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11JUN82 0815Z – UKE Tokio a FCO. Voto de Japón en ONU.

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TELEGRAM NO 292 OF 11 JUNE
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TOKYO TELNO 285: FALKLAND ISLANDS: JAPANESE VOTE AT THE UN

1. I WAS SUMMONED TO THE MFA LAST NIGHT BY KATO, DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE EUROPEAN AFFAIRS BUREAU, TO RECEIVE THE JAPANESE RESPONSE TO SIR H CORTAZZI'S PROTEST TO SUNOBE REPORTED IN TOKYO TUR. KATO HIMSELF HAD BEEN AWAY IN VERSAILLES. OUR MEETING TOOK PLACE AFTER A HEATED DISCUSSION IN THE MFA NOT ONLY ABOUT THE FALL-OUT FROM THE JAPANESE VOTE AT THE UN ON THE PANAMANIAN/SPANISH RESOLUTION BUT ALSO ABOUT JAPAN'S POLICY VIS-A-VIS THE UK MORE GENERALLY.

2. KATO SOUGHT TO EXPLAIN THE DETAILED BACKGROUND TO THE HANDLING OF THIS ISSUE AT VERSAILLES ON THE NIGHT OF 4 JUNE AS WELL AS THE POLICY REASONS UNDERLINING JAPAN'S DECISION TO VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THE RESOLUTION.

TO VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THE RESOLUTION.

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3. ON THE BACKGROUND KATO'S MAIN POINTS WERE THAT

(A) ONCE THE DRAFT INCLUDED A REFERENCE TO THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 502 THE JAPANESE LIME HAD CONSISTENTLY BEEN TO VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THE RESOLUTION.

(B) THE JAPANESE UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT MR SAKURAUCHI, AFTER DISCUSSION WITH YOU, HAD UNDERTAKEN TO DISCUSS THE MATTER FURTHER WITH THE JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER BUT HAD IN NO WAY ENTERED INTO A COMMITMENT TO CHANGE THE JAPANESE VOTE TO AN ABSTENTION.

(C) THE JAPANESE DELEGATION IN VERSAILLES AT OFFICIAL LEVEL HAD BEEN AT FAULT FOR NOT INFORMING THE BRITISH DELEGATION THAT MR SUZUKI AND MR SAKURAUCHI HAD DECIDED, DESPITE YOUR REPRESENTATION, THAT THE JAPANESE VOTE SHOULD NOT BE CHANGED. KATO EXPRESSED HIS APOLOGIES FOR THIS.

4. ON SUBSTANCE KATO'S MAIN POINTS WERE THAT:

(A) THE FINAL DRAFT OF THE RESOLUTION, CALLING FOR A CEASE-FIRE AND SIMULTANEOUSLY FOR THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTIONS 502 AND 505 WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE JAPANESE POSITION OVER THE FALKLANDS ISSUED.

(B) JAPAN THOUGHT IT RIGHT THAT THERE SHOULD BE THIS FINAL APPEAL FOR A CEASE-FIRE AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES BEFORE THE BATTLE FOR PORT STANLEY, IN ORDER TO SAVE LIVES. THIS AND THE PREVIOUS POINT HAD BEEN MADE CLEAR IN AMBASSADOR NISHIBORI'S EXPLANATION OF THE JAPANESE VOTE AT THE UN.

(C) THE JAPANESE WERE FULLY INFORMED OF THE BRITISH POSITION ON THIS RESOLUTION AND THEY UNDERSTOOD THE POSITION AND THINKING OF THE UK GOVERNMENT. BUT TAKEN LITERALLY, IE SEPARATELY FROM ITS BACKGROUND, JAPAN HAD NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THE RESOLUTION.

(D) JAPAN WELL UNDERSTOOD THE PRESENT MOOD OF THE

(D) JAPAN WELL UNDERSTOOD THE PRESENT MOOD OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND OF THE BRITISH PUBLIC. BUT JAPAN VOTED IN FAVOUR OF WHAT IT JUDGED TO BE IN THE LONG TERM INTERESTS OF THE FREE WORLD AND WAS STILL OF THE VIEW THAT ITS ACTIONS WOULD BE UNDERSTOOD BY THE UK SIDE BEFORE LONG.

5. REFERRING TO THE JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO PERU AND BRAZIL NEXT WEEK KATO SAID THAT THE FALKLAND ISSUE WOULD INEVITABLY COME UP. HE THOUGHT THAT MR SUZUKI WOULD SAY THAT THE ARGENTINE USE OF FORCE, WHICH WAS THE CAUSE OF THE CRISIS, WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND NOT COMPATIBLE WITH JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY AND JAPAN THEREFORE CALLED AGAIN ON ARGENTINA TO WITHDRAW FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.

