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FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP (DETAILED VERSION):0700 HOURS, 5 JUNE 1982United Nations

- A (UKMis New
York tel no 933)
- B (UKMis New
York tel no 934)
- C (UKMis New
York tel no 935)
- D (UKMis New
York tel no 936)
1. A slightly amended version of the Panamanian/Spanish draft failed to secure adoption yesterday evening (4 June) because of vetoes by the UK and US. The voting was 9 - 2 (UK US) - 4 (France Guyana Jordan Togo). The Resolution secured 9 votes only because of a last minute switch by Japan. After the vote Mrs Kirkpatrick stated in the Council that she had been asked by her Government to say that if it were possible to change a vote once cast the United States would like to change its vote from a veto to an abstention. Her Deputy told the press that Haig had given the orders to change to an abstention too late for the vote in the Council.
 2. Upon receipt of his instructions from Versailles Sir A Parsons informed De Pinies (Spain) and the President of the Council (de Nanteuil - France) that we would not be proposing amendments to the Panamanian/Spanish draft. Both said that in that case there was no alternative to voting that afternoon (4 June). In the delay of about two hours before the vote, Mrs Kirkpatrick made several efforts to persuade Haig in Versailles to switch from a no to abstention. The draft Resolution would not have secured the necessary nine votes had not the Japanese Ambassador, to his obvious chagrin, received instructions from Versailles at the last minute to switch from an abstention to a vote in favour. Last minute efforts were made by ourselves (telecon Emergency Unit/UKDel Versailles) and the French to get the Japanese instructions changed back to an abstention. But it was too late and the vote could not be delayed any longer.
 3. The draft Resolution voted on was essentially the same as the earlier revised text with the first and second operative paragraphs run together and an unhelpful change to the third operative paragraph. Sir A Parsons spoke first in explanation of vote before the vote emphasising that the draft did not meet UK criteria.
 4. Sir A Parsons describes Mrs Kirkpatrick's performance as 'truly grotesque'. She claimed incomprehensibly to the press that when she had vetoed she had not realised that Sir A Parsons was going to do so too. Her performance has thus excited much more media attention than our veto.
 5. There has been very little talk yet about an Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly. Sir A Parsons considers that at present there will be little sympathy for such a call which would need either nine votes in the Security Council or a letter signed by a majority of the whole UN membership.

/Vulcan

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Vulcan Aircraft Diversion

6. The Vulcan aircraft diverted to Brazil on 3 June, is still being held at Rio de Janeiro military airport.

7. The missile was successfully detached from the aircraft yesterday afternoon and stored separately by the Brazilian authorities outside the supervision of our Air Attache. No action was taken by the Brazilians to refuel the aircraft.

8. The Brazilian Foreign Ministry have received a formal Note from the Argentine Ambassador, requesting them to intern the aircraft. The former have reported that no decision has yet been taken, and they have advised HM Ambassador that they are prepared to give consideration to British thoughts on the Argentine request.

9. HM Ambassador has been instructed to seek a meeting with the Foreign Minister, to express HMG's surprise and disappointment at the delay in allowing the aircraft to depart. HMA has also been instructed to draw the Brazilian Government's attention to the fact that they are allowing Argentine aircraft, transporting military equipment, to use Brazilian airfields.

10. The State Department have instructed their Ambassador to raise the matter at the highest possible level with the Brazilian authorities.

Non-Aligned Meeting Havana

11. The final scheduled date of the Plenary Session has been reached with only half of the speakers having spoken and is expected to continue late into the night of 4/5 June. The reference to the Falkland Islands in the general statement of international problems in the final communique has been withdrawn at Yugoslav insistence and should therefore only appear in the Latin American section. Drafting is continuing. The Caribbeans and Africans have resisted a one-sided text. Clumsy references to apartheid in Costa Mendez' speech were reportedly greeted with laughter by some African representatives who recalled that Argentina had never previously supported their efforts against South Africa. General feeling is that the reference in the communique will probably be even-handed while making reference to previous NAM support for Argentine sovereign claim, but the UK veto in the Security Council may affect the outcome.

COMMENT

12. As Sir A Parsons has commented, it has been a remarkable achievement to avoid having to use a veto until this late stage. Even then it was a tight run thing. There seems to be no immediate likelihood of an Emergency Session of the General Assembly.


13. We need to consider action on the following:

- (a) to take up with the Japanese at the highest level our disappointment at their switch of vote;

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- (b) to send messages of thanks to Guyana, Jordan and Togo for their support (any necessary thanks to the US and France can presumably be done best at Versailles);
- (c) the issue of early guidance to posts on the Security Council outcome emphasising the bare majority for the Resolution, the fact that we are not isolated and, as appropriate, that the Secretary-General's good offices can continue. We will need to be careful to take a non-committal line on the odd US behaviour. It will, however, be too late for further lobbying of NAM members.



5 June 1982

P R Fearn

Emergency Unit

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