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Se refiere a:

13MAY82 1100Z – FCO a UKMIS. Situación crítica de las negociaciones.

(PREM 19/627) (desclasificado DIC 2012)

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ZZ UKMIS NEW YORK

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ZZ WASHINGTON

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 131100Z MAY 82
TO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 396 OF 13 MAY
AND REPEATED FLASH TO WASHINGTON
YOUR TELEGRAMS 731-3: FALKLANDS

1. I REALISE THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE REACHED A VERY DIFFICULT POSITION. ALL HERE ARE AGREED THAT OUR IMMEDIATE PURPOSE SHOULD BE TO KEEP THE NEGOTIATIONS GOING, AT LEAST FOR SOME TIME YET. WHILE I UNDERSTAND THE VIEWS IN YOUR THIRD TELEGRAM, I SEE SCOPE FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION OF CERTAIN OF THE PROBLEMS WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL BEFORE MINISTERS ATTEMPT TO TAKE A DECISION ABOUT A PACKAGE COVERING ALL THE IMPORTANT OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS. IN PARTICULAR, PLEASE PURSUE THE FOLLOWING MATTERS.

(A) YOU SHOULD MAKE FULL PLAY WITH THE CONTINUED STATEMENTS BY COSTA MENDEZ THAT ARGENTINA INSISTS ON HAVING SOVEREIGNTY, IN ORDER TO PRESS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON WHETHER HE REALLY IS CONVINCED THAT THE JUNTA IS BACKING WHAT ROS IS SAYING IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS, IN PARTICULAR THE FORMULA ON NON-PRE-JUDGEMENT.

(B) YOU SHOULD SAY THAT THE RISK OF A VACUUM AFTER AN INTERIM PERIOD IS FOR US ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT MATTERS, AND THAT MORE CLARITY MUST BE ACHIEVED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. GIVEN THE BACKGROUND OF ARGENTINE INVASION, IT IS NO GOOD ASKING US TO RELY ON GOOD FAITH IN BUENOS AIRES. AS WELL AS PRESSING THE FORMULA IN ARTICLE 8 IN YOUR TELEGRAM NO 713, YOU MAY FLOAT THE POSSIBILITY THAT INTERIM ADMINISTRATION MIGHT CONTINUE UNTIL EITHER A DEFINITIVE AGREEMENT WAS IMPLEMENTED OR THE

SECURITY COUNCIL VOTED FOR ITS DISCONTINUATION, WHICHEVER WAS THE SOONER.

(C) IT IS CLEAR (PARA 2 OF WASHINGTON TELNO 1725) THAT THE US WOULD BE WILLING TO HELP IN VERIFYING WITHDRAWAL. HAS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL MADE ANY PROGRESS IN CONSIDERING US INVOLVEMENT, PERHAPS WITH OTHER STATES? (SEE PARA 4 OF SAME WASHINGTON TELEGRAM)

2. I REALISE THAT YOU ALSO NEED TO SAY SOMETHING ABOUT SOUTH GEORGIA AND ABOUT INTERIM ADMINISTRATION.

I CANNOT AUTHORISE YOU TO TAKE THE LINE IN PARA 6 OF YOUR THIRD TELEGRAM. BUT ON SOUTH

GEORGIA YOU MAY SAY THAT WE SHOULD BE WILLING TO REFER TITLE OVER SOUTH GEORGIA TO THE ICJ. DOES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THINK THAT THIS WOULD HELP?

3. ON INTERIM ADMINISTRATION, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE TWO COUNCILS, OR AT LEAST THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, SHOULD CONTINUE TO FUNCTION. IT SHOULD ALSO BE CLEAR THAT OFFICIALS EXPERT IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ISLANDS SHOULD BE ABLE TO RETURN. YOU MAY ASK THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WHETHER THE ADDITION OF ONE PERSON FROM AMONG THE ARGENTINES LIVING ON THE ISLANDS TO EACH OF THE TWO COUNCILS, ON THE NOMINATION OF THE UN ADMINISTRATOR, WOULD BE A HELP.

4. IF IT WOULD HELP YOU TO KEEP THE TALKS GOING, YOU HAVE DISCRETION TO RETURN TO OTHER MATTERS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, TAKING A LINE CONSISTENT WITH OUR PRESENT POSITION.

5. WE ARE TELEGRAPHING SEPARATELY ABOUT THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF THE DEPENDENCIES AND ABOUT THE FALKLAND ISLANDS COMPANY.

PYM