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Se refiere a:

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BSB/FCO 002/06

OO FCO DESKBY 060700Z

OO MODUK AIR DESKBY 060700Z

OO WASHINGTON DESKBY 061300Z

OO UKDEL VERSAILLES DESKBY 060800Z

GRS 760

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BRASILIA 060120Z JUNE 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO DESKBY 060700Z

TELEGRAM NUMBER 252 OF 06 JUNE

AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK AIR (SIC 19F) AND MODUK (FOR BGS/INT AND DIC ARMS CELL) DESKBY 060700Z

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON DESKBY 061300Z, IMMEDIATE UKDEL VERSAILLES (FOR S OF S' PARTY) DESKBY 060800Z

MY TELNO 249 VULCAN DIVERSION

1. I SAW THE FOREIGN MINISTER AT HIS HOME AT 052130Z. THE OUTCOME CAN BE SUMMARISED THUS:

(A) RELEASE OF VULCAN. NO RELEASE TILL LEGAL ADVISERS AT ITAMARATY AND AIR MINISTRY HAVE PRONOUNCED. NO INDICATION OF WHEN THEY MIGHT CONCLUDE THEIR CONSIDERATION, WHICH WILL BE RESUMED ON MONDAY.

(B) MISSILE. DEFINITELY NO RELEASE TILL END OF HOSTILITIES. MEANWHILE, IT WILL BE KEPT AS SECURE AS POSSIBLE AND, IF FEASIBLE, SEALED IN PRESENCE OF MY AIR ATTACHE.

(C) CREW. PRESENT CREW FREE TO STAY OR DEPART FROM BRAZIL

(B) MISSILE. DEFINITELY NO RELEASE TILL END OF HOSTILITIES.
MEANWHILE, IT WILL BE KEPT AS SECURE AS POSSIBLE AND, IF FEASIBLE,
SEALED IN PRESENCE OF MY AIR ATTACHE.

(C) CREW. PRESENT CREW FREE TO STAY OR DEPART FROM BRAZIL.
SENDING OF REPLACEMENT CREW (SUGGESTED IN YOR TELNO 168) UN-
ACCEPTABLE, AS TOO CONSPICUOUS.

(D) AIRCRAFT SECURITY. MY INSISTENCE ON CONTINUED CREW PRESENCE
ON AIRCRAFT WILL BE MADE CLEAR TO AIR MINISTER.

(E) LIBYAN-ARGENTINE AIRBRIDGE THROUGH RECIFE. THE AIRCRAFT
REFERRED TO IN MY BOUT DE PAPIER (MY TELNO 250) HAD BEEN
INSPECTED BY THE COMPETENT SERVICES, AND NO ARMS FOUND. (I
DOUBT THIS)

(F) ARMS FROM BRAZIL. BRAZIL REFUSED TO ALLOW TRIANGULAR ARMS
DEALS FOR ARGENTINA I.E. SHE WOULD NOT ALLOW BRAZILIAN ENTITIES
TO ORDER ARMS ON BEHALF OF ARGENTINA. BUT TO MAKE UP FOR THIS
SHE DID PERMIT SALES OF BRAZILIAN ARMAMENTS, WHICH WERE LESS
INTERESTING TO ARGENTINA.

2. I BEGAN BY HANDING OVER THE BOUT DE PAPIER (AS AMENDED
BY YOUR TELNO 168) GUERREIRO STUDIED IT IN SILENCE. HE THEN
LAUNCHED INTO A LENGTHY APOLOGIA OF BRAZIL'S DELICATE
RELATIONSHIP WITH ARGENTINA. HE SAID CANDIDLY THAT BRAZIL
HAD TO GIVE ARGENTINA SOMETHING OF WHAT SHE WANTED IN ORDER
TO CONSERVE THE GOOD RELATIONS BUILT UP SO LABORIOUSLY. ARGENTINA
WAS A BOMB THEY WANTED TO DEFUSE RATHER THAN KICK. HE WOULD
NOT BE DRAWN ON THE TIMING OF THE LEGAL STUDY, OR ITS LIKELY
OUTCOME. HOWEVER, HE DID ADMIT THAT THE "HOSTILITIES" DURING
WHICH THE VULCAN MIGHT BE RETAINED HERE, WERE ESSENTIALLY THE
LAND BATTLE ON THE FALKLANDS.

