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Se refiere a:

11JUN82 – FRUS. Transcripción. Reunión de Kirkpatrick con Listre.

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335. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State and the White House¹

New York, June 11, 1982, 2127Z

1633. Dept. for Deputy Secy. Stoessel, Asst. Secy. Enders, NSC for Director Clark, CIA for Casey. Subject: Amb. Kirkpatrick's Meeting with Argentine Acting Perm Rep Amb. Listre.

1. (C—Entire text)

2. At his request, Argentine Acting Perm Rep Amb. Listre met with Ambassadors Kirkpatrick and Sorzano. (FYI: Perm Rep Roca is in Buenos Aires recuperating from an illness. Amb. Listre indicated that for health reasons, Amb. Roca will not be returning to New York. Amb. Listre is here for 90 days but he intimated that he might stay through the GA. End FYI.)

3. Amb. Listre said that he was exceedingly pessimistic about the situation in the Falkland Islands. He was convinced that the British had decided to press on and were seeking a military victory or an unconditional Argentine surrender. He itemized the consequences of such an action, including enormous bloodshed, potential political upheaval in Argentina, possible realignment of Argentine foreign policy and prolongation of the war. He asked Amb. Kirkpatrick whether she saw any possible non-military solution to the conflict.

4. Amb. Kirkpatrick said that it was not very likely that the British would stop before taking Port Stanley. If there was any possibility, and it had to be regarded as a very remote possibility, it would be for Argentina to make very clear: a) that it wanted peace; b) that it was willing to withdraw its troops; c) that it was willing to take the initiative in withdrawing its troops; and d) that it would be willing to accept an international (not necessarily UN) administration of the Island. In her opinion, however, Argentina should have taken previous British offers and it was now too late for hoping for a non-military solution to the conflict. Amb. Listre said that he agreed with Amb. Kirkpatrick that this was the only remaining alternative. He also concurred with her assessment that it was not likely to have the expected outcome but that he would, nevertheless, transmit it to Buenos Aires.

Kirkpatrick

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Latin America/Central, [Argentina-Falkland Islands] (05/02/1982-06/14/1982). Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Buenos Aires and London. In the upper right-hand corner of the telegram, Poindexter wrote: "Judge—P." Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.