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Se refiere a:

05JUN82 – Nota del FCO. Postura de la votación en el Consejo de Seguridad de ONU.

(Margaret Thatcher Foundation) (desclasificado 2013)

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FCO UNATTRIBUTABLE LINE TO TAKE ON:
U N SECURITY COUNCIL

JUNE 5, 1982

The draft resolution voted on late on 4 June failed to be adopted by 9 votes in favour to two against (UK and USA), with four abstentions (France, Guyana, Jordan and Togo).

The British voted against because the call for an immediate ceasefire was not directly linked to a call for Argentine withdrawal according to a determined timetable.

It is for others to explain their votes

Perhaps some of the oddities in the voting pattern may be explained by the oddities in the Resolution:

- (a) Paragraph one includes a simple call for an immediate ceasefire which we have always explained was unacceptable to us unless explicitly linked to a withdrawal with a timetable. In this case it was linked with a call to initiate the implementation of 502 and 505.
- (b) 502 includes a call for the withdrawal of Argentine forces. It therefore seemed to some others that this constituted the link on which we had already insisted.
- (c) It did not seem so to us, for the following reasons:
 - (i) The Argentines had been under the Security Council demand to withdraw for eight weeks. There was no evidence to suppose that they would pay more attention to it now.
 - (ii) The link was exceedingly indirect.
 - (iii) There was no timetable for withdrawal - and thus infinite scope for Argentine procrastination with which we have become so familiar.
 - (iv) In present circumstances, with British troops

investing Port Stanley, we have explained that arrangements for honorable withdrawal/surrender can now only be negotiated by the Commanders on the spot. Any UN Resolution would therefore have to be quite explicitly clear.

We are absolutely confident that the curious events in the Security Council are to be explained by the specific text of the Resolution, and that they do not affect the strong political support renewed to the Prime Minister yesterday by Presidents Reagan and Mitterrand.

USA

Haig spoke to Pym late last night to explain that in the light of the close link between 502 and the ceasefire the Americans had decided that they could not veto. Mr Pym expressed dismay. Within 10 minutes Mr Haig had phoned back to explain that these new instructions had arrived too late.

Japan

As soon as we learned that Japan had moved from abstention to an intention to vote for the Resolution, Mr Pym spoke to the Japanese Foreign Minister at midnight, to urge him to reconsider. The Japanese explained that they were voting in favour in the expectation of an early Argentine withdrawal. Mr Pym said there was no evidence to support this, The Japanese agreed to reconsider, but it now appears that this conversation took place too late. It ought not to have been too difficult for Japan to have abstained in the company of France, Guyana, Jordan and Togo. It is a pity to find them in the company of the Soviet Union, China and Poland.

R505 would have been overtaken by this Res. had it been adopted and ref. to it were clearly designed to permit Argentine to make conditions for her withdrawal on the basis of the approach followed by the S.C. 3 weeks ago