
 4. STOESSEL THEN TELEPHONED ME BACK, AFTER THE MEETING WAS WELL UNDER WAY IN NEW YORK, TO SAY THAT HAIG HAD NOW CONSIDERED THE PROBLEM AND HAD DECIDED THAT, GIVEN THAT NO EFFORT HAD BEEN MADE TO IMPROVE THE DRAFT, IT WAS NO LONGER APPROPRIATE FOR THE UNITED STATES TO VOTE AGAINST IT. HE HAD THEREFORE GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS THAT MRS KIRKPATRICK SHOULD ABSTAIN. IN THE MEANTIME, HOWEVER, SHE HAD ALREADY ACTED ON HER EARLIER INSTRUCTIONS WHICH HAD BEEN TO JOIN US IN VOTING AGAINST. STOESSEL SAID THAT SHE HAD NOW BEEN INSTRUCTED TO CHANGE HER VOTE. HE CONCLUDED LAMELY THAT HAIG HAD TRIED TO REACH YOU BY TELEPHONE TO EXPLAIN HIS THINKING. IT WAS MOST REGRETTABLE THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO DO SO AT THE TIME (THOUGH I UNDERSTAND HE HAD SPOKEN TO YOU SINCE.)
 5. I SAID THAT THIS SUDDEN SWITCH WOULD CAUSE THE UTMOST DISMAY.

ONLY THIS MORNING HAIG HAD GIVEN YOU AN ASSURANCE THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD JOIN US IN VOTING AGAINST THE RESOLUTION. MOREOVER I COULD NOT IMAGINE WHAT THE REST OF THE WORLD WOULD MAKE OF THE UNITED STATES CHANGING ITS MIND PUBLICLY IN SUCH A FASHION. STOESEL HAD THE GRACE TO BE EXTREMELY EMBARRASSED.

6. HIS EMBARRASSMENT BECAME ACUTE WHEN HE HAD TO TELEPHONE ME TEN MINUTES AFTERWARDS TO TELL ME THAT MRS KIRKPATRICK HAD DUG HER TOES IN AND WAS STICKING TO HER VETO. HER NEW INSTRUCTIONS HAD ARRIVED TOO LATE AND SHE WOULD NOT CHANGE. I SAID I WAS MOST RELIEVED. HAD THE UNITED STATES ABSTAINED AFTER SO MANY ASSURANCES THAT THEY WOULD STICK WITH US, I FEARED THAT TO SAY THE LEAST IT WOULD HAVE DONE SERIOUS DAMAGE TO MUTUAL CONFIDENCE.

7. STOESEL HAS NOW SPOKEN AGAIN TO HAIG WHO AGREED THAT THINGS SHOULD REMAIN AS THEY ARE. IF THE PRESS PICKS UP THE CONFUSION, AS IT SEEMS BOUND TO DO, THE STATE DEPARTMENT WILL TRY TO GET AWAY WITH BLAMING IT ON THE DIFFICULTY OF RAPID COMMUNICATION, WITH HAIG IN VERSAILLES ATTENDING THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT MEETINGS. THEY WILL GO ON TO DRAW ATTENTION TO THE DEFICIENCIES IN THE DRAFT RESOLUTION AS IT STOOD, IN PARTICULAR THE ABSENCE OF A DATE CERTAIN OR WIGHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINIAN FORCES FROM THE FALKLANDS.

THOMAS