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FALKLAND ISLANDS : FCO SITREP (DETAILED VERSION) :
0700 HOURS, 8 JUNE 1982

✓ 3

Paragraph 1 deleted and retained under Section 3(4).

On Wayland

11 September 2012

Vulcan Diversion

: (FCO telno. 2. Instructions were sent to HM Ambassador, Brasilia, to
) to Brasilia) renew representations about the detained Vulcan aircraft and
 to make four main points:-

- (a) the British Government's view that the draft Hague Rules were neither relevant nor binding;
- (b) our view that this is a political and not a legal question;
- (c) Brazilian even-handedness did not appear to apply to military supplies for Argentina transitting Brazil; and,
- (d) the British Government strongly held the view that such arms transits should stop.

: (Brasilia
 lno.258 to
)

3. HM Ambassador made representations accordingly to the Brazilian Foreign Minister on the evening of 7 June, putting him through the wringer on the points above. He received some small comfort and concludes that the Brazilian Legal Adviser will say that the Hague Rules do not apply; that the Brazilian Government will then seek a political solution (possibly the aircraft being put into bond); and that the Brazilians will somewhat late in the day stir themselves to discourage the Argentines from routing their arms purchases from Libya through Brazil.

Follow-up to the Security Council

: (Tokyo tel.
 .285 to FCO)

4. HM Ambassador, Tokyo, reports his representations to the Japanese Government expressing our astonishment and dismay at the Japanese vote. Japanese explanations continued to be unsatisfactory. Mr Cortazzi suggested to the Japanese that they might now retrieve the damage by reinforcing their diplomatic pressure on the Argentines or instituting further economic sanctions.

(Accra tel.
 .301 to FCO)

5. HM Ambassador, Accra, reports that he conveyed our thanks to the Togolese MFA for their support and recommends that a message of appreciation be sent from the Prime Minister to President Eyadema in order to ensure Togo's future cooperation.

: (FCO telno.
 to Kinshasa)

6. HM Embassy, Kinshasa, have been informed that in view of the unhelpful Zairean vote in the Council we no longer feel any special commitment to assistance to Zaire.

Relations with Latin America

G: (Brasilia
elno.255 to
CO)

7. HM Ambassador, Brasilia, reports that he and his American colleague (who is the personal nominee and a close friend of President Reagan) are agreed that Brazil sees a rôle for itself in helping to sort out the aftermath of the conflict and will wish to play it. He suggests that Brazil should be helped by us and the Americans so to do and that the time to move in this direction is now and that tactics should be concerted with the Americans during President Reagan's visit to London.

H: (Bogotá tel.
o.145 to FCO)

8. HM Ambassador, Bogotá, reports that he will present credentials today (8 June) and that it would be helpful if he could hand over the Prime Minister's reply to President Turbay's message when he sees the Foreign Minister.

I: (Caracas
elno.200 to
CO)

9. HM Ambassador, Caracas, has made recommendations about the tactics for accreditation of the new British Ambassador to Venezuela.

US Diplomatic Activity


J: (Washington
elno.2052 to
CO)

10. HM Chargé, Washington, reports that Enders of the State Department was proposing to show the Argentine Ambassador in Washington Haig's tentative proposals of 29 May in order to bring unrealistic Argentine expectations down to earth. HM Chargé strongly discouraged this and informed Enders that the most useful point he could get across to the Argentine Ambassador was that the only option open to them now, short of defeat, was a ceasefire negotiated between the two Commanders with a fixed timeframe for withdrawal.

Comment

11. Action is needed on the idea of a message from the Prime Minister to the President of Togo and on the Colombian President's message to the Prime Minister.

8 June 1982


R M Jackson
Emergency Unit