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Se refiere a:

06JUN82 0445Z y 0446Z – Referencia, y mensaje, del Secretario General de ONU a Margaret Thatcher y a Galtieri.

(PREM 19/634) (desclasificado diciembre 2012)

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
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CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 060445Z JUNE 82

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 944 OF 6 JUNE

AND TO FLASH UKDEL VERSAILLES (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY)

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

FALKLANDS:

1. MIFT CONTAINS A MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE PRIME MINISTER. AN IDENTICAL MESSAGE HAS BEEN SENT TO GALTIERI.
2. THE S-8 IS NOT WELL AND DE SOTO DELIVERED THE MESSAGE TO ME LATE TONIGHT (SATURDAY). I ASKED HIM WHETHER THE S-G HAD ANY INDICATION OF A CHANGE IN THE ARGENTINE POSITION; I KNEW THAT THEY HAD CALLED ON HIM EARLIER IN THE DAY. DE SOTO SAID THAT THEY HAD NOT; ALL HE COULD TELL ME WAS THAT THE S-G WAS MAKING SURE THAT HIS MESSAGE "GOT TO THE RIGHT PEOPLE".
3. I BELIEVE THAT THIS IS ANOTHER GENUINE LAST MINUTE ATTEMPT BY PEREZ DE CUELLAR TO TRY TO BRING ABOUT ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL WITHOUT FURTHER BLOODSHED. OBVIOUSLY IT HAS COME TOO LATE, WHILE POINTS 4-7 WOULD DRAW US BACK INTO THE MORASS FROM WHICH WE EMERGED ON 28 MAY.
4. I RECOMMEND THAT I SHOULD BE AUTHORISED TO TRANSMIT A MESSAGE FROM THE P.M. TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR BY 8PM NEW YORK TIME ON SUNDAY. THIS MESSAGE MIGHT INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:-
 - (A) APPRECIATE OF THE S-G'S, CONTINUED EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE THE PEACEFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 502 AND TO AVOID FURTHER LOSS OF LIFE.
 - (B) REGRET THAT ARGENTINE INTRANSIGENCE HAS RENDERED HIS APPROACH TO A CEASEFIRE/WITHDRAWAL/NEGOTIATIONS UNACCEMPTABLE AT THIS LATE STAGE; TO THE VERY END OF THE RECENT SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE WE HAD LOOKED FOR BUT HAD FAILED TO DETECT ANY SIGN OF CHANGE IN ARGENTINA'S ATTITUDE;
 - (C) CONFIRMATION AND REINFORMCEMENT OF ARGENTINA'S ATTITUDE TO BE

(B) REGRET THAT ARGENTINE INTRANSIGENCE HAS RENDERED HIS APPROACH TO A CEASEFIRE/WITHDRAWAL/NEGOTIATIONS UNACCEPTABLE AT THIS LATE STAGE: TO THE VERY END OF THE RECENT SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE WE HAD LOOKED FOR BUT HAD FAILED TO DETECT ANY SIGN OF CHANGE IN ARGENTINA'S ATTITUDE:

(C) CONFIRMATION AND REINFORCEMENT OF ARGENTINA'S ATTITUDE TO BE FOUND IN THE NAM COMMUNIQUE (HAVANA TELS NO'S 3 AND 4 TO ME).

(D) IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE THE SG'S PROGRAMME FOR A CEASEFIRE/WITHDRAWAL WOULD NOT WORK: ONLY DIRECT CONTACT BETWEEN THE TWO COMMANDERS WOULD ACHIEVE THIS NOW (POINTS 1 AND 2):

(E) WE WILL NOT COMMIT OURSELVES NOW, AFTER ALL THAT HAS HAPPENED, TO A PROGRAMME FOR A REDUCTION OF BRITISH FORCES "IN THE REGION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS", OR TO FUTURE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS UNDER UN AUSPICES (POINT 4). WE CANNOT ALLOW OUR RIGHT TO DEFEND THE ISLANDS TO BE PREJUDICED.

(F) EQUALLY WE WILL NOT NOW COMMIT OURSELVES TO A PROGRAMME OF NEGOTIATIONS (POINTS 5-7) UNDER UN AUSPICES, ESPECIALLY "TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY": OUR ATTITUDE TO THIS PROPOSITION IS INEVITABLY INFLUENCED BY THE NAM COMMUNIQUE AND BY OUR EXPERIENCES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH CONCLUDED ON 28 MAY.

(G) HENCE, ALTHOUGH WE APPRECIATE THE POSITIVE ELEMENTS IN THE SG'S PROPOSALS, WE ARE NOT ABLE TO GIVE UNQUALIFIED ACCEPTANCE TO SUCH A FAR REACHING SET OF PROPOSITIONS "AS AN INTEGRAL WHOLE". WE CANNOT ALLOW OURSELVES TO BE DRAWN INTO ANOTHER PROBABLY LONG DRAWN OUT NEGOTIATION WITH ARGENTINE FORCES STILL SITTING ON THE ISLANDS. OUR FIRST AND FOREMOST OBJECTIVE MUST BE TO SECURE IMMEDIATE AND TOTAL ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL.

5. IT IS NOT INCONVEIVABLE THAT THE ARGENTINES WILL ACCEPT THE PROPOSALS "AS AN INTEGRATED WHOLE" FOR PRECISELY THE REASONS THAT THEY ARE UNACCEPTABLE TO US I.E. THAT THEY COULD THEN PRESS FOR A CEASEFIRE WHILE NEGOTIATIONS BEGAN ON POINTS 4-7. EQUALLY, IF PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAS REVEALED HIS IDEAS TO THE AMERICANS, THEY MAY TRY TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON US TO ACCEPT.