3. I TOLD GUERREIRO THAT IT WAS ALL
VERY WELL FOR BRAZIL TO CONCENTRATE ON ARGENTINE REACTIONS,
WHICH WE ALL KNEW TO BE UNPREDICTABLE. BUT THE BRAZILIAN
GOVERNMENT MUST REALISE THAT AN ISSUE OF THIS KIND, COMING AT
THE CRITICAL TIME IT DID, AROUSED VERY STRONG FEELINGS IN BRITAIN
IT WAS BEING REGARDED AS A LITMUS-TEST OF BRAZILIAN EVEN-
HANDEDNESS.

THE VOLTE FACE YESTERDAY, WHEN ALL HAD SEEMED TO BE SATISFACTORILY
SETTLED IN THE LIGHT OF THE AIR MINISTER'S NOTE OF 3 JUNE
(MY TELNO 239), HAD CAUSED SHOCKWAVES IN LONDON. AS THE PUS
HAD TOLD CAMPOS (YOUR TELNO 160) THE BRAZILIAN

SETTLED IN THE LIGHT OF THE AIR MINISTER'S NOTE OF 3 JUNE
(MY TELNO 239), HAD CAUSED SHOCKWAVES IN LONDON. AS THE PUS
HAD TOLD CAMPOS (YOUR TELNO 169), THE BRAZILIAN

THORITIES SHOULD BE IN NO DOUBT AS TO THE SERIOUSNESS WITH
WHICH WE REGARDED THE REVERSAL OF THE INITIAL DECISION TO
RELEASE THE AIRCRAFT.

4. ON THE SALES OF BRAZILIAN ARMS AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT
TO ARGENTINA, I TOLD GUERREIRO THAT PARTICULAR EXCEPTION WOULD
BE TAKEN TO THE EXPORT OF CERTAIN KEY ITEMS, FOR INSTANCE A
SUBMARINE, AND REMINDED HIM OF HIS ASSURANCE TO ME AT THE START
OF THE CONFLICT THAT NOTHING "DECISIVE" WOULD BE PROVIDED TO
ARGENTINA. GUERREIRO REPEATED THIS ASSURANCE. SOME BANDEIRANTE
MARITIME RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN MADE OVER; AND
THE ARGENTINES MIGHT ASK FOR XAVANTE TRAINERS, WHICH COULD BE
CONVERTED TO A GROUND-SUPPORT ROLE. BUT NOTHING LIKE A SUBMARINE
WOULD BE HANDED OVER. BRAZIL HAD BARELY ENOUGH MAJOR ARMAMENTS
FOR ITS OWN PURPOSES.

5. GUERREIRO AND RICUPERO, WHO WAS PRESENT, WERE UNCONVINCING
ON THE ALLEGED SEARCHING OF ONE OF THE ARGENTINE FLIGHTS THROUGH
RECIFE, AND THE APPARENTLY NON-MILITARY NATURE OF ITS CARGO.
THEY DISMISSED THE NEWSPAPER REPORTS. I SAID THAT THE REPORTS
MERELY CORROBORATED DETAILED INFORMATION IN OUR POSSESSION.
I ASKED WHETHER THE AUTHORITIES WOULD HAVE IMPOUNDED MILITARY
EQUIPMENT IF IT HAD COME TO LIGHT. GUERREIRO HESITATED AND THEN
SAID THAT THEY WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO IMPOUND SUCH EQUIPMENT
BUT WOULD PROBABLY TAKE MEASURES TO DISCOURAGE SUCH TRAFFIC.
I ASKED IF THE HAGUE RULES WOULD NOT APPLY IN SUCH A CASE.
GUERREIRO AVOIDED COMMENT AND LOOKED UNCOMFORTABLE.

6. FINALLY I PUT IT TO GUERREIRO THAT HE SEEMED TO BE SAYING
THAT THE VULCAN WAS BEING USED AS A PROPITIATORY OFFERING TO
ARGENTINE -BRAZILIAN RELATIONS. HE DID NOT DENY THIS. I SAID
THAT WE HOPED THAT OUR STRONG REPRESENTATIONS, BOTH HERE AND
IN LONDON, WOULD CAUSE THE BRAZILIANS TO CHANGE THEIR MINDS.
GUERREIRO SAID THAT THEY WOULD CERTAINLY BE GIVEN DUE WEIGHT.

7. IN FACT, I THINK THAT THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF THE BOUT DE PAPIER
WILL HAVE A CHILLING EFFECT ON THE BRAZILIANS. BUT I AM NOT
CONFIDENT THAT THEY WILL ALLOW THE VULCAN TO DEPART UNTIL
FIGHTING ON THE FALKLANDS HAS ENDED.