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293. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, May 25, 1982, 0153Z

142586. Subject: Falklands and Security Council: Further Guidance. Ref: A) USUN New York 1440,² B) USUN New York 1439,³ C) State 139097.⁴

1. S-Entire text.

2. In light of Security Council debate and prospect that resolution(s) unacceptable to US may soon be introduced (Ref A), the following amended guidance is provided for USUN.

3. Our objective remains to encourage all constructive efforts for a settlement while avoiding any UN action which would prejudice the UK's right to use force under Article 51 of the Charter or which would amount to a de facto imposition of change in the Islands' status prior to negotiations. We continue to wish to preserve the UN as an impartial intermediary in case it is needed in the future, and wish to avoid any unbalanced resolution that one side would reject.

4. We should continue in our talks with others to hold that Res 502 remains basis for a just solution and that we would oppose any action which superseded 502. Of resolutions likely to be advanced at this point we could accept only one which (A) limited itself to reaffirming 502 in a way not prejudicial to UK's right to recover Islands entirely and/or (B) gave SYG new mandate to continue his mediating efforts but without calling for cease-fire or a substantive prescription for a settlement that would prejudice British right to self-defense or impose other terms unacceptable to the UK. This means that we should discourage others from believing that we might find acceptable a cease-fire resolution made somewhat more positive by the inclusion of selected elements for a settlement already agreed upon but whose effect

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 05/25/1982. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Buenos Aires and London and for information to all UN Security Council capitals. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

² See Document 289.

³ Telegram 1439 from USUN, May 24, transmitted a summary of Kirkpatrick's May 23 meeting with a high-level Venezuelan delegation on the impact of the South Atlantic conflict on the inter-American system. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820269-0665)

⁴ In telegram 139097 to USUN, May 21, Haig conveyed guidance for the Mission to use in the event of a request for a meeting of the UN Security Council, an announcement by Pérez de Cuéllar of an impasse in his mediation effort, or a British landing. Haig suggested that as a "first effort," the United States "should discourage any further, formal action by the Council." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820266-0219)

would be to call for a halt in UK's legitimate exercise of self-defense and leave British in unsatisfactory position on the ground. British would veto such a resolution, and we would support them.

5. We also believe that the British at this stage will veto any resolution that would stand in the way of their complete recovery of the Falklands and restoration of a UK administration or at least traditional local administration. Since there is probably no substantive formula which could bridge the gap between the UK and Argentina at this stage, we want to discourage efforts to do this in a resolution. We do not wish to be placed in a position of having to vote on a reasonable sounding resolution that contains ostensible concessions to the British, but which the British will veto in any case.

6. As for possible resolution described in Ref A, para 11, it would fall into the category of resolution described in para 4 above which we would veto, assuming the British did.

7. We have just learned that Irish draft resolution calling for a temporary cease-fire and for SYG to contact parties to discuss extended cease-fire and possible UN observers has been tabled.⁵ In accordance with the above, U.S. should urge other members of the Council to oppose this draft. If, however, it obtains nine votes, and as we assume UK plans to veto it, we should also vote against.

Haig

⁵ In telegram 1454 from USUN, May 25, Kirkpatrick reported that the Irish resolution would be tabled the evening of May 25. "The Irish argue that it is like a wedge—it asks little of either party and builds confidence." Kirkpatrick continued that Parsons "has already informed us that the resolution is unacceptable to them. They will veto. A ceasefire is unacceptable in principle; unworkable in practice. Panamanian resolution is not acceptable. The Japanese version of a resolution is least acceptable to British because it provides nothing. Parsons did not comment to me concerning the 'Brazilian' approach which I think we should expect after Irish draft is rejected, but clearly they prefer no action at all. Vote is likely to come tomorrow afternoon on Irish draft. In considering US vote, I urge that we carefully consider our distinctive interests and hemispheric friends. And also, especially, that we look at UK record of support for US. On Nicaraguan complaint for example, of which we were target—we vetoed, they abstained, also Salvador, and on a whole series of Middle East votes." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Cable File, Falkland File 05/25/1982) For a summary of the Irish and Japanese resolutions, see *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1982, p. 1330.