PARSONS

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 060446Z JUNE 82
TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 945 OF 6 JUNE

AND TO FLASH UKDEL VERSAILLES (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY)

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

MIPT: FALKLANDS.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE.

BEGINS

MESSAGE TO HER EXCELLENCY, THE RIGHT HONOURABLE MARGARET THATCHER, M.P., PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND.

EXCELLENCY:

THE ARMED CONFLICT IN THE REGION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS) THREATENS TO ENTER INTO A NEW AND EXTREMELY DANGEROUS PHASE THAT IS LIKELY TO RESULT IN HEAVY LOSS OF LIFE ON BOTH SIDES. THIS WOULD GRAVELY PREJUDICE, FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, ANY PROSPECT FOR A SETTLEMENT OF THE UNDERLYING DISPUTE. TENSION AND CONFLICT WOULD CONTINUE, IN CONTRADICTION TO THE INTERESTS OF ALL CONCERNED.

I FEEL IT MY DUTY IN THIS SITUATION, IN PURSUANCE OF THE MANDATE ENTRUSTED TO ME BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL, TO APPEAL DIRECTLY TO YOUR EXCELLENCY AND TO PRESIDENT GALTIERI, IN THE HOPE THAT A WAY CAN STILL BE FOUND TO BRING THE FIGHTING TO A HALT AND TO INITIATE NEGOTIATIONS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT OF THIS CRISIS.

AT THIS LATE STAGE, FURTHER EXCHANGES WITH THE PARTIES ARE NOT LIKELY TO BE PRODUCTIVE. I THEREFORE WISH TO SUGGEST THE FOLLOW-

YOUR EXCELLENCY AND TO PRESIDENT GALTIERI, IN THE HOPE THAT A WAY CAN STILL BE FOUND TO BRING THE FIGHTING TO A HALT AND TO INITIATE NEGOTIATIONS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT OF THIS CRISIS.

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AT THIS LATE STAGE, FURTHER EXCHANGES WITH THE PARTIES ARE NOT LIKELY TO BE PRODUCTIVE. I THEREFORE WISH TO SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING PLAN WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS AN INTEGRAL WHOLE:

1. A TRUCE COMES INTO EFFECT AS OF 11.00 A.M., NEW YORK TIME, ON MONDAY, 7 JUNE 1982.
2. ON WEDNESDAY, 9 JUNE, THE TWO MILITARY COMMANDERS ON THE ISLANDS MEET IN THE PRESENCE OF A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR THE PURPOSE OF AGREEING ON THE MODALITIES OF THE CEASE-FIRE, WHICH IS TO COME INTO EFFECT BY 11.00 A.M, NEW YORK TIME, ON FRIDAY, 11 JUNE.
3. SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE CEASE-FIRE, WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES FROM THE ISLANDS WILL COMMENCE, TO BE COMPLETED WITHIN 15 DAYS. ARGENTINA WILL INFORM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE WITHDRAWAL SCHEDULE.
4. WITHIN THIS TIME FRAME, THE UNITED KINGDOM WILL INFORM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF PLANS FOR THE REDUCTION OF ITS FORCES IN THE REGION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS). IN THE LIGHT OF THESE PLANS, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WILL UNDER-TAKE CONSULTATIONS ON THE POSSIBILITY OF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS UNDER UNITED NATIONS AUSPICES.
5. THE PARTIES UNDERTAKE TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS IN GOOD FAITH UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, FOR THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THEIR DISPUTE AND TO SEEK, WITH A SENSE OF URGENCY, THE COMPLETION OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS BY 31 DECEMBER 1982, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. THESE NEGOTIATIONS SHALL BE INITIATED WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE RIGHTS, CLAIMS OR POSITION OF THE PARTIES AND WITHOUT PREJUDGEMENT OF THE OUTCOME. THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE HELD IN NEW YORK OR AT A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE LOCATION IN THE VICINITY THEREOF.
6. THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE INAUGURATED ON 1 JULY 1982.
7. SHOULD THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, AFTER TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS AND THE VIEWS OF THE PARTIES, DETERMINE THAT THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE WITHIN THE TIME FRAME ENVISAGED, HE MAY ESTABLISH A NEW TARGET DATE WHICH WILL BE IN KEEPING WITH THE URGENCY OF A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO WHICH THE PARTIES ARE COMMITTED.

TO BE EFFECTIVE, THE ABOVE PLAN WILL REQUIRE THAT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS COMMUNICATE THEIR UNQUALIFIED ACCEPTANCE BY 8.00 P.M., NEW YORK TIME, ON SUNDAY, 6 JUNE 1982. UPON RECEIPT OF SUCH POSITIVE

ACHIEVEMENT OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE
WITHIN THE TIME FRAME ENVISAGED, HE MAY ESTABLISH A NEW TARGET DATE
WHICH WILL BE IN KEEPING WITH THE URGENCY OF A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION
TO WHICH THE PARTIES ARE COMMITTED.

TO BE EFFECTIVE, THE ABOVE PLAN WILL REQUIRE THAT THE TWO
GOVERNMENTS COMMUNICATE THEIR UNQUALIFIED ACCEPTANCE BY 8.00 P.M.,
NEW YORK TIME, ON SUNDAY, 6 JUNE 1982. UPON RECEIPT OF SUCH POSITIVE
RESPONSES, I WILL IMMEDIATELY REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

PLEASE ACCEPT, EXCELLENCY, THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST
CONSIDERATION.

JAVIER PEREZ DE CUELLAR.

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