6. FINALLY KATO SAID THAT HE KNEW THAT FEELING AGAINST JAPAN OVER THE UN RESOLUTION VOTE WAS STRONG. HE EARNESTLY HOPED HOWEVER THAT IN THE LONGER TERM INTERESTS OF ANGLO-JAPANESE RELATIONS THERE WOULD BE "NO RETALIATORY ACTION BY THE UK AS A RESULT OF THIS INCIDENT".

7. I REPLIED THAT IT WAS USEFUL TO HAVE THIS DETAILED EXPLANATION BUT

(A) KATO HAD REFERRED ON MORE THAN ONE OCCASION TO THE POINT THAT "TAKEN LITERALLY" THE RESOLUTION WAS ONE WHICH JAPAN COULD NOT VOTE AGAINST. BUT IF ONE LOOKED AT ITS PARENTAGE ONE WAS BOUND TO DRAW THE CONCLUSION THAT THE INCLUSION OF REFERENCES TO SCR 502 AND 505 WAS A CYNICAL LAST MINUTE AMENDMENT DESIGNED SOLELY TO ATTRACT VOTES FROM COUNTRIES SUCH AS JAPAN AND ZAIRE.

(B) SINCE JAPAN MUST HAVE LOOKED AT THE BACKGROUND TO THE RESOLUTION AS WELL AS AT ITS WORDING MY ASSUMPTION HAD TO BE THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT HAD EVIDENCE TO SUGGEST THAT ARGENTINA WAS PREPARED TO MOVE TOWARDS EARLY FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 502. WAS THIS SO? AND IF SO, WHAT DID THE EVIDENCE AMOUNT TO?

(C) KATO HAD ALSO REFERRED TO THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

(C) KATO HAD ALSO REFERRED TO THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT DINNER. SINCE THERE HAD BEEN AN EXTENDED DISCUSSION OF THE FALKLAND ISSUE ON THAT OCCASION AND SINCE THE JAPANESE AS WELL AS MRS THATCHER APPEARED TO TAKE THE VIEW THAT IT HAD BEEN A HELPFUL DISCUSSION IT WAS REASONABLE TO ASSUME THAT NO GOVERNMENT THERE REPRESENTED WOULD WITHIN THE SPACE OF 2 OR 3 HOURS BE VOTING IN THE COMPANY OF THE SOVIET UNION IN A WAY WHICH WAS CLEARLY INIMICABLE TO BRITISH INTERESTS AND PARTICULARLY IN A WAY WHICH MEANT THAT THE UK WOULD HAVE TO CAST A VETO.

(D) KATO HAD REFERRED TO JAPAN'S VOTE IN FAVOUR AS BEING IN THE LONG TERM INTERESTS OF THE FREE WORLD. FRANKLY I DID NOT UNDERSTAND THIS AND PERHAPS HE WOULD LIKE TO EXPLAIN WHAT HE MEANT.

(E) SPEAKING PERSONALLY, I THOUGHT WE WOULD ENDORSE THE WISH THAT DIFFERENCES OVER THIS ISSUE SHOULD NOT BE EXACERBATED IN A WAY WHICH WOULD LEAD TO A SERIOUS DETERIORATION IN ANGLO-JAPANESE RELATIONS. BUT IN RECENT WEEKS THERE HAD BEEN ALTOGETHER TOO MANY OCCASIONS ON WHICH THE SMALL PRINT OR THE LITERAL WORDING HAD RESULTED IN JAPANESE ACTIONS WHICH WERE EITHER ONLY MINIMALLY IN SUPPORT OF OUR POSITION OR WERE PLAIN UNHELPFUL. THE CONSEQUENCE OF THESE ACTIONS INEVITABLY LED US TO THE CONCLUSION THAT JAPAN HAD SHELTERED BEHIND EXCUSES FOR INACTION BECAUSE SHE LACKED THE POLITICAL WILL TO STAND WITH US ON AN ISSUE WHICH IN OUR VIEW WAS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE AND REMARKABLY CLEAR-CUT. FOR THOSE WHO WISHED TO POINT TO JAPAN'S GOODWILL THERE WAS REMARKABLY LITTLE EVIDENCE TO SHOW ON THE FALKLANDS ISSUE. MY HOPE WAS THAT THE INGENUITY OF THE JAPANESE WOULD LEAD IN THE NEAR FUTURE TO ACTIONS WHICH COULD BE CLEARLY SHOWN TO BE POSITIVELY HELPFUL FROM THE BRITISH POINT OF VIEW.

8. KATO SAID THAT HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR THIS FORCEFUL AND CLEAR RESPONSE. HE WOULD BE DISCUSSING WITH HIS FOREIGN MINISTER(WHO RETURNS TO TOKYO BRIEFLY TODAY) WAYS IN WHICH JAPAN MIGHT TAKE A MORE HELPFUL LINE OVER THE FALKLANDS IN THE FUTURE.